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A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players

Aryal, Gaurab and Stauber, Ronald (2014): A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players.

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Abstract

Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

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