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Optimal Income Taxation with a Stationarity Constraint in a Dynamic Stochastic Economy∗

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Abstract

We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic, stochastic environment when the government cannot change the tax rule as uncertainty resolves. Due to such a stationarity constraint, our taxation problem is reduced to a static one over an expanded type space. We strengthen the argument in the static model that the zero top marginal tax rate result is of little practical importance because it is actually relevant only when the top earner in the initial period receives the highest shock in every subsequent period. Under a general stochastic structure such that the support of types moves over time, all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.

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1 Introduction

Since the New Dynamic Public Finance was inaugurated, progress has been made in clarifying what the optimal dynamic nonlinear income tax looks like. This

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agenda aims to extend the seminal work of Mirrlees (1971), who studies optimal income taxation in a static environment, to dynamic, stochastic environments.\footnote{See Kocherlakota (2010) for an overview of this literature.} Dynamic tax rules are in effect dynamic contracts because taxpayers have private information about their labor productivity, so the optimal dynamic income tax rule is generally complicated: it is non-stationary and depends on the entire history of income declared for any taxpayer. However, it is questionable whether governments can implement such complex tax rules because making tax rules time-dependent and tracking histories of income would entail large administrative and compliance costs. Indeed, neither of our governments (i.e., the US and Japanese governments) is tracking income histories for taxation.

In view of this observation, we contribute to the New Dynamic Public Finance literature by considering optimal dynamic income taxation when the government faces a stationarity constraint that the tax rule cannot be changed over time. That is, the government can use only stationary tax rules. Moreover, stationarity of tax rule implies that the tax cannot depend on histories of income. Indeed, the government using a stationary tax rule can look at only current incomes, just as it can only look at current incomes in the initial period. Naturally, we also assume that the government makes a full commitment to its (stationary) tax rule. That is, once the tax rule is determined in the initial period, the government cannot switch to another stationary tax rule afterwards. We are assuming that such commitment is not only possible, but perhaps unavoidable, due to political deadlock over the issue of tax policy, as in the US right now.\footnote{Indeed, the US government has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 1986. The Japanese government is more flexible, but it has not changed its income tax system in a major way since 2007. Therefore, once the tax systems are fixed, they persist for some time.} Thus, we may interpret our planner’s problem on a politician’s short time-scale. Although our assumptions might be extreme, we believe that it is important and useful to have a sense about what the optimal dynamic income tax looks like when the set of tax rules is limited to ones that are feasible in practice.

We consider a finite horizon discrete time model in which the government would like to maximize the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function. Our economy is heterogeneous as we begin with a non-trivial exogenous type distribution where type here is people’s earning ability.\footnote{If we do not fix the initial type distribution, the model has identical agents facing uncertainty, which is like a macro model. However, as long as we consider the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function, the optimal tax rules for identical agents are identical.} People receive stochastic shocks
in each period such that the larger the value of the shock, the higher the earning ability is. We focus on idiosyncratic shocks, but the process of shock is general.\footnote{In particular, the initial type and subsequent shocks can be correlated for each agent. In the empirical literature regarding earning risk, it has been found that idiosyncratic shocks are highly persistent. See, for example, Storesletten et al. (2004).} Regarding intertemporal resource allocation, we assume that the government can save or borrow from an outside party so that it considers a single aggregate resource constraint. However, we show that the government cannot allow agents to save or borrow at all because allowing them to save or borrow requires the government to look at histories.

Although the analytical characterizations and even numerical analysis of the optimal dynamic tax system are difficult in general, we can analytically characterize the optimal tax system because our problem can be reduced to a static one due to the stationarity of the tax rule.\footnote{Naturally, gaining tractability in this way widens the analytical insights about optimal dynamic income taxation we could derive. For example, if we assumed the quasi-linear utility, we could conduct comparative static analysis as in Weymark (1987).} Specifically, this is because under the stationarity constraint, the tax rule depends on only the current income and (as we show) individual saving or borrowing is not allowed, so we can regard an agent living for $T$ periods as distinct agents in each period and for each shock. Therefore, we can directly apply the arguments for static models to our model.

