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An integrative framework of attributions after a business failure

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Abstract

Purpose – Although business failure has garnered a plethora of scholarly attention, there remains an ambiguity and lack of clarity about the process and types of attribution after a business failure. This article examines types of attributions after a business failure.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a synthesis of the multiple streams of research on the subject. This led to the development of an integrated framework of attributions after business failure.

Findings – The paper integrates the business failure literature and attribution theory to develop a 2x2 conceptual framework which not only accounts for the effect on pace (time), but also locus of causality in the attribution process. Crossing the two main causes of business failure with two types of attribution produces the 2x2 matrix of types of attribution after a business failure which includes: early internal attribution, late internal attribution, early external attribution and late external attribution.

Research limitation/implications – Our theorisation of the literature offers a number of implications for theory and practice.

Originality/value – The study also explains the underlying processes inherent in learning from others’ failures and consequences of business failure. Our framework removes some of the ambiguity in the existing literature and outlines a number of fruitful avenues for future research.

Introduction

Over the past three decades, we have witnessed the dramatic improvements in decision support systems and technologies in an array of areas including employee evaluation,
production planning and control, and strategic formulation (Shim et al., 2002; Osterwalder et al., 2005). It has been argued that they play a pivotal role in enabling organisations to minimise errors and achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Afuah, 2004).

Despite these assertions and considerable technological breakthroughs in decision support technologies, half of all decisions made within firms fail to achieve the desired outcome (Nutt, 1999) and business failure remains a regular occurrence often traced to decisions made within the firm (Dovey and Fenech, 2007). Against this backdrop, organisational leaders are expected to be judged by the outcomes of their decisions (Lipshitz, 1989), which provides a basis for rewards and punishment (Feather and Simon, 1973).

Broadly speaking, people have a natural tendency to search for meaning and explanations as to how and why things occur, to provide a basis for such attribution. Individuals who are able to achieve considerable successes through their decisions within an organisation are often rewarded with promotion and a pay rise. However, those whose decisions lead to business failure are also expected to be subjected to attribution by social arbiters. Despite decades of scholarly accomplishment on organisational failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), some scholars (e.g., Yang and Aldrich, 2012) have indicated that our understanding of the relationship between business failure and attribution remains limited.

In addition, although attributions after business failure may be rendered at a different pace, scholars have often put together all attributions, ignoring the issue of pace (speed) in the attribution process. Indeed, “common observations tell us that our explanations of events change over time” and our attributions for individuals’ actions are often modified with the passage of time (Burger, 1985: 330). Furthermore, no robust comprehensive framework has been developed to distinguish types of attribution after a business failure.
The primary purpose of this paper is to develop an integrated framework of types of attributions after a business failure to help explain how attributions are rendered. We depart from much of the existing literature by developing a unified model of the subject. Specifically, we differentiate types of attributions and delineate the underlying processes and mechanisms through which they are rendered. In so doing, our study integrates business failure literature and attribution theory (Jones and Davis, 1965) to develop a 2x2 framework to delineate two types of attribution: immediately or delayed attribution, and two locus of causality: controllable and uncontrollable. Such typologies can significantly enrich our understanding of the subject (Doty and Glick, 1994).

Our work further contributes to the literature by clarifying the conditions and the underlying processes in post-exit attribution. Our article proceeds by first defining business failure, attribution and the role of social arbiters in rendering attribution. This is then followed by the development of an integrated framework for studying types of attributions and their effects on individuals. By working through the framework, we clarify the components and dimensions of attribution. The final section outlines implications for theory and practice.

**Toward a typology of attribution after business failure paradigms**

By business failure, we are referring to situations where the inability of the firm to meet stakeholders’ expectations and obligations forces it to cease operations (Amankwah-Amoah, 2014a; Hamilton, 2006). Although some scholars have argued that business failure is bad (see Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004), others have suggested that business failure is good for some stakeholders such as competitors, the communities and the wider economy by removing inefficient firms and thereby allowing effective competition to thrive (Knott and Posen, 2005). Some scholars have indicated that: “some individuals respond to failure negatively, with feelings of dejection and loss of motivation, whereas others respond more positively,
with heightened motivation to succeed” (Johnson et al., 1997: 385). In entrepreneurial ventures, recent studies provide evidence that some venture capitalists view past venture failure as a sign that the individual is willing to take risks and are willing to invest in their venture (McGrath, 2011).

To ground our model on a firmer theoretical footing, we draw on business failure literature (Whetten, 1987) and attribution theory (Kelley, 1967) to develop an integrative framework of attribution after business failure. We borrow the two main schools of thought on the causes of business failure: voluntaristic and deterministic views (Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah 2010; Whetten, 1987). The deterministic view contends that business failure is attributed to external factors such as economic recession, declining demand, bad luck and market forces which are beyond the control of decision makers rather than as an outcome of poor decision-making process, laziness, and lack of skills or ability. Failure may also stem from the process of natural selection or serendipity, which drives out inefficient firms (Andrews et al., 2006; Svensson and Wood, 2005) or natural disasters which stem from indiscriminate “Acts of God” over which managers have little or no control (Fothergill, 2003). Nutt (2004a: 261) puts it this way:

“Good decision-making practices cannot guarantee good outcomes, because of chance events. Bad luck, when product demand falls below expectations because of unexpected bad weather and the like, can be mistaken for bad decision-making practices. Good luck, such as windfall profits due to favourable turn on interest rates or consumer interest in a product, can cover up failure-prone decision-making practices.”

