Entanglement by Genes or Shares; Hamilton´s rule of kin selection revisited

Friedrich, Thomas (2014): Entanglement by Genes or Shares; Hamilton´s rule of kin selection revisited.

Abstract

Help within genetically related and unrelated organisms as well as investments of investors holding shares to different degree including charity can be understood within the ensemble concept. In an ensemble transfer of substrate from a source to a sink may result in superadditivity as well as subadditivity. The ensemble with the better net profit will prevail. Source and sink may be entangled by genes or shares. The degree of entanglement is expressed by an entanglement factor between zero and one. This entanglement factor may be (over)compensated by a success factor. In non-entangled parties a higher success factor is necessary for partial compensation. However, the over-compensation is only a local phenomenon. In entangled parties a higher success factor will completely over-compensate lower entanglement. The redistribution of substrate from source to two different sinks is an example of a target conflict between maximal yield and maximal yield increase. The success factor is a complex amalgam of unknown but interrelated equations and values. Besides transfer efficiencies, survival probabilities and number an important part of the success factor is the time frame. In organisms costing help for offspring is due to genetic entanglement and a longer lifespan of the young offspring versus the old parent. Exceptions from this rule (filial cannibalism) are completely encompassed by the concept. Long term investments will outperform short term investments always on the long run - in case they manage to survive on the short run!

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: ensemble, source, sink, net profit, Hamilton´s rule, success factor, entanglement factor, genetic reciprocity, inclusive fitness, charity, altruism, quantity, quality, hidden variable, group selection, target conflict
• Subjects: Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General

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