A famous result in the static optimal income taxation is that the top marginal tax rate is zero. That is, the top earner’s marginal tax rate is zero. However, we cast doubt on its policy relevance. In our dynamic stochastic economy, the support of types will move over time, and a direct application of the static arguments implies that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of the expanded type space, or the union of supports over time. Thus, if the maximum earning ability increases over time, the zero top marginal tax result would apply only when the top earner in the initial period receives the largest possible value of the shock in every period.\footnote{The policy relevance of the zero top marginal tax rate result has also been questioned from other perspectives. For example, it has been pointed out that the result depends on the shape of type distribution (see, e.g., Diamond, 1998; Diamond and Saez, 2011).} Although one can argue that the fraction of people who face the zero marginal tax rate is small in the static model, our result strengthens this. Indeed, whereas the top earner certainly exists in a static economy, an individual who eventually attains
the highest possible income, to whom the zero marginal tax rate applies, does not necessarily exist ex post in our dynamic, stochastic economy.

The stationarity constraint has a non-negligible impact on equilibrium outcomes of new dynamic public finance models. Battaglini and Coate (2008), who consider history-dependent non-stationary tax rules, show that the marginal tax rate is zero if an agent is currently, or has at some point been, the top earner. Thus, an individual who is the top earner in all periods faces the zero marginal tax rate in every period. Evidently, their tax rule takes full advantage of the fact that it can be history-dependent and non-stationary. In our model, as we have stated, such an individual faces the zero marginal tax rate only in the terminal period. Moreover, we observe that the structure of stochastic shock can also have a non-negligible impact. Because Battaglini and Coate (2008) consider a two-state Markov process, the support of types is fixed over time. Thus, their result implies that the fraction of people whose allocation is distorted vanishes as the time horizon increases. On the other hand, in our model, the support of types generally moves over time, and all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.

Regarding the past literature that is relevant to our work, one of the most general treatments of optimal nonlinear income taxation in a dynamic, stochastic economy is Kocherlakota (2005). In his model, both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks are present, and no restriction is imposed on the processes of shocks. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) consider optimal taxation in a dynamic stochastic economy with i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks. They show that the constrained-efficient allocation can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with an indirect mechanism that depends on only current wealth and current labor income. Battaglini and Coate (2008), as we have already mentioned, consider a dynamic stochastic economy where idiosyncratic shocks evolve as a two-state Markov process. Although the stochastic structure is simplified, they address the effects of people’s risk attitude and the time-consistency of the optimal tax rule.7

There has been some work that shares our motivation and studies tax rules that are more realistic than fully optimal rules in dynamic economies. It has been found that simple tax rules can achieve sizable welfare gains. Weinzierl (2011) considers history-independent non-stationary tax rules, which he calls age-dependent tax

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7In a two-period deterministic environment, Berliant and Ledyard (2014) study a history-dependent non-stationary tax rule while addressing time-consistency.
rules, in a dynamic, deterministic economy. Golosov et al. (2013) study a realistic pension system in which income tax is history-independent and retirement benefits are inspired by the actual US system. Farhi and Werning (2013) consider a dynamic stochastic economy with idiosyncratic shocks that evolve as a Markov process, and study history-independent tax rules. Compared to their work, we consider even simpler tax rules that are stationary while the evolution of idiosyncratic shocks is not limited to a Markov process.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we state the basic structure of the model, present our problem, and characterize the second-best tax rule. Section 3 contains our conclusions and discusses subjects for future research. Proofs omitted from the main text are provided in an Appendix.

2 The Model

We consider a finite horizon model with a unit mass of agents. The economy lasts for $T + 1$ periods. In period 0, each agent is endowed with type $w \in W_0 \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{++}$, where $W_0$ is a (non-degenerate) closed interval, distributed with density function $f_w$. However, there are idiosyncratic shocks to the agents’ types in the subsequent periods. At the beginning of period 1, an element of $z^T = \{z_t\}_{t=1}^T \in Z^T$ is drawn for agent with type $w$ according to a density function $f(z^T | w)$ where $Z \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a (non-degenerate) closed interval. What we are trying to capture here is the latent ability of workers that is not observed by others. We assume that the draw of the entire vector $z^T$ conditional on $w$ is i.i.d. among people and the law of large numbers holds. Thus, $f(z^T, w) \equiv f(z^T | w) f_w(w)$, which is the joint density of $z^T$ and $w$, denotes the density of agents having type $w$ in the initial period and getting shock $z^T$. Note that, although shocks for all $T$ periods are drawn in the initial period, the agent only learns them as time goes on. Specifically, in period $t$, the agent for whom $z^T$ was drawn in the initial period observes the history $(w, z^t)$, where $z^t$ is the vector of the first $t$ elements of $z^T$ (i.e., $z^t = \{z_s\}_{s=1}^t$).

