Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Networks information in the civil wars

Estrada, Fernando

Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales

2014

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59949/
MPRA Paper No. 59949, posted 17 Nov 2014 05:23 UTC

NETWORKS OF INFORMATION IN THE CIVIL WARS

Fernando Estrada

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to interpret the relationships between information networks and the massacres in Colombia. Over a period of paramilitary violence networks of informants were used with a strategic purpose. In fact, the paramilitaries were preparing each slaughter counting information previously learned between the inhabitants of the town. For these reasons, it is shown that information is a key phenomenon to understand civil wars. Moreover, as demonstrated in this work is the evolution of the slaughter in the civil wars as a result of rumor and information.

Keywords: Colombia, civil wars, massacres, paramilitary, information and rumors, communication.

Universidad Externado de Colombia

CIPE, March 2010.

NETWORKS OF INFORMATION IN THE CIVIL WARS

Fernando Estrada

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to interpret the relationships between information networks and the massacres in Colombia. Over a period of paramilitary violence networks of informants were used with a strategic purpose. In fact, the paramilitaries were preparing each slaughter counting information previously learned between the inhabitants of the town. For these reasons, it is shown that information is a key phenomenon to understand civil wars. Moreover, as demonstrated in this work is the evolution of the slaughter in the civil wars as a result of rumor and information.

Keywords: Colombia, civil wars, massacres, paramilitary, information and rumors, communication.

Introduction

An outstanding feature of the analysis of civil wars is the information management and its effects locally[1]. The confrontation between enemy troops regularly proceeded by intelligence operations. With qualified informants to give details that reduce risks. Although information is a key to understanding life in a locality usually it is used to recognize important aspects of economic resources, contracts, and investment officials. The information has also served to find profiles of the population and characteristics of the positions of power in government, its scope and limits. In addiction conflict agents use information they can get to impose on the population norms, habits of conduct, threats, punishments, culminating in killings and massacres.

[1] Uribe, María Teresa, Urabá: región o territorio. Editado por Corpourabá, Iner (Instituto de Estudios Regionales Universidad de Antioquia, "Los destiempos y los desencuentros - Una perspectiva para mirar la violencia en Colombia", *Revista Universidad de Antioquia*. N° 220, 1989. Medellín, Colombia; "El proceso de apropiación de la tierra en Colombia. 1821-1850 - una perspectiva regional para el análisis"., *Lecturas de economía*. N° 16. Medellín, Colombia, 1985; Kapferer, J.-N.: *Rumeurs: le plus vieux média du monde*, París, Seuil, 1987; Reumaux, F.: *La rumeur. Message et transmission*, París, Armand Colin, 1998; Rouqutte, M. L.: Les Rumeurs, París, PUF, 1975; Kaplan, S.: L*e complot de famine: histoire d'une rumeur au XVIII des consommateurs*, París, Institut d'éstudes et de recherches publicitaires, 1983; Allport F. H. & Lepkin M.: "Wartime Rumors of Waste and Special Privilege: Why Some People Believe them" en *Journal of Adnormal and Social Psychology*, n. 40, 1945, pp. 3-36. Caplow, T.: "Rumors in War" en *Social Forces*, n. 25, 1947, pp. 298-302 y Cartey, J.: "Rumeur et politique" en La *Revue administrative*, n. 195, mayo-junio, 1980, pp. 250-252. Kalyvas, Stathis. 2001. "'New' and 'Old' Civil Was: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics* (in Research Notes) 54(1); "la violencia en medio de la guerra civil, esbozo de una teoría", En, *Revista Análisis Político* No 42, Enero de 2001.

Nevertheless the theme of the strategic roles of information and rumor in areas under paramilitary or insurgent influence suggests several questions: What role has the information in the landscape of struggle for power in local areas?, How information flows in contexts conflict over political power, and what characterizes the information in areas of paramilitary or guerrilla influence are, who are responsible for the information, and what types of acts arising from the information, how to have developed so-called " blacklists?, how does the sound derived from the information, and what kind of information promotes the values at locations under the authority of violent armed agents how to run the information "down" "up and back ?[2].

Provided along with the deployment of various strategic assault tactics, escalation of violent actions in taking over villages and the fear imposed by the targeted killings, routine tasks also arise to collect information in areas under the influence of different fronts, paramilitary insurgents, compile data and selecting names and characteristics of potential victims (enemies of the cause), informants or in some cases, strategic targets had to be used selectively for the sole purpose of expelling the "opposite"[3].

During the recent period of events and actions of the Colombian armed conflict have been many changes in strategic matters. Both with respect to the dynamics of withdrawal and military coups against as FARC, the ELN organic derangement, and the impact they have had negotiations with the AUC or paramilitaries. In relation to these groups, the logic of their strategic dominance displays by the territorial and local government in the regions is clear with the upcoming elections of mayors, governors and councilors, as derived from the information given by means of opinion and analysts. But also part of the crossroads of the ongoing negotiations will depend on what might happen with the political and military power they have achieved over a quarter century

[2] These questions require the analyst a mandatory condition of comparative research on theories of conflict. In addition to suggesting also that the mainstream media have a function that can help to rise concerns at the community level and should serve as a bridge to protect them. These are questions that require advanced work in the complex web of interests in contention for the local political power.

