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Janda, Karel and Krska, Stepan

University of Economics, Prague, Charles University in Prague

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Benchmarking Methods in the Regulation of Electricity Distribution System Operators *

Karel Janda^{a,b} and Stepan Krska^a

^aCharles University, Prague

^bUniversity of Economics, Prague

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Abstract

This paper examines the regulation of distribution system operators (DSOs) focused the Czech electricity market. It presents an international benchmarking study based on data of 15 regional DSOs including two Czech operators. The study examines the application of yardstick methods using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Based on our results, we find that the cost efficiency of each of the Czech DSOs is different, which indicates a suitability of introduction of individual efficiency factors in the regulatory process.

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1 Introduction

The electricity distribution sector in the Czech Republic is dominated by three regional distribution system operators (DSOs). Their natural monopolistic structure creates a need for regulation. Czech Energy Regulation Office (ERU) is applying incentive based revenue cap regulation, which is designed to motivate the incumbents to improve efficiency of their operation. The problem is that the firms are treated equally, regardless of the structure of the network that they control. The regulator employs only the general X factors that implicitly assume the firms to be similar. The equal treatment of DSOs is, however, very simplistic and if there are differences in cost efficiency among the operators, the less efficient operators are not incentivised to converge to the more cost efficient operators.

Introduction of the individual efficiency factors is problematic due to only three firms dominating the market. The comprehensive analysis of the incumbents conducted to reveal their true cost efficiency is beyond the capabilities of the regulator and given the size of the companies even impossible to complete. ERU sought to introduce the individual efficiency factors, but abandoned the idea because of the shortage of data (ERU, 2009). The companies can be compared with their competitors or with comparable companies; however, as Pollitt (2005) notes, in reality it is difficult to find strictly compa-

rable firms. Another option is to model an efficient frontier of the comparable firms that serves as a yardstick (Kuosmanen et al., 2013). Given the Czech market structure, the option might be benchmarking of gas and electricity DSOs; however, there are significant differences between the sectors (storage, impact of the crisis, network specifics, etc.) and these may prove to be very difficult to control for. We believe that the suitable option, how to compute the efficiency of the incumbents, is to conduct a benchmarking analysis using the international dataset.

Our paper is based on articles published in the Energy Policy journal. We draw inspiration from works of Michael Pollitt and his colleagues. International benchmarking study was conducted by Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) who benchmarked 63 regional electricity distribution and transmission companies using the DEA, SFA and COLS methods. The authors stressed the potential of international benchmarking for regulators but they also mentioned the obstacles. We see the problematic part in inclusion of both DSOs and TSOs in the analysis because their operation is different. Haney and Pollitt (2009) conducted a survey of 40 energy regulators and found out that benchmarking techniques are widely used for the regulation of gas and electricity utilities. They further sought the determinants of best practice regulation (Haney and Pollitt, 2011) on the same sample of countries. The authors examined the benchmarking practice of TSOs; they mentioned that the benchmarking methods and frontier analyses substitute the complicated engineering models of regulated methods and they also stressed that the TSOs are more difficult to benchmark as they are more idiosyncratic and need to be benchmarked internationally (Haney and Pollitt, 2013, p. 277). This also confirms our

assumption that DSOs and TSOs should be benchmarked separately. Kuosmanen et al. (2013) focused on the best practice benchmarking of DSOs. They compared DEA, SFA and StoNED (for more details, refer to Kuosmanen et al., 2013) methods. StoNED methods are employed by Finnish regulator and combine advantages of DEA and SFA, however, they demand bigger datasets. Both Michael Pollitt and Timo Kuosmanen worked for national regulatory offices in England and Finland respectively, and they influenced the development of benchmarking for regulation in both countries.

As was mentioned above, a similar benchmarking study in the Czech Republic was not conducted yet. As far as we know, similar analysis was not conducted for other European countries that we examine either (namely Slovakia, Poland and Serbia). We follow papers that examined benchmarking methods in particular states. Farsi et al. (2005 and 2006) examined the panel of 59 Swiss distribution utilities using SFA estimated by generalised least squares, maximum likelihood and random effects models. Their analysis was facilitated by large dataset (around 380 observations) that significantly exceeds other studies. Agrell and Bogetoft (2011) supervised the final report on the use of benchmarking methods for the regulation of DSOs prepared for the Belgian regulator. They examined both gas and electricity DSOs and recommended DEA for the regulation. The general recommended variables were TOTEX (input), and number of connections, lines length and transformers (outputs).

The benchmarking studies are not only used in theoretical literature, but are widely used in the regulatory practice. According to Bogetoft and Otto (2011), there were nine European regulators that used benchmarking for the

regulation of electricity DSOs. According to Schweinsberg et al. (2011), regulators in 12 out of 27 EU members used methods of cost benchmarking in energy regulation.

Our study complements the already conducted studies and brings analysis of states that were outside of the field of interest of the researchers. We are, unfortunately, not allowed to disclose the computed efficiency scores for foreign operators due to the contractual obligations; however, the international dataset brings the efficiency comparison among the companies and allows us to determine the efficiency scores for the Czech DSOs.

In the following sections, the yardstick methods used to measure the performance of DSOs and collected data are described. We adopt the DEA and SFA methods for benchmarking while taking into account the scope of the data available. The methods widely applied to the regulation of electricity markets are described and compared in the second section without formalisation. The thorough formalisation of all methods and yardstick techniques (TFP, DEA, COLS, MOLS and SFA) would significantly exceed the recommended scope of the paper. This section encompasses description of the DEA and SFA methods and of the dataset. The purpose of the following sections is to outline the methodology and data used for a computation of the efficiency scores of DSOs.

2 Methodology

DSOs are traditionally subject to specific regulation. The regulators have been changing the rate of return schemes to incentive regulation since 1990s. The incentive regulation is usually complemented by yardstick methods to

better fit the regulated decision making units (hereafter DMUs) and to mitigate the information asymmetry. The terms DMU and firm are taken as interchangeable even though the firm may not be inappropriate for example in the case of benchmarking the public service companies, but in context of our study they are both relevant.

The most widely used techniques are the DEA methods combined with the stochastic frontier methods or methods based on the OLS regressions. In our study, the DEA models are preferred because of the limited scope of data while both the constant and variable return to scale DEA models are applied. In the literature, the DEA models are often complemented by a second stage OLS regression of efficiency parameters to control for other environmental characteristics that are typical of DSOs in the electricity sector. We checked the CRS DEA results and regressed coefficients on population density and the estimates confirmed the results of VRS DEA. Due to the size of dataset, we decided to apply both the CRS and VRS DEA specifications without second stage. The DEA models are supplemented with SFA, but we are aware of the limitations stemming from the size of the dataset.

