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Competition and Growth in an Endogenous Growth Model with Expanding Product Variety without Scale Effects*

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationship between competition and growth in an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety without scale effect. In order to do this, we develop an extension of the Bucci (2005) model in which we eliminate the scale effects. We find that the relationship between competition and growth is always inverted U shaped. We explain this result by the composition of two effects on growth: resource allocation and profit incentive effects. For low values of product market competition, an increase of competition has a positive effect on growth. For large values of competition, we have a negative relationship between competition and growth.

Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Horizontal Differentiation, Technological Change, Imperfect Competition

JEL Classification: 031, 041

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1 Introduction

Economists have long been interested in the relationship between competition and growth, but economic theory seems to be contradicted by the evidence. Indeed, all the most important growth models in which there exists an imperfect competition (Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) show a decreasing relationship between competition and growth. However, recent empirical works (Aghion and Griffith (2005)) which dispute the form of this relationship, find an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth which is robust to many alternative specifications and remains true in the data for many individual industries. In order to reconcile theory with evidence, Aghion and Griffith (2005) and Bucci (2005) extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model. The first one introduce an escape competition effect in the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model whereas the second one introduces an resource allocation effect in the Romer (1990) model.

On the other hand, recent empirical works (Jones (1995a) and Jones (1995b)) suggest that the scale effect which exists in the most important endogenous growth models is not consistent with data. Many theoretical works are removed the scale effect prediction from an innovation driven growth model (see Aghion and Howitt (1998), Dinopoulous and Thompson (1999), Jones (1999), Jones (2005) and Bucci (2003) for a survey).

The purpose of this paper is to relate these two kinds of works in extending the Bucci (2005) model. First, by following Benassay (1998), we introduce a distinction between the returns to specialization and the market power parameter which allows us to have a better measure of the competition. Indeed, contrary to Bucci (2005), in our model the market power parameter is not strongly related to the returns to specialization but it is completely independent. Secondly, by following Dinopoulous and Thompson (1999), we eliminate the scale effect.

Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 analyzes the market equilibrium. Section 4 discuss the relationship between competition and growth. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2 The model

The model developed is based on the Bucci (2005) model. The economy is structured by three sectors : final good sector, intermediate goods sector and R&D sector. The final output sector produces output that can be used for consumption using labor and intermediate goods that are available in A
varieties. These are produced by employing only labor. The R&D sector creates the blueprints for new varieties of intermediate goods which are produced by employing labor and knowledge. These blueprints are sold to the intermediate goods sector.

2.1 The final good sector

In this sector, atomistic producers engage in perfect competition. The final good sector produces a composite good $Y$ using all the $i$th type of intermediate goods $x_i$ and labor $L_Y$. Production is given by:

$$Y = A^{\gamma + \alpha - 1} L_Y^{1 - \alpha} \int_0^A x_i^\alpha \, di,$$

(1)

where $\alpha$ and $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ are two parameters. This production function allows us to disentangle the degree of market power of monopolistic competitors in the intermediate sector $(\frac{1}{\alpha} - 1)$ and the degree of returns from specialization $(\gamma)$. Consequently, this model is a generalization of Bucci (2005) and Benassy (1998) models.

If we normalize to one the price of the final good, the profit of the representative firm is given by:

$$\pi_Y = A^{\gamma + \alpha - 1} L_Y^{1 - \alpha} \int_0^A x_i^\alpha \, di - \int_0^A p_i x_i \, di - w_Y L_Y,$$

(2)

where $w_Y$ is the wage rate in the final goods sector, $p_i$ is the price of the $i$th intermediate good. Under a perfect competition on the final output market and the factor inputs markets, the representative firm chooses intermediate goods and labor in order to maximize its profit taking price as given and subject to its technological constraint. The first order conditions are the followings:

$$\frac{\partial \pi_Y}{\partial x_i} = \alpha A^{\gamma + \alpha - 1} L_Y^{1 - \alpha} x_i^{\alpha - 1} - p_i = 0,$$

(3)

$$\frac{\partial \pi_Y}{\partial L_Y} = (1 - \alpha) A^{\gamma + \alpha - 1} L_Y^{-\alpha} \int_0^A x_i^\alpha \, di - w_Y = 0.$$

(4)

3Time subscripts are omitted whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.

