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Africa?**

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Mobile banking and mobile phone penetration: which is more pro-poor in Africa?

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Abstract

The contribution of this paper to complement theoretical and qualitative mobile penetration literature with empirical evidence is twofold: firstly, we assess the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration and; secondly, the instrumentality of financial development dynamics in this nexus. Main findings suggest an equalizing income-redistributive effect of ‘mobile phone penetration’ and ‘mobile banking’, with a higher income-equalizing effect in the latter than in the former. Poverty alleviation channels explaining this difference in inequality mitigating propensity are discussed. The empirical evidence is based on 52 African countries and deviates from mainstream country-specific and microeconomic survey-based approaches.

JEL Classification: E00; G20; L96; O17; O33

Keywords: Banking; Mobile Phones; Shadow Economy; Financial Development; Africa

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1. Introduction

Many lives have been improved by the mobile revolution that is providing beyond communication, basic financial access in the forms of phone-based money transfer and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Asongu, 2013ab, 2014a). The significant growth and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into pocket-banks in Africa is providing countries on the continent with increase affordable and cost-effective means of bringing on board a large part of the population that hitherto has been marginalized in formal financial services for decades. At the 2007 ‘Connect Africa’ summit, Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda characteristically emphasized: *“in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has become a basic necessity in Africa”* (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 208). An article in *The Economist* (2008) had earlier postulated: *“a device that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a potent for economic development in the world’s poorest countries”*. This paper seeks to examine how these sentiments and slogans are reflected on income-redistribution from ‘mobile phone penetration’ and ‘mobile banking’ perspectives. The assessment is of substantial appeal not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) but also to governments, financial regulators as well as development partners who are providing support to improve the livelihoods of Africans through poverty reduction and sustained economic growth.

Beyond the need to assess these sentiments and slogans, there is a growing body of work emphasizing the imperative of more scholarly research on the burgeoning phenomenon of mobile penetration². Little research attention is focused on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of mobile (m)-banking (payments) systems in the developing world (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012; Asongu, 2014a). Most studies on mobile

² *“Relative to the spread of some other technologies that have been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa-improved seeds, solar cook stoves and agricultural technology-mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate on the continent. Yet few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due to a variety of factors, including unreliable or nonexistent data on individual level adoption (leading to measurement error)...”* Aker & Mbiti (2010, 225).

penetration have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012), with the few existing empirical works hinging on country-specific and micro-level data mostly collected from surveys (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012; Asongu, 2014a). As far as we have reviewed (and to the best of our knowledge), one of the most exhaustive accounts in the ‘mobile penetration’ literature concludes: *“Existing empirical evidence on the effect of mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones for particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated into macroeconomic gains...”* (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 224).

The contribution of this paper to the literature is therefore threefold. Firstly, it complements theoretical and qualitative literature with empirical evidence on the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration. To the best of our knowledge, macroeconomic evidence on the poverty incidence of mobile penetration is missing in the literature (Asongu, 2013ab, 2014a). Secondly, the study integrates the instrumentality of financial development dynamics in the mobile-inequality nexus to assess what role mobile banking plays, in order to give policy makers the much needed guidance on the concerns of how mobile penetration and mobile banking distinctly affect income-equality. Thirdly, contrary to mainstream literature that is focused on country-specific analyses, this study covers 52 African countries. The choice of Africa as investigation platform draws from its growing inequality and stubbornly high poverty rates (Asongu, 2013a; Anyanwu, 2005, 2011, 2013). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical framework. Data and methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 3. Section 2 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.

2. Theoretical framework of the mobile-banking nexus

There are four main strands along which the incidence of mobile phone penetration on mobile banking could be discussed (Asongu 2013ab, 2014a). The first avenue captures the usefulness of mobile transactions (store of value, conversion of cash and, transfer of stored value). The concepts of savings (basic or partially integrated) in mobile banking are discussed in the second strand. The third strand links mobile banking to GSM phones whereas; the fourth presents some statistics on the proliferation of mobile telephony in Africa.