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8Gaube (2010) also discusses age-dependent tax rules. Because his main interest lies in the time-consistency of tax rules, he focuses on a two-period model.

9Kocherlakota (2005), for example, also makes these assumptions. Regarding the law of large numbers, there are some technical issues for the case of continuum of i.i.d. random variables (Judd, 1985). However, Sun (2006) provides a solution to this issue by presenting a probability space in which the law of large numbers holds.
If an agent is endowed with type \( w \) in the initial period, his type will change to \( w_t = \phi_t(w; z^T) \) in period \( t \) with \( \phi_t : W_0 \times Z^T \to \mathbb{R}_+ \), where \( \phi_t(w; z^T) \) is continuously differentiable and monotone increasing in \( w \) and \( z_s (s \leq t) \) but constant in \( z_s (s > t) \). For example, if we consider a linear technology, \( \phi_t(w; z^T) = w + \sum_{s=1}^{t} z_s \). Let 

\[
W_t = \left\{ w' \in \mathbb{R} : \exists (w, z^T) \in W_0 \times Z^T, w' = \phi_t(w; z^T) \right\}.
\]

That is, let \( W_t \) be the range of \( \phi_t \). Because \( \phi_t \) is continuous and \( W_0 \times Z^T \) is connected and compact, \( W_t \) is a closed interval. Moreover, the strict monotonicity of \( \phi_t \) implies that \( W_t \) is non-degenerate. \( W_t \) is the type space in period \( t \), and we assume \( W_{t-1} \cap W_t \neq \emptyset \) for any \( t \geq 1 \). For later use, we also define the expanded type space \( \mathbb{W} = \bigcup_{t=0}^{T} W_t \).

The agents supply labor and consume the good produced under constant returns to scale in each period. As is usual in optimal taxation models, they face a trade-off between consumption and leisure. The utility function is

\[
U\left([c_t, \ell_t]_{t=0}^{T}\right) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \rho^t u(c_t, \ell_t)
\]

where \( \ell_t \in [0, 1] \) is labor in period \( t \), \( c_t \) is consumption in period \( t \), and \( \rho > 0 \) is the discount factor. We assume that \( u(c, \ell) \) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave as well as increasing in \( c \), and decreasing in \( \ell \). Moreover, we assume that leisure \( 1 - \ell \) is a noninferior good. In our model, type represents the earning ability of agents. That is, if the labor supply of agent \( w \) is \( \ell \), his gross income is given by \( y = w\ell \).

Before proceeding, let us summarize the regularity conditions we have imposed:

**Assumption 1 (Regularity conditions).**

1. \( W_0 \subset \mathbb{R}_+ \) and \( Z \subseteq \mathbb{R} \) are non-degenerate closed intervals;
2. \( \phi_t(w; z^T) \) is positive, continuously differentiable, monotone increasing in \( w \) and \( z_s (s \leq t) \) as well as constant in \( z_s (s > t) \); \( W_{t-1} \cap W_t \neq \emptyset \) for any \( t \geq 1 \);
3. \( u(c, \ell) \) is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave as well as increasing in \( c \), and decreasing in \( \ell \); leisure \( 1 - \ell \) is a noninferior good.

