Huric Larsen, Jesper Fredborg (2014): A note on the effect of consumer protection requirements on firm strategy.
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Abstract
The effect of consumer protection on firms’ strategy choices in a market with perfect competition is examined in a simple model. It is found that consumer protection may lead to reduced product quality and adverse effects on firm survival.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | A note on the effect of consumer protection requirements on firm strategy |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Strategy, consumer protection, firm incentives |
| Subjects: | B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B2 - History of Economic Thought since 1925 > B21 - Microeconomics L - Industrial Organization > L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services |
| Item ID: | 58585 |
| Depositing User: | Jesper Fredborg Huric Larsen |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Sep 2014 04:33 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2019 23:35 |
| References: | Besanko, D., Dranove, D., Shanley, M., Schaefer, S. (2010). Economics of strategy. John Wiley & Sons. Coleff, J. (2012). Can Consumer Complaints Reduce Product Reliability? Paper presented at JEI XXVII. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/58585 |
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