2.1 Techniques

2.1.1 Data envelopment analysis

DEA is a non-parametric method that use piecewise linear programming to calculate the efficient surface (or frontier) over the data (Coelli et al., 2005). The efficient DMUs lying on the frontier envelop the less efficient firms. The efficiency of particular DMUs (firms) is calculated relative to the frontier on a $(0, 1)$ scale. The efficient DMU is scored one and the number indicates a

point on the frontier.

The DEA models can be both input and output oriented. The input-orientated DEA calculates how much the input quantities can be reduced without changing the output values. The output-orientated programmes how much the outputs can be expanded keeping the input quantities unchanged. The input-orientated DEA is generally appropriate for benchmarking of DSOs (e.g. Frontier Economics, 2012; Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003); moreover, the demand for distribution services is a derived demand, the incumbents cannot influence it and it has to be met because of the regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). The models can be specified for constant or variable returns to scale (CRS, VRS respectively).

Firstly, we define the CRS input-based model. We will follow notation made by Coelli et al. (2005). Assume the dataset of N firms containing data on K inputs and M outputs. They are represented by column vectors x_i and y_i respectively. The input matrix X ($K \times N$) and the output matrix Y ($M \times N$) represent the data for all firms.

For each firm, we would like to obtain the efficiency score that is the maximum ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs for each DMU, such as $u'y_i/v'x_i$ where u is a vector of output weights ($M \times 1$) and v is a vector of input weights ($K \times 1$). The efficiency score in a multiple input and output scenario is obtained by solving of the linear programming problem

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{u,v} \left(\frac{u'y_i}{v'x_i} \right) & (1) \\
& \text{s.t. } \frac{u'y_j}{v'x_j} \leq 1, \quad j = 1, \dots, N \\
& u, v \geq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

The linear programming is solved for each DMU while the efficiency score must be less or equal to one. The problem of above mentioned programming problem is that it has infinite number of solutions (Coelli et al., 2005). If (\tilde{u}, \tilde{v}) are the solutions, then for $a \in \mathbb{R}$, $(a\tilde{u}, a\tilde{v})$ are solutions as well; therefore, it is necessary to modify the model and impose a constraint of weighted inputs to equal one. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{u,v} \left(\frac{u'y_i}{v'x_i} \right) & (2) \\
& \text{s.t. } v'x_i = 1, \\
& \frac{u'y_j}{v'x_j} \leq 1, \quad j = 1, \dots, N \\
& u, v \geq 0.
\end{aligned}$$

Coelli et al. (2005) suggest equivalent form of the (2) linear programming problem that is also more convenient for our analysis. Using duality, it can be rewritten as a linear programming problem

$$\begin{aligned}
& \min_{\theta, \lambda} \theta && (3) \\
& \text{s.t. } -y_i + Y\lambda \geq 1 \\
& \theta x_i - X\lambda \geq 0 \\
& \lambda \geq 0,
\end{aligned}$$

where θ is a scalar (equal to efficient score) and λ represents a $N \times 1$ vector of constants. The problem (3) satisfies the assumption of efficiency score to be between zero and one while the DMU with $\theta = 1$ is technically efficient. To obtain the efficient score for each DMU, the linear programming problem must be solved N times. In the model (3), the DMU i is compared to linear combination of other firms in the sample. It is obvious from the second condition that the output vector x_i is minimised while still remaining in the feasible set of inputs that is bounded by the piece-wise linear isoquant determined by the firms included in the sample. The input vector x_i is radially contracted on the isoquant (frontier) to the point $(X\lambda, Y\lambda)$. This point is a linear combination of the observed data points and given the constraints in the model (3), it is inside the feasible set.

The radial contraction of the input vector is invariant in units so the efficiency score is not influenced by change of measurement units. Since we assume only one cost input variable in our model, there can be identified missing outputs after the proportional reduction in input. These exist only for inefficient firms and represent only the leftover portion of inefficiencies after the radial contraction and the slacks are necessary to move to firm to

the efficient frontier (Ozcan, 2008).

The problem of CRS DEA is that implicitly assumes that the firms are operating on the optimal scale. This assumption is violated in case of imperfect competition, regulations and other factors that restrict the firms to operate at optimal scale (Coelli et al., 2005). To get VRS DEA, the model (3) is modified by adding a convexity constraint $\sum \lambda = 1$. If the CRS specification is applied to DMUs that are not operating on efficient scale, the technical efficiency is influenced by scale efficiencies. VRS DEA calculates technical efficiency less the scale efficiencies and the firms are compared against other DMUs with similar size. The VRS DEA model is defined

$$\begin{aligned}
 \min_{\theta, \lambda} \theta & & (4) \\
 \text{s.t. } -y_i + Y\lambda & \geq 1 \\
 \theta x_i - X\lambda & \geq 0 \\
 N1'\lambda & = 1 \\
 \lambda & \geq 0,
 \end{aligned}$$

where the $N1$ is a $N \times 1$ vector of ones.

To find out the nature of the returns to scale, Coelli et al. (2005) recommends non-increasing returns to scale specification (NIRS) where the restriction $N1'\lambda = 1$ from (4) is replaced by restriction $N1'\lambda \leq 1$. If the efficiency scores from VRS and NIRS differ, the increasing returns to scale exist for the particular firm. The NIRS restriction ensures that the firm is benchmarked against firms of similar size and not substantially larger.

Using VRS DEA, the overall effect can be decomposed to technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Important advantage of DEA is that it does not suffer from problems with multicollinearity, because it is based on linear programming (Andor and Hesse, 2011; Went, 2007). Jensen (2005) showed that multicollinearity has little impact even on the results of SFA.

There are several rules of setting the minimal amount of DMUs for DEA to have good discriminatory power. The general rule of thumb is that the minimum number of DMUs should be at least twice the sum of inputs and outputs. Some authors recommend more prudent approaches - twice the multiple of inputs and outputs, three times the number of inputs and outputs and so forth (for more details, refer to Sarkis, 2007; or Cullinane and Wang, 2006).

2.1.2 Stochastic frontier analysis

In the previous section, we considered the non-parametric DEA to obtain efficiency measures. In this section, parametric estimation using SFA is considered. The development of the SFA models is soundly described in the literature (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Greene, 2007). The main advantage of SFA compared to DEA is that it allows for statistical and functional form testing and separates noise and inefficiency. SFA requires specification of production (or cost) function requiring assumptions about production technologies of DMUs.

As well as the ordinary least squares methods, SFA requires specification of the production function and shares many properties with regression techniques, but it uses more sophisticated estimation of the production frontier.

We will consider costs as dependent variable in model similarly to DEA. The treatment of outputs and inputs will be therefore analogous.