In the first strand, Jonathan & Camilo (2008) have emphasized that most mobile transactions³ in the developing world enable users to do three main things. (a) Store value (currency) in an account accessible with the help of a handset. When the user already has a bank account, linkage to a bank account generally becomes the matter. Should the user not have an account, then the process creates a bank account for him/her or creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or the user's mobile operator. (b) Conversion of cash into and out of the store value account. When the account is connected to a bank account, then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In many cases, users can also visit the GSM providers' retail stores. In most flexible services, a user can visit a corner kiosk or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she buys airtime) and transact with an independent retailer serving as an agent for the transaction system. (c) Transferring stored value between accounts. Users can generally transfer funds between accounts linked to two GSMs, by using a set of SMS messages (or menu commands) and PIN codes. The new services offer a means to move money

³ In order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer is suppose to own a cell phone SIM card with the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. Then the customer makes cash deposits at the physical offices of one of the operator's mobile money agents. These cash deposits create electronic money credit in the account. Customers can then make person-to-person transfers of mobile money credit to the accounts of other mobile money users in the same network. They can also use their mobile money credit to buy phone airtime and pay bills. Conversion to cash (withdrawals) could be made at the offices of the network's mobile money agents. There is also a possibility for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is not subscribed to the same network. In this case, when notice of the transfer is received via an SMS text message, the recipient can pick-up the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012).

from place to place and present an alternative to the payment system offered by remittance firms, banks, pawn shops...etc. The uptake of m-banking (payments) systems has been particularly significant in the Philippines (where three million customers use systems offered by mobile operators Smart & Globe; Neville, 2006); Kenya (where nearly two million users subscribed to Safaricom M-PESA system within a year of its nationwide rollout, Vaughan, 2007; Ivatury & Mas, 2008) and; South Africa where 450, 000 people use Wizzit ('the bank in your pocket'; Ivatury & Pickens, 2006) or one of two other national systems (Porteous, 2007).

The concept of savings is elucidated in the second strand. The mobile-finance nexus has been approached through this concept (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). Demombynes & Thegeya distinguish two types of mobile savings. (a) *Basic mobile* savings; which is merely the use of a standard mobile money system such as M-PESA to store funds. These basic mobile savings do not generate interest. Bank-integrated mobile savings views have received a substantial deal of attention as a way to provide banking services to the poor. They have the appealing role of offering access to basic banking services without requiring proximity to a physical bank branch. Therefore, with a bank-integrated mobile savings account, basic banking services can be accessed via a network of mobile phone agents, which in Kenya significantly outnumber the weight of bank branches (Mas & Radcliffe, 2011). (b) The term '*partially integrated*' mobile savings system is also used to describe situations where bank account access via mobile phones depends on the opening of a traditional account at a physical bank. More so, banks are beginning to build their own agent networks in a bid to assume a more competitive bargaining position in accessing mobile service platforms. Fully and partially integrated savings present different types of contracts among the mobile service provider and partnering bank. According to Demombynes & Thegeya (2012); on the one hand, a *partially integrated* product clearly delineates the role of the bank (which provides and owns banking services) from that of the mobile service provider (which provides mobile telephony infrastructure and

controls the agent network). Thus, the bank rewards the mobile service provider for access to the network and retains the remaining profits. This type of contract more closely resembles a debt contract between parties. On the other hand, a *fully integrated* solution may not draw the same distinction between bank and mobile service providers. In this case, the distribution of surplus is contingent on the relative bargaining power of the mobile service provider and the bank. This sort of contract more closely looks like an equity contract between two parties. Equity-oriented contracts are more likely to be complex and hence more difficult to negotiate than debt-like contracts. This ultimately presents a potential hurdle towards the goal of increasing access.