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\( \text{If } \phi_t(w; 0) = w \text{ where } 0 \text{ is the } T \text{-dimensional null vector, } 0 \in Z \text{ is sufficient for this.} \)

\( \text{Hellwig (2007) presents another assumption that is a cardinal property of } u \text{ instead of the assumption that leisure is a noninferior good, which is an ordinal property.} \)
We suppose that there is a risk-free bond market with interest rate \( R > 0 \) where \( b \) is the bond holding of an agent. Then, letting \( \tau \) be a (lump-sum) component of an income tax, an agent’s budget constraint in period \( t \) is

\[
c_t + b_{t+1} = y_t - \tau_t + (1 + R)b_t. \tag{3}
\]

The government would like to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we consider the following utilitarian social welfare function:

\[
SW = \int_{W_0} \int_{Z^T} U \left( \{c_t, y_t/w_t\}_{t=0}^{T} \right) f(z^T, w) dz^T dw. \tag{4}
\]

Since the one-period utility function is strictly concave and leisure is a noninferior good, it follows that redistribution is desirable under the utilitarian welfare function (Seade, 1982). The planner would like to carry out redistribution through income taxes, but he cannot observe the agents’ types. Thus, the government needs to design a mechanism that makes the agents reveal their true types.

We consider a direct mechanism in which agents report their types and the government specifies the combination of consumption \( c \), gross income \( y \), and bond holding \( b \) for each report in each period. In general, the rule for specifying the allocation \( (c, y, b) \) could be non-stationary and depend on histories of reports. However, because our planner faces a stationarity constraint, he cannot enforce non-stationary tax rules. Moreover, as a consequence, he looks at only current reports, just as he can only look at current reports in the initial period. Therefore, we focus on allocation rules described by function \( x(\cdot) = (c(\cdot), y(\cdot), b(\cdot)) \) with \( x : W \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+^2 \times \mathbb{R} \) such that the allocation rule in period \( t \) is the restriction of \( x \) to \( W_t \).\(^\text{12}\)

Since the planner cannot observe the agents’ types, he faces incentive compatibility (IC) constraints that require that the agents do not misreport their types. Let

\[
v(x(w'), w) = u(c(w'), y(w')/w). \tag{5}
\]

This is the one-period utility that an agent of type \( w \) obtains when he reports \( w' \). Since the agents report their types in each period, the IC constraints are imposed

\(^\text{12}\)We note that the government is aware of the stationarity constraint, so once it chooses its allocation rule, it knows the rule cannot be changed, and accounts for this when choosing the rule.
in each period. Recall that $W_t$, the range of $\phi_t$, is the type space in period $t$ for $t \geq 1$. The IC constraint in the last period is then given by

$$\forall w \in W_T, \ v(x(w), w) \geq v(x(w'), w) \text{ for all } w' \in W_T.$$  \hspace{1cm} (IC_T)

On the other hand, the IC constraint in period $t \in \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, T-1\}$ is given by

$$\forall w \in W_t, \ v(x(w), w) + \sum_{s \geq t+1} \rho^s \int_{Z^T} \max_{\tilde{w} \in W_s} v(x(\tilde{w}), \phi_s(w; z^T)) f(z^T | w) dz^T$$

$$\geq v(x(w'), w) + \sum_{s \geq t+1} \rho^s \int_{Z^T} \max_{\tilde{w} \in W_s} v(x(\tilde{w}), \phi_s(w; z^T)) f(z^T | w) dz^T \text{ for all } w' \in W_t \text{ } (IC_t)$$

Because our mechanism does not depend on history, the report in the current period does not affect the expected continuation payoff, i.e.,

$$\sum_{s \geq t+1} \rho^s \int_{Z^T} \max_{\tilde{w} \in W_s} v(x(\tilde{w}), \phi_s(w; z^T)) f(z^T | w) dz^T$$

does not depend on the report in period $t$. As a result, the IC constraint in period $t$ reduces to

$$\forall w \in W_t, \ v(x(w), w) \geq v(x(w'), w) \text{ for all } w' \in W_t.$$  \hspace{1cm} (IC_t)

Although we have included bond holding in the mechanism above, there is an important result regarding to what extent the government facing the stationarity constraint can control individual saving or borrowing. Note that, under the stationarity constraint, the tax rule, which is induced by an allocation rule via (3), also must be stationary and history-independent. However, this will imply that the government cannot allow saving or borrowing:

**Proposition 1.** Under Assumption 1, the government facing the stationarity and incentive compatibility constraints cannot allow agents to save or borrow. That is, $b(w) = 0$ for all $w \in W$.