[3] The phenomena of information and rumor in strategic areas and territories are not a new topic in the historical context of armed conflict and violence in Colombia. Mary Roland, professor of Latin American history at Amherst College in Massachusetts and Cornell University, New York, has documented these events with evidence of local order in the case of the violence that marked the regional identity of Antioquia: *A sangre y fuego, la violencia en Antioquia*, Colombia, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia & Fundación para la Promoción de la Ciencia y la Tecnología, Bogotá, Colombia, 435 pp. In contemporary political theory, stands the study by Robert Nozick on the preparatory conditions on a conception of the State neocontractualism. These conditions are defined by the phenomena described below. In that sense, this test can be judged as a continuation of the hypotheses suggested by Nozick, *Anarquía, Estado y Utopía,* published by Fondo de Cultura Economica, translated by Rolando Tamayo, First reprint, Mexico, 1990, 333 pp. See an interpretation of the concept of "minimal state" and "Protection Agency" in the recent article "Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial". *Revista Análisis Político*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia, S.A:, v.56, p.115 - 131, 2006.

local paramilitaries. Any time is evidence of the failure of the military logistics to flood the territory abandoned by these violent groups and overt signs of municipalities and towns that live under the conditions of an anomic state[4].

Although reports suggest that the territories "abandoned" by the paramilitary groups are being covered by emerging: In the southwest of Antioquia are the 'Aguilas Negras', in the municipalities of Salgar, Titiribi, Santa Barbara and Amagá. 'Rene', a 'to' runaway Ralito, is one of their leaders. In Salgar, in the village of Las Margaritas, police shot dead six armed men wearing armbands of a group called the Protection of Farmers, CAP. In the northeast, in former zone of 'Macaco', has denounced the presence of 60 to 70 men of the 'Central Bolívar'. Uraba is present in groups of demobilized 'Elmer Cardenas' and the band led by 'HH'. Also in Santander, according to the Ombudsman, a group of demobilized paramilitaries in Puerto Boyaca and the 'Central Bolívar' created 'The Eagles'. Engaged in drug trafficking and theft of Ecopetrol pipeline. In Cauca, armed groups caused a shift in two villages of Roncesvalles, 'Taps' and 'Stubble', the armies of the Norte of Valle cartel, is presented as paramilitaries. This has been extended to Chocó and Nariño. In Caldas the 'Cacique Pipintá', a group of 'Ernesto Báez', not demobilized. See it is estimated that between 30 and 60 'emerging bands' arising from groups paramilitaries demobilized

Because deep down is not only to legitimize actions that undermined the government's institutional presence, but the very existence of the state is questioned. In some regions as demonstrated in earlier studies, local experienced what Robert Nozick described under conditions precedent to the formation of the State: entire communities living under the control and intimidation of private protection agencies (paramilitary or guerrillas) and that does not find how long is something that could be the "State"[5].

Although the cases of explosive bombs in large and medium cities, collective kidnappings by armed groups, represent just a sampling of how the violent armed conflict has decisively taken a course where they are open predominating intelligence work and handling information as strategic weapons[6]. But the demonstrations in favor of revealing a detailed understanding of the contexts of paramilitary and insurgent

[4] *El Tiempo*, diciembre 10/2006.

[5] Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York, Basic Books, 1974). However, serious dilemmas of detail and state presence in many localities should not detract forces a received view about the legitimacy of democratic institutions in Colombia. The theoretical problems - arising from the empirical debate on the various forms of state-building in Colombia are an issue too dense to be treated in this paragraph. References to Nozick's analytical categories to address the context of our armed conflict are limited resources. In the sense that do exist raise identifiable forms of political and military power in the Colombian case reproducing substantive aspects of the theoretical framework nozickiano. 1988).

[6] Santos Juliá (ed.), Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Victimas de la guerra civil", Madrid: *Temas de Hoy*, 1999. Estrada, Fernando, *Metáforas de una Guerra perpetua, Estudios de pragmática del discurso en el conflicto armado en Colombia*, Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT, 2004, 173 pp.

political influence, the handling of contracts in areas as necessary for the population as health and education, and the scandals caused by the ties of the political class in departments Atlantic Coast as Sucre, are events that are defining today decisively the Colombian armed conflict[7].

In summa, in the context of these strategies by the local and regional power bets violent actors are at a key moment. Following the agreements of Santa Fe de Ralito and events have occurred in the illegal negotiations with the paramilitary groups have dispersed heterogeneous in regional locations, and reports show a volume of violence on the part of strategic resources drug cartels, paramilitary and insurgency, this kind of violence more directly to citizens, as in the case of targeted killings, abductions, extortion, increased threats and threaten[8]. Not only-but also in areas under paramilitary or guerrilla influence what we have in terms of Clausewitz might be termed "a rise of extremes". Rather, the concentration of forces of violent groups has given way to a kind of naturalization of armed conflict. In addition a proliferation of effects of violent conflict by careful selection of victims and information resources available on a ladder in each locality[9].

