Atabati, Omid and Farzad, Babak (2014): A strategic model for network formation. Published in: Computational Social Networks , Vol. 2, No. 1 (1 February 2015): pp. 114.

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Abstract
We study the dynamics of a gametheoretic network formation model that yields largescale smallworld networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for gametheoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by EvenDar and Kearns' model [8], we consider a more realistic framework in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation and maintenance of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. We achieved an economic mechanism and its dynamic process for individuals which firstly; unlike the earlier model, the outcomes of players' interactions or the equilibrium networks are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, these networks coincide with the outcome of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Secondly; it generates largescale networks that have a rational and strategic microfoundation and demonstrate the main characterization of small degree of separation in reallife social networks. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates smallworld networks.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A strategic model for network formation 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  network formation; linking game with transfer payments; pairwise stability; pairwise Nash equilibrium; smallworld phenomenon 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79  Other D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85  Network Formation and Analysis: Theory 
Item ID:  62529 
Depositing User:  Omid Atabati 
Date Deposited:  03 Mar 2015 11:32 
Last Modified:  02 Oct 2019 12:27 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/62529 