The proof can be found in the Appendix. The logic behind this result is pretty simple. Suppose that, in period $t-1$, there are agents having types $w_{t-1}$ and $w'_{t-1}$ respectively, and both of them become type $w_t$ in period $t$. Under the monotonicity of $\phi_t$, such agents exist. By incentive compatibility, they truthfully report their types in each period. By the budget constraint, the period-$t$ tax on the agent who changes
from \( w_{t-1} \) to \( w_t \) is then \( \tau(w_t) = y(w_t) - c(w_t) - b(w_t) + (1 + R)b(w_{t-1}) \). Because of the stationarity constraint, the tax on the agent who changes from \( w_{t-1}' \) to \( w_t \) is also \( \tau(w_t) \), but the budget constraint implies that \( \tau(w_t) = y(w_t) - c(w_t) - b(w_t) + (1 + R)b(w_{t-1}) \). Thus, we must have \( b(w_{t-1}) = b(w_{t-1}') \). The assumption \( W_{t-1} \cap W_t \neq \emptyset \) then enables us to use induction, and, in particular, we obtain \( b(w) = 0 \) for all \( w \in W \) because \( b(w) = 0 \) by the terminal condition. Note that this argument does not depend on the utility function. In particular, Proposition 1 holds regardless of people’s risk attitude (i.e., whether they are risk-neutral or risk-averse).

There are two remarks about this result. First, because our revenue constraint is integrated over time, as we will see, the government can save and borrow for the agents. However, the stationarity constraint leaves no room for saving and borrowing not because the government borrows and saves for the consumers, but because it cannot actually address the intertemporal wedge.\(^{13}\) Indeed, Farhi and Werning (2013) also have a revenue constraint integrated over time, but according to their simulations, bond holdings are not zero. Second, we can see that the stochastic shocks are important for the argument above. Due to the shocks, each state can be reached by several agents who generally have different histories. When the government would like to address the intertemporal wedge, it is impossible for the government to take care of these agents’ situations simultaneously due to the stationarity constraint.\(^{14}\)

In view of Proposition 1, we henceforth drop the notation for the bond holding and let \( x(\cdot) = (c(\cdot), y(\cdot)) \). In addition to the IC constraints, the government faces a resource constraint: it needs to finance \( G \) in units of consumption good through the tax. This revenue could be used for a public good that is fixed in quantity (and thus in cost) or the public good could enter utility as an additively separable term. We assume that the government can borrow or save at rate \( \rho \). Because \( \tau(w) = y(w) - c(w) \) by Proposition 1, the government then faces the following resource constraint (RC):

\[
G \leq \int_{W_0} (y(w) - c(w)) f_w(w)dw + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \rho^t \int_{W_0} \int_{Z^t} (y(w_t) - c(w_t)) f(z^t, w)dz^t dw. \quad (RC)
\]

\(^{13}\)The intertemporal wedge is related to Euler equation, or intertemporal substitution. See, for example, Kocherlakota (2004).

\(^{14}\)Kapicka (2006) studies optimal income taxation in a dynamic, deterministic model where people can allocate their time to human capital investment. Focusing on steady states, the government can specify (constant) investment levels for each agent even though it faces a stationarity constraint.
Suppose that an agent is endowed with type \( w \) in the initial period. Let
\[
V(x(\cdot), w) = \int_{\mathbb{Z}^T} U \left( \left( c(w_t), y(w_t) / w_t \right)_{t=0}^T \right) f(z^T | w) dw^T.
\]
where \( w_t = \phi_t(w; z^T) \). This is the expected lifetime utility that the agent obtains by reporting truthfully in each period. Then, the planner’s problem is given by
\[
\max_{x(\cdot)} \int_{W_0} V(x(\cdot), w) f_w(w) dw
\]
s.t. (RC) and (IC\(_t\)) for all \( t \).

For reference, the \textit{first-best allocation rule} \( x^*(\cdot) \) maximizes the utilitarian welfare function subject to the resource constraint only, assuming that the government knows the type of each agent at each time.

In addition to the regularity conditions stated above, we make the following assumption on the one-period utility function \( u \):

**Assumption 2 (Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property: SCP).** \( \forall (c, y, w) \in \mathbb{R}^2_x \times W, -wu(c, y/w)/u(c, y/w) \) is increasing in \( w \).