The voluntaristic perspective argues that business failures are simply the result of managers and their colleagues’ actions and inactions. This view attributes failure to factors such as the inability to anticipate and respond to market changes, lack of effort and ability on the part of management and their subordinates (Nutt, 2002). This school of thought further contends that
even natural disasters as a cause of failure can be attributed to managers’ failure to anticipate and respond to risk in their environment, failure to take precautionary measures such as insurance or the decision to locate in high-risk areas (Fothergill, 2003). According to Nutt (2004b: 13),

“Failure almost always stems from decision-maker actions and not from bad luck or situational limitations.” In other words, business failure is a result of a number of controllable factors.

We employ these simplistic views of how business failure occurs in deducing our model. To build our matrix of attribution, we also borrow the notion of stigma to enrich our analysis. Stigma can be defined as the “attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular context” (Crocker et al., 1998: 505; see also McKinley et al., 1996). We contend that in instances where the cause of business failure is attributed to internal organisational factors such as the inability to identify and respond to changing market conditions, risky investment and overpaying for acquisitions bringing about exit, it is likely to lead to stigma, where the attribution can be too powerful for the individual to hide from others.

Failure can sometimes be attributed to external factors such as recession and environmental disasters, for example fire, flood and heavy rainfall, which destroy all of the assets of the business forcing it to cease operation. Under these circumstances, the organisation’s managers can claim “no fault” dissolution leading to minimal or no attribution of blame. Indeed, organisations should not be seeking to sanction individuals for past actions or decision making over which they had little or no control (Arvey and Jones, 1985). Figure 1 articulates our argument about the causes of business failure and failure as a continuum incorporating internal and external causes with varying consequences.
We now turn to attribution theory because it provides a unique opportunity to enrich our understanding of how observers attach meanings to events. As Kelley (1973: 107) contends, the theory is “about how people make causal explanations, about how they answer questions beginning with ‘why?’.” The theory has been found to be particularly useful for examining events or issues that span over a long period of time (Burger, 1985). There are a number of schools of thought on the processes underlying attribution.

Broadly speaking, attribution by social arbiters or observers begins by identifying the key individuals and locus of causality, sense-making, and rendering sanctions (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; see also Weick, 1995). Recent evidence pinpoints that the basis for attribution commences by seeking meanings and explanations for the business failure and factors that precipitated it (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Attribution after business failure can be seen as an iterative process which involves seeking the locus of causality and delivering attribution (see Figure 2).

Organisational failure triggers a range of issues to which arbiters attribute blame or rewards where necessary. We employ an evaluating audience or arbiters to refer to the three society arbiters (i.e. social, legal and economic) identified by Wiesenfeld et al. (2008). Social arbiters refer to stakeholders who possess legitimate platforms to provide an assessment of individuals’ actions (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013). Legal arbiters refer to regulatory agencies and prosecutors whose responsibility it is to enforce the “rules of the game” and bring to book individuals who seem to have committed infringements (see Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).
Economic arbiters encompasses executives and directors at other organisations who play a key role in deciding to engage with individuals from departed firms such as offering them a job. Different arbiters such as regulators and investors can see an individual’s involvement in business failure in completely different ways.

People have a general tendency to attribute success to their efforts and failure to outside forces beyond their control. According to the “egocentric bias” perspective (Ross and Sicoly, 1979), individuals have a greater tendency to give themselves credit for good organisational performance and remember more of their contributions relative to their colleagues.

However, individuals are less likely to either admit their involvement or contributions in driving an organisation into the ground. When an organisation ceases to exist, some former managers are more likely to engage in actions that allow them to take credit for the successful phase in the firm’s life, whilst they attribute the declining period to colleagues or external factors (Zuckerman, 1979). This “self-serving attribution bias” means that when failure happens it is up to the social arbiters as regulators, expert groups and government agencies to identify the locus of causality and then impose sanctions, blame and then punishment on managers involved with the failure (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008). Managers involved in failure are more likely to exaggerate their involvement in successful periods in organisational life and attribute less successful periods to co-workers. The observers or arbiters are required to identify key individuals seen to have committed a deviant act in bringing about the failure.

**Types of attribution**

Once business failure has occurred, we identify two main types of attribution and their occurrence: immediate and delayed attribution. Immediate attribution occurs instantaneously after business failure often before regulatory or professional bodies have thoroughly
examined the issue. This is largely because the individuals are often the first to be identified and they are often stigmatised because they might be in the public eye or have a prominent position of representing the company to the mass media. Immediately after business failure, there are executives who are automatically shamed in the media even before their culpability is established, however, there are also those who slip under the radar and never have their actions brought under the microscope.