In synthesis the sources of information, building networks of informants and local intelligence work have become targets of paramount importance in the calculations of political power of the paramilitaries and insurgents. The top-down relationships between commanders and irregular troops, and horizontal direct participation of the affected population, are now processed through an extensive strategic game that relates political wrangling and feelings (hatred, jealousy, revenge). Above all the elections of

[7] "Peor que el 8000" *Revista Semana* Nº 1280, 2006., "… y esto apenas comienza", *Revista Semana*, Nº 1281 "El ventilador", *Revista Semana* Nº 1281, 2006. "Otros dos políticos uribista confirman reunión y firma de un acuerdo con paramilitares", *El Tiempo*, Noviembre 26 de 2006. "40 congresistas firmaron compromiso político con Autodefensas, reconoce Miguel de la Espriella" *El Tiempo*, Noviembre 25 de 2006. "Fiscalía descubrió listados con la 'nómina' de colaboradores de 'Jorge 40' en Barranquilla", *El Tiempo*, Noviembre 27 de 2006.

[8] War of the paramilitaries, along growing power of the self increases the threat to the viability of the country, *Revista Semana*, *Periódico El Tiempo*, Revealing the truth about links paramilitaries paramilitary and political promise held in La Ceja November 20, 2006; demobilized paramilitaries are willing to tell the whole truth about their crimes, *Revista Semana*, noviembre 24, 2006; "Frentes 5 y 18 de las Farc, los nuevos 'señores' que mandan en Alto Sinú y Nudo del Paramillo", *Periódico El Tiempo*, noviembre 26, 2006; "Negociación con los paras" *Revista Semana*, Octubre 10, 2005; Gouësset, V. 1999. "el territorio colombiano y sus márgenes. La difícil tarea de la reconstrucción territorial". In: *Territorios*, No1, pp. 77-94.

[9] In view of Clausewitz intimidation and fear of the civilian population could only count as elements against the agent of the war in their favor. Clausewitz, C. v. *De la Guerra*, Madrid, Labor, 1978. A good aspect highlighted in the case of conflicts in Colombia, Uribe, Maria Teresa. Matar, rematar y contramatar, Cinep, Bogotá, 1999.

governors, mayors, councilmen and members are subject to the power interests of the agents of violence. So it is possible to notice, with variants of the case that the irregular election cycles that have prevailed in recent decades, will be present at the election of mayors, governors and councilors in 2007.

Furthermore, the phenomena of information and rumor can offer us for this very central aspect to comprehend the march of events we have in political life in the local context.

In what follows, this paper proposes the following basic next target: 1) To illustrate how information operates within the terms of a slaughter, (2) What aspects of intra changes reveals information circulating by violent actors (3) The type of relations that produces asymmetric information at the local community (4) how information is identified in the context of local political conflict identity structure of populations and their forms of political power

In sum, the text introduces a phenomenological analysis of information (deviations) to understand the dynamics of local conflict. More or less information or limited information can be derived for the case of populations where they are active agents of conflict, more or less retaliation.

However, this supports the author is that information becomes a key tool for understanding key aspects of strategic type by warfare agents, are the tools of the networks of informants who have the warriors and politicians to prove their greater penetration ability and intelligence against their enemies.

The information and the informant

An everyday scene of a community besieged by armed conflict is enough to illustrate the scope of the accusation against the inhabitants of a population, the scope of information and rumor in the hands of an informant. For this purpose, the events occurred in the village of Chengue (Montes de Maria, Sucre)[10]. We will take this case because it has the ingredients of the analysis are proposed:

Although all have that with a list of informants were calling about 40 people by their first name and the brave gathered in the main square [1]. Before the terrified eyes of his countrymen, 25 men were killed in an awful way [2]. Those with better luck dry shot in the head [3] and others were beheaded with machetes, as if they were pigs [4]. Everyone saw the carnage of the people [5], and not worth the pleas of parents, sons and brothers to respect their family life [6]. The uniformed executioners [7] finished their slaughter,

[10] "La ley del embudo", *Revista Semana*, septiembre 20, 2005; "Una tragedia sin fin" *Revista Semana*, marzo 12, 2002; "¿Por qué la Corte le cree a Pitirri, el testigo que puso a temblar a los políticos de Sucre?", *Revista Semana*, noviembre 21, 2006; "Revelan documentos que muestran la influencia de paramilitares en la Fiscalía", *Revista Semana*, octubre 19, 2006

burned 30 houses [8], explained that his action sought to clear the area of guerrillas [9], took hostage 10 farmers [10] and left as quickly and noisily Chengue [11] as they had arrived two hours before [12][11].

Nevertheless, the description that communicates the event is framed in a complex common strategy with violent actors by the local political power. The event marks a symbolic ritual components and machinery of fear and war gear, including weapons stab household. The assembled audience is broad: the entire population. Closed all entrances and exits, one has no escape. It is about getting an assertion of power that can be witnessed by men, women and children. The general context of the story is perceived as passing off background details. And the conditions of place are crucial [1].

The story places emphasis on "looking terrified" of the peasantry. Rate and describes the act [2]. Compare and refers to the "luck", the death rate of victims [3]. Identify the instruments of harm as part of the gravity of grief that will cause [4], and makes an analogy with the vulgar sense of horror [4]. The background narrative is familiar and close to all [5]. And the type is covered in similar language to highlight the comparative degrees alienate these humans from domestic animals slaughtered for the table. They move things and people to an impregnable target.

In particular, the context of the criminal action reflects little respect for religious symbols and expressions. The slaughter has components of paganism. And does not support place for other forms of expression outside the same barbarism [6]. Also care little prayers or prayers from the blood ties between families. Similarly, a local tragedy in Colombia can be viewed with the characters of a power that nothing will work without limit, as the power used by Creon in times of Classical Greece. The clothing of the attackers is stored as a sign of a massacre evidence [7]. And the fire that burns is an integrated element of terror to signals that the perpetrators wanted to plant on victims [8].

