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**Hofstede, Inglehart and beyond. New  
directions in empirical global value  
research**

By

Arno Tausch

## Abstract

However much we appreciate the enormous scientific contribution by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who initiated the international data collection of the *World Values Survey*, our re-analysis of the very *World Values Survey* data [“roll-outs” of the *World Values Survey* data wvs1981\_2008\_v20090914.sav] brought us to question Inglehart’s theories, with which he and his associates interpret the mass of the *World Values Survey* data. Their theoretical approach does not use a sufficiently number of hard-core indicators how global publics view central issues of economic policy, and their theories overemphasize a secularistic view of the religious phenomenon in modern society. Their theories predict the gradual waning of the religious phenomena in parallel with the increase of human security, and even cherish at times the tendencies brought about by such a waning of the religious element in advanced democracies. Inglehart spells them out: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life et cetera. Is that really something to cherish?

Today, societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family values can be an important asset in the stability of capitalist development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina’s and Paola Giuliano’s new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents *et cetera* coincide with the global map of economic growth today.

Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the *World Values Survey* project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from the *World Values Survey* project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth.

Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social

capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes.

In our re-analysis, we use the advanced statistical multivariate analysis technique of the Promax factor analysis, which allows for correlations between factors. It is available to the global public via the IBM-SPSS statistical package XXI. We eliminated missing values by listwise deletion.

In our first re-analysis, there were 92289 interview partners from around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables of our research design. Our main model explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. We highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions:

- a) economic permissiveness
- b) traditional religion
- c) racism
- d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
- e) distrust of the army and the press
- f) authoritarian character
- g) tolerance and respect
- h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as values in education)
- i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy

We also look at the trajectory of global society by analyzing the factor scores along the path of the Human Development Indicator of the UNDP (“human security indicator”, also used by Inglehart and his associates).

- Economic permissiveness clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary economic theory of growth. In statistical terms, it is the most important of all the resulting factors.
- Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic permissiveness. We also look at the exceptional performers (“residuals”) which best avoided economic permissiveness on each stage of secularization.

We also present Choropleth maps of human values across the globe, and show the regional implications of our analysis.

Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy. The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in this work. Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia.

While in general terms our analysis is quite optimistic about the civil society foundations for a stable democracy for several Muslim countries, including Morocco, Bosnia, Indonesia, Turkey and Jordan, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

In a second factor analysis, we re-analyze the question of Islam and feminism, based on an analysis of all respondents from the *World Values Survey*. The Muslim population covered in this survey comprises representatives of 62.6% of the Muslim population of our globe.

The data were based on the following variables:

- \* Age
- \* Education level (recoded)
- \* Highest educational level attained
- \* How important is God in your life
- \* How often do you attend religious services (never?)
- \* Important child qualities: religious faith
- \* Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject)
- \* Sex (Gender)
- \* University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject)
- \* Acceptancy of woman as a single parent

The respondents (all denominations) comprised  $n = 173231$  representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories. After Promax factor analysis, three factors explained 53.8% of total variance. While the distance to religious

practice is explained to some 4% by the education level (correlation between the two factors is 0.192), one can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. And while gender determines feminist convictions, contained in our analysis to some 40%, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also increasingly by enlightened men, non-Muslims and Muslims alike. Interestingly enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of the acceptancy of women as a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. only 12.39% of variance explained). Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common now in Western countries: the argument is that marriage is an outdated institution et cetera. Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance towards religion around the globe (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained).

Data emerging from the *World Values Survey* in the first decade of the 2000s also seem to suggest that the precariousness, which more and more characterizes the economies of leading Western countries leads toward an implosion of what Inglehart and his sociological school of thought interpreted as “self-expression values”. Our analysis of the time series element in the *World Values Survey* data shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To this end, we calculated which countries – in descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over preceding *World Values Survey* surveys from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data ([http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_54](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54)). The very idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other regions of the world they are rising, is a challenge to existing value theories.

The world, described by Inglehart and Baker, 2000, where in advanced industrial societies people pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures no longer seems to exist for the “1.000 Euro” generation born after 1975, which experiences more and more job insecurity and hardly finds full-time tenured work opportunities, let alone the financial means to travel to long-distant countries. No wonder then that “self-expression” is dramatically declining in the West.

We also highlight the fact that the latest wave of *World Values Survey* data, wave 6, from 2010 - 2014, released in May 2014 contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the R<sup>2</sup> between the two variables is almost 20%.

Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-expression tendencies, there is a greater number of Muslim countries (i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think for an instance Inglehart's theory to its end: according to the *World Values Survey* data, among the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-expression we find Jordan; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Egypt; and Uganda!

The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in western democracies. The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in the world system. Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self expression, and economic growth during the crisis years. Our Choropleth maps in this part of our article underline our contentions. Even a pure Inglehartian world values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is eroding.

So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart's and our own – is different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it.

With all the extensions of the *World Values Survey* project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, the Inglehart world map of global values recedes into the memory about a world order, which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the tsunami of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we try to show in this article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the North Atlantic arena.

In addition, we present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in relationship to the other variables contained in the *World Values Survey* data. Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the *World Values Survey* from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy.

The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 representative respondents in 70 countries are the following:

- moral (sexual) permissiveness ('Permissiveness 1')
- acceptancy of the shadow economy('Permissiveness 2')
- distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')
- educational values: independence and imagination
- distance to market economy values
- education values: responsibility and tolerance
- educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving
- right wing acceptance of inequality
- educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work

Contrary to Inglehart's expectations about a positive role of the low importance given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated with one another and with the loss of religious values.

Table 5.3 of our article shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for "effective democracy", i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in our Table 5.3. Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor analytical loading of beyond 0.333 (>10% of variance explained) confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-market.

In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following:

- a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system
- b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social decay

Table 5.4 shows the correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis ("factor scores") as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the secularistic and permissive logic, proposed by Inglehart.



In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Ralston *et al.* dimensions and our results. Ralston *et al.* is an application of the Schwartz categories to global business people. There was an enormous reception of the works of Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem especially in the expanding field of international business studies. Our quantification of Schwartz's theory relies exclusively on Ralston *et al.* The reason is simple: Ralston *et al.*, 2011 – somewhat in the tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on business people (Hofstede: one company, IBM; Ralston *et al.*, 2011: business people in general). Thus his sampling is restricted to a certain segment of society, while Schwartz's categories are much more encompassing. To provide more encompassing tests of Schwartz's theory in the framework of theories of overall global value change would be the theme for another essay, and is beyond the scope of this paper.

In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the Ralston *et al.* business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede and the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already mentioned, a problem of limited country samples in Ralston *et al.*, 2011. To understand the Ralston *et al.* framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern.

His seven dimensions are

1. Embeddedness
2. Hierarchy
3. Mastery
4. Affective Autonomy
5. Intellectual Autonomy
6. Egalitarianism
7. Harmony

In many ways, we can show that Hofstede's Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart's main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-expression, which we can well interpret in our own system. In all cases,

however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research by Hofstede and Inglehart.

Table 5.8 shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston *et al.*' work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the Ralston *et al.* factors "Embeddedness", "Hierarchy" and "Mastery".

We then debate current contentious political cleavages, especially in Europe in the light of the empirics, as suggested by the *World Values Survey*. These days, in the leading world newspapers we read stories which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? The French socialists, it seems, for example seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the *World Values Survey*, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe. I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa.

Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally applicable message of our article on the drivers of "effective democracy": a sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, and economic freedom will be conducive to "effective democracy". Nevertheless the path towards "effective democracy" will be one of ups and downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits for a too rapid economic liberalization in terms of "effective democracy".

As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the *World Values Survey*, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages of this article – tolerance and democracy.

In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of the *World Values Survey*:

- People who speak a different language
- People of a different religion
- Immigrants/foreign workers
- People of a different race

According to the *World Values Survey* data, the most tolerant nation on earth today is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia.

Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country Romania. Some Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance.

Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the *World Values Survey* results for the average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy.

Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are the Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis.

Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but already very high internal divisions on the issue are Libya; Philippines; Qatar; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia. In these countries and territories, debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy. Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don't assign a great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue.

Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the

surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification could be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article.

**JEL Classification:** A13; Z12; P48; O017; N3

**Keywords:** Relation of Economics to Social Values; religion; other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights, Formal and Informal Sectors, Shadow Economy, Institutional Arrangements; Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy

## Background

Societal and economic development is discontinuous; regional centers of the world economy shift at an enormous speed; and above all, religion and family values can be an important asset in the stability of capitalist development. Economic growth inexorably shifts away from the North Atlantic arena towards new centers of gravitation of the world economy. Alberto Alesina's and Paola Giuliano's new maps of global values (Alesina and Giuliano, 2013) present a real break with the hitherto existing secularistic consensus of global value research. Their maps of family ties, respect for parents *et cetera*.<sup>1</sup> coincide with the global map of economic growth today.

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<sup>1</sup> Pages 45 ff in Alesina and Giuliano, 2013, available at <http://scholar.harvard.edu/alesina/publications> and World Bank data, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries?display=map> We recommend to our readers to carefully look at Alesina's and Giuliano's maps, one by one, and then to compare these maps with the freely available World Bank maps of global economic growth. The end result will always be the same: economic growth in the world shifts to regions, where “*capitalist family values*” are strong:




economic growth, 2009-2013, in % per year

In doing so, we might add that we are researching in good company. Leading representatives of the global economics profession now start to take up the challenge to interpret the mass of the data from the *World Values Survey* project on their own. The essay by Barro and McCleary (2003) was an important beginning and a good example of how today economic research uses data from the *World Values Survey* project to study the relationship between religion, denominations and economic growth.

Alesina (2013); Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007); Alesina and Guiliano (2010, 2011, 2013); Alesina, Cozzi and Mantovan (2012); and Alesina, di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) all show how the economic discipline can gain hard-core, quantitative and valuable insights from comparative knowledge about such phenomena as generalized trust and social capital, individualism, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and perception of poverty, and religious practice for economic processes.

In our article, we will attempt to define “cultures” on a global scale largely following Alesina and Guiliano (2013). Although some of our preferred *World Values Survey* indicators are different from those used by Alesina and Guiliano (2013), there is sufficient resemblance between the two approaches, and also there is a high correspondence between their choropleth geographical maps of global values and our own maps.

Leaving behind the omnipresent logic of the confrontation between traditional vs. secular-rational values and survival vs. self-expression values, which is so common for the Inglehart paradigm of global values, opens the way to consider such phenomena as the shadow economy.



We are above all interested in such phenomena as attitudes on competition and free markets, on social expenditures, and on bribery and corruption. Without question, bribery and corruption are one of the main challenges for international business studies nowadays.

From such diverse economic theories as Alesina, Barro and Schumpeter, we re-discover the importance of the data on generalized trust and social capital, family ties, morality, attitudes toward work and religious practice. Democratic and liberal values can correspond to a civilization, characterized by an enlightened religion, in the West and in the Muslim world alike.

In many ways, our investigation puts the large secularistic scientific consensus on the issues under consideration on its head.

We show that the world economic rise of the global South, among them the BRICS countries and the countries of the Arab Gulf, is no coincidence: economic growth in the post-crisis period from 2008 onwards is highly and positively correlated with family values.

All too often, the loss of religion and the rise of the shadow economy go hand in hand, including in leading Western countries. The decay of family values, which are so deeply enshrined in the religious commandments of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and which are also basic to the other global religious civilizations, goes hand in hand with the decay of economic and social values.

In our study, we used the following variables to arrive at our factor analytical models.

<b><i>World Values Survey variable</i></b>
Age
Competition good or harmful (harmful)
Confidence: Armed Forces
Confidence: The Press
Education level (recoded)
Highest educational level attained
How important is God in your life
How often do you attend religious services (never)
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility
Important child qualities: hard work
Important child qualities: imagination
Important child qualities: independence
Important child qualities: obedience

Important child qualities: religious faith
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
Important child qualities: unselfishness
Income equality (large differences needed)
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject)
Justifiable: abortion
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
Justifiable: cheating on taxes
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them
Justifiable: divorce
Justifiable: euthanasia
Justifiable: homosexuality
Justifiable: prostitution
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
Justifiable: suicide
Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers
Neighbors: People of a different race
Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject)
Political system: Having the army rule (very bad)
Private vs. state ownership of business (state)
Satisfaction with your life
Self-positioning in political scale (right wing)
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)
University is more important for a boy than for a girl
Woman as a single parent

Already the great Harvard economist Joseph Alois Schumpeter (8 February 1883 – 8 January 1950) put the decline of family values at the center of his theory about the decline of the capitalist order. Today, Barro goes even further: religion does affect economic outcomes mainly by fostering religious beliefs that influence individual traits such as thrift, work ethic, and honesty. Barro's perspective is largely confirmed in this study.

For Inglehart, phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the state to get government benefits for which one wouldn't be entitled practically even do not exist, while the rich data base of the *World Values Survey* itself provides ample evidence about these phenomena. Starting with Schumpeter and his hypothesis about the waning of family values and the capitalist family enterprise as the basis of the crisis of capitalism, we re-discover the positive contribution



of religion for society instead of cherishing its decline in the name of “self-expression”.

In contrast to the research which still characterizes the reflexion on *World Values Survey* data in current social sciences, we think that the time has come to use techniques which properly allow for stronger relations between the “factors” underlying the correlations between the variables. We think that the Promax Factor Analysis is such an advanced analytical technique, and we use it throughout this article. Global value research would also be unthinkable today without factor analytical index construction. Our research results and the statistical foundations presented here are an invitation for decision makers and researchers to start for themselves developing indices based on the freely available *World Values Survey* data. All they need are competent statisticians, modern statistical software and the firm intention and will to develop projects facilitating the path towards a more mature and encompassing democracy – everywhere around the globe.

The choice of the factor analytical method used to reduce the number of variables of the *World Values Survey* project to its underlying dimensions is not just a matter for the specialist but it also has many different consequences. Inglehart and most other researchers rely on standard linear factor analysis, which is basically a statistical methodology already developed before the Second World War.