The third strand dissects with great acuteness the manner in which mobile banking is linked to GSM phones (Asongu, 2013a). Ondiege (2010), Chief Economist of the African Development Bank has confronted the mobile-finance nexus from four perspectives. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual bank card where institution and customer information can be securely stored, thereby mitigating the cost associated with distributing cards to customers. In fact Ondiege postulates, the subscriber identity module (or SIM) card within most (if not majority of) GSM phones is in itself a smartcard (the same as the virtual bank card). It follows that banks customer's PIN and account number can be stored on this SIM card to serve functions similar to those of the bank virtual card. Secondly, the mobile phone could play the role of a point of sale (POS) terminal. As such, a mobile phone could be used to communicate and transact with the appropriate financial institutions to solicit authorization for transactions. These are the same functions of a POS terminal at retail, mail or other stores. A mobile phone can duplicate these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, the mobile phone can also be used as an automatic teller machine (ATM). A POS is thus used to pay for goods and services at the store. If cash and access to savings were to be considered as 'goods and services', that customers buy and store, then the POS will also serve as a cash collection and

distribution point which basically is the function of an ATM. Fourthly, the GSM may be used as an Internet banking terminal. By implication, it offers two fundamental customer services: a) ability to remotely make payments and transfers and; b) instant access to any account. Hence, wireless connectivity and the mobile phone device bring the internet terminal into the hands of otherwise unbanked customers.

The fourth strand presents a clearer picture of the proliferation of mobile telephony with some statistics. The story of the growth of mobile phones in Africa is one of a tectonic and unexpected change in communications technology (Mbiti & Weil, 2011). From virtually unconnected in the 1990s, more than 60% of Africa now has mobile phone coverage and there are currently over ten times as many mobiles as landline phones in use (Aker & Mbiti, 2010). Aker & Mbiti have further stressed how African mobile phone coverage has progressed at a staggering rate over the past decade. In 1999, only 11% of the African population had mobile phone coverage, primarily in Southern (Kenya and South Africa) and Northern (Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) Africa. By 2008, 60% of the population (477 million) could get a signal and an area of 11.2 million square kilometers (equivalent to the United States and Argentina combined) had mobile phone coverage. It was projected that by the turn of 2012, most villages in Africa would have had coverage with only a handful of countries relatively unconnected. Kenya has undergone a remarkable information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. At the turn of the 1990s, less than 3% of Kenyan households owned a telephone and less than 1 in 1000 Kenyan adults had mobile phone service (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). However, by the turn of 2011, 93 percent of Kenyan households owned a mobile phone. The M-PESA mobile-banking network is largely credited for this soar.

In light of above points, it will be interesting to know if mobile phone penetration and mobile banking have had any substantial incidence on poverty and inequality in the continent. Clearly underlining the distinct role of mobile phone penetration from that of mobile-banking

in the mobile-inequality nexus could lead to substantial policy implications, especially with growing inequality and stubbornly high poverty rates despite more than two decades of financial reforms (Asongu, 2013a). From intuition, we should expect mobile banking to have a greater inequality mitigating effect than ‘mobile phone penetration’ because the former offers more services than the latter. In other words, a poor benefiting from mobile-banking inherently already benefits from traditional mobile phone activities. The paper also extends a new stream of macroeconomic literature on mobile phone penetration and financial sector competition: mobile phone penetration is more positively correlated with the informal financial sector (Asongu, 2013a), the positive role of institutions in the income-equalizing effect of mobile phone penetration (Asongu, 2013b), financial channels that are more pro-poor given the instrumentality of investment (Asongu, 2013c), the incidence of financial reforms on inequality through financial sector competition (Asongu, 2013d) and the nexuses among inequality, liberalization, knowledge economy and financial sector competition (Asongu, 2014bcde).

3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

We investigate a sample of 52 African countries with data from African Development Indicators (ADI), the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) and, the African Development Bank (AfDB). The ‘mobile phone penetration’ rate is obtained from the AfDB. This rate could also be used to proxy for mobile banking/activities (Ondiege, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010; Asongu, 2013a). Owing to constraints in the time series properties of the mobile penetration measurement, the data structure is cross-sectional and made-up of 2003-2009 average growth rates. Financial intermediary instrumental variables are obtained from the FDSD while, the dependent and control variables source from ADI. The measure for inequality is the GINI coefficient which accounts for disparity among values of the frequency income distribution. A value of zero means equality whereas; a coefficient of one denotes maximal

inequality. The GINI index has been used in recent Africa inequality literature (Batuo et al., 2010), as well as in many fields investigating inequality (sociology, economics, health science, agriculture...etc).

