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Kohnert, Dirk

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New Markets for Local Experts in Africa?

Dirk Kohnert (1)

Abstract:

In the past decades the involvement of local experts in the planning and evaluation of development programs has steadily increased. Ownership of development planning is propagated as major aim of bilateral and international development co-operation. Yet, the quality and performance of many local experts is still open to question, last but not least, because they share the same technocratic bias as quite a number of their Western counterparts, notably concerning pro-poor development policies, empowerment and ill-adapted technology transfer. An unreserved replacement of expatriates by local experts, or the substitution of technical assistance by unconditioned budget aid would be counter-productive with respect to poverty-oriented development policies.

Key-words: consultancy; aid; technical cooperation; capacity building; Africa; indigenous knowledge

JEL-code: F35; H52; H75; I21; D83; N37; N87; Z13

1. Roots of the fashionable call for local experts

In recent years the call for an increasing involvement of local experts in planning and evaluation of development projects has steadily increased (1). This applies to sub-Saharan Africa too, although it may be considered a special case: first, because of the considerable dependency of African states (most of them LLDCs) on development aid (high "aid ratio" compared with GNP or state budget), and second, because it is said that consulting and management qualifications are relatively low developed in Africa, compared with Asia or Latin America. Nevertheless there exist a growing pressure by African governments and NGOs vis-à-vis foreign donors to employ more local experts. This demand has increasingly been considered as justified, not just by churches or other NGOs, but even by major donor agencies of official development aid, out of the following reasons:

- All parties concerned share - at least rhetorically - the same basic aims and policies of development co-operation, i.e. self-reliance, guarantee of sustainability of development projects by the use of indigenous resources, the principle of subsidiarity of aid, and last not least the desire to learn from one-another; therefore, an equal or even predominant part concerning employment of local experts has been demanded.

- As a rule of thumb, on average half of the aid-money has been spent in the past for salaries of expatriate technical staff. Therefore the political pressure by both donors and recipient countries for a major stake of local experts in development projects can not be over-heard. For African governments and radical Western liberal economists alike, the best would even be to substitute "technical" by "financial" co-operation", i.e. to transfer finance directly to recipient governments or NGOs on which the latter could decide independently. International donor agencies are increasingly responsive to these demands, not just because of shared common aims (see above), but also because of "economies" of employing "cheap" local experts in view of stagnant financial resources and growing criticism of the ineffectiveness of development aid.

- Since at least two decades, local experts are increasingly recognized and used (by the international donor community) as "door openers" for their expatriate counterparts, because of their intimate knowledge of the socio-cultural and political setting of their home-country, and because of their personal affiliation to major decision makers in domestic governmental or implementing agencies. Therefore they are considered to be an indispensable part of any international planning- or evaluation team.

- The offer in (by international standards) qualified local development experts is growing, even in many least developed countries in Africa. However, as in these countries there does not yet exist an effective independent domestic demand for the services of local experts, the latter are 

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1) cf. Jaycox (1993); Braun (1993); Hampel (1993). By "local experts" we understand national experts who live and work in the country where they are meant to do their expertise. "international experts" (expatriates) by contrast are those experts, employed outside the borders of their homeland; i.e. Africans, too, may either be "local" or "international" experts, depending on their qualification and contract.
still to a great degree dependent on contracts of foreign donor agencies. Therefore, "locals" are trying to compete on the same terms with foreign international development experts.

- In addition local experts - as any other professionals in the world - are keen to reserve a greater part out of the "cake" of the consulting market in LLDCs (financed by the international donor community) for themselves.

- Local experts of African LDCs (e.g. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria) are gradually gaining bargaining power in doing consulting for foreign donor agencies, both at local and international level. This, however, is not just due to growing individual qualification, but it may be considered as well as the effect of corporate strategies of the concerned, i.e. of creating professional organisations and pressure groups and/or by advocating "closed shops", in delimitation against expatriates as well as against the so-called "pirates" in the business, i.e. unorganized local competitors, said to be unqualified by international standards or suspected to offer their services at dumping prices. Concerning this political or other lobbying the backing of their demands by African governments may be taken for granted, as the network of clientelism in African countries is for specific socio-cultural reasons even more effective than in Western countries.