Here is the key idea of our work. When we solve the problem (7), we exploit the fact that our mechanism is time-invariant and does not depend on history, and we consider a time-separable utility function and the utilitarian social welfare function. Therefore, the problem can be reduced to a static problem in which the total mass of agents is expanded to \( \sum_{t=0}^{T} \rho_t \). That is, each person in each period is considered to be a different person in the static model. Utilitarianism with the time-separable utility gives us the equivalence. Then, we take the standard approach for static optimal income taxation problems to solve the problem (7). That is, we consider a relaxed problem in which the IC constraints are replaced with weaker conditions and invoke the fact that a solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the original problem under Assumption 2.

It might be more straightforward to consider an indirect mechanism in which

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\(^{15}\)This assumption is equivalent to assuming that the consumption good is a normal good. See p. 182 of Mirrlees (1971).

\(^{16}\)This argument crucially depends on the fact that mechanism is static. Otherwise, general assumptions like the single crossing property that connect the relaxed problem to the original one are not known (Farhi and Werning, 2013).
the agents report their incomes and the government specifies income taxes for each report. However, because bond holding cannot be allowed by Proposition 1, it readily follows that Hammond’s (1979) result applies to our problem because, as we will see, our problem reduces to a static one. That is, characterizing the direct mechanism is equivalent to designing a tax rule \( \tau(\cdot) \) and letting each agent choose his income \( y_t \) and consumption \( c_t = y_t - \tau(y_t) \).

Let \( w = \min W \) and \( \bar{w} = \max W \) (thus, \( W = [w, \bar{w}] \)). Moreover, recall that \( x^*(\cdot) \) is the first-best allocation rule that maximizes social welfare subject to the resource constraint. The main properties of the planner’s allocation rule are then summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.** Under Assumptions 1 and 2, (i) \( x(w) \leq x^*(w) \) for any \( w \in W \) with equality at \( w = \bar{w} \).\(^{17}\) If \( y(w) \) is strictly increasing at \( w = \bar{w} \), \( x(w) = x^*(w) \). Moreover, if \( y(w) > 0 \), then \( x(w) \ll x^*(w) \) for any \( w \in (w, \bar{w}) \); (ii) \( \tau'(y(\bar{w})) = 0 \) and if \( y(w) \) is strictly increasing at \( w = \bar{w} \), \( \tau'(y(\bar{w})) = 0 \). Moreover, if \( y(w) > 0 \), then \( \tau'(y(w)) \in (0, 1) \) for any \( w \in (w, \bar{w}) \).

The proof can be found in the Appendix. Property (i) states that the allocation is first-best at the top of \( W \) and if income is strictly increasing at the bottom of \( W \), the allocation is also first-best there. In addition, no allocation can be distorted upward from the first-best allocation and in particular, if income is positive, the allocation is distorted downward from the first-best allocation in the interior of \( W \). Property (ii) states that the marginal tax rate is zero at the top of \( W \) and if income is strictly increasing at the bottom of \( W \), the marginal tax rate is also zero there. On the other hand, if income is positive, the marginal tax rate is more than 0 but less then 1 in the interior of \( W \).

By Proposition 2, as long as everyone works so that \( y(w) > 0 \) for all \( w \in W \), the allocation is generally first-best and the marginal tax rate is zero only at the top of the expanded type space \( W \). Thus, if \( \max W_t \) increases over time,\(^{18}\) no one’s allocation is generally first-best and no one’s marginal tax rate is zero in the first \( T \) periods nor the last period except when the type of the top earner in the initial period reaches \( \bar{w} = \max W \). This is possible only when the top earner in the initial period remains top in every period. In practice, the planner may set the marginal tax rate at zero for the type \( \bar{w} \), but the probability of anyone achieving this type is zero.

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\(^{17}\)\( x(w) \leq x^*(w) \) means \( c(w) \leq c^*(w) \) and \( y(w) \leq y^*(w) \).

