Pincheira, Pablo and Zeuli, Kimberly (2007): Cooperatives and Area Yield Insurance:A Theoretical Analysis.
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential benefits that arise from a cooperative selling a government subsidized area-yield contract (i.e., the Group Risk Plan). The indeminities in area-yield contracts are triggered by a geographically determined yield (e.g., a county-wide yield average) instead of the more conventional individual actual production history. Therefore, an area-yield contract would be appropriate for managing the cooperative's systemic throughput risk. The cooperative would also capture some of the substantial government subsidies that are normally given to a private insurance company. Our primary finding is that farmers should be indifferent when considering the decision to purchase area-yield insurance from a private company or encompass that business in their cooperative. We derive this result for the specific case of costless insurance and assume a Pareto Optimal contract. Under these assumptions, the government subsidies that the cooperative would hope to capture are simply a net deduction in their premiums. In other words, the benefit they capture from the subsidies is the same when they purchase the insurance from an outside firm or internally.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Cooperatives and Area Yield Insurance:A Theoretical Analysis |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Cooperatives, Area Yield Insurance, Optimal indemnity |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q1 - Agriculture > Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing ; Cooperatives ; Agribusiness D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty |
Item ID: | 6174 |
Depositing User: | Pablo Matias Pincheira |
Date Deposited: | 08 Dec 2007 09:46 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 13:29 |
References: | Arrow, K.J. The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2, (Apr., 1964), 91-96. Borch, K.H. Economics of Insurance. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1989. Ermoliev Y.M and S. Didrik Flam, Finding Pareto Optimal Insurance Contracts. IIASA Interim Report IR-00-033. June 2000. Mahul, O. Optimum Area Yield Crop Insurance. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 81 (February 1999): 75-82 Mahul, O. Optimal Insurance Against Climatic Experience. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83 (August 2001): 593-604 Raviv, A. The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy. Amer. Econ. Rev. 69 (March 1979):84-96 Young, C.E., M.L. Vandeveer, and R.D. Schnepf. "Production and Price Impacts of US Crop Insurance Programs." Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 83(Number 5, 2001):1196-1203. Zeuli, K.A. New Risk-Management Strategies for Agricultural Cooperatives. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 81 (Number 5, 1999): 1234--1239. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/6174 |