4Benassy (1996) made a simple modification to the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model which clearly disentangles taste for variety and market power. At the same time, Benassy (1998) and de Groot and Nahuis (1998) show that the introduction of this modification in an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety à la Grossman and Helpman (1991) affects the welfare analysis.

5Indeed, we obtain the Bucci (2005) model if we introduce the following constraint $\gamma = 1 - \alpha$. In the same way, in introducing the constraint $L_Y = 1$, we obtain the Benassy (1998) model.
Equation (3) is the inverse demand function for the firm that produces the \( i \)th intermediate good whereas equation (4) characterizes the demand function of labor.

### 2.2 The intermediate goods sector

In the intermediate goods sector, producers engage in monopolistic competition. Each firm produces one horizontally differentiated intermediate good and have to buy a patented design before producing its own intermediate good. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Bucci (2005), we assume that each local intermediate monopolist has access to the same technology employing only labor \( l_i \):

\[
x_i = l_i. \tag{5}
\]

The profit function of firms is the following:

\[
\pi_i = p_i x_i - w_i l_i, \tag{6}
\]

where \( w_i \) is wage rate in the intermediate goods. Under the assumption that in the intermediate goods sector the number of firms is so large that each of them is unconstrained by competitors offering an equivalent product,\(^6\) the profit maximizing price of \( i \)th intermediate good is given by:

\[
p_i = \frac{w_i}{\alpha}. \tag{7}
\]

At the equilibrium, all the firms produce the same quantity of intermediate goods \( x \), face the same wage rate \( w \) and by consequence fix the same price for their production \( p \). The price is equal to a constant mark up \( \frac{1}{\alpha} - 1 \) over the marginal cost \( w \). Defining by \( L_i = \int_0^A l_i \, di \), the total amount of labor employed in the intermediate goods sector and under symmetry among intermediate goods producers, we can rewrite the equation (5):

\[
x_i = \frac{L_i}{A}. \tag{8}
\]

Finally, the profit function of the firm which produces the \( i \)th intermediate good is:

\[
\pi_i = \alpha (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y}{A}. \tag{9}
\]

---

\(^6\)This assumption implies that each intermediate goods firm acts as local monopolistic. Formally, we have \( \frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} \left[ \int_0^A x_i^\alpha \, di \right] = 0. \)
As in Bucci (2005), the profit is decreasing in the number of intermediate goods \((A)\) and the relationship between competition and profit is inverted U shaped.\(^7\)

### 2.3 The R&D sector

There are competitive research firms undertaking R&D. These firms produce designs indexed by 0 through an upper bound \(A \geq 0\).\(^8\) Designs are patented but non-rival and indispensable for intermediate goods production. Following Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), we assume that new blueprints are produced using old blueprints \(A\), an amount of R&D labor \(L_A\) and the labor force \(L\):

\[
\frac{\partial A}{\partial t} = \frac{AL_A}{L}.
\]

(10)

This formulation of the firm research process allows us to eliminate the scale effect which is inconsistent with time series evidence (Jones (1995a) and Jones (1995b))\(^9\). Because of the perfect competition in the R&D sector, we can obtain the real wage in this sector in function of the profit flows associated to the latest intermediate in using the zero profit condition:

\[
w_AL_A = \frac{\partial A}{\partial t} P_A,
\]

(11)

where \(w_A\) represents the real wage earned by R&D labor and \(P_A\) is the real value of such a blueprint which is equal to:

\[
P_A = \int_t^\infty \pi_i e^{-r(\tau-t)}d\tau, \tau > t,
\]

(12)

since the research sector is competitive, the price of the \(ith\) design at time \(t\) will be equal to the discounted value of the flow of instantaneous profits that is possible to make in the intermediate goods sector by the \(ith\) firm from \(t\) onwards.

Given \(P_A\), the free entry condition leads to:

\[
w_A = \frac{AP_A}{L}.
\]

(13)

\(^7\)Bucci and Parello (2006) obtains the same result about the relationship between the profit and the number of intermediate goods.