DEA attributes the difference between the particular DMU and efficient firm to inefficiency. The estimation of deterministic production frontier could be conducted by methods based on OLS, but any deviation from deterministic efficient frontier is again assigned to inefficiency; however, the deviations might not be under control of the management and could be caused for example by measurement error or other source of statistical noise (Coelli et al., 2005). The stochastic frontier production function model was developed to overcome these problems.

There are several different expressions of the technology of the industry. The Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications are most frequently used in empirical applications. The Cobb-Douglas form is more restrictive in assumptions but usually preferred over translog specification for benchmarking of DSOs with smaller samples. SFA is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation techniques.

We start with a model for cross-sectional data and follow notational system from Coelli et al. (2005). The stochastic production function model was simultaneously proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van Den Broeck (1977) in form

$$\ln q_i = x_i' \beta + v_i - u_i, \quad (5)$$

where q_i is dependent variable of i -th firm (input in case of cost frontier); x_i is a $K \times 1$ vector of logarithms of explanatory variables (outputs in case of cost frontier); β is a vector of unknown parameters; v_i is a symmetric random

error accounting for statistical noise; and u_i is non-negative random variable associated with inefficiency. The statistical noise is caused by measurement error, omission of relevant variables and it can arise from approximation of errors related to the functional form of the production (or cost) function. The model is bounded from above by stochastic variable $\exp(x'_i\beta + v_i)$ that gives the model its name.

Let us further assume production function. The SFA frontier can be illustrated graphically. Taking the Cobb-Douglas stochastic frontier (5) of the production function with single dependent (output) and single explanatory (input) variables, we have

$$\ln q_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_i + v_i - u_i. \quad (6)$$

If we rearrange the equation (6), we get

$$q_i = \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_i) \times \exp(v_i) \times \exp(-u_i), \quad (7)$$

where $\exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_i)$ is deterministic component; $\exp(v_i)$ represents noise; and $\exp(-u_i)$ is inefficiency term. Assume the deterministic frontier to reflect the decreasing returns to scale. Further assume two firms, firm A and firm B. Firm A produces output q_A using input x_A , firm B uses x_B to produce q_B . If the both firms are effective, i.e. there are no inefficiency effects ($u_A = 0 \wedge u_B = 0$), the production functions are

$$q_A^* \equiv \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_A + v_A) \wedge q_B^* \equiv \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_B + v_B). \quad (8)$$

Further assume the noise effect for firm A to be positive ($v_A > 0$) and for firm B to be negative ($v_B < 0$), and deterministic frontier $q_i = \exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln x_i)$.

The position of the firm with respect to the deterministic frontier depends on the magnitudes of noise and inefficiency effects.

Most of the frontier analyses are aimed at prediction of inefficiencies. The technical efficiency is defined as ratio of observed output to the SFA output

$$TE_i = \frac{q_i}{\exp(x_i' \beta)} = \exp(-u_i). \quad (9)$$

The value of technical efficiency is between zero and one and it represents the ratio of the company's output to the output that could be produced by fully efficient firm using the same vector of inputs. A drawback of SFA is that even if there are no statistical errors, some may be wrongly regarded as noise (Jamasp and Pollitt, 2003).

The estimation of the SFA parameters is more complicated due to two random terms included in the right hand side of the equation (5); therefore, some assumption concerning these terms should be made. Assume v_i are random variables that are assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d), $v_i \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$ and independent of u_i ; u_i are non-negative random variables assumed to be i.i.d, $u_i \sim |N(0, \sigma_u^2)|$ (Coelli, 1996b). Aigner et al. (1977) obtained maximum likelihood estimators under these assumptions and parameterised the log-likelihood function for half-normal model. Assume $\sigma^2 = \sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2$ and $\lambda^2 = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{\sigma_v^2}$ for $\sigma_v^2 \geq 0$. There are no inefficiency effects if $\lambda^2 = 0$ and the deviations from frontier are due to statistical noise. For details of this parameterisation, refer to Coelli et al. (2005).

The u_i is homoscedastic with constant mean and uncorrelated; the v_i is homoscedastic, with zero mean and uncorrelated (similar properties to the noise of the classical linear regression model). The OLS model cannot be used for estimation, because the intercept is biased downwards. Coelli et al. (2005) suggest the use of maximum likelihood method for better asymptotic properties in comparison with adjusted OLS models (e.g. COLS, MOLS).

The general model (5) from Aigner et al. (1977) can be extended to panel data. The model is expressed as (Battese and Coelli, 1992)

$$\ln q_{i,t} = x'_{i,t}\beta + v_{i,t} - u_{i,t}, \quad (10)$$

where time factor t is added. Statistical noise is assumed to be i.i.d, $v_i \sim N(0, \sigma_v^2)$ and independent of inefficiency term. The inefficiency term may vary over time

$$u_{i,t} = u_i \exp[-\eta(t - T)], \quad (11)$$

where u_i are random non-negative variables assumed to be i.i.d. as truncations at zero of $N(\mu, \sigma_u^2)$ distribution; η parameter to be estimated; and the panel dataset does not have to be balanced.

Using parameterisation of Battese and Corra (1977), we introduce $\gamma := \sigma_u^2 / (\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2)$ that represents the share of technical efficiency in error term. If $\gamma = 0$, all deviations from the frontier are attributed to statistical noise; on the other hand if $\gamma = 1$, all deviations are caused by inefficiency. For more details, refer to Battese and Corra (1977), Battese and Coelli (1992), Coelli (1996a), Coelli (1996b) and Coelli et al. (2005).

Since a cost function is considered in our study (dependent variable is

total expenditures), the equation (10) is adjusted (Coelli, 1996b)

$$\ln q_{i,t} = x'_{i,t}\beta + v_{i,t} + u_{i,t}, \quad (12)$$

all other factors keeping the same. In case the cost function in equation (12) is considered, the $u_{i,t}$ term defines the cost inefficiency of the firm, i.e. the distance of the firm from the cost frontier. Some authors recommend translog form for cost function specification (e.g. Coelli et al., 2005; Agrell and Bogetoft, 2011). We considered the option, but due to the limited dataset and loss of degrees of freedom, we applied log-linear functional form. In case of larger dataset, we would test both options and compare results.

2.2 Data description

Our benchmarking study is based on data of the electricity DSOs. We focus on the unbundled regional DSOs with more than 100,000 customers. The inclusion of smaller DSOs would increase the size of the dataset, but the differences would have significant impact on the computed efficiency scores. We complemented the Czech DSOs with companies from other European countries.