It is surprising that the massive items available from the *World Values Survey* data base on the shadow economy and core economic values have not yet been hitherto used to a sufficient degree in the dominant theory construction of empirical social science.

In a common approach, Schneider (2005) defines the shadow economy to include all market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons: (i) to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes, (ii) to avoid payment of social security contributions, (iii) to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, and (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures. However, this definition does not include economic activities that are illegal and fit the characteristics of classical crime, as well as the informal household economy or tax evasion.

Schneider (2005), in the context of industrialized and transition economies, mentions that the shadow economy is expected to influence the tax system and its structure, the efficiency of resource allocation between sectors, and the official economy in a dynamic sense.

Schneider (2005) concludes that for all countries investigated, the shadow economy as share of GDP has reached a remarkably large size (Africa 33.9-41.2; Americas 34.2-41.5; Asia 20.9-26.3; Transition countries 31.5-37.9 and highly developed OECD countries 13.2-16.8). The average percentage shares of GDP in all cases are increasing over time. The author demonstrates empirically a strong interaction of the shadow economy with government policies and with the official economy. He draws three further conclusions. First, an increasing burden of taxation and social security payments, combined with rising state regulatory activities, are the major driving forces underlying the size and growth of the shadow economy. Second, the shadow economy has a statistically significant and quantitatively important influence on the growth of the official economy. Increases in the shadow economy have a negative effect on the official growth in a developing country, but a positive effect in the developed industrialized and transition countries. People engage in shadow economic activity because of government actions, most notably high levels of taxation and regulation.

Although *World Values Survey* (WVS) data are used by the economics profession in their attempt to estimate the drivers of the shadow economy, contemporary sociological WVS research has failed hitherto to integrate the shadow economy into general theories of values and value change.

The data base of the *World Values Survey* indeed contains very precise items in connection with a neo-liberal interpretation of economic processes, like the acceptancy or rejection of free competition, or various items on the acceptability or desirability of state intervention. In contrast to hitherto published research, we try to integrate these elements into the core-model of global value change. For this good reason, we present here an extensive survey how contemporary economic theory already integrates economic freedom in its empirical and theoretical research. Our survey is intended to be an overview especially for readers who are more familiar with other disciplines of the social sciences and not economics. In the presentation, we use a non-mathematical language.

Muslim societies sometimes already perform very well on indices of economic freedom, irrespective of their development level. As defined by the well-known think tank "*Heritage Foundation*" (<http://www.heritage.org/index/book/chapter-5>) economic freedom is the condition in which individuals can act with maximum autonomy and minimum obstruction in the pursuit of their economic livelihood and prosperity. As Hayek observed, to be controlled in our economic pursuits would mean to be controlled in everything.

For the Heritage Foundation, a comprehensive view of economic freedom encompasses all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services.

The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom takes a broad and comprehensive view of country performance, measuring 10 separate areas of economic freedom. Each economic freedom is individually scored on a scale of 0 to 100. A country's overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on the 10 individual freedoms. The 10 economic freedoms are grouped into four broad categories:

- Rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption);
- Government size (fiscal freedom, government spending);
- Regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and
- Market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom).

The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union led to creation of 15 new states and a transition from centrally planned economies to market economies for 25 states for the period from 1998 to 2005. These countries experienced heterogeneous growth and development. Pääkkönen (2010) reviewed the political economy of economic growth in the post-communist economies transition to free markets. The focus is on the role of economic policy and institutions in the transition process. The author tested the hypothesis that better institutions, measured in terms of economic freedom, contributed to growth. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis. Increased government consumption has a negative effect on growth suggesting the presence of wasteful spending and hindrance to growth.

Economic research provides very important insights into the conditions of “*effective democracy*”, which cannot depend – as contemporary *World Values Survey* research often contends – on “self expression” values alone. In accordance with *World Values Survey* research, “*effective democracy*” is an indicator, which combines performance in terms of what Western scholarship understands by ‘*human rights*’ and the *rule of law* (concept of the World Bank).

Also, all the dimensions, which were shown to be relevant in our own empirical value research already surfaced in prior economic research, like economic permissiveness, which most strongly affects large parts of Latin America (except Venezuela, Peru, and the countries of the Southern Cone), some but not all nations of Africa, most of the former USSR and some other countries of East Central and Southeastern Europe, Thailand and the Philippines, as one of the main stumbling blocks against effective democracy.

Corruption is widespread in particular among developing countries. A precondition for achieving growth and reducing poverty is to deal with corruption in an effective way. This view is supported by a growing literature,

which we review in this Chapter. Potentially effective instruments in rooting out corruption are democratic elections and press freedom.

The major existing sociological theories about global values do not focus as yet sufficiently on these phenomena: Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart, the three major theoretical approaches guiding the discipline of value research today.

## ***1. The sociological and psychological theories of global values***

To our great surprise we find out that the major existing sociological and psychological theories about global values do not even talk about these phenomena: they as yet do not exist for global value research in the traditions of Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart, the three major theoretical approaches guiding the discipline.

So, among the most prominent competing international attempts to define and measure the development of human values, we should specify the current three major approaches dominating international social science:

- **Hofstede's** theory of global values
- **the Schwartz/Davidov** approach
- **Inglehart's** and his associates' studies of world values

First we mention **Geert Hofstede**. This Dutch psychologist and his associates really stood at the beginning of comparative international value research. Initially, they based their empirical studies on global culture on the statistical analysis of the staff of the single US transnational enterprise IBM in 40 different countries around the world (see also Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013). The background to all this was very clear: with IBM production taking place in more and more countries around the globe, IBM needed to know more about the culturally determined mindsets of its employees.

### **1. 1. Geert Hofstede**

According to Hofstede and his school, there are **four to six basic clusters of international value systems**, and they are all defined along the scales of how

different national societies handle ways of **coping with inequality, ways of coping with uncertainty, the relationship of the individual with her or his primary group, and the emotional implications of having been born as a girl or as a boy.** Hofstede defines these dimensions of national culture as

- Power Distance
- Individualism vs. Collectivism
- Masculinity versus Femininity
- Uncertainty Avoidance Index
- Long-Term Orientation
- Indulgence versus Restraint

Between 1990 and 2002, Hofstede replicated these dimensions in six other cross-national studies on very different populations from consumers to airline pilots, covering between 14 and 28 countries. In the 2010 third edition of his book *'Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind'*, scores on the dimensions are listed for 76 countries.<sup>2</sup>

**Power distance**, according to Hofstede, is the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions (like the family) **accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.** This represents inequality (more versus less), but it is **defined from below, not from above.** *'It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by the leaders.'*

**Uncertainty avoidance** deals with a **society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.** It indicates to what extent a culture programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations. Unstructured situations are novel, unknown, surprising, and are different from the usual.<sup>3</sup> Uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, safety and security measures, and **on the philosophical and religious level they try to avoid uncertainty by a belief in absolute Truth.** According to Hofstede and his associates,

*"[...] People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. The opposite type, uncertainty accepting cultures, are more tolerant of opinions different from what they are used to; they try to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are relativist and allow many currents to flow side by side. People within these cultures are more phlegmatic and contemplative, and not expected by their environment to express emotions."*<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

**Individualism** on the one side, versus its opposite, **collectivism** is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups. On the individualist side we find societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after her/himself and her/his immediate family:

*“On the collectivist side, we find societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, often extended families (with uncles, aunts and grandparents) which continue protecting them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. The word collectivism in this sense has no political meaning: it refers to the group, not to the state.”*<sup>5</sup>

**Masculinity** versus its opposite, **femininity** is defined by the Hofstede School as referring to the distribution of emotional roles between the genders. According to Hofstede’s system this is another fundamental issue for any society to which a range of solutions are found.<sup>6</sup> For Hofstede, female values around the globe differ less than male values from country to country.

With the passage of time, Hofstede and his associates added a **fifth dimension** to their value studies, called the **long-term orientation (LTO)**. In part, this dimension is based on data from the ‘*World Values Survey*’ project. According to this interpretation, long-term oriented societies *‘foster pragmatic virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular saving, persistence, and adapting to changing circumstances. Short-term oriented societies foster virtues related to the past and present such as national pride, respect for tradition, preservation of “face”, and fulfilling social obligations.’*<sup>7</sup>

In this context, Hofstede and Minkov (2010) also provided a principal components analysis of their own of the different items from the *World Values Survey* on such items as thrift and perseverance, religious faith, efforts to meet expectations of friends, love of parents, dedication of parents to their children’s’ well-being (rather than having a parallel parental life of their own), the stance on divorce, attitudes on national pride, making parents proud, and the importance of service to others in life.<sup>8</sup>

We re-arranged the original presentation in Hofstede and Minkov (2010) to allow our readers to immediately be able to see the relationship of the long-term orientation scale with the original factor loadings (i. e. principal components), based on the Hofstede/Minkov re-analysis of the *World Values Survey* data:

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>8</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

**Table 1.1: Hofstede’s LTO score**

	<b>original factor loadings, reported in Hofstede/Minkov, 2010</b>	<b>multiplied by -100 to arrive at the reformulated LTO-score</b>
thrift	-0,82	82
perseverance	-0,77	77
divorce justifiable	-0,04	4
always love parents	0,10	-10
live up to friends' expectations	0,57	-57
parents do their best	0,62	-62
parental pride	0,63	-63
religious faith	0,65	-65
national pride	0,68	-68
service to others	0,84	-84

South Korea, Japan and China lead the field, while Egypt, Jordan, but also several Latin American countries, rank lowest among the 38 countries with data.

According to Hofstede and his school, there is also a sixth dimension emerging from their data: **Indulgence versus Restraint**. Indulgence stands “*for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms.*”

Table 1.2 now summarizes the Hofstede scores in the world system. Many Muslim societies find themselves at the opposite ends of the various different scales, i.e. the global dividing lines are different from those portrayed by Huntington.

**Table 1.2: the global Hofstede scores (majority Muslim countries are marked in green color)**

<b>country</b>	<b>Power Distance</b>	<b>Individualism vs. Collectivism</b>	<b>Masculinity versus Femininity</b>	<b>Uncertainty Avoidance Index</b>	<b>Long-Term Orientation</b>	<b>Indulgence versus Restraint</b>
Argentina	49	46	56	86	20	62
Australia	36	90	61	51	21	71

Austria	11	55	79	70	60	63
Bangladesh	80	20	55	60	47	20
Belgium	65	75	54	94	82	57
Brazil	69	38	49	76	44	59
Bulgaria	70	30	40	85	69	16
Canada	39	80	52	48	36	68
Chile	63	23	28	86	31	68
China	80	20	66	30	87	24
Colombia	67	13	64	80	13	83
Croatia	73	33	40	80	58	33
Czech Rep	57	58	57	74	70	29
Denmark	18	74	16	23	35	70
El Salvador	66	19	40	94	20	89
Estonia	40	60	30	60	82	16
Finland	33	63	26	59	38	57
France	68	71	43	86	63	48
Germany	35	67	66	65	83	40
Greece	60	35	57	112	45	50
Hong Kong	68	25	57	29	61	17
Hungary	46	80	88	82	58	31
India	77	48	56	40	51	26
Indonesia	78	14	46	48	62	38
Iran	58	41	43	59	14	40
Ireland	28	70	68	35	24	65
Italy	50	76	70	75	61	30
Japan	54	46	95	92	88	42
Korea South	60	18	39	85	100	29
Latvia	44	70	9	63	69	13
Lithuania	42	60	19	65	82	16
Luxembourg	40	60	50	70	64	56
Malaysia	104	26	50	36	41	57
Malta	56	59	47	96	47	66
Mexico	81	30	69	82	24	97
Morocco	70	46	53	68	14	25
Netherlands	38	80	14	53	67	68
New Zealand	22	79	58	49	33	75
Norway	31	69	8	50	35	55
Pakistan	55	14	50	70	50	0
Peru	64	16	42	87	25	46
Philippines	94	32	64	44	27	42
Poland	68	60	64	93	38	29
Portugal	63	27	31	104	28	33
Romania	90	30	42	90	52	20
Russia	93	39	36	95	81	20
Serbia	86	25	43	92	52	28
Singapore	74	20	48	8	72	46
Slovak Rep	104	52	110	51	77	28



Slovenia	71	27	19	88	49	48
Spain	57	51	42	86	48	44
Sweden	31	71	5	29	53	78
Switzerland	34	68	70	58	74	66
Taiwan	58	17	45	69	93	49
Thailand	64	20	34	64	32	45
Trinidad and Tobago	47	16	58	55	13	80
Turkey	66	37	45	85	46	49
U. S. A.	40	91	62	46	26	68
United Kingdom	35	89	66	35	51	69
Uruguay	61	36	38	100	26	53
Venezuela	81	12	73	76	16	100
Vietnam	70	20	40	30	57	35

Our own compilation from: <http://geerthofstede.com/dimensions-of-national-cultures> and <http://www.geerthofstede.com/research--vsm> . We only considered the countries with complete values for the final analysis.