2. On the socio-cultural setting of local experts

The social structure and the socio-cultural setting in most African developing countries has been dominated since colonial times by clientelism, patronage, the socio-economic system of the "command state" and prebend economy. Even the second wave of democratization, experienced since about three years in African countries, will not change this situation in the short run. There are indicators that even in model cases like in Benin Republic, corruption and nepotism among the new elected elite are on the contrary still increasing (cf. Engels et al 1994: 2 - 10). This may have strong repercussions on the work of local development experts. First, because local experts belong as a rule to the upper social strata of the society or the "intelligentsia", and they often share the same socio-cultural background as the new breed of the political class of "technocrats", dominating many of the new democratically elected governments, like in Benin, Senegal or Côte d'Ivoire. These experts are deeply rooted in this socio-cultural system, therefore they too must honour the demands of clientelism and the prebend economy, otherwise they are threatened by economic and social sanctions. These sanctions are related to the degree of disrespect of established "traditional" rules of solidarity vis à vis their own extended family, ethnical- or peer group; already the threat of sanctions, has to be considered as especially effective, because these threats apparently still exert by fare greater power in African countries than in most other developing countries, extending even into the realm of supernatural threats (e.g. magic and witchcraft; cf. Kohnert 1994). In view of such a considerable social and economic pressure the independence of judgement and action of local experts is supposed to be seriously affected and endangered in cases of conflict between their role as expert and their role within the clientele system in which they are embedded. Second, experts in general are supposed to
have a certain distortion of judgement or blinkers vis-à-vis the analysis of their own society; given the social background of local experts in African LDCs (see above), we have to pose the question, whether many of them are not exposed to even greater bias in relation to certain basic problems of development planning (e.g. recognition of problems of gender, of human rights or of the definition concept the "poor"). Local experts sometimes are less target-group and poverty oriented because they have to honour their obligations vis-à-vis political or administrative decision makers in their country. They may be even less accepted by the poor because the latter consider them to be part of the suppressive state structure. Even though expatriate experts more often than not do share the same status barriers in communication with the poor, and do have the disadvantage of not being able to talk to the target-groups without an interpreter, they often profit from the fact that they are not involved in local political, ethnic or religious antagonisms, as may be the case, e.g. of a Yoruba consultant doing interviews on sensitive issues with Hausa peasants in the North of Nigeria. Third, according to own experience in West Africa, local experts in African LLDCs are especially liable to back outdated development theories, like theories of modernisation, relying principally on the transfer of technology. This point is made not at all to assert that the undue reliance on concepts of technology transfer has been already eradicated within the circles of the international expert community. But professional blindness, e.g. vis-à-vis indigenous innovations by African peasants and peasant experimentation, is especially difficult to overcome in the presence of vested interests in accelerated growth according to the lines of western development, this holds even more, if experts should be interested not just in the transfer of technology, but also in the transfer of equipment, inputs, and finance, incorporated in this technology and benefiting more or less directly the upper class to which they belong (cf. Kohnert/Weber 1991). We have to stress once and again, all this has nothing to do with the lack of academic or intellectual qualification, therefore the biases mentioned above are (if at all) difficult to eliminate by training-programs for the promotion of local experts.

3. On the self-esteem of local experts

Quite a lot of local experts in Africa are nowadays - according to their own opinion - as qualified and independent as their expatriate colleagues. However, there still exist formal and informal market barriers, which prevent fair and equal competition on the international market. These barriers have to be removed by the international donor community. In addition more stress should be put on "professionalism"; notably the so-called "pirates" should be thrown out of business by giving contracts only to experts honouring professional codes of conduct and/or belonging to corporate professional organisations. Compared with their international competitors, local experts, according to their own point of view, dispose of special advantages, especially their familiarity with local languages, the socio-cultural setting, and indigenous innovations; in addition they consider themselves more accepted by implementing agencies as well as by target groups (cf. the "S.W.E.T." - Model by Mbagathi 1993).
African experts see their major disadvantage, compared with their Western colleagues, in the lack of equipment, capital, and of international experience, insufficient training and insufficient access to donors. The assertion of special ideological or other biases on the part of local consultants is countered by the argument that the donors are the one who draft the terms of reference of contracts, and that local experts do just what they are asked to do; i.e. the blame, if accepted at all, is put back on the donors in a rather technocratic interpretation of their work which seems to be even more widespread among African than among Western experts.

4. Past experience with local experts

4.1 The view of foreign donors and expatriate counterparts

Rhetorically both donors and expatriates alike propagate the view that local experts should be treated on an equal footing with their foreign counterparts. In practice, however, local counterparts are still today most often used in Africa as "door opener" or as "junior brother", i.e. assistant, and they are treated and paid accordingly. Mainly two reasons are given for this. First, experience showed in the past that the service of local experts was not very reliable. Often - it is said - they did not honour the terms of reference of their contract, did not deliver the report in time (or not at all), and even if they delivered, the quality of the report and analysis was rather low. Although these assertions are certainly exaggerated in the interest of fencing the market, there may be a grain of truth in it. To begin with, local experts themselves readily admit that there still is a great need of training and further qualification in almost all African countries. But they maintain as well that local experts are generally badly paid, and even in case they should receive a good salary, they would have to give part of it to their "patrons", and/or they have to honour the demands of their extended family. As they are therefore always obliged to look for secondary sources of income, they are mostly short of time; in addition they may held the view that it is only fair, if they work according to pay, i.e. low quality for low payment, both measured by international standards. The low payment, and here we come to our second point, is at least partly explained by donor agencies with the situation on the domestic labour market in African LDCs, were they are advised by governments and national NGOs alike not to pay too high salaries in order to prevent distortions of the local salary structure.