In the regressions, we shall control for the macroeconomic environment (*inflation*, *government expenditure*) and institutional quality (rule of law). The limitation to only three control variables is due to constraints in the overidentifying restrictions test for instrument validity. In essence, the presence of five instruments and four explaining variables leaves us with just one degree of freedom needed for the test⁴. The following discussion is relevant to expected signs of the control variables (with respect to inequality). We expect: high *inflation* to increase inequality (Albanesi, 2007) whereas, low *inflation* should curb it (Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004); the impact of *government expenditure* depends on efficient management of resources, especially if budget allocated for poverty reduction investments is not tainted with corrupt practices (Ndikumana & Balioune-Lutz, 2008) and; generally the respect for the *rule of law* should have a mitigating effect on inequality.

In this paragraph, we devote space to providing justification for the choice of instrumental financial development variables. This justification is essential for the relevance of the empirical analysis because a theoretical basis for the instruments is imperative for sound and consistent interpretation of estimated coefficients, in view of the research questions under consideration. We have already presented a case for the close link between ‘mobile phone penetration’ and mobile-banking in the theoretical section of this paper. The object of this study is not only to examine the incidence of mobile penetration on inequality. It also aims to assess the instrumentality of the financial sector in this nexus. With the financial intermediary development dynamics integrated into the equation, the incidence of ‘mobile phone

⁴ An OIR test is only employable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification (instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible.

penetration’ becomes that of ‘mobile banking’ because, the formal financial sector is instrumental in the effect of ‘mobile phone penetration’ on inequality. Borrowing from recent African mobile banking literature (Asongu, 2013a), we employ financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size . Hence, instruments include: financial depth (money supply and liquid liabilities), financial efficiency (financial system credit on financial system deposits), financial activity (private domestic credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions) and, financial size (deposit money bank assets on deposit money bank assets plus central bank assets).

Details about the variables’ sources, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations among key variables used in this study) are presented in the appendices. The summary statistics (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions shows that there is quite a level of variation in the data utilized such that one should be reasonably confident that sound estimated relationships should emerge. Definitions and corresponding sources of the variables are also reported in Appendix 1. The interest of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to manage issues cropping-up from overparametization and multicollinearity. Based on the correlation coefficients, there do not seem to be any serious issues with respect to the nexuses to be modeled.

3.2 Methodology

2.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)

Due to the cross-sectional structure of our data, we employ an empirical specification used in the inequality literature for this type of data structure (Andrés, 2006). The model to be estimated is as follows:

$$Inequality = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 Mobile + \sigma_2 Inflation + \sigma_3 Gov + \sigma_4 RL + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where, *Inequality* denotes the GINI coefficient, *Mobile* is the mobile phone penetration rate, *Inflation* is the inflation rate, *Gov* represents government expenditure, *RL* is the rule of law and, ε is the error term. Robustness checks of the analysis will be ensured with: (1) use of alternative specifications; (2) modeling with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (3) RAMSEY's Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) for validity of model specification. Since we are modeling with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the four basic concerns of this approach are also addressed. Whereas, autocorrelation in residuals and heteroscedasticity are addressed with HAC standard errors, the assumption of linearity is verified with RAMSEY's RESET. As we have already highlighted above, the correlation analysis in Appendix 2 has helped us to mitigate issues of multicollinearity and overparametization.

2.2.2 Instrumental Variables estimation

Given the research questions under consideration, OLS only provide a baseline of the mobile-inequality nexus within the context of mobile phone penetration. Corresponding estimates have to be compared with models that instrument the nexus with financial development dynamic indicators (the mobile banking context). To this effect, in accordance with recent inequality literature (Asongu, 2013a), the paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation technique. IV estimation addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and hence, avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by OLS when the exogenous variables are endogenous (correlated with the error term in the equation of interest).