\(^{18}\)This holds for linear technology \( \phi_t(w; z^T) = w + \sum_{s=1}^{t} z_s \) when \( \max Z > 0 \).
This would strengthen the argument in the static model that the zero top marginal tax result is relevant to only a small fraction of people (i.e., the top earner). Indeed, whereas someone certainly faces the zero marginal tax rate in a static economy, that is not true here. As in a static model, an agent faces the zero marginal tax rate when he attains the highest possible income, but this very top earner does not always exist ex post in our dynamic, stochastic economy.

Moreover, it would be worth pointing out that the results above are in sharp contrast with those of Battaglini and Coate (2008) in which the shock follows a Markov chain over two states (high and low). Under their tax rule, the allocation is distorted only when people’s type is currently and has always been low. That is, the allocations of agents who are currently, or have at some point been, high types are first-best. Therefore, the fraction of people whose allocations are distorted is decreasing over time. However, their results crucially depend on the following facts: the support of types is fixed over time, and the tax rule can depend on history. In our model, the support of types generally moves over time, and the tax rule can depend on only the current income. As a result, all people’s allocations are almost surely distorted in any period.

3 Conclusion

We consider the optimal dynamic income taxation problem faced by a government that cannot change the tax rule over time. Because of the stationarity constraint, we could reduce our problem to a static one and analytically characterize the second-best tax rule. We argued that the zero top marginal tax result is of little importance in practice because it would apply only when the top earner in the initial period receives the largest value of the shock in every period. This is a probability zero event, so ex post we ensure a positive tax rate for the top type.\(^\text{19}\)

Regarding the stationarity of the tax rule, we have made an extreme assumption: the government cannot make its tax rule time-dependent and thus its tax rates cannot be history-dependent at all. It might be more realistic to consider the situation in which the government can make its tax rule time-dependent or look at

\(^{19}\)In this paper, we consider a finite-horizon model. Technically speaking, we use optimal control theory, so by replacing terminal conditions with transversality conditions, we would be able to extend both Propositions 1 and 2 to an infinite-horizon model.
past histories at some cost.

Moreover, because we considered i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks, we could obtain a single resource constraint by invoking the law of large numbers. Besides the stationarity of the tax rule, this was also crucial for our results. In fact, if the agents face the common aggregate shocks, their types are correlated with each other, and the analytical approach of this paper will fail to apply. These should be subjects of future research.

Finally, although we characterized an optimal tax rule, we did not address its existence. This can probably be proved using the results of Berliant and Page (2001) for static optimal income taxes.

**Appendix**

Proof of Proposition 1. We argue by backward induction. First, \( b(W_T) = \{0\} \) by the terminal condition (i.e., in the last period, no one will save and borrowing is not permitted because people cannot repay). Now, suppose \( b(W_t) = \{0\} \) where \( t \leq T \).

Let \( w_{t-1} \in W_{t-1} \), and take \( w'_{t-1} \in W_{t-1} \) that belongs to an \( \epsilon \)-neighborhood of \( w_{t-1} \). Then, there exist \( (w, z^T), (w', z'^T) \) \in \( W_0 \times Z^T \) such that \( w_{t-1} = \phi_{t-1}(w; z^T) \) and \( w'_{t-1} = \phi_{t-1}(w'; z'^T) \) respectively, and \( |w_{t-1} - w'_{t-1}| < \epsilon \). Let \( (y, z^{-t}) = (z_1, ..., z_{t-1}, y, z_{t+1}, ..., z_T) \). Then, because \( Z \) is a non-degenerate closed interval and \( \phi_t(w; y, z^{-t}) \) is continuous in \( y \), we can take \( w_t \in [\phi_t(w; z^{-t}), \phi_t(w; z^{-t})] \cap [\phi_t(w'; z^{-t}, y, z_{t+1}, ..., z_T)] \) for sufficiently small \( \epsilon > 0 \) where \( z = \min Z \) and \( \bar{z} = \max Z \).

Then, because the stationary tax rule can depend on only the current state and agents always truthfully report their types by incentive compatibility, \( \tau(w_t) = y(w_t) - c(w_t) - b(w_t) + (1 + R)b(w_{t-1}) \) and \( \tau(w_t) = y(w_t) - c(w_t) - b(w_t) + (1 + R)b(w'_{t-1}) \), and thus \( b(w_{t-1}) = b(w'_{t-1}) \). Therefore, \( b \) is constant in a neighborhood of \( w_{t-1} \). However, because \( w_{t-1} \) is arbitrary, we deduce that \( b \) is continuous on \( W_{t-1} \). We then obtain the desired result because \( b \) is zero on \( W_{t-1} \cap W_t \) by assumption.

