Aryal, Gaurab and Stauber, Ronald (2014): A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players.

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Abstract
Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; Dynamic consistency 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81  Criteria for DecisionMaking under Risk and Uncertainty 
Item ID:  57336 
Depositing User:  gaurab aryal 
Date Deposited:  17 Jul 2014 07:48 
Last Modified:  10 Oct 2019 11:27 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/57336 