The collection of data was complicated due to their confidentiality. There were problems with provision of both financial (cost data) and technical data. We contacted national regulatory authorities and communicated with the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators and the Council of European Energy Regulators, but we were only referred to annual reports and to particular firms. Due to the confidentiality, we could not have been allegedly provided with the data; therefore, we directly contacted particular compa-

nies. The financial statements are publicly accessible in the Czech Republic, but it is very uncommon in the international comparison. Sometimes consolidated data for particular energy groups are available, but they do not include detailed data. During the data collection, we had to sign several contracts and declarations on oath and we had to pledge to anonymise the data. Thus we cannot mention companies' names and we can only state descriptive statistics of the dataset.

We obtained data of 15 DSOs from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Serbia. The data are from financial statements, annual reports, reports to the regulatory authorities, websites and mostly supplemented by data provided directly by the companies. All companies are unbundled and operating on the regional basis. We sought data from the Austrian DSOs and contacted all 11 DSOs distributing energy to more than 100,000 customers, but none of them provided us demanded data.

The only data we were able to obtain directly without help were the data of Czech DSOs. There are three regional DSOs in the Czech Republic, but we can use only two of them for our study, because the company E.ON Distribuce, a.s. did not provide us with financial data that would be usable for our analysis. The published financial statements are consolidated for distribution of both gas and electricity and it was not possible to obtain the separated cost data; therefore, only ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. and PREdistribuce, a.s. are included. We obtained the data from annual reports, distribution quality reports and websites. The data and documents are available online at websites of the companies.

Selection of inputs and outputs is based on theoretical literature (e.g.

Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; Haney and Pollitt, 2009; Kuosmanen et al., 2013; Shuttleworth, 2005) and practical application (e.g. EY, 2013; Frontier Economics, 2010; Frontier Economics, 2012; Schweinsberg et al., 2011).

The data are analysed using two methods, therefore, they are adjusted accordingly. For DEA, cross-sectional data for 2012 are used. We sought most up to date data and endeavour to obtain complete dataset of 2012. Data of some firms we were able to obtain from 2010 to 2012 and the panel is used for SFA. The balanced panel is not necessary for SFA and we utilise this characteristic.

The inputs (costs) are represented in monetary values. They are adjusted for inflation using annual growth rate and denominated in euro with 2012 as a base year. The exchange rates were used as at the end of individual years, because the costs were taken mostly from financial statements that consider exchange rate at the year end.

The summary statistics over the data are depicted in Table 1. The data are rounded to comply with the rules of DSOs and to guarantee anonymisation. To anonymise the data, values for minimum, maximum and median are rounded to the nearest ten. Most of the minimum values have to be anonymised with designation “N/A”, because the minimum values would be attributable to single company. We are aware of the low information value, but we are limited by the signed contracts and declarations on oath.

The efficiency scores are estimated using software developed by Timothy Coelli. For DEA, version 2.1 of software DEAP (Coelli, 1996a) and for SFA, version 4.1 of software Frontier (Coelli, 1996b) are used.

Table 1: Summary statistics over dataset

Variable	Minimum	Maximum	Median	Mean
TOTEX ('000 000 EUR)	N/A	10	0	0.532
Distributed energy in TWh	N/A	50	10	12.280
Number of customers ('000 000)	N/A	10	0	1.552
Service area ('000 sq. km)	N/A	80	20	26.048
Grid length ('000 km)	10	220	30	67.298
HV lines ('000 km)	10	150	20	42.668
MV lines ('000 km)	N/A	70	10	22.030
LV lines ('000 km)	N/A	10	0	2.609
Underground cables ('000 km)	N/A	70	10	20.085
Overhead lines ('000 km)	N/A	160	30	47.212
Number of transformers	N/A	60	10	20.527
SAIFI	40	1 800	350	503.328
SAIDI	N/A	20	0	5.661

2.2.1 Input variables

DEA can be used for estimation of multiple inputs and outputs while SFA requires specification of the cost function (or production function) with single dependent variable. The single input model utilises comparability of the results of both methods.

We use input variable (dependent variable in case of SFA) in monetary terms in form of total expenditures (TOTEX). We obtained capital expenditures, however, the investments in distribution networks are cyclical and given the scope of analysis (panel data for SFA), the use of CAPEX would require long panel data or adjustments. Therefore, we prefer total costs to be benchmarked.

The costs are converted from national currencies to euro. Jamasb and Politt (2003) converted their costs using purchasing power parities to equalise the price differences among countries. We decided to transform the data

using only the exchange rates, because the capital expenditures comprise mostly of materials traded in euro and the direct labour costs form a minor share of TOTEX of the utilities. We do not consider the transformation using purchasing power parity to be convenient. In other studies, we did not observe similar adjustments.

In some of the models, the total costs are weighted by distributed energy and represents costs of unit of distributed energy.

2.2.2 Output variables

Our models are based on the output (dependent) variables we obtained. The selection is based on the literature and practice of regulators. We consider these variables as major cost drivers. Except for quality parameters (SAIFI and SAIDI), the parameters are assumed to be non-discretionary or to limited extent manageable by the incumbents. The output variables are

- distributed energy in MWh,
- number of clients (grid connection points),
- service area (sq. km),
- grid length (area),
- low voltage lines (km);
- medium voltage lines (km);
- high voltage lines (km);
- length of underground cables (km);

- length of overhead lines (km),
- number of transformers,
- quality parameters - SAIDI, SAIFI.

These are the general variables used for estimation. The specifications of models based on these data are described in the following sections.

2.3 Estimated models

2.3.1 Estimated DEA models

The input (dependent) variable of all models is represented by total expenditures. The explanatory (output) variables differ. For DEA, we use four output variables for analyses and consider methods with both CRS and VRS. We use a mean normalisation of data to correct for imbalances in data magnitudes. The normalisation is recommended by Sarkis (2007) to address possible scaling effects of the software. The DEAP does not indicate any problems, but we decided to normalise the data for the sake of accuracy. The normalisation is defined

$$\bar{A}_i = \frac{\sum_{n=1}^N A_{ni}}{N}, \quad (13)$$

where \bar{A}_i is the mean for i-th output or input; N is a number of DMUs; and A_{ni} is a value of particular input (output) of n-th DMU.

The outputs for first DEA model (**DEA1**) are:

- (1) area (sq. km),

- (2) grid length (km) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
- (3) transformers (count) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
- and (4) inverse value of interruption duration (min) per MWh.

The interruption duration is computed from the SAIDI coefficient, which is multiplied by number of customers and weighted by distributed energy. The value is inverted, because the lower the interruption duration is, the more costly the grid maintenance is assumed to be. The weighting of parameters is used to address to multicollinearity of output variables. As mentioned above, multicollinearity is not a problem for DEA, but high correlations among variables may decrease the descriptive power. The weighting is also preferred in the practical usage of DEA (e.g. benchmarking of DSOs in Norway).