For Hofstede and his associates, there are very clear **underlying dimensions of these six dimensions** and social and **cultural history**. Some of these conclusions, not necessarily fully shared by us, are nevertheless really breathtaking theoretical perspectives over the last two millennia of global history:

*“Power distance scores are high for Latin, Asian and African countries and smaller for Anglo and Germanic countries. Uncertainty avoidance scores are higher in Latin countries, in Japan, and in German speaking countries, lower in Anglo, Nordic, and Chinese culture countries. Individualism prevails in developed and Western countries, while collectivism prevails in less developed and Eastern countries; Japan takes a middle position on this dimension. Masculinity is high in Japan, in some European countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and moderately high in Anglo countries; it is low in Nordic countries and in the Netherlands and moderately low in some [...] countries like France, Spain and Thailand. Long-term orientation scores are highest in East Asia, moderate in Eastern and Western Europe, and low in the Anglo world, the Muslim world, Latin America and Africa. Indulgence scores are highest in Latin America, parts of Africa, the Anglo world and Nordic Europe; restraint is mostly found in East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Muslim world.”*

*“The grouping of country scores points to some of the roots of cultural differences. These should be sought in the common history of similarly scoring countries. All Latin countries, for example, score relatively high on both power*

*distance and uncertainty avoidance. Latin countries (those today speaking a Romance language i. e. Spanish, Portuguese, French, Italian or Romanian) have inherited at least part of their civilization from the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire in its days was characterized by the existence of a central authority in Rome, and a system of law applicable to citizens anywhere. This established in its citizens' minds the value complex which we still recognize today: centralization fostered large power distance and a stress on laws fostered strong uncertainty avoidance. The Chinese empire also knew centralization, but it lacked a fixed system of laws: it was governed by men rather than by laws. In the present-day countries once under Chinese rule, the mindset fostered by the empire is reflected in large power distance but medium to weak uncertainty avoidance. The Germanic part of Europe, including Great Britain, never succeeded in establishing an enduring common central authority and countries which inherited its civilizations show smaller power distance. Assumptions about historical roots of cultural differences always remain speculative but in the given examples they are plausible. In other cases they remain hidden in the course of history.”<sup>9</sup>*

*“Power distance is correlated with the use of violence in domestic politics and with income inequality in a country. Uncertainty avoidance is associated with Roman Catholicism and with the legal obligation in developed countries for citizens to carry identity cards. Individualism is correlated with national wealth and with mobility between social classes from one generation to the next. Masculinity is correlated negatively with the percent of women in democratically elected governments. Long-term orientation is correlated with school results in international comparisons. Indulgence is correlated with sexual freedom and a call for human rights like free expression of opinions.”<sup>10</sup>*

The differences between the Muslim countries in the sample and the global unweighted means reveal no particular pattern:

**Table 1.3: The Muslim countries in Hofstede’s global sample and their differences from the global, unweighted means**

	<b>Power Distance</b>	<b>Individualism vs. Collectivism</b>	<b>Masculinity versus Femininity</b>	<b>Uncertainty Avoidance Index</b>	<b>Long-Term Orientation</b>	<b>Indulgence versus Restraint</b>
Bangladesh	21,42	-25,76	5,89	-6,95	-2,76	-27,50
Indonesia	19,42	-31,76	-3,11	-18,95	12,24	-9,50

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.geerthofstede.nl/dimensions-of-national-cultures>

Iran	-0,58	-4,76	-6,11	-7,95	-35,76	-7,50
Malaysia	45,42	-19,76	0,89	-30,95	-8,76	9,50
Morocco	11,42	0,24	3,89	1,05	-35,76	-22,50
Pakistan	-3,58	-31,76	0,89	3,05	0,24	-47,50
Turkey	7,42	-8,76	-4,11	18,05	-3,76	1,50

Our own compilation from: <http://geerthofstede.com/dimensions-of-national-cultures> and <http://www.geerthofstede.com/research--vsm> . We only considered the countries with complete values for the final analysis.

In the following presentation of Hofstede's theory, we are presenting the global ranks of the countries of the world according to Hofstede's scales. We highlight the results for the majority Muslim countries in green color.

**Table 1.4: The global ranks according to Hofstede's scales**

Country	Power Distance	Individualism vs. Collectivism	Masculinity versus Femininity	Uncertainty Avoidance Index	Long-Term Orientation	Indulgence versus Restraint
Argentina	42	31	24	14	57	6
Australia	52	2	17	46	55	8
Austria	62	25	4	29	22	41
Bangladesh	9	49	25	38	35	28
Belgium	26	9	26	6	6	57
Brazil	19	34	32	26	38	25
Bulgaria	16	42	45	19	14	49
Canada	50	5	28	49	42	21
Chile	29	48	54	17	47	16
China	10	50	12	57	4	59
Colombia	23	61	15	23	61	2
Croatia	14	38	44	24	24	39
Czech Rep	36	24	20	28	13	50
Denmark	61	10	58	61	44	19
El Salvador	24	54	47	7	56	7
Estonia	47	21	53	39	8	55
Finland	56	18	55	41	41	22
France	20	11	38	15	18	45
Germany	53	17	11	34	5	58
Greece	32	37	21	1	37	26
Hong Kong	21	47	22	59	21	42
Hungary	44	4	3	21	23	40
India	12	28	23	53	29	34
Indonesia	11	59	35	50	19	44
Iran	34	32	39	40	60	3


Ireland	59	14	9	55	54	9
Italy	41	8	6	27	20	43
Japan	40	30	2	9	3	60
Korea South	33	55	48	20	1	62
Latvia	45	13	60	37	15	48
Lithuania	46	20	56	35	7	56
Luxembourg	48	22	29	30	17	46
Malaysia	1	45	30	54	39	24
Malta	38	23	34	4	34	29
Mexico	7	41	8	22	53	10
Morocco	17	29	27	33	59	4
Netherlands	51	6	59	44	16	47
New Zealand	60	7	18	48	45	18
Norway	57	15	61	47	43	20
Pakistan	39	60	31	31	31	32
Peru	27	57	43	13	52	11
Philippines	3	39	14	52	49	14
Poland	22	19	13	8	40	23
Portugal	30	44	52	2	48	15
Romania	5	40	42	11	28	35
Russia	4	33	50	5	9	54
Serbia	6	46	40	10	27	36
Singapore	13	51	33	62	12	51
Slovak Rep	2	26	1	45	10	53
Slovenia	15	43	57	12	32	31
Spain	37	27	41	16	33	30
Sweden	58	12	62	60	26	37
Switzerland	55	16	7	42	11	52
Taiwan	35	56	37	32	2	61
Thailand	28	53	51	36	46	17
Trinidad and Tobago	43	58	19	43	62	1
Turkey	25	35	36	18	36	27
U. S. A.	49	1	16	51	51	12
United Kingdom	54	3	10	56	30	33
Uruguay	31	36	49	3	50	13
Venezuela	8	62	5	25	58	5
Vietnam	18	52	46	58	25	38

Our own compilation from: <http://geerthofstede.com/dimensions-of-national-cultures> and <http://www.geerthofstede.com/research--vsm> . We only considered the countries with complete values for the final analysis.


The following maps show the original Hofstede scores, as they are reproduced in Table 1.2, projected onto world maps. These choropleth maps help us to arrive at a better understanding of the six Hofstede factors.

- Hofstede's **power distance** scale is generally lowest in Scandinavian and in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, and also in the social welfare state Austria, and it is, generally speaking, highest the ex-USSR, in India and South-East Asia and in China, in Mexico and Venezuela and in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
- The most **collectivistic** countries are to be found in the Andean region of Latin America, in China and in countries of South and South-East Asia, while the highest **individualism** is to be found in the United States and in the Anglo-Saxon democracies, with high scores also to be found in the Netherlands, Denmark, and also in Italy and in Hungary.
- The highest **masculinity** scores are to be found in some countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in Japan and in Venezuela, while the countries of Scandinavia and the Baltic region, the Netherlands and, interestingly enough, Chile and Portugal are characterized by high **femininity**.
- **Uncertainty avoidance** is highest in Greece, Portugal and Uruguay, and is generally highest in Roman Catholic and Orthodox cultures, and also in Japan and South Korea, while it is lowest in Protestant cultures, but also in China and in Iran, in South Asia and in South-East Asia.
- **Hofstede's long-term orientation (LTO)** is highest in South Korea, Japan, China, in Russia and the Baltic Republics, and in Germany and some other European countries, while it is especially absent in Latin America, in the Anglo-Saxon democracies and Scandinavia, and in Morocco and Iran; with most of the other European countries and the countries of South and South-East Asia classified in the same ranks.
- Hofstede's **Indulgence Factor** is highest in Venezuela, in countries of the Caribbean and in Mexico and, interestingly enough, also in Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, the UK, the US and Canada and in some European countries (Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland and Austria) and in Chile, while **Restraint** is highest in Pakistan, in most former communist countries, and in China. Most continental European countries seem to be characterized by low indulgence and higher restraint.


**Map 1.1: Hofstede's Power Distance (maximum: painted in red)**



**Map 1.2: Hofstede's Individualism (painted in red) vs. Collectivism (painted in blue)**




**Map 1.3: Hofstede's Masculinity (painted in red) versus Femininity (painted in blue)**







**Map 1.4: Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance Index (painted in red)**



**Map 1.5: Hofstede's Long-Term Orientation (painted in red)**



**Map 1.6: Hofstede's Indulgence (painted in red) versus Restraint (painted in blue)**



Hofstede's challenging categories found a global audience and attracted the attention of hundreds of scholarly articles, among others in the growing field of business studies. More recently, Grovewell International ("GLOBE Project") replicated the Hofstede findings on their own and largely came to the same conclusions.<sup>11</sup>

## 1. 2. Shalom Schwartz and Eldad Davidov

The next theory which we will briefly present here has been developed by Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It was further developed in mathematical-statistical and theoretical terms by Eldad Davidov. As with Hofstede's studies, there was an enormous international reception, especially in the expanding field of international business studies. The quantification of Schwartz's theory in this paper thus relies exclusively on Ralston *et al.* The reason is simple: Ralston *et al.*, 2011 – somewhat in the tradition of Hofstede - use samples, based on **business people** (Hofstede: one company, IBM; Ralston *et al.*, 2011: business people in general). Thus his sampling is restricted to a certain segment of society, while Schwartz's categories are much more encompassing. To provide more encompassing tests of Schwartz's theory in the framework of theories of overall global value change – and not just value change among business people - would be the theme for another essay.

In Chapter 12 we analyze correlations and also show the relationships of the Ralston business people data with our own dimensions. As with Hofstede and the GLOBE Project, influenced by Hofstede, there is, as we already mentioned, a problem of limited country samples in Ralston *et al.*, 2011. Our essay thus does not pretend in the slightest way to provide materials on the overall interrelationship between the original Schwartz categories and the results,

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.grovewell.com/> The GLOBE project was initiated by Professor Robert J. House of the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1991. Based on interviews with more than 17.000 global managers in 62 cultures, the nine GLOBE cultural competencies are:

1. Performance orientation
2. Assertiveness orientation
3. Future orientation
4. Human orientation
5. Collectivism I: Institutional collectivism
6. Collectivism II: In-group collectivism
7. Gender egalitarianism
8. Power distance
9. Uncertainty avoidance

achieved by Hofstede, Inglehart and our own investigations. It has to be emphasized that what is being tested here is solely Ralston's quantification based on samples of business people.

To understand the Ralston *et al.* framework, one has to emphasize that Schwartz himself began his investigations not on generalized surveys of the total population (Schwartz, 2009) but on global samples of schoolteachers and college students. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (k-12) from 58 national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples only included some 180 to 280 respondents. At a later stage, Schwartz validated his scales with survey data from the *European Social Survey*. The *World Values Survey* data also include items of the Schwartz scales.<sup>12</sup>

Schwartz himself presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian influenced, and African and Middle Eastern.

The seven dimensions are

1. Embeddedness
2. Hierarchy
3. Mastery
4. Affective Autonomy
5. Intellectual Autonomy
6. Egalitarianism
7. Harmony

To understand the Ralston *et al.* framework, one has also to emphasize that at the basis of Schwartz's theory are ten items from his so-called *Portrait Value Questionnaire*, whose individual dimensions we shall present according to a recent synthesis, provided by Dobewall and Strack, 2013. Items marked like "#a197" or "a193" *et cetera* refer to the original Schwartz *Portrait Value Questionnaire*.

**Universalism:** #a197 "care for nature": Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature.

**Benevolence:** #a193 "help others": It is important to this person to help the people nearby; to care for their well-being.

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<sup>12</sup> <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

**Conformity:** #a196 “behave properly”: It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.

**Security:** #a191 “secure surroundings”: Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be dangerous.

**Power:** #a190 “wealth”: It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.

**Achievement:** #a194 “successful”: Being very successful is important to this person; to have people recognize one’s achievements.

**Stimulation:** #a195 “risk excitement”: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.

**Hedonism:** #a192 “good time spoil self”: It is important to this person to have a good time; to “spoil” oneself.

**Self-Direction:** #a189 “creative original”: It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way.

At one point in his analysis, Schwartz explains:

*“I derived value dimensions for comparing cultures by considering **three of the critical issues that confront all societies**. The first issue is the nature of the relation or the boundaries between the person and the group: To what extent are people autonomous vs. embedded in their groups? I label the polar locations on this cultural dimension **autonomy versus embeddedness**. In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. They should cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and find meaning in their own uniqueness. There are two types of autonomy: Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently. Examples of important values in such cultures include broadmindedness, curiosity, and creativity. Affective autonomy encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. Important values include pleasure, exciting life, and varied life. In cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.*”

*The second societal problem is to guarantee that people behave in a responsible manner that preserves the social fabric. That is, people must engage in the productive work necessary to maintain society rather than compete destructively or withhold their efforts. People must be induced to consider the welfare of others, to coordinate with them, and thereby manage their unavoidable interdependencies. The polar solution labeled **cultural egalitarianism** seeks to induce people to recognize one another as moral equals who share basic interests as human beings. People are socialized to internalize a commitment to cooperate and to feel concern for everyone's welfare. They are expected to act for the benefit of others as a matter of choice. Important values in such cultures include equality, social justice, responsibility, help, and honesty. The polar alternative labeled **cultural hierarchy** relies on hierarchical systems of ascribed roles to insure responsible, productive behavior. It defines the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources as legitimate. People are socialized to take the hierarchical distribution of roles for granted and to comply with the obligations and rules attached to their roles. Values like social power, authority, humility, and wealth are highly important in hierarchical cultures.*

*The third societal problem is to regulate how people manage their relations to the natural and social world. The cultural response to this problem labeled **harmony** emphasizes fitting into the world as it is, trying to understand and appreciate rather than to change, direct, or to exploit. Important values in harmony cultures include world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the environment. **Mastery** is the polar cultural response to this problem. It encourages active self-assertion in order to master, direct, and change the natural and social environment to attain group or personal goals. Values such as ambition, success, daring, and competence are especially important in mastery cultures. **In sum, the theory specifies three bipolar dimensions of culture that represent alternative resolutions to each of three problems that confront all societies: embeddedness versus autonomy, hierarchy versus egalitarianism, and mastery versus harmony.** (Schwartz, 2006)*