4.2 The view of implementing (partner) organisations

The view of the implementing agencies corresponds to a great deal to the view of the local experts, with one or two important distinctions. Local governments and NGOs do want donors to pay more for "institution building" and "human capital development" in general, i.e. for training of staff on all levels in order to reduce dependency on external expertise, whether local or foreign. In addition
national partners of bilateral official aid urge international donors to replace technical cooperation by
direct transfer of aid money in order to be able to employ their own national consultants, if it should
proof to be necessary. And finally most partners overseas (especially from the NGO sector) want
foreign donors to respect the national wage structure, and not to create an artificial demand which
siphons away the best qualified manpower and contributes to the already severe brain drain in Africa.

4.3 The view of target groups

Empirical studies on the perspective "from below", i.e. the view of the target-groups, of relative
advantages of employment of local or expatriate experts in development projects in Africa are still
scarce. However, available evidence points in the direction that expatriate volunteers and experts are
often seen as a positive anti-stereotype to national project staff (cf. Elwert-Kretschmer/Elwert 1991:
342 - 349). Out of bad experience with failed development projects in Africa over the past two or
three generations, target-groups are in general quite sceptical concerning innovations and
recommendations of both white or black experts. Therefore they are mainly interested in the transfer
of inputs and credit down to the grass-roots. In this respect the "white" expert as a rule is hold to be
the direct responsible to be addressed to, sometimes he is even considered to be a more impartial
broker of development aid than his "junior colleague", the local expert, who may be exposed to the
suspicion - on the part of the villagers - of siding with those representatives of the state or the political
class who are mainly interested in exploiting the peasantry.

5. The quest for a new division of labour between local and international experts

In view of the points made above, an unconditioned assistance of training and employment of local
counterparts - as suggested by Jaycox (1993) and others - would be counter-productive with respect to
target-group and poverty orientated development policies. Under the prevailing socio-cultural
conditions of clientelism, the command state and the prebend economy in Africa, such a policy would
even increase disallocation of project funds, it would probably spread corruption and nepotism and
thus promoting social differentiation rather than alleviating poverty; in short, such a policy would
neither be effective nor sustainable. The negative effects of such a policy would even multiply, if
donors would agree to recent demands of radical Western and African scientists (cf. Hampel 1993:19)
of replacing technical assistance by budget aid, to enable indigenous implementing agencies to
employ local experts in line with their proper aims and interests.

What would be required now instead, is an increased but conditioned technical cooperation which
would meet the requirements of the overall aims of poverty alleviation and self-reliance. For this
effect we recommend a new division of labour between local and international experts according to
the comparative advantages of both groups: Local experts should concentrate on consultancy for and in the interest of the target-groups and be trained, paid, and employed accordingly. International experts (including qualified Africans) should concentrate on technical and management consultancy for international donors and national implementing organisations (African governments and NGOs). In order to prevent a further consolidation of the "two tiers society of consultants" of the past, it should be looked at that local experts are not any longer misused just as "door openers" for their expatriate senior colleagues. The task of consulting target-groups is a very demanding task, both concerning professional qualification as moderator and facilitator and technical knowledge as well as concerning physical and psychological stress of working and living under depriving local conditions together with the poor. At present very few local, and probably even less foreign experts, do have these qualifications as well as the will to do this job. A great deal of training, and may be even a kind of "brain washing" would be necessary to create a pool of this new breed of target-group consultants. In order to find consultants really qualified, independent of their patronage network, and dedicated to this task, it has to be valued and paid accordingly, that is at least as much as that of international experts. However, the tricky problem of interference in the domestic salary structure remains still unsolved. In view of a target-group and poverty orientated development policy the relationship between local and international experts should be reversed: consultant-teams should be directed by target-group specialists responsible for the general orientation of the project or program, international experts should assist them concerning planning or evaluation of implementation of the program.

For the time being these propositions are still far from realization because of too much counteracting vested interests of nearly all parties involved. As international experts Africans have still to cope with informal barriers to access to decision makers of major international donors, and it would be unrealistic to expect radical changes in this respect in the near future. Therefore it will be difficult for them to compete with their Western colleagues in this realm of consultancy. However, concerning consulting target-groups there exist still an unexplored market in which local experts would dispose of considerable comparative advantages vis-à-vis expatriates, if they only could overcome the barriers of elite-thinking and of clientelism. Why not assisting them in taking advantage of this situation in promoting market differentiation and -development in the above indicated direction? Networks like ILEIA, financed by the Dutch government, the French Réseau Recherche-Développement, or the recent promotion of an African counterpart of a big rural regional integrated development project, assisted by German official development aid, as director of a German GTZ-team in a neighbouring African country are first encouraging examples in the right direction.

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