For the second DEA model (**DEA2**), the outputs are

- (1) area of the distribution network (sq. km)
- (2) grid length (km) weighted by distributed energy (MWh)
- (3) transformers (count) weighted by distributed energy (MWh),
- and (4) share of underground cables (%).

The interruption duration parameter is replaced by percentage share of underground network that is generally considered to be more costly to maintain and thus we decided to include it.

2.3.2 Estimated stochastic frontier models

In regulatory practice, the parameters used for SFA are similar to DEA and both methods are compared. We estimate three models. Two of them are using similar variables as our DEA model.

We use unbalanced panel specification of the SFA cost model. We use a log-linear model specification. This specification employs a Cobb-Douglas cost functional form and it is linear in log of the variables. The log-linear model specification for **SFA1** is

$$\begin{aligned} \ln TOTEX_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln AREA_{i,t} + \beta_2 NETW_{i,t} \\ & + \beta_3 TRAN_{i,t} + \beta_4 INTE_{i,t} + u_{i,t} + v_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

where dependent variable *TOTEX* are total expenditures expressed in euro weighted by distributed energy; explanatory variables (*AREA*, *NETW*, *TRAN* and *INTE*) are similar to outputs in DEA1; *u* is inefficiency term; *v* is noise term; β_s are unknown parameters to be estimated; $i \in \{1, \dots, 15\}$ is the coefficient for particular companies; and $t \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ is a time parameter for 2010-2012 years. The variable for interruptions is not inverted, because inversion is not necessary in case of SFA. The variables are not weighted by MWh as in the case of DEA, because the values must be greater than one due to the logarithmic form. For SFA, the data were scaled by 10 TWh instead of GWh of delivered energy.

The **SFA2** is specified similarly, only variable for interruption duration is replaced by the share of cable lines (*CABL*).

The third SFA model, **SFA3**, we defined as unweighted. We are aware of the high correlation coefficient between distributed energy and number of transformers (0.87); however, Jensen (2005) showed that multicollinearity has little impact even on results of SFA and therefore we decided to include also unscaled model. The selection of explanatory variables was based similarly to previous models on regulatory practice. The model is defined

$$\begin{aligned} \ln TOTEX_{i,t}^u &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln DIST + \beta_2 CABL & (15) \\ &+ \beta_3 TRAN_{i,t}^u + u_{i,t} + v_{i,t}, \end{aligned}$$

where dependent variable $TOTEX^u$ represents unscaled total costs; explanatory variables are $DIST$ (represent distributed energy), $CABL$ (already defined cables' share), and $TRAN^u$ (unscaled number of transformers) other variables keeping similar to two previous models.

An important advantage of SFA is the possibility of statistical testing. The significance of estimated parameters (βs) can be tested comparing the computed t-statistics with critical values from ordinary statistical tables. In addition to testing of the parameters of cost function, the existence of inefficiency effects can be tested. SFA requires a priori assumption about the distribution of inefficiency term. There two options, either to conduct simple z-test or likelihood-ratio test (LR test). Coelli et al. (2005) suggest using of one sided LR test, because the z-test has a poor performance for small samples. The Frontier automatically gives values of one-sided likelihood ratio test. The null hypopaper is inexistence of inefficiency effects, i.e. $H_0 : \lambda = 0$ for the half-normal model and $H_0 : \mu = \sigma_u^2 = 0$ for the truncated-

normal model. The statistic value of the LR test of the half-normal model is to be compared with $\chi^2_{1-2\alpha}(x)$ distribution where α is a level of statistical significance and x refers to number of restrictions. The critical value for the truncated-normal model can be obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986).

The appropriateness of the truncated-normal model over the half-normal model can be also tested using values computed by the Frontier. The LR test statistic is

$$\lambda = -2 [\ln L(H_0) - \ln L(H_1)], \quad (16)$$

where $\ln L(H_0)$ and $\ln L(H_1)$ are statistics for log-likelihood values reported for half-normal and truncated-normal models. The null is $H_0 : \mu = 0$ against alternative $H_1 : \mu \neq 0$. The value of the test statistic (16) is to be compared with $\chi^2_{1-\alpha}(x)$ where α is a level of statistical significance and x refers to number of iterations of half-normal model.

3 Results

This section presents the results of the models described in the previous section. In the first section, the results of the DEA models are discussed. Subsequently, the results of the SFA models are presented and the assumptions of the SFA models are tested. In third section, the summary statistics of efficiency scores are presented. The section is concluded with evaluation of the models and policy implications.

3.1 DEA models

As described in the previous section, there are two specifications of the DEA models to be tested. We apply input-based VRS specification of the models while DEAP presents also efficiency scores for the CRS specification. The DEAP in addition computes values for NIRS DEA to compute the nature of the returns to scale. The technical efficiency scores are depicted in Table 2, which contains values of both DEA models and encompasses the efficiency scores for the CRS and VRS specifications, scale effects, and nature of the returns to scale (abbreviation *irs* is for increasing returns to scale, *drs* for decreasing returns to scale and *dash* for constant return to scale).

Given the CRS specification, we assume that the firms are operating on the same scale. Since the dataset is comprised of companies of diverse size and from different countries, we consider the VRS specification to be more appropriate. If we use the CRS model, the technical efficiency scores might be confounded by scale efficiencies. The scale efficiency is defined by computing both CRS and VRS models, and then decomposing the efficiency scores obtained by CRS DEA to scale and pure technical inefficiency. If the efficiency scores obtained from the CRS and VRS models differ, then it indicates the existence of scale inefficiency. The technical efficiency score of the CRS specification is equal to multiple of the VRS efficiency score and scale efficiency score.

In case of the CRS DEA models, there are three and two firms lying on the frontier. The lowest efficiency score is equal to 0.201 and 0.239 respectively. The values indicate significant differences among the firms. For the VRS DEA models, the number of firms on the frontier increases in both cases

Table 2: Summary of DEA efficiency scores

Firm	DEA1				DEA2			
	CRS	VRS	Scale	RtS	CRS	VRS	Scale	RtS
1	0.356	0.429	0.831	irs	0.422	0.446	0.947	irs
2	1.000	1.000	1.000	-	0.642	1.000	0.642	drs
3	0.241	0.319	0.757	irs	0.241	0.319	0.757	irs
4	0.378	0.413	0.915	irs	0.239	0.362	0.658	irs
5	0.281	0.454	0.619	irs	0.299	0.454	0.658	irs
6	0.747	0.906	0.825	irs	0.834	0.926	0.900	irs
7	1.000	1.000	1.000	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	-
8	1.000	1.000	1.000	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	-
9	0.721	1.000	0.721	drs	0.800	1.000	0.800	drs
10	0.207	0.430	0.483	irs	0.264	0.430	0.615	irs
11	0.386	1.000	0.386	drs	0.386	1.000	0.386	drs
12	0.300	0.366	0.820	irs	0.300	0.366	0.820	irs
13	0.201	0.415	0.484	irs	0.293	0.440	0.666	irs
14	0.315	0.386	0.815	irs	0.315	0.386	0.815	irs
15	0.622	0.910	0.684	irs	0.828	0.953	0.869	irs
mean	0.517	0.669	0.756	-	0.524	0.672	0.769	-

to five and the mean efficiency increases in both cases. Most of the firms exhibit non-constant returns to scale, but there are still significant differences among the benchmarked firms. The problem of VRS specification is that the validity depends on the size of the sample and VRS DEA tends to overstate the efficiency scores (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). The various categories of the firms should be sufficiently represented in the sample that is, however, limited in our case due to the small sample of firms.