Correlations between the sample means were used in a **multidimensional scaling analysis** to assess the presence of seven cultural orientations and the relations among them. The 2-dimensional projection in Graph 4.1, which is the main result of Schwartz's research, portrays the pattern of intercorrelations among values, based on the sample means. Each value item is represented by a point such that the more positive is the correlation between any pair of value items, the closer they are in space, and the less positive their correlation, the more distant they are (Schwartz, 2009). According to Schwartz, this analysis should clearly discriminate the seven orientations: Embeddedness; Hierarchy;


Mastery; Affective Autonomy; Intellectual Autonomy; Egalitarianism; and Harmony, which are also at the basis of Ralston’s *et al.* work

In his 2009 analysis, Schwartz says:

*“Equally important, the regions representing each orientation form the integrated cultural system postulated by the theory: They emanate from the center of the circle, follow the expected order around the circle, and form the poles of the three broad cultural dimensions.” (Schwartz, 2009)*

In Graph 1.1, we refer to Schwartz’s summarizing essay (2006) and his overview of the relationships in his theoretical system:

**Graph 1.1: the relationship of the seven cultural-level dimensions of societies to underlying values**




Muslim societies, according to Schwartz, rank very high on values of embeddedness. Embeddedness combines such values as social order, respect tradition, forgiving, moderateness, obedience, politeness, cleanness, national security, devoutness, wisdom, self-discipline, family security, honoring elders, reciprocation of favors, protecting the public image. According to Schwartz, 2006, in cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. *“Embedded cultures*



*emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom.”*  
 (Schwartz, 2006)


To understand the Ralston *et al.* framework, one has also to emphasize that Schwartz attempts to identify seven transnational cultural groupings: West European countries, English-speaking countries, Latin American countries, East European countries, South Asian countries, Confucian influenced countries and African and Middle Eastern countries. Only nine cultures are located outside of their expected region. Four of these are, according to Schwartz, from the culturally diverse Middle East (Turkey, Greek Cyprus, Israeli Arabs, and Israeli Jews). Schwartz maintains that his regions show some parallels with the zones in Huntington (1993) and Inglehart and Baker (2000):

**Graph 1.2: The Schwartz global map of human values (adapted from Schwartz, 2006)**




Based on Ralston, Egri, Reynaud *et al.* 2011 we drew the following choropleth maps of the value orientations of global business people:


**Map 1.7: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Embeddedness (highest value: painted in red)**




**Map 1.8: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Hierarchy (highest value: painted in red)**




**Map 1.9: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Mastery (highest value: painted in red)**




**Map 1.10: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Affective Autonomy (highest value: painted in red)**




**Map 1.11: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Intellectual Autonomy (highest value: painted in red)**



**Map 1.12: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Egalitarianism (highest value: painted in red)**



**Map 1.13: Ralston *et al.* societal dimension: Harmony (highest value: painted in red)**






The specific Ralston *et al.* country results for **mastery, affective autonomy, intellectual autonomy and harmony** contradict the generalizations about Muslim countries, inherent in Huntington, 1996.

In order to evaluate the potentialities of the Ralston *et al.* framework, one also has mention that Eldad Davidov, who is also a researcher of Israeli origin, and who is currently professor of sociology at Zurich University, pays great attention to the statistical-mathematical foundations of comparative value analysis, including the detection of contradictory statements in survey research. Among his major works of mathematical sociology one finds **Davidov**, 2008, 2010; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt, 2008; Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 2011; and Davidov, Schmidt, and **Schwartz**, 2008; where Davidov and associates also base their analysis of human values on the **cascade of human values**, already developed in the works of **Shalom Schwartz**.

In his 2008 study on the contradictions of the European integration process, Davidov also highlights the close interrelationship between gender prejudice, homophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, social out-groups (as for example homeless people), Islamophobia and the overall devaluation of newcomers:

**Graph 1.3: Davidov's explanation of group-focused enmity (adapted from Davidov and associates, 2008): group focused enmity explains racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, devaluation of homosexuals, of women, newcomers, Muslim people and homeless people at the same time**



### 1. 3. Inglehart's theory

**Inglehart**, in some of his main publications, developed by contrast an interpretation of **global value change** (Inglehart, 1970, 1977, 1990, 1997, 2000), which rests on a well-known **two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change**. It is based on the statistical technique of **factor analysis** of up to over twenty key WVS variables from the originally more than 900 survey items in the WVS. Factor analysis, as we highlighted in our methodological introduction, reduces variables to the underlying statistical dimensions, and is based on a mathematical procedure, implemented today on most advanced statistical software packages for social statistics, like IBM SPSS (here versions 20 and 21).

Several essays developed the critique of Inglehart's methodology (Hadenius, and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Steenkamp, and Geyskens, 2012; furthermore Au, 2000; Davis, Dowley, and Silver, 1999; Li, Zinn, Chick, Absher, Graefe, and Hsu, 2007; Sacchi, 1998; Van de Vijver, and Poortinga, 2002).

The two Inglehart dimensions are: **(1) the Traditional/ Secular-Rational dimension and (2) the Survival/Self-expression dimension.** These two dimensions also explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables.

So let us look at Inglehart's theoretical main pillars. To understand his theory, we best should look at an important paragraph written in Inglehart and Baker, 2000:

*'In the course of human history, thousands of societies have existed, most of which are now extinct. These societies had a vast range of characteristics. Infanticide was common in hunting and gathering societies, but became rare in agrarian societies; homosexuality was accepted in some preindustrial societies; and women are believed to have dominated political and social life in some preindustrial societies. Although the full range of "traditions" is diverse, a mainstream version of preindustrial society having a number of common characteristics can be identified. All of the preindustrial societies for which we have data show relatively low levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; most of them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to have the opposite characteristics. It would be a gross oversimplification to assume that all known preindustrial societies had similar characteristics, but one can meaningfully contrast the cultural characteristics of industrial societies with those of this mainstream version of preindustrial society.'* (Inglehart and Baker, 2000: 23-24)

In that quoted path-breaking essay, which has become a true classic of contemporary global sociology, they also go on to say that the two mentioned dimensions explain 70 percent of the total cross-national variation among 10 variables. The factor scores generated by these 10 items are highly correlated with factor scores from earlier research. In a statistical Table in that landmark article, Inglehart and Baker, 2000 also show the results from a factor analysis of variables with 165,594 *World Values Survey* respondents (Inglehart and Baker, 2000, their Table 1). As expected, the factor loadings are considerably lower than those at the national level, and are reproduced here below.

**Traditional values** are defined by:

- God is very important in respondent's life 0.70
- It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determinations (the so-called autonomy index from WVS data) 0.61
- Abortion is never justifiable 0.61
- Respondent has strong sense of national pride 0.60
- Respondent favors more respect for authority 0.51

**Self-expression** values are defined by:

- Respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality-of-life (measured by the four-item materialist/**post-materialist values index**, documented in the WVS data) 0.59
- Respondent describes self as very **happy** 0.58
- Respondent **has signed and would sign a petition** 0.59
- **Homosexuality is always justifiable** 0.54
- You should be **trusting people** 0.44

Inglehart and Baker, 2000 also maintain that in traditional societies a main goal in life is to make one's parents proud and one must always love and respect one's parents, regardless of how they behave. Conversely, parents must do their best for their children even if their own well-being suffers. People in traditional societies idealize large families, and they actually have them (high scores on this dimension are strongly correlated with high fertility rates):

*“Yet although the people of traditional societies have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority, take protectionist attitudes toward foreign trade, and feel that environmental problems can be solved without international agreements, they accept national authority passively: They seldom or never discuss politics. In preindustrial societies the family is crucial to survival. Accordingly, societies at the traditional pole of this dimension reject divorce and take a pro-life stance on abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. They emphasize social conformity rather than individualistic striving, believe in absolute standards of good and evil, support deference to authority, and have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics. The survival/self-expression dimension taps a syndrome of trust, tolerance, subjective well-being, political activism, and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial societies with high levels of security. At the opposite extreme, people in societies shaped by insecurity and low levels of well-being, tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all other goals, and feel*

*threatened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and by cultural change. This leads to an intolerance of gays and other out-groups, an insistence on traditional gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook. A central component of this dimension involves the polarization between materialist and postmaterialist values. Extensive evidence indicates that these values tap an intergenerational shift from an emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increased emphasis on self-expression, subjective well-being, and quality-of-life concerns.” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000)*

This cultural shift, Inglehart and Baker, 2000 say, is found throughout advanced industrial society; it emerges among birth cohorts that have grown up under conditions in which survival is taken for granted. These values are linked with a growing emphasis on environmental protection, the women's movement, and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life. But as our data in Chapter 10 show, recent experiences in the “North Atlantic arena” under the pressure of the current economic crisis clearly contradict the contention of the Inglehart/Baker 2000 essay that self-expression values will go on to become increasingly widespread in almost all advanced industrial societies. Instead of the predicted extension, we witness an implosion of self-expression values in the West.

According to Inglehart and Baker, 2000, societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, are low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of out-groups, are low on support for gender equality, emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism, and relatively favorable to authoritarian government. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on these topics:

*“When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't "enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable- indeed, beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may be positively valued because it is interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisine; they pay large sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening. The past few decades have witnessed one of the most dramatic cultural changes that has occurred since the dawn of recorded history - the emergence of new gender roles enabling women to enter the same occupations as men. Polarization over new gender roles is strikingly evident in the survival/self-*

*expression dimension: One of its highest-loading issues involves whether men make better political leaders than women. In the world as a whole, a majority still accepts the idea that men make better political leaders than women, but this view is rejected by growing majorities in advanced industrial societies and is overwhelmingly rejected by the younger generation within these societies. Equal rights for women, gays and lesbians, foreigners, and other out-groups tend to be rejected in societies where survival seems uncertain and increasingly accepted in societies that emphasize self-expression values.” (Inglehart and Baker, 2000)*

In another important publication, Inglehart and Welzel (2010a) highlighted their understanding of modernization theory and the modernization process in an illuminating way:

*“The core concept of modernization theory is that economic development produces systematic changes in society and politics. If so, one should find pervasive differences between the beliefs and values of people in low-income and high-income societies. The World Values Survey and European Values Study ([...] WVS/EVS) provide evidence that the transition from agrarian to industrial society produces one set of changes, and the rise of postindustrial societies produces another set of changes in peoples’ values and motivations. Analyses of WVS/EVS data reveal two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: a traditional versus secular-rational values dimension and a survival versus self-expression values dimension. These two dimensions tap scores of attitudinal variables, and are robust enough that researchers obtain similar results using various combinations of these variables.*

*Theoretically, the traditional/secular-rational dimension reflects changes linked with the transition from agrarian to industrial society, associated with bureaucratization, rationalization, and secularization. **Accordingly, the publics of agrarian societies emphasize religion, national pride, obedience and respect for authority, while the publics of industrial societies emphasize secularism, cosmopolitanism, autonomy, and rationality. With the emergence of postindustrial society, unprecedented levels of prosperity and the advent of the welfare state bring high levels of existential security. When survival is insecure, it tends to dominate people’s life strategies. But the younger birth cohorts of these societies have grown up taking survival for granted, allowing other goals to become more prominent. This trend is reinforced by the fact that in knowledge societies, one’s daily work requires individual judgment and innovation, rather than following routines prescribed from above. Both factors bring increasing emphasis on self-expression. The survival versus self-expression dimension reflects polarization between emphasis on order, economic security, and conformity and emphasis on self-expression, participation, subjective well-being, trust, tolerance, and quality of life concerns. In recent decades the publics of virtually all rich countries have***

*gradually moved toward increasing emphasis on self-expression values, but the relative positions of given countries have been remarkably stable.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a)*


We emphasize that our own empirical approach to the analysis of human values and their interrelationship among each other revealed many results, which partially contradict, correct or extend the Inglehartian findings, and in some ways re-iterate the interpretations, forwarded by Hofstede, Davidov, and Schwartz (2006). In contrast to all three hitherto dominant explanations, we introduce the dimension of the shadow economy, acceptancy of corruption, and overall moral decay. And as we see in the results, **this consideration of the dimension of economic permissiveness results in a significant redrawing of the global maps of human values.**

The Inglehart dimensions are based upon *World Values Survey* data from at least 145.000 interview partners around the globe.<sup>13</sup> For Inglehart and his associates, the rise of rational-secular values is an important element in socio-economic and democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. For Inglehart, there is a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. The culture of trust and tolerance are crucial, Inglehart emphasizes throughout his recent works, to democracy. Self-expression (x-axis) and secularism (y-axis) and are but two sides of the same coin – modernity. The Inglehart School assumes the following famous global “*map of human values*”. In our version of the famous graph, we check the Inglehart map data with the data, available to us from the electronic publicly available download facilities from the *World Values Survey* website. The two graphs are practically identical:


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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_54](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54)

**Graph 1.4: Map of global human values according to Inglehart and associates**







Source: adapted from Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." *Perspectives on Politics*, June 2010 (vol. 8, No. 2) page 554. Graph 1 is the latest published version of the Inglehart/Welzel map; earlier data, including a number of countries NOT included in Graph 1, are to be found at the supplementary data source in doc. format at the bottom of the WVS Internet page at [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_54](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54)

But in many ways, the map should and could be reverted, because **secular values** should be seen on an **x-axis** of global value development, and **self-expression** values on the **y-axis**.