The 2SLS estimation will entail the following steps:

First-stage regression:

$$Mobile = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1(Instruments) + \beta X + \nu \quad (1)$$

Second-stage regression:

$$Inequality = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1(Mobile) + \beta X + \mu \quad (2)$$

In the first and second equations, ν and μ respectively represent the error terms. Instrumental variables are: *money supply (M2), liquid liabilities (financial system deposits), financial efficiency, financial activity and financial size*. X representing control variables entail: *inflation, government expenditure and rule of law*. *Inequality* is the GINI coefficient.

We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the financial development instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the main explaining variable (Mobile channel) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. Further robustness checks are performed with alternative specifications and modeling with robust HAC standard errors.

4. Empirical analysis

4.1 Presentation of results

This empirical section addresses four main concerns: (1) the ability of ‘mobile phone penetration’ to explain income-inequality conditional on other covariates (control variables); (2) the possibility of non-linear combinations of the fitted values explaining inequality; (3) the ability of financial development dynamics to explain inequality beyond the mobile channel and; (4) the difference between the effects of ‘mobile phone penetration’ and ‘mobile banking’ in the inequality-mobile nexus. The first concern is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, the second depends on the results of RAMSEY’s RESET, the third is contingent on the outcome of the Sargan OIR test while, the fourth concern depends on a comparative analysis between OLS baseline estimates and their corresponding 2SLS values. The intuition behind the RESET is that, if non-linear combinations of the independent variables

have any power in explaining the response variable, then the model is misspecified. Therefore, the RESET is a general specification test for the linear regression estimation. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that, non-linear combinations of the fitted values have no explanatory power on inequality. Hence, failure to reject the null hypothesis confirms the validity of the linear model specification. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that financial instruments are valid in explaining inequality via no other mechanisms beside the mobile channel (conditional on the control variable). Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis implies the instruments suffer from endogeneity as they correlated with the error term in Eq. (2). The Hausman test precedes every IV estimation procedure. Its null hypothesis is the stance that OLS estimates are efficient and consistent. Hence, the rejection of the null hypothesis points to the inconsistency of OLS because of endogeneity and lends credit to the choice of the 2SLS estimation strategy as means of assessing the instrumentality of financial development in the inequality-mobile nexus.

Table 1 below reports regressions of inequality on the mobile phone penetration (mobile) channel. Whereas, the first half of the table reports OLS results, the second entails their corresponding 2SLS estimates. With respect to the first concern, mobile penetration has a positive income redistribution effect (equalizing income effect). On the second issue, all models validate the linearity assumption, implying they are rightly linearly specified since the null hypotheses of the RESET are not overwhelmingly rejected. For the third issue, the null hypothesis of Sargan OIR test is rejected for Model 3*; an indication of a negative ‘mobile banking’ inequality nexus. In other words, financial development dynamics are instrumental in the equalizing income effect of mobile phone penetration. To tackle the fourth concern, OLS estimates provide a baseline and we compare their estimates with those of 2SLS. The resulting conclusion is that, ‘mobile banking’ has a higher income equalizing effect than ‘mobile phone penetration’. This is because, in the absence of financial development dynamics (with OLS

specifications), the magnitude of the mobile-inequality nexus is lower. The significant control variables have the right signs. High inflation (above 117% in the mean from Appendix 1) fuels inequality, in accordance with Albanesi (2007). Institutional quality in the perspective of *rule of law* reduces income-inequality.