Both DEA models give similar results. The validity can be increased by the larger dataset, because different categories of the firms would be better represented and thus the validity of VRS DEA would increase, but the data gathering is very complicated as was described in the previous sections.

3.2 SFA models

The SFA models are computed using programme Frontier. All the SFA models are defined in Cobb-Douglas log-linear specification and modelled as cost functions. The dataset is unbalanced for 15 firms with 28 observations. Both truncated-normal and half normal distributions of the inefficiency term are considered and tested. Summary statistics are reported in Table 3 for the half-normal and Table 4 for the truncated-normal models. The values of estimated coefficients are reported in columns while in parentheses the t-statistics are depicted. The level of significance of the estimates is represented by stars in parentheses. For LR test, the number of restrictions is depicted in parentheses. The nature of the variables is described in previous section in detail.

Table 3: Summary of SFA parameters with half-normal distribution of inefficiency term

	SFA1 (H-N)	SFA2 (H-N)	SFA3 (H-N)
Variable	Coefficients (t-statistics)		
Intercept	7.956 (3.544***)	10.954 (12.499***)	-0.555 (-0.308)
AREA	-0.076 (0.972)	-0.109 (1.862*)	-
NETW	-0.224 (-0.763)	-0.468 (-1.916*)	-
TRAN	0.130 (0.509)	0.059 (0.279)	-
INTE	-0.194 (-0.929)	-	-
CABL	-	-0.715 (-6.188***)	-0.378 (-3.478***)
DIST	-	-	1.132 (5.262***)
TRAN ^U	-	-	-0.386 (-2.222**)
σ^2	0.334 (1.710*)	0.116 (1.937*)	0.159 (2.206**)
γ	0.948 (18.368***)	0.852 (7.445***)	0.907 (15.533***)
Statistics	Values		
Log-likelihood	-0.824	5.869	5.427
LR one-sided test	7.222 (1 res.)	5.880 (1 res.)	11.971 (1 res.)
Statistical significance: * refers to 10%, ** refers to 5%, and *** refers to 1% significance.			

The SFA1 specification shows poor statistical results. None of the vari-

ables is significant at the 10% level. The value of γ indicates that 95% of the variation in error term is attributable to technical efficiency and only 5% to statistical noise. In the SFA2 model, two coefficients are weakly significant at the 10% level of significance, one is significant at the 1% level and remaining coefficient at variable *TRAN* is not statistically significant at the 10% level. The second model exhibits lowest variance and only 15% of the variation in error term is attributable to noise. In the third model, all coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level. The model has lower variance than model SFA1 and around 9% of the error term is attributable to statistical noise. To test the existence of inefficiency effects with $H_0 : \lambda = 0$, the values of LR test are compared with $\chi_{0.9}^2(1) = 2.706$. Since the values reported for the models exceed the critical value, we can reject the null hypothesis of no inefficiency effects at the 5% level of significance.

The specification of truncated-normal distribution of inefficiency term brings similar results. The SFA1 specification shows poor statistical results. None of the variables is significant at the 10% level. The value of γ indicates that 86% of the variation in error term is attributable to technical efficiency. The SFA1 model has the lowest variance. The SFA2 model brings slightly better results, one coefficient is weakly significant at the 10% level of significance, one is significant at the 5% level, one at the 1% level and remaining coefficient at variable *TRAN* is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Only 6% of the variation in error term is attributable to noise at the SFA2. In the third model, all coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level. The model has highest variance and only 3% of the variation in error term is attributable to statistical noise.

Table 4: Summary of SFA parameters with truncated-normal distribution of inefficiency term

	SFA1 (T-N)	SFA2 (T-N)	SFA3 (T-N)
Variable	Estimated parameters (t-statistics)		
Intercept	7.313 (4.216***)	11.200 (12.719***)	-0.519 (-0.330)
AREA	-0.091 (-1.156)	-0.107 (-1.903*)	-
NETW	-0.093 (-0.348)	-0.516 (2.111**)	-
TRAN	0.772 (0.282)	0.079 (0.376)	-
INTE	-0.147 (-0.959)	-	-
CABL	-	-0.742 (-6.531***)	1.150 (6.092***)
DIST	-	-	-0.384 (-3.845***)
TRAN ^U	-	-	-0.414 (-2.688**)
σ^2	0.117 (1.945*)	0.317 (0.247)	0.503 (0.726)
γ	0.862 (7949***)	0.944 (4.224***)	0.970 (2.050**)
μ	0.629 (2.460**)	-1.035 (-0.159)	-1.397 (0.544)
Statistics	Values		
Log-likelihood	0.630	5.955	5.559
LR one-sided test	10.123 (2 res.)	6.050 (2 res.)	12.235 (2 res.)
Statistical significance: * refers to 10%, ** refers to 5%, and *** refers to 1% significance.			

The negative signs of estimates and high coefficients at intercepts may seem to be difficult to interpret. Initially, we were surprised with the signs, but the results are in line with previous research (e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003). The negative signs can be interpreted by scale effects and increasing returns to scale. The high values of γ indicates that most of the error term is attributable to inefficiency. The low values would indicate wrong specification of the model and on the contrary very high values approaching 100% would need to be cautiously treated, because absence of noise is not likely to occur especially in the cross-country comparison.

The existence of inefficiency effects is tested in different way compared to the half-normal model. The null hypothesis is inexistence of inefficiency effects in the model specification, i.e. $H_0 : \mu = \sigma_u^2 = 0$ (Coelli et al., 2005).

The values of LR test are compared with critical values obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm (1986). Taking the 5% level of significance, the critical value is equal to 5.138. The reported values exceed the critical value thus we can reject the null at the 5% level of significance.