\(^8\)As in Romer (1990), \(A\) measures the total stock of society’s knowledge.

\(^9\)For a survey about this question, see Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999) and Jones (2005).
2.4 The consumer behavior

The demand side is characterized by the representative household who consumes and supplies labor. Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that the utility function of this consumer is logarithmic: \[ U = \int_0^\infty e^{(n-\rho)t} \log(c) dt, \] (14)

where \( c = \frac{C}{L} \) is per-capita private consumption, \( \rho > 0 \) is the rate of pure time preference. The representative household are endowed with a fixed quantity of labor \( L \). The flow budget constraint for the household is \[ \frac{\partial a}{\partial t} = w + ra - c, \] (15)

where \( a \) is the total wealth of the agent (measured in units of final good), \( w \) is the wage rate per unit of labor services and \( r \) is the real interest rate. From the maximization of the consumer, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution use the Keynes-Ramsey rule:

\[ g_c = r - \rho, \] (16)

and the transversality condition:

\[ \lim_{t \to \infty} \mu_t a_t = 0, \] (17)

where \( \mu_t \) is the co-state variable.

3 The equilibrium and the steady state

In this section, we characterize the equilibrium and give some analytical characterization of a balanced growth path.

3.1 The equilibrium

It is now possible to characterize the labor market equilibrium in the economy considered. On this market because of the homogeneity and the perfect mobility across sectors, the arbitrage ensures that the wage rate that is earned by salaries which work in the final goods sector, intermediate goods sector

\[^{10}This specification of the utility function does not alter the results.\]
or R&D sector is equal. As a result, the following three conditions must simultaneously be checked:

\[ 1 = s_Y + s_i + s_A, \]  
\[ w_i = w_y, \]  
\[ w_i = w_A, \]  

where \( s_Y, s_i \) and \( s_A \) represents the shares of the total labor supply devoted respectively to final and intermediate goods production and to research activity. Equation (18) is a resource constraint, saying that at any point in the time the sum of the labor demands coming from each activity must be equal to the total available supply (L). Equation (19) and equation (20) state that the wage earned by one unit of labor is to be the same irrespective of the sector where that unit of labor is actually employed.

We can characterize the product market equilibrium in the economy considered. Indeed, on this market, the firms produce a final good which can be consumed. Consequently, the following condition must be checked:

\[ Y = C. \]  

Equation (21) is a resource constraint on the final good sector.

### 3.2 The steady state

In order to define the steady state, we assume that all variables as \( Y, C, A, L_Y, L_i, L_A \) and \( L \) grow at a positive constant rate.

**Proposition 1** If \( L \) grows at a positive growth rate \( g_L = n > 0 \), then all the other variables grow at strictly positive rates with

\[ g_Y = (1 - \alpha)g_{L_Y} + \alpha g_{L_i} + \gamma g_A, \]  
\[ g_Y = g_C, \]  
\[ g_A = s_A. \]  

**Proof.** We substitute equation (8) into equation (1), then we log-differentiate the equation (1) and finally we obtain the equation (22). From the equilibrium on the product market, given by the equation (21), it is easy to find the equation (23). From the definition of the firm research process, given by the equation (10), we obtain the equation (24).
Using the previous equations, we can demonstrate the following steady state equilibrium values for the relevant variables of the model\footnote{We assume that \( n < \rho < n + \frac{1}{(\alpha-1)^{\alpha+1}} - 1 \) in order to have all the variables positive.}:

\[
\begin{align*}
    r &= n((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1)\gamma - (\rho + (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1))\gamma + \rho, \\
    s_i &= \alpha^2(1 + \rho - n), \\
    s_Y &= (\alpha - 1)(n - \rho - 1), \\
    s_A &= n((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1) - \rho - (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1), \\
    g_Y &= ((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1)\gamma n + n - \gamma(\rho + (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1)).
\end{align*}
\] (25)

According to the equation (25), the real interest rate is constant. Equations (26), (27) and (28) give the amount of labor in each sector at the equilibrium. Equation (29) shows that the growth rate is a function of technological, preference parameters \((\gamma, n, \rho)\) and competition \((\alpha)\).