Table 1: Effect of mobile on inequality (with HAC standard errors)

	Dependent Variable: GINI Index					
	Mobile Phone Penetration			Mobile Banking		
	Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)			Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1*	Model 2*	Model 3*
Constant	75.527*** (0.000)	77.914*** (0.000)	79.845*** (0.000)	77.331*** (0.000)	78.884*** (0.000)	136.744*** (0.000)
Mobile	-21.569*** (0.002)	-24.001*** (0.002)	-26.160*** (0.002)	-23.403** (0.028)	-25.842** (0.023)	-79.336*** (0.000)
Inflation	0.443** (0.032)	0.647* (0.067)	0.696** (0.037)	0.534 (0.136)	0.626 (0.223)	1.734* (0.053)
Gov't Expenditure	---	0.016 (0.921)	0.043 (0.807)	---	0.374 (0.511)	0.970 (0.217)
Rule of Law	---	---	-1.876 (0.519)	---	---	-35.465** (0.024)
RAMSEY RESET	1.868 (0.174)	1.542 (0.245)	1.374 (0.285)	---	---	---
Hausman	---	---	---	0.316 (0.853)	1.0392 (0.791)	12.471** (0.014)
Sargan OIR	---	---	---	11.589*** (0.008)	6.113** (0.047)	0.006 (0.935)
Adjusted R ²	0.327	0.406	0.382	0.392	0.346	0.086
Fisher	7.027	5.746***	5.205***	3.904**	2.820*	6.753***
Observations	52	52	52	52	52	52
Instruments		Not Applicable		Constant; M2; Fdgdg; Perbof; dbacba; fcfd		

*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. P-values in brackets.

4.2 Discussion of results and policy implications

Before we dive into the discussion of results, it is worthwhile pointing-out that mobile phones represent long-term economic growth investments for the disadvantaged in income-distribution. It follows that many households maybe willing to cope with unpleasant sacrifices (such as reduction in food consumption or sanitation in the perceived short-term) in the hope that, the mobile phone would improve their opportunities with income and jobs in the long-term. The first strand will focus on the reasons mobile penetration has a positive income redistributive effect, while the second will elucidate why the income-equalizing magnitude of mobile-banking is higher in comparison to ‘mobile phone penetration’.

4.2.1 Why does mobile penetration mitigate income-inequality?

The equalizing incidence of mobile phone penetration could be explained from two main angles: the absorption of shocks which drive poverty and the empowering of women as well as the 'income-disadvantaged' to engage in business activities.

Firstly, mobile phones can assist household's budget when confronted with unpredictable shocks that fuel poverty. Consequently, the probability of a poor family incurring drastic losses due to an unpredictable shock is certainly mitigated and lowered when families are able to respond to the shocks timely. Therefore, the mobile phone could have the greatest effects on poverty mitigation during vulnerable shock experiences through down costs associated with the shock. More efficient financial management and coping with shocks include: incurring lower travel costs, more efficient action, less trauma and improved access to information. Immediate positive feedbacks of income saving and cost mitigation are found particularly during vulnerable circumstances like death or illness in the family. It is also interesting to cite security increases for poor families via reduced loss of poverty. For example a family's ability to scale-down the number of overnight hospital days or capacity to avoid transport cost during desperate situations are some principal cost-saving strategies implemented with the quick dial of the mobile phone. In a nutshell, the communication (mobile phone) device provides a means of timely response, reduced surprises, multi-task and plans during shocks, as well as less time to physically search individuals during difficult ordeals.

Secondly, the communication device could empower women to engage in small business activities, as well as the ability to run existing businesses more efficiently. Hence, enabling them to bridge the gap between gender income inequality. Also, the low-income strata faction of the population which previously had low political connections and were unprivileged to information indispensable for successfully doing business could more timely get to know

changes in market dynamics (price, demand, market conditions, new market rules...et) that are essential for smooth running of business.

4.2.2 Why is the inequality mitigation effect higher in mobile-banking?

We have discussed two mechanisms through which the mobile phone could reduce inequality and poverty. The propensity of these channels to mitigate inequality will increase if the mobile phone is adapted to mobile banking activities. On the first point, responding timely to poverty mitigating shocks is a good advantage; but responding to the shock with the possibility of receiving financial assistance is even better. This is because most shocks are associated with one form of financial liability or the other, which could be addressed with the help of mobile transfers (payments and receptions). In the same vein, the ability of the poorer gender or segment of the population to engage in business activities or run those already existing properly, depends to a great extent on mobile-banking. Business indispensably requires payment and reception of financial transactions which could be substantially eased if the business person, in addition to his/her ability to timely demand for commodities (through mobile phones) also has the ability to financial comply with the corresponding transactions (via mobile banking).

