DEFAUT DE PAIEMENT, COMPORTEMENT DE SAUVE-QUI-PEUT ET TRAITEMENT DES CREANCIERS

Tarbalouti, Essaid (2013): DEFAUT DE PAIEMENT, COMPORTEMENT DE SAUVE-QUI-PEUT ET TRAITEMENT DES CREANCIERS.

Abstract

This article analyzes the economic effeciency of legal rules of bankruptcy. It aims to answer the following question : do the legal rules of bankruptcy allow an efficient solution to the problem of sauve-qui-peut or opportunistic behavior inherent in bankruptcy firm ? I adopt a model of games theory between two creditors. I define the condition of strategic behavior emergency and demonstrate who bears the cost. I analyze the impact of legal rules on the reduction of the strategic behavior. I demonstrate none of these rules of law is adequate to solve the problem of bankruptcy efficiently. I provide a new rule of contrat, and show how my analysis of the contrat infuence the strategic behavior.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: DEFAULT, BEHAVIOR OPPORTUNISTIC AND TREATMENT OF THE CREDITORS
• Language: French
• Keywords: legal rules, behavior opportunistic, Default, economic efficiency
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G33 - Bankruptcy ; Liquidation; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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