4 The relationship between product market competition and growth

In this section, we study the long run relationship between competition and growth in the model presented above. As it is well known in the IO literature, all the authors use the so-called Lerner Index to gauge the intensity of market power within a market. Such an index is defined by the ratio of price \((P)\) minus marginal cost \((CM)\) over price. Using the definition of mark up \((P = \text{Markup} \times CM)\) and Lerner Index \((LernerIndex = \frac{P-\text{CM}}{P})\), we are able to define a proxy of competition as follows\footnote{This is the same measure of product market competition used by Aghion, Bloom, Bhundel, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), Aghion and Griffith (2005), Aghion and Howitt (2005), Bianco (2007a) and Bianco (2007b).}:

\[(1 - \text{LernerIndex}) = \alpha.\] (30)

**Proposition 2** We show that

(i) there exists an inverted-U relationship between product market competition and aggregate economic growth,

(ii) the returns of specialization alter this relationship only quantitatively. Indeed, the returns to specialization amplifies the impact of competition to growth,
(iii) the returns to specialization does not affect the maximum economic growth rate which is always obtained for a specific value of competition \((\alpha = \frac{1}{2})\).

Proof.

(i) 

\[
\frac{\partial g_Y}{\partial \alpha} = (2\alpha - 1)\gamma(n - \rho - 1). \quad (31)
\]

As \(\rho > n > 0\), we have \(n - \rho - 1 < 0\). Or, as \(\gamma > 0\), the sign of the derivative is given by the opposite sign of \(2\alpha - 1\). Finally, we obtain that \(\frac{\partial g_Y}{\partial \alpha} > 0 \) if and only if \(0 \leq \alpha < \frac{1}{2}\) and \(\frac{\partial g_Y}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \) if and only if \(\frac{1}{2} < \alpha \leq 1\).

(ii) Let note that \(\frac{\partial g_Y}{\partial \alpha} = f(\gamma)\). We obtain \(\frac{\partial f(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma} = (2\alpha - 1)(n - \rho - 1)\). As \(n - \rho - 1 < 0\), then the sign of the derivative is given by the opposite sign of \((2\alpha - 1)\). Finally, \(\frac{\partial f(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \) if and only if \(0 \leq \alpha < \frac{1}{2}\) and \(\frac{\partial f(\gamma)}{\partial \gamma} < 0 \) if and only if \(\frac{1}{2} < \alpha \leq 1\).

(iii) we can show that \(\frac{\partial g_Y}{\partial \alpha} = 0 \) if and only if \(\alpha = \frac{1}{2}\).

\[
\blacksquare
\]

In order to illustrate our view, we plot equation (29) in order to show the relationship between the economic growth rate \((g_Y)\) and the competition \((\alpha)\) for different values of the returns to specialization \((\gamma)\), we obtain the following figure\textsuperscript{13}.

\textsuperscript{13}In drawing Figure 1, we take the same values of parameters like Bucci (2005) in order to be as close as possible to his model : \(\rho = 0.03\). However, since our model is a generalization of the Bucci (2005) model, we need to choose a value for the growth rate of the population \(n = 0.01\) and the returns to specialization \(0 \leq \gamma \leq 1\).
Figure 1: Relationship between competition ($\alpha$) and growth ($g_Y$) for different values of the returns to specialization ($\gamma$)

This kind of relationship between competition and growth can be explained by two effects: profit incentive effect and resource allocation effect. The first one means that an increase of competition ($\alpha$) reduces the price of the intermediate good and profits. This latter determines the incentives to innovation. Therefore, the profit incentive effect seems to predict an unambiguously negative relationship between product market competition and growth along the entire range of competition intensity. The second one is explained by the substitution of labor between each sector.

**Proposition 3** We have

(i) a decreasing relationship between the competition and the share of labor allocated to the final good sector;

(ii) an increasing relationship between the competition and the share of labor allocated to the intermediate goods sector;

(iii) an inverted-U relationship between competition and the share of labor allocated to the research sector.

**Proof.**

(i) $$\frac{\partial s_Y}{\partial \alpha} = n - \rho - 1.$$ (32)
As \( \rho > n > 0 \), we have \( n - \rho - 1 < 0 \). Therefore, \( \frac{\partial s_Y}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \).