Also the reasons given by officers to commit the violent slaughter of rhetoric have a weak character. In addition, to using a metaphor of war in use, the need to "debug", "disinfect", "clear the area of guerrilla influence[12]. In reality it is an explanation in euphemistic terms about the reasons for the action [9] which appeals to the general discourse of orders from "above". "Down" death and barbarism, "up" ambiguous justification in a unit of information learned. And after withdrawal [10] creating an agonizing uncertainty. With the fold-out, the hallmark of who are the sole authors of the

[11] *Revista Cambio*, Enero 21 de 2001.

[12] André Glucksmann, *El discurso del odio*, Trad. Mónica Rubio F., Madrid, Taurus, 2005.

assassination? Finally, the witness reports the time course of the tragedy [11] in a tone which, though not in-intentioned, makes the sharpness of the comparison [12][13].

In sum, this action includes globally what could be called a typology of territorial control and the strategy for taking the local power[14]. But common aspects of the stage, actors, victims and all the scenery of the horror caused to the population. Although no explicit mention in the text, presumably the list with the names of the accused by informants, the event tells the thunderous arrival of criminals, the location of victims, and the public notice in the main square of the population. In conclusion the deliberate act of killing without showing hatred, calculating the damage to be caused to the victims, the impression that the witnesses should be present. Many more details in this passage can be made "visible" events, not enough to cover its total cruelty.

The conflict in regions and municipalities has reflected many scenes of this kind[15]. If it can be of any value taxonomy and computational technology resources are used to classify the victims. But if war makes innocent dead, dead "guilty" may also have become victims through the murky information that accused them of being "enemies". And for every victim in war is always "guilty enemy. Really, innocent or guilty, many victims of the conflict emerge as an indirect effect of information networks and informants who complete listings filed in books or in electronic memory. In the paramilitary slaughter of the Barge, the people gathered by the murderers saw with horror that the commander opened his laptop and began to call by name the victims[16]. This phenomenology of violent confrontation also shows how the facts of the conflict are increasingly dependent on how information circulates locally[17].

Therefore, in war as in everyday life information has decisively to mobilize person and collective actions. A slight change, a slight distortion of the messages may have unfortunate consequences, how does the information among contender's conflict? How is acquired and information circulates in the conflict zones. What kind of issues presented information? What do the dynamics of information within communities affected by war? What operating relationships between information and violence that top-down work?

---

[13] A similar analysis: "la máquina de los eufemismos", In Estrada G., Fernando: *Las metáforas de una guerra perpetua*, Óp. Cit. 71-94 pp.

[14] Kalyvas, Stathis, "La violencia en medio de la guerra civil, esbozo de una teoría" en *Revista Análisis Político*, Iepri, Universidad Nacional, Bogotá, 2001.

[15] Kalyvas, S. 2000. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* Department of Politics, New York University: Mimeo.

[16] "la lista electrónica", *El Tiempo*, Marzo 6 de 1999.

[17] Kalyvas Stathis N., "Ontología de la violencia política: acción e identidad en las guerras civiles", *Revista Análisis Político* n° 52 Septiembre-Diciembre de 2004, p.67.

More important for the question that interests us here to discuss, how it distorts the sound information, What is going from rumor to information?, Rumor How can become a powerful instrument of harm?[18].

Rumor and violence among the community

To introduce the analysis of this problem is a hypothesis based on variant key information[19]. The hypothesis is that in any of these domains (conflict or everyday life) the sound corresponds to a kind of politically directed behavior. That rumor is installed noise phenomena such information and has a rational purpose in his sources deliberately designed to cause damage against an opponent.

Also in conflict zones the rumor spread prejudices are faced before by interpersonal clashes, jealousy, envy and hatred. And it allows level of public discourse and projects these negative emotions without direct inclusion of those who experience it. In others words, the rumor meets cycle's plot, where each cycle adds or adds some agreement with the very interests of those involved[20]. A fireball initially takes the strength of the evidence supporting it. Consolidating an important factor unsettling to the victims and preparing the *coup de grace*. Kalyvas this aspect is emphasized in the following terms:

> Many of the detailed descriptions of violence suggest the presence of significant supply and local initiatives in the production its. Instead of being imposed on communities by outsiders, this evidence suggests that violence often (but not always) grows from within the community even though it is run by outsiders, it is in other words, intimate[21].

[18] It should be noted that only yes, we take a first step to raise a differentiation necessary in the analysis of information on the role of the rumor in conflict zones. The rumor is circulating with the information so parasitic. It contains "half truths". Hidden key aspects as it would dilute confirmation. But it is powerful when you can find in a social adjustment range for all manner of contending interests, jealousy, envy, revenge, hatred. The rumor discursively simulates these negative emotions, relieving the sufferer of social visibility. Further details: Elster, Jon, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 416 pp.

[19] Boris Salazar, María del Pilar Castillo, Universidad del Valle: *La hora de los dinosaurios, conflicto y depredación en Colombia*, Cedec, UniValle, Cali, 2001; "Jugando a la violencia en Colombia: el dilema de pagar o no pagar", en: *Cuadernos de Economía 25*, Vol. XV, 1996, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional; Salazar, "Rationality, Preferences and Irregular War", en *Colombian Journal of Economics*, 2003.

