Xu, Jin (2007): INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN STACKELBERG DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY.
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We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when demand fluctuation is important.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN STACKELBERG DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
|Depositing User:||Jin Xu|
|Date Deposited:||20. Dec 2007 14:54|
|Last Modified:||10. Aug 2015 06:47|
Available Versions of this Item
Information Advantage in Stackelberg Duopoly under Demand Uncertainty. (deposited 22. Dec 2007 17:24)
- INFORMATION ADVANTAGE IN STACKELBERG DUOPOLY UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY. (deposited 20. Dec 2007 14:54) [Currently Displayed]