\( \text{(ii)} \)
\[
\frac{\partial s_i}{\partial \alpha} = -2\alpha(n - \rho - 1).
\]  
(33)

As \( \rho > n > 0 \), we have \( n - \rho - 1 < 0 \). As \( 0 \leq \alpha \leq 1 \), we have \( \frac{\partial s_i}{\partial \alpha} > 0 \).

\( \text{(iii)} \)
\[
\frac{\partial s_A}{\partial \alpha} = (2\alpha - 1)(n - \rho - 1).
\]  
(34)

As \( \rho > n > 0 \), we have \( n - \rho - 1 < 0 \). So, the sign of the derivative is given by the opposite sign of \( 2\alpha - 1 \). Finally, we obtain that \( \frac{\partial s_A}{\partial \alpha} > 0 \) if and only if \( 0 \leq \alpha < \frac{1}{2} \) and \( \frac{\partial s_A}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \) if and only if \( \frac{1}{2} < \alpha \leq 1 \).

An increase of competition affects negatively the share of labor devoted to final goods sector \((s_Y)\), positively the share of labor devoted to intermediates goods sector \((s_i)\) and has a non linear effect on the share of labor allocated to the research sector \((s_A)\). Consequently, this means that the resource allocation effect seems to predict an inverted-U relationship between product market competition and growth. Finally, the association of this two effects implies that the relationship between product market competition and growth is inverted-U shaped as we can see on the previous figure.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between returns to specialization, competition and growth in an endogenous growth model with expanding product variety without scale effects. More precisely, on the one hand, following Benassy (1998), we disentangle returns to specialization from market power parameter in order to have a better measure of competition in the intermediate goods sector, and following Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), we eliminate the scale effects, on the other hand. We found a inverted U relationship between competition and growth. This relationship is due to the interplay between two effects: Schumpeterian and resource allocation effects. The former implies an negative links between competition and growth. On the other hand, the latter induces an effect of competition on growth which depends on the level of the competition. For low values of competition, the competition has an positive effect on growth and for high values of competition, the competition reduces growth. We also show that the returns to specialization does not affect qualitatively but only quantitatively
the relationship between competition and growth. Indeed, the returns to specialization amplifies the impact of competition to growth. Clearly, more work is needed. Indeed, it would be interesting to analyze if this result is robust to the introduction of alternative ways of cleaning the scale effect.

Appendix

In these appendix, we describe the way followed in order to obtain the main results of this paper (25 through 29). Using the equations (3, 4, 7, 8 and 19), we obtain:

\[ s_i = \frac{\alpha^2 s_Y}{1 - \alpha}. \]  

(35)

Using the equations (4, 8, 12 and 13), we obtain:

\[ s_Y = \frac{g_A - g_Y + r}{\alpha}. \]  

(36)

Using the equations (16, 23, 24) and the definition of per capita private consumption, the previous equation can be re-written as:

\[ s_Y = \frac{s_A + \rho - n}{\alpha}. \]  

(37)

Plugging the equation (37) into the equation (35), we obtain:

\[ s_i = \frac{\alpha(s_A + \rho - n)}{1 - \alpha}. \]  

(38)

Using the condition of equilibrium on the labor market (given by the equation 18), we obtain:

\[ s_A = n((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1) - \rho - (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1). \]  

(39)

From the equations (22, 24 and 39) and assuming that \( g_L = g_{LY} = g_L = n \) which is true at the steady state, we obtain:

\[ g_Y = ((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1)\gamma n + n - \gamma(\rho + (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1)). \]  

(40)

Plugging the equation (39) into the equation (37), we find:

\[ s_Y = (\alpha - 1)(n - \rho - 1). \]  

(41)

Using the equations (38 and 39), we obtain:

\[ s_i = \alpha^2(1 + \rho - n). \]  

(42)

From the equations (16, 40) and the definition of per capita private consumption, we find:

\[ r = n((\alpha - 1)\alpha + 1)\gamma - (\rho + (\alpha - 1)\alpha(\rho + 1))\gamma + \rho. \]  

(43)
References