One of the advantages inherent in early attribution of the individual is that it provides an early opportunity to engage in actions aimed at repairing trust and tarnished reputations. In so doing, such individuals can re-establish relationships with key stakeholders who have been lost due to their involvement in the failure. One of the effects of immediate attribution is that sometimes the wrong people have their reputation tarnished for events or decisions which were beyond their control or in which they had no involvement and the stigma can last wrongly forever.

Delayed attribution occurs when all of the factors precipitating the business failure are known. It is less likely to be potent given that memory may have faded and the emotional sentiments associated with the failure have taken a back seat. It may stay in the pipeline for months or even years after the event when the individual has “moved on” or even changed profession before being sanctioned by arbiters. With delayed attribution, individuals connected to business failure are less likely to be sanctioned. This can be attributed to the passage of time between the event and the attribution which also leads to the fading of memory and often the involvement of the legal profession to mitigate the damage.

“By the time of the delayed attribution, the salience of the general impression may have faded considerably, but some recall of the subjects’ own specific actions, and not those of the
partner, remained” (Burger and Rodman, 1983: 1238). Some individuals welcome early attributions, others try to delay their attribution, whilst others do their very best to avoid attribution altogether. The delayed attributions may stem from a lack of information about an individual’s involvement earlier during the immediate attribution phase or the sudden emergence of new documents outlining that person’s direct involvement in directing and managing the failed venture.

Unlike immediate attributions which happen just after the event, those seen to have committed a deviant act or made the wrong decisions have little time or space to detach themselves from the guilt or shame following the business failure. Perhaps in some cases, delaying attribution may not be as harmful to an individual as early attribution and social consequences to help bring about closure. Under certain circumstances, the stigmatisation might not be as severe as the individual expects or imagines. Since not all “attribution of responsibility and allocation of rewards and punishments are made after the fact” (Lipshitz, 1989: 381), individuals who are able to delay investigation into their conduct or past decisions can get space to devise a strategy to deal with the consequences. Table 1 summarises the key features of the two types of attribution.

Social arbiters such as professional bodies and regulators who place a high value on fairness are more likely to deliver harsh attributions after business failure whether delivered immediately or delayed. There is a sense in these bodies to ensure that all individuals are treated in the same way since those who receive delayed attribution have had the time to assemble resources and develop new expertise which enable them to mount a defence or move on from the event. “To avoid being cast in the role of a buffoon, protagonists in public
dramas use a number of devices for forestalling such criticism, including justifications, rationalisations, and reinterpretations of the events” (Davies, 1987: 51).

To simplify the discussion, we build on these views to develop a four-cell typology of the paradigms of attribution after business failure. Crossing the two main causes of organisational failure with two types of attribution, produces the 2x2 matrix of the types of attribution after a business failure (see Figure 3). The four combinations of nature of attribution (early or delayed) and locus of causality (controllable or uncontrollable factors) are represented by a 2x2 matrix. Figure 3 presents our matrix which delineates key features of attribution and the process model of the mechanism through which attribution is signalled by social arbiters.

Who are the recipients of attribution?

Past studies indicate that social arbiters through the labour market reward or penalise executives and managers for their decisions which bring about business failure or success (Fama, 1980). Broadly speaking, all members of a departed organisation are subjected to attribution, however, the labour market is unlikely to tar “all managers with the same brush based on mere association with a failed firm” (Cannella et al., 1995: 209). One plausible reason for not indiscriminately penalising managers of failed firms is the different responsibility and degree of controls of each one. Observers are also unlikely to treat all organisational members and leaders as equally influential and skilled, or have the same level of expectations and control, therefore, there is a need to recognise, distinguish and reclassify managerial and non-managerial staff based on their level of responsibility and control in the attribution process (See Figure 4).
By top-tier managers/executives we are referring to corporate-level decision-makers such as the President, Chief Executive Officer, Board of Directors and corporate staff who are regarded as the linchpins in the strategic formulation and decision-making process. Such an elite and prestigious group are seen to be “competent, credible and trustworthy” and have a degree of higher control and responsibility (D’Aveni, 1990; Pozner, 2008). In cases where, top-tier managers are perceived to be highly skilled and more knowledgeable about their organisation and strategies required to deliver success (D’Aveni, 1989b), failure is more likely to lead to severely stigmatised reputations and status within their industry (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Indeed, top-tier managers of failed firms are more likely to attain fewer successive jobs in the same industry than their subordinates, largely attributed to their role and the greater responsibility attached to their position (Cannella et al., 1995).

Individuals seen to have committed a deviant act or been culpable for bringing about failure are more likely to suffer from diminished human capital in future employment opportunities (D’Aveni, 1990; Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Human capital refers to the knowledge, skills and abilities possessed by individuals (Becker, 1964). Managers of failed firms are more likely to find a similar job position if social arbiters attribute the cause to external factors which are beyond their control and thereby suffer minimal decline in their human capital value (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Top-tier managers with high degree of control have an important role in ensuring their firms’ survival by not engaging in extremely risky ventures.