Table 1.5 ranks the countries of the world according to their secularism/traditionalism scale according to the results of waves 1-4 of the *World Values Survey*. Tanzania, Puerto Rico and Jordan are the least secular countries of the world, while Sweden, Japan and the Czech Republic are the most secular countries of the world:

**Table 1.5: Secular values according to Inglehart**

	<b>TRADITIONAL/SECULAR</b>
Sweden	1,234
Japan	1,152
Czech Republic	1,093
Estonia	1,011
Latvia	0,902
Russian Federation	0,852
Germany	0,812
Netherlands	0,780
Bulgaria	0,766
France	0,730
Belarus	0,714
Switzerland	0,706
Norway	0,704
Finland	0,688
Ukraine	0,658
Slovenia	0,617
South Korea	0,591
Croatia	0,543
Slovakia	0,516
Serbia and Montenegro	0,503
Lithuania	0,494
Moldova	0,444
Hungary	0,429
Taiwan Province of China	0,422
New Zealand	0,408
Armenia	0,390
Albania	0,329
Great Britain	0,321
Macedonia, Republic of	0,304
Spain	0,239
Italy	0,235
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,226
Romania	0,172
Israel	0,147
Australia	0,075
Kyrgyzstan	0,032
Uruguay	0,020
Azerbaijan	0,018
Canada	-0,042
Georgia	-0,042
India	-0,080
Viet Nam	-0,125
Argentina	-0,247
Mexico	-0,267
Poland	-0,275

Singapore	-0,278
Indonesia	-0,339
United States	-0,346
Turkey	-0,360
Chile	-0,431
Dominican Republic	-0,444
Philippines	-0,450
Brazil	-0,452
Peru	-0,489
South Africa	-0,506
Uganda	-0,586
Bangladesh	-0,671
Egypt	-0,713
Algeria	-0,734
Pakistan	-0,763
Zimbabwe	-0,772
Nigeria	-0,816
Venezuela	-0,822
Jordan	-0,882
Puerto Rico	-0,894
Tanzania, United Republic Of	-0,937

Table 1.6 now ranks the countries of the world according to their survival/self-expression scale based on the results of waves 1-4 of the *World Values Survey*. New Zealand, Australia and the United States are the most self-expression oriented countries of the world, while all of the five most survival oriented and least self-expression oriented countries of the world were of Orthodox Christian cultural heritage: Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Romania.

**Table 1.6: Self-expression according to Inglehart**

	<b>SURVIVAL/SELF-EXPRESSION</b>
New Zealand	1,130
Australia	1,025
United States	0,951
Sweden	0,902
Canada	0,841
Netherlands	0,794
Switzerland	0,732
Great Britain	0,661
Finland	0,610
Norway	0,536
Puerto Rico	0,431
Germany	0,298
France	0,259
Venezuela	0,243

Mexico	0,235
Japan	0,206
Uruguay	0,185
Italy	0,165
Viet Nam	0,124
Dominican Republic	0,113
Israel	0,111
Czech Republic	0,086
Spain	0,057
Argentina	0,052
South Korea	-0,041
South Africa	-0,054
Peru	-0,061
Chile	-0,065
Philippines	-0,071
India	-0,101
Brazil	-0,124
Tanzania, United Republic Of	-0,125
Singapore	-0,158
Croatia	-0,173
Egypt	-0,175
Slovakia	-0,184
Slovenia	-0,220
Nigeria	-0,276
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,288
Uganda	-0,300
Indonesia	-0,332
Poland	-0,353
Bangladesh	-0,426
Algeria	-0,441
Turkey	-0,443
Hungary	-0,518
Albania	-0,525
Kyrgyzstan	-0,555
Macedonia, Republic of	-0,600
Latvia	-0,600
Jordan	-0,621
Azerbaijan	-0,644
Lithuania	-0,645
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,662
Taiwan Province of China	-0,663
Georgia	-0,664
Pakistan	-0,669
Armenia	-0,678
Bulgaria	-0,701
Estonia	-0,737
Zimbabwe	-0,765
Romania	-0,780
Belarus	-0,819
Russian Federation	-0,912


Ukraine	-0,947
Moldova	-0,993

Our choropleth maps – Maps 1.7 and 1.8 – designed with Inglehart’s data, further highlight these aspects of the Inglehart global map of human values. Choropleth maps show global statistics on an easily readable real world map. They allow important insights into the essence of social scientific theories. Even at the price of oversimplification they can show to audiences confronted with theories where a given phenomenon is strongest and where a given phenomenon is weakest. Projected onto such world choropleth maps, it is clear that Inglehart’s secular values, based on the *World Values Survey*, waves 1-4, are strongest in Sweden, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, and indeed the entire former USSR, China, Korea, France, Germany, and the Benelux countries.


Poland, the United States, but also Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Spain, Italy and several other European countries are less secular than the leading secularist countries, with Turkey, Poland, and most of Latin America belonging to a middle range of the continuum, and most of the Muslim nations, Venezuela and Zimbabwe being the least secular countries in the world.

Self-expression in the *World Values Survey* studies, waves 1-4, was highest in the highly developed Western Anglo-Saxon democracies, Scandinavia, and in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Most of the other continental European countries exhibited lower rates of self-expression. Latin America, several Muslim nations and Japan were to be found in the middle ranges of self-expression. Lowest rates of self-expression were to be found in the Orthodox countries and/or the countries of former Communism.

**Map 1.14: Inglehart: Secular Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4**



**Map 1.15: Inglehart: Self-Expression Values. Data from the WVS waves 1-4**





In Graph 1.5, we further take the results of Inglehart's calculations at their face value. Here, we draw a scatterplot of our own in the style of Graph 1.4, but with reverted axes. There are hundreds of good historical and sociological reasons why secularization and not self-expression values are the prime movers of the modernization process. Also historically, secularization and not postmaterialistic self-expression values first developed in the Western countries from the 19<sup>th</sup> to the late 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

As to be expected from the results of standard factor analysis without oblique factor rotation (see Chapter 3), the bi-variate correlation between the two Inglehart factors is very small. But there is an interesting wave structure in the relationship between secularism (in our Graph 1.5 projected on the x-axis) and self-expression (in our Graph 1.5 projected on the y-axis). With rising secularization, first there is a certain implosion and only then a rise in self-expression values, considered by Inglehart and his associates to be so important for "*effective democracy*" (see below). There is then a rise of self-expression values, in order to implode again at later stages of development, and only at very high levels of secularization, self-expression rises in a linear fashion. This wave-structure of modernization, secularization and self-expression is perhaps an important qualification of Inglehart's theory.



**Graph 1.5: Secular values (x-axis) and self-expression values (y-axis) in the World Values Surveys, 1-4, 2006**



Source: adapted from Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, "Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between Modernization and Democracy." *Perspectives on Politics*, June 2010 (vol. 8, No. 2) page 554. Their Graph 1 is one of the latest published versions of the Inglehart/Welzel map; earlier data are to be found at the supplementary data source in doc. format at the bottom of the WVS Internet page at [http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_54](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54)

In Table 1.7 we now document these non-linear developments; the trend values and their residuals, used in Graph 1.1. Again taking Inglehart's sociology at its face value, let us assume that secularization is the prime mover of value change. We all of a sudden discover then that the real problematic cases with exceptionally low self-expression rates are not the majority Muslim countries, but the countries of the Christian Orthodox cultural tradition, including the former USSR. In Table 1.7, which lists the distances of the dots (country values) in Graph 1.5 from the non-linear trend line, Egypt and its neighbor Israel have about the same residuals. All Muslim countries in the sample (with the exception of post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan) are even ahead of the three Baltic EU-member states Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in their self-expression development. Judged by the size of its residual self-expression, the EU-member country Poland is ranked about equally with Turkey, and is even behind several Muslim countries. I.e. judging by the advancement of secularization, Poland has a lower self-expression than several Muslim countries. Such comparisons could be continued almost endlessly, all showing that prospects for the Muslim countries in the framework of Inglehart's sociology must be considered as more positive than commonly thought.

**Table 1.7: The two waves of self-expression – results from our non-linear re-analysis of the Inglehart global map of human values**

	<b>TRADITIONAL /SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES WVS 1-4/2006</b>	<b>SURVIVAL/SE LF- EXPRESSION VALUES WVS 1-4/2006</b>	<b>non-linear trend: Self- Expression</b>	<b>Residual: Self- Expression</b>
New Zealand	0,4080	1,1300	-0,1876	1,3176
Australia	0,0750	1,0250	-0,0246	1,0496
United States	-0,3460	0,9510	-0,0655	1,0165
Netherlands	0,7800	0,7940	-0,2182	1,0122
Switzerland	0,7060	0,7320	-0,2456	0,9776
Finland	0,6880	0,6100	-0,2492	0,8592
Canada	-0,0420	0,8410	0,0029	0,8381
Great Britain	0,3210	0,6610	-0,1425	0,8035
Norway	0,7040	0,5360	-0,2461	0,7821


Puerto Rico	-0,8940	0,4310	-0,1926	0,6236
France	0,7300	0,2590	-0,2391	0,4981
Germany	0,8120	0,2980	-0,1993	0,4973
Venezuela	-0,8220	0,2430	-0,2523	0,4953
Sweden	1,2340	0,9020	0,5087	0,3933
Mexico	-0,2670	0,2350	-0,0286	0,2636
Italy	0,2350	0,1650	-0,0964	0,2614
Dominican Republic	-0,4440	0,1130	-0,1240	0,2370
South Korea	0,5910	-0,0410	-0,2496	0,2086
Uruguay	0,0200	0,1850	-0,0084	0,1934
<b>Israel</b>	<b>0,1470</b>	<b>0,1110</b>	<b>-0,0532</b>	<b>0,1642</b>
Spain	0,2390	0,0570	-0,0985	0,1555
Viet Nam	-0,1250	0,1240	0,0047	0,1193
South Africa	-0,5060	-0,0540	-0,1645	0,1105
Peru	-0,4890	-0,0610	-0,1533	0,0923
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>-0,7130</b>	<b>-0,1750</b>	<b>-0,2667</b>	<b>0,0917</b>
Argentina	-0,2470	0,0520	-0,0212	0,0732
Croatia	0,5430	-0,1730	-0,2399	0,0669
Philippines	-0,4500	-0,0710	-0,1279	0,0569
Chile	-0,4310	-0,0650	-0,1157	0,0507
Slovakia	0,5160	-0,1840	-0,2320	0,0480
Slovenia	0,6170	-0,2200	-0,2523	0,0323
Tanzania, United Republic Of	-0,9370	-0,1250	-0,1312	0,0062
Brazil	-0,4520	-0,1240	-0,1292	0,0052
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>-0,8160</b>	<b>-0,2760</b>	<b>-0,2552</b>	<b>-0,0208</b>
Uganda	-0,5860	-0,3000	-0,2145	-0,0855
Czech Republic	1,0930	0,0860	0,1742	-0,0882
Japan	1,1520	0,2060	0,3027	-0,0967
India	-0,0800	-0,1010	0,0056	-0,1066
Singapore	-0,2780	-0,1580	-0,0331	-0,1249
<b>Bangladesh</b>	<b>-0,6710</b>	<b>-0,4260</b>	<b>-0,2553</b>	<b>-0,1707</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>-0,7340</b>	<b>-0,4410</b>	<b>-0,2695</b>	<b>-0,1715</b>
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>0,2260</b>	<b>-0,2880</b>	<b>-0,0917</b>	<b>-0,1963</b>
<b>Indonesia</b>	<b>-0,3390</b>	<b>-0,3320</b>	<b>-0,0617</b>	<b>-0,2703</b>
Hungary	0,4290	-0,5180	-0,1975	-0,3205
<b>Poland</b>	<b>-0,2750</b>	<b>-0,3530</b>	<b>-0,0318</b>	<b>-0,3212</b>
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>-0,3600</b>	<b>-0,4430</b>	<b>-0,0731</b>	<b>-0,3699</b>
<b>Albania</b>	<b>0,3290</b>	<b>-0,5250</b>	<b>-0,1468</b>	<b>-0,3782</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>-0,7630</b>	<b>-0,6690</b>	<b>-0,2694</b>	<b>-0,3996</b>
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>-0,8820</b>	<b>-0,6210</b>	<b>-0,2061</b>	<b>-0,4149</b>
Lithuania	0,4940	-0,6450	-0,2245	-0,4205
<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	<b>0,5030</b>	<b>-0,6620</b>	<b>-0,2277</b>	<b>-0,4343</b>
<b>Macedonia,</b>	<b>0,3040</b>	<b>-0,6000</b>	<b>-0,1334</b>	<b>-0,4666</b>

<b>Republic of</b>				
Taiwan Province of China	0,4220	-0,6630	-0,1943	-0,4687
<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>0,7660</b>	<b>-0,7010</b>	<b>-0,2250</b>	<b>-0,4760</b>
Latvia	0,9020	-0,6000	-0,1217	-0,4783
Zimbabwe	-0,7720	-0,7650	-0,2683	-0,4967
<b>Armenia</b>	<b>0,3900</b>	<b>-0,6780</b>	<b>-0,1787</b>	<b>-0,4993</b>
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	<b>0,0320</b>	<b>-0,5550</b>	<b>-0,0114</b>	<b>-0,5436</b>
<b>Belarus</b>	<b>0,7140</b>	<b>-0,8190</b>	<b>-0,2437</b>	<b>-0,5753</b>
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>0,0180</b>	<b>-0,6440</b>	<b>-0,0079</b>	<b>-0,6361</b>
<b>Georgia</b>	<b>-0,0420</b>	<b>-0,6640</b>	<b>0,0029</b>	<b>-0,6669</b>
<b>Ukraine</b>	<b>0,6580</b>	<b>-0,9470</b>	<b>-0,2525</b>	<b>-0,6945</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>0,1720</b>	<b>-0,7800</b>	<b>-0,0647</b>	<b>-0,7153</b>
<b>Russian Federation</b>	<b>0,8520</b>	<b>-0,9120</b>	<b>-0,1694</b>	<b>-0,7426</b>
Estonia	1,0110	-0,7370	0,0247	-0,7617
<b>Moldova</b>	<b>0,4440</b>	<b>-0,9930</b>	<b>-0,2043</b>	<b>-0,7887</b>

Maps 1.16 and 1.17 further highlight these tendencies with the help of choropleth maps.


**Map 1.16: Redrawing the Inglehartian map – the residuals from the linear function secularization → selfexpression**

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**Map 1.17: Redrawing the Inglehartian map – the residuals from a polynomial function of the fifth degree secularization → selfexpression (see also Table 1.7)**

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In Chapter 10, we will look at the changes in self-expression over time. We show with Inglehart's own data that self-expression values are imploding over time in leading Western countries. In addition, direct measurements undertaken by the *World Values Survey*, wave 2010-2014, asking respondents whether they assign importance to the value of self-expression in child education, directly contradict the Inglehart scores (negative correlation, around 20% of variance explained).

