Status and incentives: A critical survey

Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2014): Status and incentives: A critical survey.

Abstract

This paper aims to provide a survey on the studies on incentive, especially non-monetary incentive like status. We intend to summarize the different studies in a concise manner and comment on the divergent views on valuation for status, relation between monetary and status incentives, the technique of modeling status and on the cost of introducing status. We also underline the some probable adverse consequences associated with the use of status incentive. In this paper it also highlights the problem associated with asymmetric information in the labour market, specifically, the (post contractual) moral hazard problem.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Status, incentives, principal–agent problem
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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