Second-tier managers refer to functional or divisional heads that often support and help to ensure implementation of decisions made by the upper echelon managers/ managers. Cannella et al.’s (1995) findings indicate that second-tier managers often play a minimal role in their organisation and are unlikely to face severe sanctions relative to top-tier managers and may be more likely to secure comparable jobs in the future after their firm’s demise.
These scholars also observed that managers of failed firms often secure fewer jobs in the same industry after business failure than managers from (non-failed) firms. The third-tier managers refer to functional low-level managers below second-tier managers who also play a role in strategic implementation. We also contend that third-tier managers can be seen as less-powerful and less-prestigious members of the organisation who are unlikely to be sanctioned by legal arbiters such as regulators often due to their minimal role and control of their organisation.

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**Insert Figure 4 about here**

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With regard to non-managerial staff, some scholars have observed that “lower-level members may perceive that it is not in their interest to convey information that suggests the existence of potential performance problems to their bosses” (Fang et al., 2014: 1187). Such concealment is likely to affect top-tier managers’ ability to identify root causes of organisational problems and deliver effective responses to avoid collapse. Such individuals operating in hierarchical organisational structures have a tendency to report positive feedback accurately whilst “sugarcoating”, distorting or deleting negative feedback (Fang et al., 2014; Morrison and Milliken, 2000). Such information distortions not only stifle interpretation of the data but also affect the manager’s response during decline (For a detailed review of organisational decline see Mone et al., 1998).

Although such low-ranking employees have a low level of control and decision-making powers, they can affect how performance information is relayed through the organisational channels and the interpretation of the information. Such upward communication has the potential to enrich the internal workings of the firm and “employees can help stem illegal and immoral behaviour, address mistreatment or injustice, and bring problems and opportunities
for improvement to the attention of those who can authorize action” (Detert and Edmondson, 2011: 461). However, individuals seen to have “sugarcoated” information are unlikely to avoid attribution. Therefore:

**Proposition 1:** *Non-managerial employees seen to have sugar-coated or be disinclined to disseminate negative information upwards in the organisation before business failure are more likely to receive harsher attribution.*

Individuals in declining firms may engage in responses such as doing nothing, opting for flight, staying the course and generating a turnaround. The “downward spiral” perspective of organisational failure posits that once an organisation enters a period of decline, there is a tendency for further incapacitating events to transpire such as the departure of top-tier managers, customers’ dissatisfaction, defection of allies and shrinking of the resource base with which to innovate (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1990; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988, 1992; Semadeni et al., 2008). These events within the organisational life become so incapacitating that it forces it to cease operation.

When a firm enters a downward spiral, executives with a degree of foresight can anticipate the potential stigma at the end of the tunnel and may therefore opt for flight before the organisation is forced into bankruptcy or exit (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Such executives have access to inside information and can therefore anticipate, respond to and minimise potentially stigmatising events (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). Indeed, some studies have indicated that top-tier managers who “jump ship” two years prior to the failure are less likely to be stigmatised than those colleagues who remain with the declining firm (e.g. Semadeni et al., 2008).

A case in point is Jeff Skilling of Enron, who departed the company just before the firm collapsed. Such actions often lead to that deterioration of expertise and top talent, and also
limit the firm’s ability to attract new executive talent which accelerates the decline and brings about the death of the organisation (D’Aveni, 1989a, 1990). Therefore, early attribution might not be able to capture the intricacies of ‘jumping ship’ to avoid the stigma which significantly affects who should be blamed for business failure. This is important because studies have demonstrated that observers sometimes err in rendering attribution either through incomplete information, faulty mechanisms in processing information about the role of others or new information coming to light (see Tetlock, 1985).

In the same way, the protracted delays before bankruptcy provide the space for some executives to opt for flight to avoid being stigmatised. Therefore, the attribution process of some individuals might be before the collapse and individuals with rich inside information about the nature of poor decisions and the potential impact on their reputations may opt to flee to deflect blame onto others. Prestigious top managers through elite affiliations are able to acquire and nurture legitimacy with respect to external agencies such as investors and shareholders, which are often lost when they depart declining organisations leading to failure (D’Aveni, 1990). By opting to quit before exit, this group of people is able to engage in preferential detachment actions to avoid or minimise any stigma stemming from the collapse. Also, elite managers may have elite political and social connections as well as financial resources which can be utilised to minimise the effects or avoid attribution all together (Wahrman, 1972). The elites have long been seem to be highly educated and are often connected to individuals who fill most positions of power and authority in the wider society (Clignet & Foster, 1964). The social network in tandem with the considerable financial resources can be deployed to mount a successful public defence of their reputation and actions through explaining issues seen to have been “misrepresented”.
A similar line of thinking suggests that the pace at which bankruptcy happens has the potential to shape the post-exit attribution. During the process of decline, not all prestigious managers may ‘jump ship’ to avoid stigma, but for some their pay package may become totally unaffordable to a financially troubled firm, leading to their exit (D'Aveni, 1989b). Their exit sometimes accelerates the process of failure because it often conveys signals to stakeholders that “a financially troubled organisation is no longer worthy of their support” and that there will be a further decline in the firm’s human capital base (D’Aveni, 1990: 138).