## ***2. Towards a new political geography of human values***

### **2.1 Re-analysis of Inglehart's data**

Convincing, as Inglehart's theory and empirics might appear at first sight, several essays questioned Inglehart's way of combining the analyzed variables into his dimensions or the linkage between his dimensions and democratic development (Hadenius, and Teorell, 2005; Haller, 2002; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Steenkamp, and Geyskens, 2012; furthermore Au, 2000; Davis, Dowley, and Silver, 1999; Li, Zinn, Chick, Absher, Graefe, and Hsu, 2007; Sacchi, 1998; Van de Vijver, and Poortinga, 2002). In our view, the most important theoretical and at the same time empirical problem is the following: principle component analysis or factor analysis with orthogonal standard rotation of factors (as is the current SPSS default option) is a convenient, but not always best way to reduce the relationships in a statistical correlation matrix between variables.

It is of paramount importance to be of the "small print" here – what relationships exist between the factors? Which relationships are being allowed by the model? **No correlations between the factors?** The statistical method chosen by Inglehart to reduce the complexity of the different components allows for no correlations between the chosen factors. It is the standard varimax rotation. Today, this technique is increasingly being substituted by better and more advanced methods, like the promax rotation, which exactly allows such correlations between the factors (Finch, 2006). To make matters worse, Inglehart's choice of the *WVS* data did not always use the items, which are the best available items for a maximum number of countries. His analyses are based on a maximum of 146789 global interviews reflecting 22 variables; while we thought it more appropriate to base our analysis on a maximum of 180041 global interviews for 30 variables. Our analysis is based on the *World Values Survey* data roll-out entitled: "*wvs1981\_2008\_v20090914.sav*", which was

freely available at the WVS website. Any person around the globe in the possession of an IBM/SPSS 21 license, and an internet connection to download the freely available WVS data should be able to arrive at exactly the same results as we do.

In our research design, we worked with **listwise deletion of missing values**. At the end of the day, there were **92289 persons around the globe with complete data for all the 30 variables**. We worked with the very best documented *World Values Survey* items. Our “new” nine factors all make very much ‘sense’ and are completely free from problematic theoretical assumptions. We included all 30 original indicators, based on the original more than 180.000 WVS interviews, into the original principal components and later the promax factor analysis. Our research design was thus intended to be more straightforward and simple than Inglehart’s. In addition, it uses a more advanced and up to date statistical methodology. To explain the mathematical-statistical details of the Inglehart approach, let us quote here at length from Inglehart and Welzel (2010a), where the two authors very concisely explain the intricate details of their own factor analytical approach:

*“These two dimensions (i.e. Secular Values and Self-Expression Values) explain more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance in a factor analysis of **ten indicators—and each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other orientations**. The **Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension** reflects the contrast between societies in which **religion is very important and those in which it is not**. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of **parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide**. These societies have **high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook**. **Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics**. The **second major dimension of crosscultural variation** is linked with the transition from industrial society to **post-industrial societies**, which brings a polarization between **Survival and Selfexpression values**. The unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation means that an increasing share of the population has grown up **taking survival for granted**. Thus, priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on **economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life**. A central component of this emerging dimension involves **the polarization between Materialist and Postmaterialist values, reflecting a cultural shift that is emerging among generations who have grown up taking survival for granted**. **Self-expression values** give high priority to **environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making**”*



*in economic and political life. These values also reflect mass polarization over tolerance of out-groups, including foreigners, gays and lesbians and gender equality. The shift from survival values to self-expression values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child. And it goes with a rising sense of subjective well-being that is conducive to an atmosphere of tolerance, trust and political moderation. Finally, societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust. These two dimensions tap scores of variables [...]. For technical reasons, early work using factor analysis derived the dimensions from ten of these variables; more recent work uses a 12-item additive index to measure Survival/Self-expression values. Regardless of how it is constructed, the resulting cross-cultural map is so robust that it produces very similar results. Moreover, using a completely different way of measuring basic values, different types of samples and a different type of dimensional analysis, Schwartz (2006) finds very similar transnational groupings among 76 countries.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a)*

In contrast to Inglehart, we also include background variables, like gender, age and education. Thus, our analysis is not anymore a “gender-free zone”:

**Table 2.1: the research designs compared**

	<b>Inglehart and associates</b>	<b>Our re-analysis</b>
<b>choice and naming of the dimensions</b>	ex ante, perhaps controversial, for example that survival values (and not tradition values) include the divorce and abortion item and the limits on selling foreign goods item, while the item on incomes and jobs, currently listed in the traditional values dimensions, very plausibly might be listed under the survival dimension as well	ex post, as suggested by the empirical results; the results were compared to the literature
<b>factor analytical design</b>	standard factor analysis using orthogonal varimax rotation (does not allow for correlations between the factors)	more advanced versions of factor analysis, allowing for relationships between the factors (Promax rotation)
<b>inclusion of socio-economic background variables like age, education in the model</b>	no	yes
<b>n of countries, considered in the analysis</b>	65	68
<b>number of variables in the original analysis</b>	22 variables/later reduced to 10	30
<b>results are based on items, available for at least the following number of respondents</b>	146789	180041
<b>% of total variance explained at the individual analysis level</b>	26% (traditional values) + 13% (survival values)	47. 89%

**Our re-analysis is based on 68 countries, and there is a good number of Muslim societies or predominantly Muslim societies among them [the**

Organization of Islamic Cooperation members Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Morocco; Tanzania; Turkey; Uganda]. The smallest n for any of our items is more than 180.000 persons and our total analysis is based finally on none the less than 92289 persons with complete data covering all the 30 variables from around the globe. No substitution of missing values had to be carried out. The SPSS XXI statistics program with the default options for factor analysis/promax rotation was applied. Independent of culture, religion or moral convictions, any researcher around the globe could arrive at the same results as we did.

**Table 2.2: The choice of our variables from the *World Values Survey***

Variable label	Interpretation of the variable according to the highest numerical value	n =
Age	Age	247978
Competition good or harmful	Competition good or harmful	203976
Confidence: Armed Forces	[No] Confidence: Armed Forces	231665
Confidence: The Press	[No] Confidence: The Press	236529
Highest educational level attained	Highest educational level attained	230283
How important is God in your life	How important is God in your life	240112
How often do you attend religious services	[Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services	238981
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	187066
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	247782
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	255656
Important child qualities: hard work	Important child qualities: hard work	253331
Important child qualities: imagination	Important child qualities: imagination	252238
Important child qualities: independence	Important child qualities: independence	255656
Important child qualities: obedience	Important child qualities: obedience	255656
Important child qualities: religious faith	Important child qualities: religious faith	253503
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	255656
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	255656
Important child qualities: unselfishness	Important child qualities: unselfishness	252238
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	224394
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	Justifiable: cheating on taxes	232012
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	Justifiable: claiming government benefits	230882
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	243824
Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful]	Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	246798
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	225868
Neighbors: People of a different race	[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race	231410

Political system: having a democratic political system	Political system: (It's very bad) having a democratic political system	193889
Satisfaction with your life	Satisfaction with your life	252679
self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	[Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	180041
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	252941
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	207655

The WVS data we used correspond to 88.96% of the total global population and 84.75% of the world's Muslim population. The complete data matrix for the re-analysis of the Inglehart world map of human values is based on the sample of 56.89% of the global population and 56.16% of the global Muslim population. Table 2.2 listed the final variables of our investigation. Table 2.3 now lists the indicators, their data range, and the original wording in the *World Values Survey* questionnaire. Our readers should thus be in a better position to be able to follow our naming of the different factors, which reproduce the underlying correlation matrix for the data.

**Table 2.3: description of the variables of our model according to the *World Values Survey***

Indicator	range	maximum numerical value	wording
Age	15 to 65	65+	V237. - This means you are ___ __ years old.
Competition good or harmful	1 to 10	10 (harmful)	V119. - Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Sentences: Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people
[No] Confidence: Armed Forces	1 to 4	4 (none at all)	V132. - I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The armed forces
[No] Confidence: The Press	1 to 4	4 (none at all)	V133. - I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The press
Highest educational level attained	1 to 9	9 University with degree/Higher education - upper-level tertiary certificate	V238. - What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (use functional equivalent of the following, in given society; IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE):
How important is God in your life	1 to 10	10 (very important)	V192. - How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.
[Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services	1 to 7	7 (never, practically never)	V186. - Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
Immigrant policy	1 to 4	4 (prohibit people from coming)	V124. - How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do?
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	0 to 1	1 (important)	determination and perseverance
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	0 to 1	1 (important)	feeling of responsibility
Important child qualities: hard work	0 to 1	1 (important)	hard work

Important child qualities: imagination	0 to 1	1 (important)	imagination
Important child qualities: independence	0 to 1	1 (important)	independence
Important child qualities: obedience	0 to 1	1 (important)	obedience
Important child qualities: religious faith	0 to 1	1 (important)	religious faith
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	0 to 1	1 (important)	thrift, and saving money and things
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0 to 1	1 (important)	tolerance and respect for other people
Important child qualities: unselfishness	0 to 1	1 (important)	unselfishness
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	1 to 10	10 (always justifiable)	V199. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code one answer for each statement). Avoiding a fare on public transport
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	1 to 10	10 (always justifiable)	V200. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code one answer for each statement). Cheating on taxes if you have a chance
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	1 to 10	10 (always justifiable)	V198. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code one answer for each statement). Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	1 to 10	10 (always justifiable)	V201. - Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements. Code one answer for each statement). Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	1 to 2	2 (you can't be too careful)	V23. - Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0 to 1	1 (mentioned)	On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race	0 to 1	1 (mentioned)	On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?
Political system: (It's very bad) having a democratic political system	1 to 4	4 (very bad)	V151. - I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political

			system
Satisfaction with your life	1 to 10	10 (satisfied)	V22. - All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.
[Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	1 to 10	10 (right wing)	V114. - In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	1 to 2	2 (female)	V235. - Sex (Gender)
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	1 to 4	4 (strongly disagree)	V62. - For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl

Table 2.4 provides an overview of the sample sizes of *World Values Survey* respondents with complete data for all the chosen 30 variables.

**Table 2.4: the sample size of *World Values Survey* respondents with complete data for all 30 variables of our investigation**

Country/region	n =
Albania	1297
Azerbaijan	860
Argentina	2031
Australia	2750
Bangladesh	1033
Armenia	1154
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1809
Brazil	2161
Bulgaria	953
Belarus	861
Canada	2832
Chile	2109
Taiwan	1820
Cyprus	932
Czech Republic	835
Dominican Republic	276
Ethiopia	950
Estonia	685
Finland	1552
Georgia	2042
Germany	2953
Ghana	718
Guatemala	748
Hong Kong	785
Hungary	478
India	2358
Indonesia	1112
Italy	597
Jordan	300
South Korea	1156
Kyrgyzstan	883
Latvia	772
Lithuania	489
Mali	595
Mexico	2299
Moldova	1809
Morocco	278
New Zealand	1022
Nigeria	1494
Norway	2016
Peru	1864
Philippines	2174
Poland	543
Puerto Rico	1378

Romania	1433
Russian Federation	821
Slovakia	777
Viet Nam	1830
Slovenia	1181
South Africa	6086
Zimbabwe	667
Spain	2336
Sweden	1639
Switzerland	910
Thailand	1452
Trinidad and Tobago	597
Turkey	945
Uganda	759
Ukraine	1186
Macedonia	1176
Tanzania	671
United States	3317
Burkina Faso	725
Uruguay	1075
Venezuela	1634
Serbia and Montenegro	1975
Zambia	775
Serbia	559
<b>Total</b>	<b>92289</b>

So our re-analysis of Inglehart’s theories is based on 68 countries. The smallest n for any of our single variables is slightly more than 180.000 persons. For 92289 persons around the globe, there are complete data for all the 30 variables available in the WVS database (<http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDData.jsp>) at once.<sup>14</sup>

## **2. 2. A “light” version of the results and their immediate consequences for the general public: the Kuznets curves of human values along the paths of human development.**

Since the content of Chapter 2.3, presenting the factor analytical model in great detail will be only of special interest to the social scientific audience of this article, we present here for the general public a “light” version of the results and their immediate consequences.

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<sup>14</sup> WVS FIVE WAVE AGGREGATED FILE 1981-2005 (NEW) available at <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSDData.jsp>



We already highlighted that our model, based on the usual standard criteria of factor analysis and the promax rotation, explains 47.89% of the total variance of all the 30 variables. For an analysis of original survey data from more than 90.000 global representative interview partners, this percentage must be considered as high.

In **Table 2.5**, we highlight the relationships between the original 30 variables and the newly derived factor analytical dimensions. As it is well-known from the methodological literature on the subject, the naming of the different factors might sound arbitrarily. The best proposed solution, suggested by the literature, is to provide readers with a full unbiased original account of all the loadings from the rotated structure matrix and also to mention the table of the correlations between the newly derived factors (to cite some classical and contemporary literature on the subject, see: Child, 2006; Diena *et al.*, 2005; Finch, 2006; Jackson and Borgatta, 1981; Kim and Mueller, 1978a, 1978b; Thompson, 2004; Ueberla, 1970). We think that our naming of the factors, based on the structure of the loadings, represents a good choice, compatible with the results of a large body of world-values-related literature, quoted in our bibliography. But as in any factor analysis, the naming of the factors is indeed subjective and open to criticism. But we claim that from the given lists of results, the choice taken by us is a good one.

We also should highlight that a loading (i. e. correlation coefficient of a factor with an underlying variable) of, say, 0.400 only represents 16% of variance of the original variable explained, and 0.500 only implies a percentage of 25% of explained variance, while 0.600 already implies 36% of explained variance, and 0.900 would imply 81% of total variance explained *et cetera*. Readers are invited to compare the loadings with our proposed naming of the factors:

- a) economic permissiveness
- b) traditional religion
- c) racism
- d) higher education for the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
- e) distrust of the army and the press
- f) authoritarian character
- g) tolerance and respect
- h) the 'ego' company (i. e. the rejection of obedience and unselfishness as values in education)
- i) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy

Let us now look at the trajectory of the factor scores along the path of Human Development (measured by the well-known UNDP Human Development

Indicator). Norris and Inglehart, 2004 link the UNDP Human Development Index directly with the concept of “*human security*”. They maintain that human security will be increasing with a rising UNDP Human Development Index.