In the last step, we test the appropriateness of the use of the truncated-normal over the half-normal distribution of the inefficiency term. The test statistic is defined in expression (16). The null hypothesis is that the half-normal model is adequate, $H_0 : \mu = 0$, against alternative $H_1 : \mu \neq 0$. The computed statistics of the test give

- $\lambda_{SFA1} = -2[7.222 - 10.123] = 5.802$,
- $\lambda_{SFA2} = -2[5.880 - 6.050] = 0.34$,
- $\lambda_{SFA23} = -2[11.971 - 12.235] = 0.528$,

and the critical value at the 5% level of significance is $\chi_{0.95}^2(1) = 3.841$; therefore, we have to reject the null in case of first model and we cannot reject the null for SFA2 and SFA3 at the 5% level of significance.

Due to the statistically insignificant parameters, we do not include the model SFA1 in our comparison. None of the parameters was significant that indicates inappropriate specification. The results from remaining models are better and we include them in our analysis. The models SFA2 and SFA3 are included in their half-normal specification, because we rejected the adequacy of truncated-normal distribution of inefficiency term at the 5% level of significance. The values are depicted in Table 5.

Table 5: Summary of SFA cost efficiency estimates

Firms	SFA2 (H-N)	SFA3 (H-N)
	Efficiency estimates	Efficiency estimates
1	0.476	0.400
2	0.596	0.583
3	0.752	0.586
4	0.724	0.800
5	0.731	0.800
6	0.916	0.863
7	0.907	0.881
8	0.922	0.889
9	0.747	0.642
10	0.835	0.716
11	0.846	0.816
12	0.843	0.786
13	0.749	0.728
14	0.879	0.900
15	0.899	0.946
mean	0.764	0.720

3.3 Summary of results

In this section, results from preferred models are described and summarised. The results are depicted in Table 6. We include the CRS and VRS efficiency scores obtained by both the DEA models and efficiency scores of the SFA2 and SFA3 models. The SFA models are specified with half-normal distribution of inefficiency term.

The results significantly differ across the firms. As we can see, the mean efficiency is in interval from 52% (CRS DEA1) to 76% (SFA2). The diversity in results is not exceptional in comparison with other studies and practice. For example, the efficiency scores computed by the German regulator experienced similar variation. It ranged between 45% and 77% with lower values for DEA and higher for SFA (Frontier Economics, 2012). The variation of

results is caused by differences in nature of the methods.

In the regulatory benchmarking practice, the results from different methods are considered. The results are usually weighted and final efficiency scores are based on scaling. The weighted sum of efficiency scores helps to deal with particularities of different models. In the current 2014-2018 regulatory period in Austria, the results from two DEAs and MOLS are scaled and used.

The Austrian energy regulatory office employs CRS DEA. The CRS specification is chosen under an assumption that possible scale inefficiencies would be solved by mergers or joint ventures within the market (Frontier Economics, 2012). German regulator applies CRS DEA and SFA and takes into the account results from both methods; however, benchmarking in Austria and Germany is based on the data of national DSOs and since our study is based on international dataset, we believe that the VRS specification is also valid. Considering the practice of regulators, we include both specifications in our final comparison.

As the data of the Czech companies in the sample are publicly accessible, we can reveal results for Czech DSOs included in the dataset. The company 1 is ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. and company 2 PREdistribuce, a.s. Names of other companies we are not allowed to disclose due to the contractual obligations. The efficiency scores of ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. are among the lowest in the sample. The efficiency scores for PREdistribuce, a.s. are better and in half of the results the company is lying on the frontier. The better results could lead us to assign them to the different structure of the service area of both operators; however, DSOs similar to both ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. and

Table 6: Summary of computed efficiency scores

	CRS DEA1	VRS DEA1	CRS DEA2	VRS DEA2	SFA2 (H-N)	SFA3 (H-N)
Firms	Efficiency scores					
1	0.356	0.429	0.422	0.446	0.476	0.400
2	1.000	1.000	0.642	1.000	0.596	0.583
3	0.241	0.319	0.241	0.319	0.752	0.586
4	0.378	0.413	0.239	0.362	0.724	0.800
5	0.281	0.454	0.299	0.454	0.731	0.800
6	0.747	0.906	0.834	0.926	0.916	0.863
7	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.907	0.881
8	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.922	0.889
9	0.721	1.000	0.800	1.000	0.747	0.642
10	0.207	0.430	0.264	0.430	0.835	0.716
11	0.386	1.000	0.386	1.000	0.846	0.816
12	0.300	0.366	0.300	0.366	0.843	0.786
13	0.201	0.415	0.293	0.440	0.749	0.728
14	0.315	0.386	0.315	0.386	0.879	0.900
15	0.622	0.910	0.828	0.953	0.899	0.946
mean	0.517	0.669	0.524	0.672	0.764	0.720

PREdistribuce, a.s. are included in the sample. The efficiency scores of city operators are on average similar to efficiency scores of DSOs operating larger regions with lower population densities; therefore, the better performance of PREdistribuce, a.s. cannot be simply attributable to the smaller area the company is distributing the electrical energy on.

The SFA models indicate that the Czech DSOs are operating inefficiently, or more precisely below an average efficiency. There can be other factors that were omitted from our study, but the selection of variables is based both on practical literature and regulatory practices for DSOs. We did not include more variables to avoid an overspecification of our models. Although the variation in results might seem very high, it is in line with previous research (e.g. Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003; EY, 2013).

3.4 Policy implications

The energy sector in the Czech Republic can be considered as infant. There are still discussions about the setting of the regulatory parameters. The obstacles were shown during the discussion process preceding the fourth regulatory period of the regulation of gas sector in the Czech Republic. There were problems with definitions of amortisation and depreciation, investments, etc. There can be problems inherited from the past that can be beyond control of the managements. The current regulatory setting does not generate sufficient incentives for development. In the current regulatory formula, the quality and development parameters are not sufficiently emphasised. Additional parameters promoting development of the grid should be encompassed in the regulation and also considered in the setting of benchmarking methods. DSOs should be more incentivised to invest in new technologies. The development of smart grids, smart metering and more effective methods of management of renewable energy sources in the Czech Republic should be more accented in the future.

We are convinced that the use of international comparison would enable thorough comparison and introduction of individual efficiency factors. Taking into account constraints stemming from the structure of the market, we believe that the performance of incumbents should be assessed by international benchmarking when the monopolistic domestic market structure with only three companies operating the market restricts representativeness of the majority of methods. Our model specification is very narrow with only handful of parameters, but this specification is in accordance with both theory and foreign regulatory practice. Benchmarking is used for evaluation of rela-

tive performance in comparison with peers and we consider it as an auxiliary tool for regulation. We are aware of possible shortcomings of the methods that are also endorsed by the use of international dataset.