Ultimately, many lives have been transformed by the mobile revolution thanks to basic financial access in the form of phone-based money transfer and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). Hence, the significant growth and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is transforming cell phones into pocket-banks in Africa is providing countries in the continent with increase affordable and cost-effective means of bringing on board a great proportion of the population that has until now been excluded from formal financial services for decades. We cannot afford to recycle all the appealing effects of mobile banking because they have already been elaborately discussed in Section 2.

5. Conclusion

The object of this paper has been to complement theoretical and qualitative mobile penetration literature with empirical evidence in a dual manner: on the one hand, we have assessed the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration and; on the other hand, the instrumentality of financial development dynamics in this nexus. Main findings suggest an equalizing income-redistributive effect of ‘mobile phone penetration’ and ‘mobile banking’, with a higher income-equalizing effect in the latter than in the former. Poverty alleviation channels explaining this difference in inequality mitigating propensity have been discussed.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Summary statistics, definitions and sources

		Mean	S.D	Min	Max	Obser.
GINI Coefficient		43.100	7.702	29.760	65.770	52
Mobile Penetration : Seven year average growth rate (% of population)		1.674	0.217	1.043	2.242	52
Control Variables	Inflation (annual % of CPI)	117.95	764.60	1.953	5304.8	52
	Government Expenditure (% of GDP)	11.015	12.229	0.0549	65.461	52
	Rule of Law (Estimate)	-0.703	0.667	-2.419	0.950	52
	Financial Depth (M2)	0.339	0.242	0.079	1.022	52
	Liquid Liabilities (Fdgdg)	0.273	0.226	0.042	0.895	52
Instrumental Variables	Financial Efficiency (Fcfd)	0.712	0.382	0.259	2.458	52
	Private domestic credit (Pcrbof)	0.208	0.244	0.027	1.423	52
	Financial Size (Dbacba)	0.765	0.210	0.063	1.074	52

S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Ober: Observations. CPI: Consumer Price Index. M2: Money Supply. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Fdgdg: Financial system deposits. FcFd: Financial system credit on Financial system deposits. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from domestic banks and other financial institutions. Dbacba: Deposit money bank assets on 'Central bank assets plus Deposit money bank assets'.

Sources: Mobile penetration data is obtained from the African Development Bank. Control variables are gathered from African Development Indicators of the World Bank, while financial instrumental variables from the Financial Development and Structure Database of the World Bank.

Appendix 2: Correlation matrix

GINI Index	Mobile Penetration	Control variables			Financial dynamic Instrumental variables					
		Inflation	Gov't	RL	M2	Fdgdg	FcFd	Perbof	Dbacba	
1.000	-0.335	0.161	-0.003	0.115	0.170	0.216	-0.493	-0.089	0.077	GINI
	1.000	-0.031	0.174	-0.367	-0.496	-0.590	-0.243	-0.551	-0.352	Mobile
		1.000	0.147	-0.258	-0.092	-0.054	-0.194	-0.123	-0.160	Inflation
			1.000	0.014	-0.248	-0.206	-0.152	-0.141	0.233	Gov't
				1.000	0.665	0.727	0.226	0.567	0.479	RL
					1.000	0.974	0.042	0.577	0.281	M2
						1.000	0.169	0.695	0.360	Fdgdg
							1.000	0.772	0.372	FcFd
								1.000	0.382	Pcrbof
									1.000	Dbacba

Gov't: Government Expenditure. RL: Rule of Law. M2: Financial Depth. Fdgdg: Financial Liabilities. FcFd: Financial System Efficiency. Perbof: Financial System Activity. Dbacba: Financial Size.

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