[20] Pereda, Carlos, *Vértigos Argumentales*, Barcelona / México, UAM, Ixtapalapa, Anthropos, 1994.

[21] Kalyvas, Stathis N., Op. Cit. p.66.

The rumor among community survives among truthful information and lies to be one or the other depends on conditions of stability or instability deliberative social context where people are immersed. There are intra-prone conditions the effects of noise, and in such conditions the emotions of the people (or physical danger) becomes more vulnerable[22]. The rumor is not clear, usually hides his primary sources, and involves a degree of ambiguity rather lax as detracting from direct responsibility to stakeholders by circulating. Nobody knows for sure who said it. The noise carries harmless to begin with, because apparently a comment that another does not cause damage. It may seem an innocent game, but in areas of armed conflict takes on a huge force with serious consequences[23].

We can compare it to an image. The information circulating locally preserves all components of a system where they are distributed for internal communication lines. The sensors of the network represent basic units of speech that can go in different directions with specificity. Sensor information locally is an agent that recognizes behavior, speech acts, i.e., different modes of communication, which is able to distinguish other agents with different names and signs. In a local population may be noted, for most cases, that information circulating on people tends to be deterministic, as suggested by the following graph:

[22] Indeed, a detailed phenomenology of information in areas of conflict should show us why communities are more prone to rumor and intra-community effects. With what can only confirm the role of social context in which to register the information. This not only depend on the veracity of the source (or the informant), but also a complex constellation of factors, sociological, anthropological and historical, which is part of the local community itself. An extension of this in Bordieu, Pierre, *¿Qué significa hablar?, economía de los intercambios lingüísticos,* Madrid, Akal ediciones, 3.a edición, 2001. También, Valbuena, F. "La comunicación interpersonal", en A. Benito (dir.), *Diccionario de Ciencias y Técnicas de la Comunicación*, Madrid, Ediciones Paulinas, pp.258-266; Sierra, Caballero, F., *Elementos de teoría de la información*, Sevilla, editorial Alcalá de Guadaira, 1999.

[23] Roldán, Mary, *A sangre y fuego: la violencia en Antioquia, Colombia, 1946-1953*, Bogotá, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2002.



Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michał Strojnowski

The features condensed by this image - network helps us understand that the distribution may keep certain levels of balance.

Asymmetrical nature of the information

For information and rumor in conflict zones, however, we can hardly play a decisive nature of it. It is not a closed system, but in the context of open systems. Among other things, the informant is related to bullying strategies and tactics to counter enemy action. More specifically, the information is useful for selecting those for whom it is presumed to potential enemies. So be declared as "military targets"[24]. As a preliminary to obtaining information, the informant provides care to the rumor; it begins as questionable information that runs from side to side without showing someone who supports their content. However, it can have a much more effective persuasive force, as symbolically threatens danger lurking from the uncertainty[25].

A feature of the information circulating in these areas is, in principle, its confidential nature and, so, it is distributed asymmetrically among political actors and civilians[26].

[24] Original agent rumor, occasionally suffer from mood effects suspected that "there are" enemies around. Such states of suspicion spread like material support to the rumor, and serve as a vehicle in interpersonal communication and intra-community.

[25] It should be stressed that the rumor is part of a family of communication phenomena of parasitic character. Close to gossip, slander and calumny.

[26] On the asymmetrical nature of the information, we have complex evidence upon which one can see how victims (almost always) the last to be aware of the plot that is woven over them. The data, names,

Hence, its primary character of the commentary comes regularly surface. Circle with emphasis depending on the degree of harm that is intended to cause, the sound is projected to cause the expected impact. In truth, under conditions of uncertainty populations besieged by violent actors are exposed to be psychologically affected by the rumor of a possible slaughter. In the background, the agents of violence can access the information through the fear in exceptional cases, but usually is to infiltrate some members in intelligence work for the people's spontaneous information[27].

And answer questions, such as, how they carried out the kidnapping collective action in the building in Neiva, to illustrate just one case, is to rediscover a whole wide web of interrelationships between informants, military intelligence and political projection on the scope of action. To detect movements, positions available, acquire data of residents and specify the conditions on the day and time of the operation, previously required very precise tactical dispositions. This implies that in war, violent acts can not be separated from the structure of intelligence operations prior to go with them. It is important to consider incentives and rational expectations of people and communities, both in regard to those who have power in the area and their potential enemies.

Empirically the progress of the war in different populations of the disputed territory, shows how communities have been fragmented, in, i.e., the effect of the imbalances created by intimidation and terror, communities are prone to a social environment mistrust and division. It is not unitary actors that can take uniform measures against their enemies (although we have exceptions), it is rather clear that: (1) The actions of actors dispersed over particular areas of interest and projects of the population, (2) Violence generated enmity among themselves for their own people from the same community[28].

In the context of a strategic confrontation to the dominance of an area between the guerrillas or paramilitaries, information and rumors are instrumentality to classify

---

addresses, family, work and relationships, are obtained without much difficulty. This intersection of information in many cases has had the cooperation of local authorities. In the Colombian conflict panoptic vision of the perpetrators, is easily documentable. Perhaps because the most powerful metaphor for this phenomenon was written in a literary chronicle insurmountable: García Márquez, Gabriel, *Crónica de una muerte anunciada*, México, editorial Diana, 1989.