Proof of Proposition 2. We show that due to the stationarity constraint, our problem can be reduced to a static problem and then invoke the results of Hellwig (2007) who analyzes a static optimal taxation problem under the utilitarian welfare function. As in Hellwig (2007), we consider a relaxed problem by replacing the IC constraint
with a weaker condition that is called the downward IC constraint:

\[ \forall w \in W_t, \quad v(x(w), w) \geq v(x(w'), w) \quad \text{for all } w' \in \{ \tilde{w} \in W_t : \tilde{w} \leq w \} . \quad (\text{IC}'_t) \]

for each \( t \). Thus, the downward IC constraint takes care of only downward deviations. By Lemma 6.2 of Hellwig (2007), \( x(\cdot) \) with nondecreasing \( c(\cdot) \) satisfies (IC'\(_t\)) if and only if \( \frac{d v(x(w), w)}{d w} \geq v_w(x(w), w) \) for all \( w \in W_t \). Thus, when we solve the problem, we impose the constraints that \( c(w) \) is nondecreasing and \( \frac{d v(x(w), w)}{d w} \geq v_w(x(w), w) \) on \( W = \bigcup_{t=0}^{T} W_t \) instead of the downward IC constraints.

Next, we rewrite the welfare function as

\[
\int_{W_0} V(x(\cdot), w)f_w(w)dw \\
= \int_{W_0} \left[ v(x(w), w) + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \rho^t \int_{Z_t} v(x(w_t), w_t)f(z^T | w)dz^T \right] f_w(w)dw \\
= \int_{W_0} v(x(w), w)f_w(w)dw + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \rho^t \int_{W_t} v(x(w_t), w_t)f_t(w_t)dw_t
\]

where \( f_t(w) = \int_{Z_t} f(z^T, \phi_t^{-1}(w; z^T)) \frac{d \phi_t^{-1}(w; z^T)}{dw} dz^T \). Let \( f_w(w) \) be an extension of \( f_w \) to \( W \) (i.e., \( f_w(w) = f_w(w) \) on \( W_0 \) and \( f_w(w) = 0 \) on \( W \setminus W_0 \)). Similarly, let \( f_t \) be an extension of \( f_t \) to \( W \). Then, the above expression reduces to

\[
\int_{W} v(x(w), w)g(w)dw \tag{8}
\]

where \( g(w) \equiv f_w(w) + \sum_{t=1}^{T} \rho^t f_t(w) \). Likewise, the resource constraint is reduced to

\[
G \leq \int_{W} \tau(w)g(w)dw. \tag{9}
\]

Therefore, our relaxed problem is given by

\[
\max_{x(\cdot)} \int_{W} v(x(w), w)g(w)dw \\
\text{s.t. } G \leq \int_{W} \tau(w)g(w)dw, \tag{10}
\]

\( c(w) \) is nondecreasing and \( \frac{d v(x(w), w)}{d w} \geq v_w(x(w), w) \) on \( W \).
On the other hand, Hellwig (2007) considers a standard static optimal taxation problem. Specifically, in our notation, his problem is written as

$$\max_{x(\cdot)} \int_{W_0} v(x(w), w) f_w(w) dw$$

s.t.  $$G \leq \int_{W_0} \tau(w) f_w(w) dw,$$

$$c(w) \text{ is nondecreasing and } \frac{d\tau(x(w), w)}{dw} \geq v_w(x(w), w) \text{ on } W_0.$$ (11)

Hence, we can see that our problem can be viewed as a static problem in which the total mass of agents is \(\sum_{t=0}^{T} \rho^t\), the support of type distribution is \(W\), and the welfare weight for type \(w\) is \(g(w)\), and therefore, the arguments of Hellwig (2007) directly apply. In particular, the property (i) follows from Theorem 6.1 and the property (ii) from Theorems 4.1 and 6.1 of Hellwig (2007).

References