Setting the efficient companies lying on the frontier (DEA), or the most efficient companies (in case of SFA), as a yardstick would be too restrictive. We would propose to set the objective efficiency value as a mean (or median) efficiency score. Similar methodology is applied by the Norwegian regulator (Frontier Economics, 2012). The companies operating above the mean (or median respectively) are considered as effective and allocated only general X factor. The companies operating below would be incentivised by the individual X factors to improve efficiency of their performance. Another method would be to set the floor similarly as the German regulator. If the company is below some artificial value (in Germany 0.6), it would be treated as having this minimum value.

We realise that international benchmarking is problematic. Similarly, the size of our dataset confines the representativeness of our results. The use of benchmarking would be the tool which suitability was proven in regulatory practice if the Czech regulator seeks to set individual X factors in the future; moreover, the Czech regulator is able to acquire the data of the EU regulated companies and conduct comprehensive analysis with larger dataset. We were informed by the representatives of ERU that the data are exchanged by the EU regulators within the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators on regular basis.

The company ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. showed efficiency below an average in all models we conducted and the results indicates inefficient operation. The

company's score was only in one case above median value. The company PREdistribuce, a.s. obtained better scores and in three DEA models it was a frontier firm, but in both SFA models it obtained efficiency scores below mean and median. The Czech DSOs scored worse than comparable firms from abroad that indicates improvement potential. There are only three companies dominating the Czech market and the regulator can hardly dispose of complete information about the firms. There is a risk of regulatory capture. We mentioned all the regulatory constraints defined by Laffont and Tirole (1996) and the political risk can also be an issue. The regulator is established as independent, but two out of three incumbents are still controlled by the state. The inefficient operation is indicated in international comparison by fees for distribution included in the price of electricity. The Slovak regulator conducted analysis of fees for electricity distribution in the selected EU countries (URSO, 2011). The examined countries were Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Germany and Austria. The fee was in the Czech Republic on average (average fee for all voltage lines) higher than in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary and comparable with Austria. In Germany, the average fee was highest due to the by far largest fee imposed on the households to bear significant amount of cost that skewed the average value.

In the third regulatory period, ERU was not able to set the individual X factors for regulatory formula based on the revenue cap incentive scheme. We are convinced that international benchmarking is a tool that would enable the establishment of the individual X factors. The introduction of the individual X factors without international comparison would demand thorough analysis

of the incumbents and would be complicated due to the above mentioned constraints the regulator has to always face. We showed in our analysis that the efficiency between the Czech DSOs markedly differ and that their operation is less efficient in comparison to foreign firms. The inclusion of only general efficiency factor in the regulatory formula is therefore not sufficient to improve their operation. We are aware of the fact that a more comprehensive dataset is necessary for precise setting of the individual X factors and we are aware of problems stemming from the limited size of the dataset we used. The larger dataset would increase the descriptive power of our results, however, the minimum criteria for DEA were fulfilled. Similarly, the more comprehensive dataset would improve the results of SFA. We recommend ERU to conduct similar benchmarking analysis with a larger dataset. The results should be used for the adjustment of general X factor and primarily to introduce the individual X factors that ERU was not able to incorporate in regulatory formula of the current third regulatory period.

4 Conclusion

In our paper, we focused on the regulation of electricity sector in the Czech Republic with main emphasis put on the implementation of benchmarking methods for the distribution system operators. We utilised the benchmarking studies focusing on electricity distribution companies and examine the applicability of the benchmarking methods to DSOs in the Czech Republic. We sought the data of foreign companies to complement the dataset. The natural monopolistic market structure, the DSOs are inclining to, facilitates the application of international benchmarking as the companies are usually

controlling certain regions. Due to the liberalisation that was institutionalised at the EU level, the companies also share similar structure as they have to be unbundled from other activities.

Our main research question was to evaluate the use of benchmarking methods for the regulation of DSOs. Benchmarking of the incumbents would facilitate introduction of the individual X factors corresponding to efficiency of particular incumbents. Similar analysis has not been conducted yet, as far as we know.

We collected a dataset comprising of 15 unbundled companies from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Serbia. The data gathering was complicated due to confidentiality. We are not allowed to disclose the data and the names of the foreign companies, however, it does not affect representativeness of our paper as we sought to find the efficiency scores for the Czech DSOs. The dataset comprises companies that are similar to the Czech DSOs in terms of area and population served. The data of the Czech companies are public and therefore we can present our results. We were only able to use the data for ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. and PREdistribuce, a.s. The financial statements for E.On Distribuce, a.s. are consolidated for distribution of electricity and gas and the company refused to provide us with unconsolidated cost data.

For the empirical analysis, we applied both non-parametric and parametric efficiency measurement methods. The data envelopment analysis was applied to cross-sectional data of the firms for 2012 in constant and variable returns to scale specifications. The stochastic frontier analyses were based on the unbalanced panel for 2010-2012 years. The data were adjusted for

inflation using annual growth rate and denominated in euro with 2012 as a base year. The total expenditures were taken as input (dependent variable) and the outputs (dependent variables) were based on grid parameters and outputs. The selection of parameters was based on theory and practical experience of regulators applying benchmarking of DSOs. The weighting of outputs was applied to address high correlation among the output variables.

The results of our analysis showed significant differences among efficiency scores of both Czech companies. The efficiency scores of ČEZ Distribuce, a.s. were below mean efficiency in all six models conducted while only in one case the efficiency score was above median. The company PREdistribuce, a.s. obtained higher scores. In case of three out of four DEA models, it was a frontier firm; however, in SFA models the efficiency was below mean and median. Our models confirmed varied efficiency of Czech DSOs that should be addressed in the forthcoming fourth regulatory period. We believe that individual efficiency factors should be implemented to control for these differences.

Benchmarking serves as a suitable tool for assessment of the cost efficiency of the Czech operators in international comparison. The results showed that the Czech DSOs are in the international comparison among the less efficient companies. This fact is in line with a study of the Slovak regulatory office, which compared fees for the distribution included in the electricity price was final customers. URSO (2011b) showed that the fee was in the Czech republic on average higher than in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland and comparable with Austria.

We are aware of the limitations stemming from the size of the dataset.

A larger dataset would improve the robustness of the frontier methods. As the regulator can acquire more data within the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators, we recommend the Czech regulator, based on our analysis, to include the benchmarking methods in the setting of parameters for the forthcoming fourth regulatory period. Our results indicated that the efficiency scores differ for the Czech DSOs and their efficiency is worse in comparison with their foreign peers. Benchmarking would enable setting of individual X factors and modifications of the general X factor to better correspond to the current market situation. We showed that the shortage of national data, which restrained the adoption of benchmarking, can be overcome by the use of international firms.

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