[27] Aronson, Elliot, *Age of Propaganda. The everyday use and abuse of persuasion*, Nueva York, W.H. Freeman & Co., 1992 (*La era de la propaganda. Uso y abuso de la persuasión*, Barcelona, Paidós, 1992); Pizarro Quintero, A., *Historia de la Propaganda. Notas para un estudio de la propaganda política y de guerra*, Madrid, Eudema, 1990. (2ª ed., 1993) Kaldor, Mary, *The new wars. Organized violence in the global era*, New York, MIT Press, 2001.

[28] Barnet, F.R.S., (eds.) P*olitical Warfare and Psychological Operations. Rethinking the US Approach* Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1989.

bipolar "friends" and "enemies"[29]. Where once coexisted in different forms of exchange and partnership, is the mistrust and opportunism, the bonds of solidarity are lost, the dynamics between intimidation and fear that is displayed in the same communication between the various members of the community[30]. But the composition of the violence in the disputed area and comes in two types of transactions or commitments on the one hand the agents 'external' (both insurgents and paramilitaries, as political actors in the exercise of power), and on the other, the agents 'internal' (civilian informants, militiamen, ordinary people of the locality). The interaction of these exogenous and endogenous agents violence occurs selectively on the basis of information obtained[31].

The information, as rumor circulating regularly in conflict zones is intended to denounce, and complaints stem from all kinds of local conflicts: private nature only (recurring enmity family), or local reflexes of a lawsuit more scale (a conflict between Indians and farmers). Complaints can be linked to the conflict (the opponents by a dispute over land, can be aligned in opposing political camps), and can be generated in the conflict itself (the political actors can invest resources in a given community) and cause competition with their opponents)[32].

So how it becomes Kalyvas describes the complex phenomena of intimidation, fear and denunciation in the dynamics within the community:

> The complaint not only provides benefits, it also carries significant costs. Individuals who are willing to denounce their neighbors will almost always only when the benefits of action outweigh the costs involved there. Because of the enormous difficulty that carries its analysis to anthropologists and historians have overlooked the calculations of the complainants (potential) part of the phenomenon of violence. The main complaint is the cost of the risk of future punishments that meet the complainant[33].

Occasionally the complaint is motivated by the genuine support a political actor (the case of militia), we have a claim on his "pure" state. But most of the time the complaints

[29] Ignatieff, Michael. *Guerra virtual. Más allá de Kosovo*. Editorial, Editorial Paidós, Barcelona. Traductor, Francisco Beltrán Adell, 195 pp.

[30] Álvarez, Gardeazabal, Gustavo, *Cóndores no se entierran todos los días*, Bogotá, Ancora editores, 1971. Una mirada a la donación de Botero al Museo Nacional de Bogotá: Botero, Fernando. "Con dolor de patria", en *Revista Diners*, marzo del 2001, pág. 24.

[31] Alfredo Molano: *De Llano llano, Siguiendo el corte, Llano adentro, Rebusque mayor, aguas arriba, trochas y fusiles*. Todas publicadas por el Áncora Editores, Bogotá.

[32] Kalyvas, Stathis N., "La violencia en medio de la guerra civil", Óp. Cit. 3-25.

[33] Ídem, p.18

are motivated by selfish interests, the selfish, the result of an interest in solving personal vendettas (complaint maliciously). In these cases, the information and rumor play a role in denouncing the war parasitic, who reveals, has the intent to cause harm to the accused[34].

Provide the information circulating as rumor is an expansive image that comes basically as empirical phenomena from elementary dialogue between two, and that is assuming increasing leadership through concatenated nodes. Note that the links created by the sound each one of the neighborhoods include potential expansion into an adjacent area in a direction oriented. Added to this is the time, that in the empirical cases studied to conflict zones, it can take only a few hours or days. The image allows us to appreciate these aspects quite simple:



Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michał Strojnowsk

Also people are often willing to denounce their neighbors to get benefits or protection and security. A complaint can take another path, once it clears the form of the rumor ("say", "some say", "There is said"). The opportunity created by the rumor is the opportunity for the settling of accounts of small altercations or discrepancies. But the

[34] The roads "intermediate" which runs through the eye provide a vague rumor about the intentions of the agent of violence. As can be corroborated, in civil wars, often camouflage the real objectives through political discourse learned (sometimes from memory.) Down (between the lines) we find the desire for personal revenge, grudges Crusaders, jealousy and envy. While "Up" is touting great causes. Only when we read in hobessian key conflict in Colombia, sufficient care should be given to rational adaptation processes with this voluntarism apparently operating blind beast warrior. As he does see the study of Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, *La ciudad representada, políticas y conflicto en Bogotá*, TM Editores, 1998.

results can have unfortunate consequences. For this reason, this network of units they move the information and reporting, are interwoven personal and collective interests, the former are related perks he receives complaint, in the second case, the strategic mobilization of terror carried signs to intimidate who are close to the victims[35].

Information units correlated with the rumor always run under conditions not fully developed. Thus, a node that has key information can potentially be related to strategic points in the network to be responsible for reproducing the information in adjacent areas. In fact, the specific information is not unidirectional. Viewed in another way, what we have in the structure is an interactive relationship with obvious flaws: gaps, distortion or instances of network drives that behave indifferent.