Based on the above discussion, we propose the following:

**Proposition 2**: Top-tier managers who jump ship before the business collapse, are more likely to avoid early attribution but are unlikely to escape delayed attribution (“Jeff Skilling effects”).

**The typology of attribution after business failure**

Having set out the recipients of attribution and the attribution process, we now turn our attention to the 2x2 matrix articulated at the outset of this article and its distinctive features.

**Cell I: Early internal attribution**

Cell I represents a situation where the observers deliver an attribution immediately after the event, however, the failure is attributed to mainly firm-specific factors such as poor leadership, loss of key personnel, and inability to identify and address the early signals of decline. Delivering such rapid attribution is essential in an environment, where observers are under intense pressure for rapid decisions by making use of the available information (Dutton et al., 1997). There is little time for the individual to assemble evidence and resources to mount any robust defence to deflect the blame from his or her actions. More importantly, the fresh emotion associated with the business failure means that often those in the spotlight are sanctioned, i.e. first- and second-tier managers.
However, this rush to judgement may create conditions where individuals are immediately stigmatised or shamed for the actions and decisions of others within the departed organisation. This often happens because of the demands of the public for immediate punishment of those seen to have made the wrong decisions. Stigmatisation occurs when a person possesses “some attribute or characteristic that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context” (Crocker et al., 1998: 505). Shame refers to the “public disapproval of some impropriety or personal shortcoming” (Tangney 1990: 102).

To illustrate this argument, we turn to the case of Spanair. The airline was founded in 1986 as a charter airline by Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS). At the outset, the firm was seen as one of the promising companies in the European airline industry. By the early 1990s, it had expanded to countries such as the United States and Mexico, however, its operations had remained largely unprofitable (Minder & Clark, 2012). In 2009, SAS sold its 80.1% stake to Catalan investors for a mere €1. The sale value exemplified the precarious financial position of the firm at the time.

After the sale, the prominent top executives recruited were confident that they could turn the fortune of the airline around. Over time, the constant media reports of its weak position meant that observers became more informed of the internal problems of the business. Indeed, the firm reported an operating loss of €115m (£96m) in 2010 and warned investors of potential future losses (The Guardian, 2012). In 2012, Spanair collapsed after a period of poor performances. The collapse led to the uncertain status of around 2,000 employees, cancellations of around 220 flights and 23,000 stranded passengers (Minder & Clark, 2012).

The collapse immediately led to public condemnation and shame of top executives including the Chief Executive Officer- Mike Szücs, the Vice-President- Miquel Martí and Chairman-
Ferran Soriano (Flottau, 2012; The 02b, 2012). They were also immediately condemned by
the Spanish government and Ministry of Public Works. Their reputations were severely
tarnished and competences seriously questioned given that they had closed the business and
cancelled all flights at a mere half an hour's notice (Gulfnews, 2012; The 02b, 2012). The
attribution was more potent given the thousands of angry and stranded passengers of the
airline around the world.

In addition, the top executives were also found to have pursued a reckless strategy which had
endangered the airline. Indeed, prior to its demise, the firm “became notorious among its
competitors for offering aggressively low fares, far below what could reasonably be the
airline’s own break-even threshold” (Flottau, 2012: 24). This helped to protect its key market
and slowed down rivals’ encroachment, but it was an unsustainable strategy for the business.
In a nutshell, the top executives came to be stigmatised by the so-called “the ghost of
Spanair”, i.e., poor leadership and managerial issues (The 02b, 2012).

**Cell II: Late internal attribution**

This is where observers conclude that the locus of causality is internal but render late
attribution. This often stems from a long drawn-out process of investigation and the need to
identify all of the culprits rather than those immediately visible to the public eye. In this cell,
the seriousness of the case and the wider impact force observers to engage in such
investigation. The ability to allow things to settle down before an attribution is made, helps to
take strong emotions out of the process and provides a basis for a better decision. Negative
internal late attribution is more likely to lead to a decline in former employees’ human capital
and undermine any claim of competence.
However, individuals receiving verification from social arbiters of having acted correctly or as being completely exonerated of precipitating business failure are more likely to see their human capital value enhanced in the current and future job market (see Deci and Ryan, 1985). However, such late attribution enables individuals to accumulate new resources and capability that then provide a basis for self-defence and demonstrate that lessons have been learnt.

To illustrate this point about the long drawn out attribution process and the effects on the individual, we turn to the UK financial industry and the case of the British arm of the collapsed Icelandic bank Kaupthing. Following the bank’s demise, the UK Financial Services Authority concluded after a protracted investigation that the behaviour of three former directors of the bank, Armann Thorvaldsson, Sigurdur Einarsson and Hreidar Mar Sigurdsson, was unprofessional and that they failed to act with due skill, care and diligence, and were banned from holding senior roles within the authorised British banking industry for five years (Treanor, 2012).

The authority ascertained that they adopted a growth strategy and made decisions but failed to anticipate and deal with the risks associated with them. Some argued that the punishment in the case did not fit the offence (see Treanor, 2012). There are inherent difficulties in deciding the right level of sanction as some individuals can be severely punished whilst others escape with minimal damage to their reputation. The above illustrative case paints a less than flattering description about the tendency of observers to over-attribute or under-attribute in many instances.
Cell III: Early external attribution

This is where the individual receives an early attribution but the failure is due to external factors over which he/she had limited control. Under these circumstances, the attribution is less likely to be severe. Despite the early nature of the attribution, the individual recipient has a better chance of diminishing or avoiding any stigmatisation from the event. Although people often attempt to conceal their stigma by suppressing thoughts about it (Smart and Wegner, 1999), there is greater likelihood that individuals with a tendency to withhold such information are more likely to be severely sanctioned when new information emerges uncovering their stigma. However, when similar events occur in the future, observers’ attention will be drawn to past events which are often moulded into the collective consciousness of interested parties and those who seek further accountability even in the future.

To illustrate this argument, we turn to the case of Q-cells. The firm was a German-based company with production facilities in countries such as Malaysia and Sweden. After its formation, it gained a reputation as one of the leading solar photovoltaic (PV) manufacturers. Indeed, it was regarded as “the energy company of the future” and ranked as the world's biggest maker of solar panels in 2008 with an estimated value of €8 billion (Schultz, 2012). By 2010, its position at the top of solar PV cell manufacturers in the world had slipped (REN21, 2011). In April 2012, the firm announced bankruptcy proceedings. Following the Euro crisis and global economic crisis of 2008, governments in Europe and elsewhere sought to reduce government spending which affected the solar industry.

In 2012, the German government decided to reduce the subsidies for solar power production by up to 30% (Wiesmann, 2012). The decision to reduce the fixed price shrunk the revenue stream of the firm and weakened its financial position. By late 2012, the bankrupted Q-Cells’
assets were sold to South Korea's Hanwha. The reduction in subsidies alongside the increasing global competition and economic crisis sealed the fate of Q-cells. Perhaps more importantly, the demise of rival businesses such as Solar Millenium, Odersun and Solarhybrid within months of each other persuaded observers that failure was largely due to factors beyond the control of the top management team (Wiesmann, 2012; Schultz, 2012).

**Cell IV: Late external attribution**

Cell IV is where the causes of failure are attributed to external factors such as global competition, luck and natural disasters, but where attribution is delayed. The delay might be due to the observers’ decisions to seek better sources of information on the individuals and the decision-making processes in the departed firm. There are cases where the timing of the business failure becomes very important in the attribution process. For instance, when the firm ceases to exist during times of economic crisis and political instability, this is more likely to be viewed as a “no-fault dissolution”, where managers linked to the failure are less likely to be stigmatised (Forsman, 2001).

With such delayed attribution, the heat may have gone out of the issues, thereby providing the time and space to respond to and overcome any stigma or shame. Delayed attribution may come so late that it can be rendered toothless and the imprint of the events in the consciousness of society may have faded away. Attribution rendered late after the event can be advantageous to the individual. This is partly because during the intervening period some individuals can acquire new expertise, new resources and networks of ties which enable them to mount a robust defence of their actions or claim that lessons have already been learnt. Individuals may have developed inbuilt capacity to handle public scrutiny and assemble resources necessary to repair his or her reputation. In addition, protracted investigations often
enable individuals to escape punishment or dodge any public scrutiny, or could simply not be traced by social arbiters (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008).

To illustrate this cell further, we turn to the case of Solyndra. The firm was once regarded as an exemplary business model of public-private partnership to help promote and develop expertise in the solar PV industry (Johnson & Suskewicz, 2009). The firm then received US government-backed loan guarantees of around $535 million in 2009. In addition to this, it also received the support of the US Department of Energy to open factories to manufacture solar panels.

The collapse in 2011 triggered a protracted Congressional investigation which meant that attribution was rendered late. Since it’s collapsed, the name Solyndra has become synonymous with government’s incompetence and ineffectiveness in picking “winners” and “losers” in the marketplace (Lesser, 2011). It has also become the symbol ingrained in the American political discourse that “federally subsidized solar-panel” manufacturers are unlikely to succeed in a competitive environment (Himmelman, 2012).

The demise was subsequently accompanied by political humiliation of politicians including the Vice-President Joe Biden who once stood at the company premises and declared “The future is here” (Scherer, 2011: 34–37). After the initial euphoria, more information emerged to shed light on the role of managers (see Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2012). With the passage of time, the public memory of the event had faded away after the investigations.