The key to interpreting the phenomenology of paramilitary massacres like the barrel of the ticks or the Playon de Orozco, a village lost in the middle of the Magdalena department, we find, not only in military-style strategic moves, but in the targeted work search information and tracking details from informants. One of the most explicit was the slaughter committed by the paramilitaries in The Gabarra, Tibu, Nort de Santander. Chacon Edison reporter makes use of an owner taking the exact words of the commander criminal: "From here it does not move anyone. With a greeting among the terrified villagers in fear: "Put on some music this holiday is just beginning"[36].

The following figure illustrates a model could use as information channels between members of the civilian population and violent actors.

[35] The set reproduces almost all the critical aspects of the impact of misinformation and rumor in conflict zones. On one hand, the strategic fields of territorial dominance and the advancing of the troops on the territories they fear being abandoned by the inhabitants of places. Moreover, the exchange of sets of rational complex conflict that is having an imitation processes and surprise. And finally, the subject we have addressed the mechanisms and impacts of information and rumor. Information as cohesive unit becomes a rumor spread that results in proliferation of ambiguous effects strategically exploited by the agents of violence.

[36] San Jose del Palmar, Chocó, was the scene of fierce fighting between the FARC and a newly developed self-defense group in Risaralda. In this particular case were subjected populations in strict compliance with all sorts of intimidation by the different fronts in confrontation. See: "Muerte en el cañón de las Garrapatas", *Revista Semana*, Octubre 31 de 2005.



Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michał Strojnowsk

However, this is one of the most complex problems in this negotiation with the paramilitaries. Their assets are precisely the most desirable fertile land and strategic sites who have taken in their outreach activities and military dominance. It is complex because these lands have been for the last two decades also the main object of poppy and coca, and camps have served as laboratories for drug processing. The return of these lands and, so, the destruction of one of the most profitable economic sources of drug traffickers and paramilitaries is still a headache for those who are negotiating the reintegration of these groups[37].

The sound and the claim can be inferred under uncertainty, when agents of violence do not have the time to corroborate the data collected, the rumor is taken as information. It's the right occasion, reporting personal enemies as a cause or political actors themselves assume all costs of risk. In many cases, violence excuse. The scene of conflict becomes dense, hidden under the shadows of anonymity to the complainant. It is paid and provided with advanced weapons to an army of mercenaries to liquidate the enemies or making a profit on property and land[38].

[37] Uribe, María Teresa: "Los materiales de la memoria". En: *La investigación cualitativa*. Editado por: ICFES (Instituto colombiano para el fomento de la educación superior) e INER (Instituto de Estudios Regionales Universidad de Antioquia). Medellín; "La territorialidad de los conflictos y de la violencia en Antioquia. En: *Realidad social*. Editorial Gobernación de Antioquia. Medellín

[38] Paul Collier y Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and grievance in civil war, Centre for Study of American Economics* Working Paper Series, 2002. María del Pilar Castillo y Boris Salazar. "Guerra Irregular, interacción estratégica y conjeturas: ¿Qué esperan ejércitos y civiles?" Ponencia presentada en el seminario *Obstacles to Robust Settlements of Civil Conflicts*. Bogotá: Santafe Institute and the Javeriana University, mayo 29-31, 2003. "Los señores de la tierra", *Revista Semana*, mayo 31 a junio7 de 2004, edición N° 1.152.; Juan Camilo Restrepo, "Los señores de la tierra", *El Tiempo*, 6 de octubre de 2004.

This combination of complex interests in confrontation, conscious and unconscious affects people who undergo this way to a private power to make sure their integrity[39]. Kalyvas said: "The State is given in concession, as it were, to people in the region, who use their newly acquired power to pursue their personal interests and settle old scores."

Many cases of violence that apparently (and outside observers) seem to originate from purely political or ideological motivations, do or not, after a thorough examination turn out to be "caused not by political or ideological issues, but by personal hatreds, revenge or jealousy."

Conclusion

In Colombia, the escalation of armed confrontation and the increasing inclusion of civilians by the agents of violence has created a personalization of the conflict, ie the links have increased subjective to prove acts of barbarism. All of which does nothing but give to increased personal vendettas, family or militia groups. In summa the war then is being waged not between distinct sides, but in areas of common interchange between armed actors and the civilian population.

Consequently, these exchanges are an irregular cycle of violence that affects social relations, from shock phenomena and micro force (the cases of personal revenge) to the rivalry between irregular armies. We study and prototype for a conflict whose dimensions, although heterogeneous understand aspects in detail, corresponding to a structured set in the interaction of disparate violence[40].

In wartime, the complaint can not only give benefits, also carries much risks and dangers. Those who share information and rumor, the complainants are willing to

[39] "Estado Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial", en *Revista Análisis Político*, Número 56,IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Enero – Abril de 2006, pp. 115 – 131.

[39] Kalyvas, Stathis, N., Op. Cit., p.19; También: Eduardo Pizarro León G. "Paramilitarización urbana", *El Tiempo*, junio 18 de 2004; Juan Manuel López Caballero: "Reflexiones que genera el paramilitarismo", en *Revista Dinero,* mayo 14 de 2004; Álvaro Camacho Guizado: "El marxismo-leninismo de las Farc" en *El Espectador,* mayo 7 de 2004; del mismo investigador "El conflicto colombiano: algo más que una guerra", *El Espectador*, junio 9 de 2004; Rodrigo Pardo: "Paras, sombrías incertidumbres" *El Tiempo*, 1 feb. 2001; Alfredo Rangel "El pantano paramilitar" *El Tiempo*, agosto 6 de 2003; "Complejo de Adán y fracasomanía" *El Tiempo*, julio de 2004; Francisco Gutiérrez Sanin: "Clausewitz vindicated?, Economics and politics in the Colombian war", *Semana.com*.