**Moderating influences**

There are a number of moderating factors which need to be taken into consideration in our quest to deepen our understanding of the subject. Although some scholars have suggested that attribution after business failure is based mainly on careful evaluation of actions and
inactions of key players (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008), we contend that hindsight plays an influential role in this process. Given that people have a tendency to view decisions that generate good results in a positive light, observers are likely to view decisions leading to business failure in a negative light. Indeed, it has been suggested that with hindsight, people not only exaggerate what things were foreseeable, but also overestimate the predictability of the event if it had led to a negative outcome such as failure (Davies, 1987; Lipshitz, 1989). Davies (1987: 50) further argued that “not only do hindsightful judges overestimate how much other people knew (or should have known) before the event, they even misremember their own foresight state of ignorance, recalling that they were wiser before the event than was actually the case”.

In rendering attribution, “decision making processes are perceived as more satisfactory when they lead to success, and successful decision makers are perceived more favourably than their unsuccessful counterparts” (Lipshitz, 1989: 380). This is important because scholars have long established that, even when instructed not to do so, observers have a tendency to take into consideration outcomes when evaluating one’s actions and decisions (Fincham, 1985).

Another moderating influence is that some attributions are based on incomplete information, especially in the case of early attributions. Because of the inherent difficulties in identifying the causes of failure, it is often very difficult for observers to be certain, which often leads to errors such as attributing blame to innocent bystanders or parties (Cannella et al., 1995). In a way, delayed attribution may not be good for the public who demand immediate punishment, but it helps to thwart irrelevant information from impeding the attribution process.

In addition, there is a tendency for people involved in failure to engage in impression management to help minimise any stigmatisation of their identity or reputation. Impression
management refers to the “psychological process by which people attempt to create and maintain desired perceptions of themselves in the eyes of others” (Dutton et al., 1997: 409). It is worth noting that people have a tendency to defend themselves by arguing that social arbiters have a “lack of perspicacity” and ignore key events surrounding the decision that forced managers to engage in a particular course of action (Davies, 1987).

However, this often depends on the resources accumulated by the individual to mount a defence or change others’ perceptions of them. We contend that “idiosyncratic credits” (Hollander, 1958) such as networks of relationships developed by the individual, are more likely to moderate the effects of attribution. ‘Idiosyncrasy credit’ refers to a situation in which the observers’ interpretations, sensemaking and attribution of business failure is moderated by an individual or organisation’s past behaviour or actions (Hollander, 1958; Amankwah-Amoah, 2013).

Furthermore, dissociative steps such as preferential detachment from groups or colleagues can be an effective mechanism through which individuals can protect their colleagues as well as minimise the effects of stigma on others. With preferential detachment, we are referring to actions taken by individuals to minimise the effects of stigma or reduce risk to others unconnected to the business failure (Yu et al., 2008). Those who can demonstrate features that de-link them from the stigmatised others are more likely to minimise or alleviate the effects to preserve their reputation. Delinking activities can come from the stigmatised others who would mount a public defence of those connected to them. Based on the above arguments, we propose the following:

**Proposition 3:** On balance, former executives who take steps to assemble key resources as well as mount a public defence are more likely to moderate the effect of any sanction.
Discussion and conclusion

The primary purpose was to delineate the types of attributions after business failure and the underlying processes through which such attributions are rendered. The study tapped into the existing streams of research on attributions and business failure to develop a 2x2 matrix, which incorporates timing of attribution alongside the locus of causality. Crossing the two main causes of organisational failure (i.e., internal and external factors) with two types of attribution (i.e., immediate attribution and delayed attribution) produced the 2x2 matrix which entails: early internal attribution, late internal attribution, early external attribution and late external attribution. The conceptual strength of the matrix lies in enriching our understanding of the effects of pace in the attribution process.

Our analysis also suggests that either early or delayed attribution has varying effects on former first-tier, second-tier and third-tier managers, and other non-managerial employees of the departed firm. This is largely due to their degree of control, influences and expectations of the departed firm. Through their elite networks and resources, first-tier managers are able to assemble resources and capabilities to evade and/or mitigate attribution by jumping ship or responding better than second- and third-tier managers.

Our study contributes to attribution and business failure literature in at least two ways. One of the shortcomings of the existing theoretical and empirical works on attribution after business failure has been the tendency to put all attributions together. Although scholars have examined the consequences of business failure (e.g. Hoetker and Agarwal, 2007) and attributions (e.g. Burger and Rodman, 1983), these have not been fully integrated to distinguish types of attribution in the post-exit environment. By integrating these two streams of research, we derive an overarching framework that distinguishes types of attribution and
explicates the conditions and processes through which immediate and delayed attributions are rendered.

In addition, our paper contributes to ongoing efforts to develop theory which helps to deliver a better explanation of the post-exit effects (Wiesenfeld et al., 2008; Amankwah-Amoah, 2014b). Thus, we extend Hoetker and Agarwal’s (2007) findings on the post-exit effect by conceptualising the literature through the 2x2 framework, which offers clarity and removes some of the ambiguity in the existing streams of research on attribution after business failure.

**Practical implications**

The study offers a number of useful insights for practising managers. First, our findings suggest that there is a need for greater accountability of social arbiters to help reduce or even eliminate errors in both early and delayed attribution. Although recipients of incorrect early attribution might be able to repair the damage, “what often results is not the acquisition of fully normal status, but a transformation of self from someone with a particular blemish into someone with a record of having corrected a particular blemish” (Goffman, 1963: 9). Correct attribution is particularly important in ensuring that the wrong people are not punished or stigmatised for others’ actions and inactions. This is pertinent given how society deals with those who have been seen to have been involved in failure.

By requiring more observers to justify their decisions in public, they are more likely to invest time and pay careful attention to all of the relevant information before reaching a conclusion and eliminating errors in the attribution process (Tetlock, 1985). This helps to prevent attribution based on incomplete information. Furthermore, there is a need for the right balance in ensuring that those responsible for business failure are brought to book for illegalities and are punished for poor decision-making, but we must ensure that we do not
create conditions that make people afraid or unwilling to take a risk. There is also a need to ensure that attributions are not so severe such that they inhibit an individual’s ability to move on after the event, however, criminal behaviour should be punished to deter others.

“Since good processes are more likely (albeit not certain) to yield good outcomes, decision makers should not be rewarded for bad decisions that succeed, nor penalized for good decisions that fail” (Lipshitz, 1989: 381).

**Directions for future research**

The typology has suggested a number of promising avenues for future research on attribution after business failure. A great deal remains to be learned about the role of organisational and national culture in the attribution process and the extent to which attribution differs across cultures. Unlike American society, many countries in the emerging world such as Ghana take a different attitude towards failure and often offer little or no opportunity for individuals to move on or recover (Amankwah-Amoah, 2013; Sandage, 2005). This area presents a fruitful avenue for scholars to enrich our understanding of attribution in general.

Another promising line of research would be to clarify the mechanisms through which some individuals are able to escape even delayed attribution for business failure and potential gains in such actions. This would be interesting given that those who are able to dodge attribution in the short term may require fewer resources and capabilities to repair their tarnished image. A great deal of thought is also required to examine how the attribution by social actors can help government craft policies that provide conditions for a “second chance” to flourish.

Our work also points to the need for future research to test the propositions identified and their generalisability across societies. We ought to know more about the reasons why some individuals are able to escape the public eye and therefore attribution for their deep
involvement in business failure. There is a need to broaden our theoretical quest to incorporate the mechanisms through which such individuals can take on new identities in a new location.

One of the limitations of our 2x2 matrix is that it glosses over the complex process and issues involved in determining the extent to which internal and external factors interacted to affect attributions. There is great potential for exploring the complexities inherent in attributions after business failure. We hope that these efforts serve as a catalyst for more research on both pre- and post-business failure attributions.

References


Nutt, P. C. (2002), Why decisions fail: Avoiding the blunders and traps that lead to debacles, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco, C. A.


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**Table 1. Type of attributions after business failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features and benefits</th>
<th>Immediate Attribution</th>
<th>Delayed Attribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Locus of causality not yet fully explored.</td>
<td>• Full examination of the facts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Arbiters tend to deliver harsher sanctions.</td>
<td>• Ability to assemble expertise and resources to mount defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Demand greater resources to repair tarnished image.</td>
<td>• Opportunity to engage impression management and preferential detachment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Avoid lingering attribution process.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: A continuum of attribution after business failure

Severity of attribution

Low

Deterministic (uncontrollable) factors

High

Voluntaristic (controllable) factors

Chain of events from the decline to demise

Figure 2: An integrated framework of the attribution process

Business failure

Quest for meaning and explanations for the business failure

Identifying the locus of causality and delivery of attribution

Immediate attribution

Delayed attribution

Attribution process

Three society arbiters (i.e. social, legal and economic)
**Figure 3: A four-cell typology of attribution after business failure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus of causality</th>
<th>Timing scenarios/pace of attribution</th>
<th>Early attribution</th>
<th>Delayed/late attribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cell I:</td>
<td>Cell II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Punitive punishment</td>
<td>• Stigmatised groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stigmatised groups and individuals</td>
<td>• Moderately sanctioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Very severely sanctioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntaristic view (lack of ability and effort)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cell III:</td>
<td>Cell IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Moderately sanctioned</td>
<td>• Industry-wide responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Bad luck</td>
<td>• “No fault” dissolution or bad luck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterministic view (uncontrollable factors)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**

- High sanction ➤ Low sanction
- Cell interactions in the matrix
- Degree of attribution/sanction

**Figure 4: The influence of control and responsibility and effects on attribution**
Degree/strength of sanctions

Control

High

Low

Responsibility

High

Low

Third-tier managers

Second-tier managers

Top-tier managers/executives

Non-managerial staff