[40] Deas. Malcolm *Intercambios violentos*, Bogotá, Taurus, 1999. As you can surmise, we have taken an additional step to this test Deas, over time become an indispensable source for understanding the conflict in Colombia. The idea of deriving the various manifestations of the war in Colombia, from the violence of 50, and from there to the complex impacts of drug trafficking should be reviewed again.

denounce their neighbors, provided the benefit of this action outweighs the costs involved there.

When the city acts on the informant has the relative advantages that gives anonymity, be aware of political and military goals, disguise your identity can be very problematic. The mobility and changing identity plays into the strategies that have armed groups to gather information. Not so in small towns, where the recognition of familiar people, know little quarrels, squabbles and differences between families, and so on. Whose complaint in a small social environment, is exposed to the next retaliation by those affected.

Keep this interpretation of the conflict at the local level involves several tasks: (a) find territorial movements of clusters (b) Study of asymmetries in the mechanisms of information between people and agents of violence (c) analyze the strategic trade rational (d) Develop a mapping as detailed as possible about the relationship between the different discourses of conflict (e) structuring based on the foregoing, a foresight on the developments between conflict and political economy in Colombia.

Bibliography

Bordieu, Pierre, 2001, *¿Qué significa hablar?, economía de los intercambios lingüísticos*, Madrid, Akal ediciones, 3.a edición.

Cartey, J. 1980, "Rumeur et politique" en *La Revue administrative*, n. 195, mayo-junio, pp. 250-252.

Clausewitz, C. v., 1978, *De la guerra*, Madrid, Labor.

Collier, Paul y Anke Hoeffler, 2002, *Greed and grievance in civil war*, Centre for Study of American Economics Working Paper Series.

Deas Malcom, 1999, *Intercambios violentos*, Bogotá, Taurus.

Elster, Jon, 1999, *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the emotions*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Estrada, Fernando, "libertad en Antígona de Sófocles", 1999, *Argumentación filosófica y lenguaje*, Ediciones UIS, Bucaramanga.

Estrada, Fernando, 2004, *Las metáforas de una guerra perpetua, estudios sobre pragmática del discurso en el conflicto armado colombiano*, Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT, Colección Cielos de Arena, 173 pp.

Estrada, Fernando, 2006, "Estado Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial". *Revista Análisis Político*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia, S.A:, v.56, p.115 – 131.

Glucksmann, André, *El discurso del odio*, 2005, Trad. Mónica Rubio F., Madrid, Taurus.

Gouësset, V. 1999. "el territorio colombiano y sus márgenes. La difícil tarea de la reconstrucción territorial". En: *Territorios*, No1, pp. 77-94.

Juliá, Santos, 1999, (ed.), Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Víctimas de la guerra civil", Madrid: *Temas de Hoy*.

Kalyvas, S. 2000. *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*, Department of Politics, New York University: Mimeo.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2001. "'New' and 'Old' Civil Was: A Valid Distinction?" World Politics (in *Research Notes*) 54(1).

Kalyvas, Stathis, 2001, "la violencia en medio de la guerra civil, esbozo de una teoría", En, *Revista Análisis Político* No 42.

Kalyvas, Stathis, 2001, "La violencia en medio de la guerra civil, esbozo de una teoría" en *Revista Análisis Político*, Iepri, Universidad Nacional, Bogotá.

Kapferer, J.-N.: Rumeurs, 1987, *le plus vieux média du monde*, París, Seuil.

Nozick, Robert, 1990, *Anarquía, Estado y Utopía*, editado por el Fondo de Cultura Económica, traducción de Rolando Tamayo, Primera reimpresión, México.

Reumaux, F. 1998, *La rumeur. Message et transmission*, París, Armand Colin.

Roldan, Mary, 1985, *A sangre y fuego, la violencia en Antioquia, Colombia*, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia & Fundación para la Promoción de la Ciencia y la Tecnología, Bogotá, Colombia.

Rouqutte, M. L.: *Les Rumeurs*, 1983, París, PUF, 1975; Kaplan, S.: *Le complot de famine: histoire d'une rumeur au XVIII des consommateurs*, París, Institut d'éstudes et de recherches publicitaires.

Pereda, Carlos, 1994, *Vértigos Argumentales*, Barcelona / México, UAM, Ixtapalapa, Anthropos.

Salazar, Boris, María del Pilar Castillo, 2001, *La hora de los dinosaurios, conflicto y depredación en Colombia*, Cedec, UniValle, Cali; "Jugando a la violencia en Colombia: el dilema de pagar o no pagar", en: *Cuadernos de Economía* 25, Vol. XV, 1996, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional; Salazar, "Rationality, Preferences and Irregular War", en *Colombian Journal of Economics*, forthcoming, 2003.

Sierra, Caballero F, 1999*, Elementos de teoría de la información*, Sevilla, editorial Alcalá de Guadaira.