By tracking the progress of the value indicators along the axis of the Human Development Indicator, we discover that value change in the societies of this world is far from linear. Our new factors, best representing the core items of the *World Values Survey*, as a rule present a curve-linear relationship with the UNDP-Human Development Index (UNDP HDI). This is an important new qualification in the debate about global development.

We should add here that there is not yet a widely accepted definition of the concept of Human Security. While definitions vary, their common ground remains the individual, not the state. There is a clear difference between the individual security and the state security.

According to the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report,

*“Most contemporary Arab writers express the belief in an unbreakable bond between individual human security and national security on the one hand and human security and external military threats on the other. Other writers believe that the authoritarian state is the source of the greatest threats to human security in the region (...) However, such writers do not maintain that the achievement of human security rules out state security. Rather, they hold that the achievement of individual human security will have the effect of transforming the authoritarian state into one that respects the rule of law. This shift may require, among other things, the reform of existing security apparatuses or possibly even the establishment of new security institutions.”* (UNDP, Arab Human Development Report, 2009).

It is noteworthy that the UNDP’s report, drawing on the concerns of the Arab thinkers, defines Human Security as “*the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged, and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable.*”


However, while the UNDP’s report relies primarily on the internationally recognized dimensions of human security, as identified in the 1994 global Human Development Report, it acknowledges that “*any identification of threats to Arab human security needs to reflect the status of the region as a highly diverse area which, through most periods of its history, has been the object of conflict among the world’s superpowers.*”


Applying this type of reasoning, we might expect the following to happen in the process of modernization:

- Traditional religion diminishes in its societal role, as human security is rising
- Tolerance and respect, distrust of the army and the press, the “ego-company” orientation, and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy all rise with human security
- There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between human security and permissiveness/pessimism, racism, the education gape between the generations, and the authoritarian character

Graph 2.1a and 2.1b highlight these strongly non-linear relationships:

### Graph 2.1a and Graph 2.1b: the global trajectory of human values along the scale of the Human Development Index





In Inglehart's model, the two dimensions – traditional values and survival values - are independent from one another, whereas the promax model allows for correlations between the factors.

We will now look at the factor loadings above  $\pm 0.500$  and we will try to debate the similarities, but also differences in the research results with earlier approaches.

**Economic permissiveness** has its higher loadings with the WVS items

- Justifiable: cheating on taxes
- Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
- Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
- Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them

**Traditional religion** expresses the higher factor loadings on the items

- How important is God in your life
- Important child qualities: religious faith
- Negative loading [Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services

**Racism**

- [Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers
- [Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race

- Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)

### **Higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)**

- Highest educational level attained
- Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
- Negative loading Age
- Negative loading Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things

### **Distrust of the army and the press**

- [No] Confidence: The Press
- [No] Confidence: Armed Forces
- Negative loading: [Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)

### **Authoritarian character**

- Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])
- Important child qualities: hard work
- Important child qualities: obedience
- Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination
- Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence

### **Tolerance and respect + post-materialism**

- Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
- Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility
- Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl
- Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work

### **The 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)**

- Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility
- Important child qualities: independence
- Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness
- Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience

## **[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy**

- Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)
- Competition good or harmful
- Political system: (It's very bad] having a democratic political system

**Traditional religion** reflects very well the results from all the three mentioned major research traditions in cross-national value research today. This is a factor, whose relationship with these research traditions is very clear, and whose significance can be easily interpreted also from the viewpoint of Hofstede's, Inglehart's and Schwartz/Davidov's theory.

**Economic permissiveness** clearly captures the dimension of lawlessness, moral-ethical decay and the shadow economy, so prominent in contemporary economic theory of growth. It is completely lacking in the hitherto published analyses by Hofstede, Schwartz/Davidov and Inglehart. Yet it is the most important of all the resulting factors today. To have overlooked this dimension is a major still existing shortcoming of contemporary cross-national quantitative value research. As Graph 2.1a and Graph 2.1b show, this factor presents a clear U-shaped function of the development level, so well-known from economic literature ever since the discoveries of Simon Kuznets (1955) about the relationship between income levels and economic inequalities. We foresee a culmination of crises tendencies, manifesting themselves in lawlessness, racism, the educational generation gap, and the authoritarian character, all at middle development levels, coinciding with the maximum points of income inequality in a nation's history. As the power of traditional religion fades away in modern developed society, not only positive processes (like the increase in tolerance) set in: we also witness a rising distrust in the army and the press, and a growing and only slowly decreasing level of [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy.


Inglehart expects that with a rising level of capitalist development, the values of '*self-expression*' gain upper hand, and that the religious element is basically a human answer to the problem of a lack of security. If human security increases, religion slowly recedes. But economic permissiveness, racism, the educational generation gap, and the authoritarian character all first increase with rising levels of development and increasing secularization. Only at very high levels of development racism and economic permissiveness diminish again. In a cultural shift, well explainable by Inglehart's theories, tolerance increases as the social power of religion recedes; but as traditional religion diminishes, distrust of the army and the press, and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market

economy and democracy increase. So we are far less optimistic than the hitherto existing theories.

Comparable to Hofstede’s LTO-factor, we also detect a factor, which we call ‘the ego company’, which is especially strong in the countries of East Asia.

Traditional religion is linked in a very complex way to the absence of economic permissiveness. An interesting question for future research would be which countries are exceptional performers (“residuals”) on each stage of secularization.

**Graph 2.2: economic permissiveness (lowest value: Bangladesh, highest value: Serbia, y-axis) as a function of secularization (lowest value: Nigeria; highest value: Russia, x-axis) in our own theoretical system**




X-axis: secularization (= our factor “traditional religion”\*-1); y-axis: economic permissiveness

**2. 3. The final factor analytical model. A presentation for the specialists**

The general public might skip over this Chapter and directly go to Chapter 2.4. We will start our presentation of the final factor analytical results by looking at the correlations between the nine factors. The final diagram about the noticeable interrelationships between the various factors of our model is described in Graph 2.4:

**Graph 2.3: final summarizing model, based on the correlations between the nine factors**



The methodological literature already referred to above suggests that the assumption of non-correlation between the factors, inherent in Inglehart’s varimax-rotation model, is unrealistic. We have highlighted the correlations above 0.100 in our Table in **bold letters**, to allow our readers a closer look at the underlying relationships between the factors.

The following Tables and Graphs are directed towards the specialists. The general public might simply gaze over the following Tables and Graphs, while the specialists are invited to take a closer look at the following materials.

The methodological literature in Chapter 3 of this article already highlighted the importance of the *Eigen values* as a defining mathematical benchmark of a principal components/factor analysis. Graph 2.4 shows the *Eigen values* of our investigation; with the first two factors way past any linear continuation of the factors 10 – 29, shown in the x-axis.

Thus eight factors,



- economic permissiveness
- traditional religion
- racism
- higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
- distrust of the army and the press
- authoritarian character
- tolerance and respect + post-materialism
- the ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)

are not only well above *Eigen value* 1.0, but also way above the linear continuation of the *Eigen values* of factors 9 – 19. Following the simple standard procedure of analyzing the *Eigen values*, we suggest to treat the results for factor nine with some caution at least. Although its *Eigen value* is still above 1.0, its numerical vicinity to the low *Eigen values* of factors 10 – 19 is clearly visible. In all, our model explains some 47% of the total variance of the correlation matrix of the data for 30 variables from more than 90.000 interview partners of the *World Values Survey*, with two factors explaining more than 17% of the total variance in between them already – economic permissiveness, and traditional religion, the two defining processes of global values and global value change today.

We have highlighted all factor loadings from the rotated structure matrix (*Promax rotation* according to the SPSS 20 with *Kaiser normalization*) in different typing and shadings in order to facilitate our readers to arrive at their own independent opinions about our results (provided that they think that the original *World Values Survey* data are credible and unbiased).

We should emphasize the point that the correlations between the factors are not correlations between aggregations at the country level but reflect the correlations between the factors, to be extracted from the data **at the individual level** of the more than 90.000 interview partners across countries and across cultures. Under such conditions, correlations between factors of more than  $\pm .100$  are already to be considered high. Nevertheless, we have to emphasize that the relationships between the factors with *Eigen values* of 2.0 or above (economic permissiveness, and traditional religion), with the rest of the nine factors under consideration here in no way sufficiently firmly confirm widespread expectations of contemporary secularism and atheism directed against the religious phenomenon.

Seven factors under consideration here are a new input for the entire global debate about human values:


- the strength of economic permissiveness,
- the clear proof of the existence of a factor describing racism,
- the generation gap in education, connected with value transformation processes,
- the existence of a joint political distrust factor directed against important institutions of society - the army and the press. This factor is also relevant for some highly developed countries, and not only countries in the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system, recovering from years of military dictatorship (like Argentina, Chile *et cetera*)
- the clear proof of an “authoritarian personality” factor, and a
- re-emergence of the Hofstede dimension of “long term orientation”, called here “the ego company”.

Two factors bear great semblance to the results, achieved by Inglehart and his associates –

- traditional religion and
- tolerance + respect and post-materialism.

Our readers are also invited to look at Table 2.7 for the aggregate country results and at Table 2.8 for the “global map” of human religious denominations. Table 2.8 and its results about factor scores for the major global denominations are way past of what Huntington, 1996 had to say on the clash between civilizations. Of course, we should remind our readers that results based on 500 interview partners have an error margin of up to  $\pm 4.4\%$  (see also Graph 2.1, confidence interval 95%).

**Graph 2.4: Screeplot for our factor analysis**



	<i>Eigen value</i>	% of variance explained	Cumulated percentage
economic permissiveness	2,526	8,711	8,711
traditional religion	2,472	8,523	17,234
racism	1,688	5,822	23,056
higher education of the younger generation	1,442	4,974	28,029
distrust of the army and the press	1,298	4,475	32,504
authoritarian character	1,189	4,099	36,604
tolerance and respect	1,143	3,942	40,545
the 'ego' company	1,118	3,854	44,399
[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy	1,012	3,489	47,888

**Table 2.5: Structure matrix – Promax with Kaiser normalization**

	economic permissiveness	traditional religion	racism	higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	distrust of the army and the press	authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	<i>[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy</i>
Age	-0,169	-0,071	-0,026	<b>-0,680</b>	-0,022	-0,037	0,195	0,114	<i>-0,135</i>
Competition good or harmful	0,155	-0,059	0,020	-0,163	0,064	-0,093	-0,076	-0,101	<b>0,556</b>
[No] Confidence: Armed Forces	0,079	-0,087	-0,054	0,157	<b>0,757</b>	-0,035	0,014	0,032	<i>0,111</i>
[No] Confidence: The Press	-0,016	-0,090	-0,076	-0,020	<b>0,759</b>	-0,010	0,120	0,039	<i>-0,007</i>
Highest educational level attained	-0,041	-0,098	-0,094	<b>0,648</b>	0,078	-0,195	0,165	0,158	<i>-0,136</i>
How important is God in your life	-0,039	<b>0,813</b>	0,035	-0,026	-0,123	0,200	-0,076	-0,106	<i>0,054</i>
[Never attend religious services. Scale: ] How often do you attend religious services	0,018	<b>-0,800</b>	-0,064	0,033	0,138	-0,119	0,108	0,080	<i>-0,021</i>
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)	0,003	0,089	<b>0,302</b>	-0,191	0,107	0,227	0,097	0,044	<i>0,095</i>
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	0,002	-0,232	0,015	0,282	-0,003	-0,104	0,114	0,114	<i>-0,192</i>
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	-0,043	-0,186	-0,044	0,071	-0,009	-0,028	<b>0,462</b>	<b>0,408</b>	<i>0,071</i>
Important child qualities:	0,007	0,033	-0,023	-0,029	-0,200	<b>0,437</b>	<b>-0,500</b>	0,256	<i>-0,148</i>

hard work									
Important child qualities: imagination	0,000	-0,098	-0,022	0,159	0,082	<b>-0,613</b>	-0,074	0,005	<i>0,032</i>
Important child qualities: independence	-0,020	-0,133	0,057	0,207	0,067	<b>-0,508</b>	0,007	<b>0,353</b>	<i>0,031</i>
Important child qualities: obedience	0,030	0,268	0,035	-0,158	-0,043	<b>0,300</b>	-0,201	<b>-0,562</b>	<i>0,031</i>
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0,028	<b>0,741</b>	0,041	-0,065	-0,038	0,166	-0,082	-0,169	<i>-0,007</i>
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	0,006	-0,069	0,080	<b>-0,338</b>	-0,097	0,212	-0,282	0,260	<i>0,170</i>
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	-0,064	-0,029	-0,104	-0,009	0,026	0,033	<b>0,623</b>	-0,032	<i>-0,072</i>
Important child qualities: unselfishness	-0,008	-0,013	-0,024	0,063	-0,016	-0,107	0,131	<b>-0,644</b>	<i>0,031</i>
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	<b>0,779</b>	-0,059	-0,002	0,079	0,066	0,021	-0,078	-0,026	<i>0,112</i>
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	<b>0,791</b>	-0,103	0,020	0,047	0,084	0,018	-0,089	0,021	<i>0,026</i>
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	<b>0,716</b>	0,006	0,059	-0,003	0,017	0,041	-0,112	-0,053	<i>0,132</i>
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	<b>0,736</b>	0,015	0,070	0,001	0,006	0,049	-0,132	-0,024	<i>0,058</i>
Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])	0,037	0,149	0,073	0,085	0,164	<b>0,562</b>	-0,238	0,058	<i>0,121</i>
[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers	0,039	0,025	<b>0,845</b>	-0,064	-0,076	0,045	-0,113	0,018	<i>0,003</i>
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race	0,043	0,059	<b>0,827</b>	-0,055	-0,115	0,026	-0,161	0,006	<i>-0,008</i>
Political system: (It's very bad) having a democratic political system	0,175	-0,106	0,097	-0,087	0,136	0,246	-0,239	-0,009	<b>0,458</b>

[Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)	0,005	0,193	0,164	-0,063	<b>-0,300</b>	0,045	-0,035	0,095	-0,145
Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)	-0,079	0,165	-0,045	0,167	-0,021	-0,011	0,216	0,061	<b>0,661</b>
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	-0,153	-0,064	-0,182	<b>0,384</b>	0,087	-0,160	<b>0,399</b>	-0,042	0,177
	<b>economic permissiveness</b>	<b>traditional religion</b>	<b>racism</b>	<b>higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)</b>	<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	<b>authoritarian character</b>	<b>tolerance and respect</b>	<b>the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)</b>	<b>[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy</b>

**Table 2.6: the correlations between the factors**

				Matrix of components					
	economic permissiveness	traditional religion	racism	higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	distrust of the army and the press	authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	
<b>traditional religion</b>	-0,051								
<b>racism</b>	0,067	0,063							
<b>higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)</b>	0,010	-0,036	<b>-0,103</b>						
<b>distrust of the army and the press</b>	0,058	<b>-0,122</b>	-0,069	0,084					
<b>authoritarian character</b>	0,055	<b>0,190</b>	0,064	<b>-0,192</b>	-0,042				
<b>tolerance and respect + post-materialism</b>	<b>-0,175</b>	-0,090	<b>-0,144</b>	<b>0,119</b>	0,072	<b>-0,276</b>			
<b>the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)</b>	-0,046	<b>-0,173</b>	0,034	0,058	-0,028	0,014	-0,004		
<i>[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy</i>	<i>0,093</i>	<i>0,034</i>	<i>0,018</i>	<i>0,030</i>	<i>0,117</i>	<i>0,045</i>	<i>-0,005</i>	<i>-0,027</i>	

**Table 2.7: the country means for the different new factors – mapping the new map of global values on earth**

	economic permissiveness	traditional religion	racism	higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	distrust of the army and the press	authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	<i>[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy</i>
Albania	0,094	-0,056	-0,137	-0,201	0,214	0,114	-0,149	-0,060	-0,229
Argentina	-0,090	0,101	-0,369	-0,103	0,557	0,050	0,067	0,037	0,147
Armenia	0,476	-0,471	-0,022	0,237	-0,060	0,332	-0,596	0,287	-0,030
Australia	-0,340	-0,569	-0,387	0,004	0,275	-0,516	0,554	-0,241	-0,166
Azerbaijan	0,283	-0,112	-0,135	0,297	0,204	0,183	-0,504	0,683	-0,169
Bangladesh	-0,589	0,839	1,712	-0,022	-0,854	-0,286	-0,626	0,457	-0,463
Belarus	0,520	-0,746	-0,413	-0,035	0,000	0,555	-0,508	0,323	0,010
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,304	-0,087	0,000	0,010	-0,128	-0,044	-0,083	-0,143	-0,172
Brazil	0,525	0,583	-0,373	-0,071	-0,037	0,503	-0,153	-0,429	0,346
Bulgaria	-0,188	-0,776	-0,037	0,028	-0,282	0,257	-0,258	0,196	-0,037
Burkina Faso	0,128	0,859	-0,440	-0,225	-0,243	0,450	-0,825	-0,710	-0,228
Canada	-0,284	-0,183	-0,424	0,038	0,018	-0,437	0,499	-0,112	-0,003
Chile	0,225	0,147	-0,139	-0,131	0,223	-0,131	0,209	-0,316	0,457
Cyprus	-0,146	0,068	0,040	0,154	-0,026	0,056	0,194	-0,204	-0,017
Czech Republic	0,286	-0,986	0,112	-0,448	0,180	0,496	-0,134	0,266	-0,079
Dominican Republic	-0,220	0,653	-0,079	0,920	0,273	0,159	0,282	0,064	-0,030
Estonia	0,041	-0,944	-0,110	0,095	0,081	0,406	-0,231	0,560	-0,108
Ethiopia	-0,343	0,711	-0,114	0,250	0,429	-0,493	-0,759	-0,062	0,137
Finland	-0,162	-0,664	-0,046	-0,168	-0,059	-0,680	0,811	-0,018	0,187
Georgia	-0,054	0,179	-0,080	0,208	-0,075	0,335	-0,228	0,510	-0,178
Germany	-0,068	-0,928	-0,256	-0,268	0,563	-0,521	0,629	0,529	0,132



Ghana	-0,098	1,120	0,097	0,054	-0,688	0,461	-0,464	-0,584	-0,402
Guatemala	0,535	0,806	-0,354	0,125	0,310	0,236	-0,120	-0,546	0,424
Hong Kong	-0,048	-0,856	1,801	-0,193	0,008	-0,236	-0,575	-0,164	0,222
Hungary	0,467	-0,716	0,256	-0,132	0,353	0,057	0,455	0,074	0,075
India	-0,064	0,260	0,704	-0,044	-0,824	0,133	-0,464	-0,100	-0,436
Indonesia	-0,412	1,032	0,591	0,268	-0,366	-0,218	0,017	0,182	-0,110
Italy	-0,362	0,005	-0,240	0,093	0,153	-0,346	0,579	0,041	-0,032
Jordan	-0,207	1,118	1,329	0,095	-0,824	-0,160	0,058	-0,695	-0,403
Kyrgyzstan	0,117	-0,185	0,047	0,433	0,041	0,239	-0,409	0,419	0,175
Latvia	0,478	-0,712	-0,115	0,046	0,319	0,511	-0,144	0,561	0,018
Lithuania	0,169	-0,376	0,167	0,047	-0,011	0,289	-0,360	0,487	0,080
Macedonia	-0,134	-0,191	0,362	0,056	0,508	-0,035	0,458	0,002	0,058
Mali	0,509	0,743	0,087	-0,454	-0,619	0,278	-0,879	-0,453	-0,129
Mexico	0,505	0,322	0,208	0,075	0,093	-0,097	-0,137	-0,407	0,307
Moldova	0,579	-0,136	-0,098	-0,034	0,221	0,322	-0,385	0,359	0,184
Morocco	-0,419	0,855	-0,184	-0,086	-0,208	0,291	-0,232	-0,068	-0,463
New Zealand	-0,371	-0,675	-0,419	-0,085	0,125	-0,702	0,601	-0,090	-0,323
Nigeria	-0,139	1,126	0,040	0,371	0,012	0,640	-0,700	-0,489	-0,483
Norway	-0,271	-0,813	-0,288	0,165	0,151	-1,324	0,989	0,165	-0,088
Peru	0,067	0,594	-0,188	0,327	0,432	0,387	-0,072	-0,297	-0,018
Philippines	0,624	0,775	0,249	0,076	-0,397	0,405	-0,543	-0,009	0,270
Poland	-0,051	0,390	-0,080	-0,449	0,093	0,040	0,299	-0,057	0,496
Puerto Rico	-0,335	0,865	-0,216	0,231	-0,043	0,181	0,472	-0,163	0,005
Romania	-0,209	0,275	0,111	0,008	-0,279	0,084	-0,083	0,514	-0,374
Russian Federation	0,339	-1,070	-0,251	-0,174	0,099	0,777	-0,462	0,363	0,259
Serbia	1,266	-0,152	0,285	0,078	0,445	0,143	-0,194	0,100	0,140
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,178	-0,534	-0,112	-0,037	0,229	0,076	-0,101	0,106	-0,322
Slovakia	0,476	-0,176	-0,016	-0,411	-0,042	0,494	-0,139	0,221	-0,105
Slovenia	0,156	-0,639	0,029	0,017	0,384	-0,182	0,279	0,100	0,068
South Africa	-0,003	0,649	0,124	0,102	0,010	0,350	-0,120	-0,098	0,022
South Korea	-0,114	-0,507	0,563	0,272	-0,026	-0,182	-0,431	0,963	0,376
Spain	-0,135	-0,554	-0,372	-0,265	0,264	0,039	0,075	-0,158	0,126
Sweden	-0,109	-1,036	-0,443	0,045	0,311	-1,205	1,067	0,133	-0,137

Switzerland	-0,404	-0,565	-0,364	0,067	0,253	-1,067	0,968	0,296	-0,153
Taiwan	-0,206	-0,705	0,191	-0,140	0,325	-0,057	0,180	0,563	0,210
Tanzania	-0,448	1,008	0,034	-0,032	-1,063	0,056	-0,437	-0,564	-0,337
Thailand	0,561	0,300	0,722	-0,739	0,093	-0,297	-0,051	-0,334	0,382
Trinidad and Tobago	0,090	0,804	-0,307	-0,253	0,460	0,601	0,037	-0,256	0,060
Turkey	-0,460	0,271	0,300	0,026	-0,218	0,463	-0,217	0,024	0,083
Uganda	0,279	0,849	-0,051	0,540	-0,545	0,607	-0,503	-0,478	-0,256
Ukraine	0,553	-0,504	-0,219	-0,016	-0,020	0,345	-0,435	0,230	0,080
United States	-0,292	0,292	-0,250	-0,050	-0,076	-0,207	0,348	-0,038	-0,155
Uruguay	-0,270	-0,406	-0,311	-0,225	0,274	-0,427	0,442	-0,455	0,422
Venezuela	-0,047	0,417	0,142	0,159	-0,303	0,199	0,170	-0,369	0,202
Viet Nam	-0,341	-0,786	0,496	-0,266	-1,833	-0,122	-0,408	0,173	-0,292
Zambia	0,648	0,795	0,403	0,323	-0,086	0,329	-0,584	-0,343	-0,012
Zimbabwe	-0,468	0,876	-0,063	0,049	-0,071	0,678	-0,405	-0,704	-0,144

**Table 2.8: the global map of the major world denominations<sup>15</sup> in the *World Values Survey* project, ordered by sample size in the WVS (analyses about global denominations with a WVS sample size of below 500 should be considered with utmost care and do not reflect population/country weighted averages but are simple based on global overall WVS samples for the different denominations)**

N	Religious denomination	economic permissiveness	traditional religion	racism	higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	distrust of the army and the press	authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	<i>[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy</i>
<b>75239</b>	<b>Total number</b>	<b>-0,014</b>	<b>0,208</b>	<b>0,016</b>	<b>-0,025</b>	<b>-0,048</b>	<b>0,037</b>	<b>-0,019</b>	<b>-0,013</b>	<b>0,004</b>
26269	Roman Catholic	0,062	0,294	-0,112	-0,016	0,024	0,097	0,038	-0,098	0,109
12652	Protestant	-0,179	0,249	-0,093	-0,004	0,025	-0,137	0,221	-0,048	-0,070
10726	Orthodox	0,110	-0,075	-0,022	0,015	0,082	0,189	-0,157	0,235	-0,027
<b>9602</b>	<b>Muslim</b>	<b>-0,144</b>	<b>0,484</b>	<b>0,300</b>	<b>0,014</b>	<b>-0,249</b>	<b>0,134</b>	<b>-0,347</b>	<b>-0,025</b>	<b>-0,182</b>
2660	Buddhist	0,238	-0,069	0,561	-0,494	-0,109	-0,198	-0,105	0,025	0,310
2256	Hindu	-0,082	0,310	0,622	0,014	-0,661	0,161	-0,374	-0,099	-0,338
1270	The Church of Sweden	-0,117	-1,056	-0,430	-0,019	0,272	-1,169	1,066	0,141	-0,146
973	Armenian Apostolic Church	0,445	-0,330	0,000	0,244	-0,077	0,302	-0,567	0,250	-0,013
783	Ancestral worshipping	-0,349	-0,888	0,791	-0,178	-1,926	-0,134	-0,479	0,313	-0,379
599	Independent African Church (e. g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.)	0,019	0,934	0,251	-0,100	-0,358	0,402	-0,356	-0,201	0,158
536	Pentecostal	-0,280	1,181	-0,055	0,402	-0,001	0,503	-0,314	-0,388	-0,276

<sup>15</sup> It is important to emphasize that these results are only unweighted world averages as they emerge from the *World Values Survey* project. These data say nothing about the value structures of given individuals across the globe and in individual countries adhering to the denominations, listed in our Table. For each denomination, there would be wide standard deviations, which we did not list in Table 5.8 due to reasons of the limitations of space.

## 2. 4. The new choropleth maps of global human values

Graph 2.1 depicted the Inglehart/Welzel map of human values. The choropleth maps, Maps 2.1 to 2.9, designed by us on the basis of the preceding data, now focus on our analysis and its geographical implications.

**Economic permissiveness** most strongly affects large parts of Latin America (except Venezuela, Peru, and the countries of the Southern Cone), some, but not all nations of Africa, most of the former USSR and some other countries of East Central and Southeastern Europe, and Thailand and the Philippines. Medium levels of economic permissiveness are to be found – among others – in India, in Germany, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Poland, in Venezuela, Peru, and the countries of the Southern Cone of Latin America, in South Africa, in Ghana *et cetera*, while there were some really shining results to be reported from several African countries. The Anglo-Saxon Western democracies had very good performances on this indicator.

In our factor analysis, **traditional religion** was highest in most of the nations of Africa, and the countries of Latin America with the highest poverty rates (Brazil, Peru, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Mexico), in the Arab speaking Muslim countries and in Poland. It is noteworthy that Turkey, India and the United States are classified in the same league of religiosity, while the real bastions of secularism are Scandinavia, Russia, Germany and the Czech Republic.

**Racism** is lowest in most of the old democracies of the West and in the South of Latin America, while in Venezuela, Mexico, in several African countries, in Eastern Europe and in Turkey, middle levels of racism are to be observed. The worst performances to be recorded are to be encountered in Bangladesh, Jordan, and South Korea, Indonesia, and India. Thailand and Vietnam also have higher racism-scores.

The **generational education gaps** are lowest in Thailand, Mali, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic. In most developed western democracies, generational education gaps are also low. In Uganda, Nigeria, Zambia, Peru and Kyrgyzstan we find the highest values on this score.

**Distrust of the army and the press** is highest in Germany, Spain, Australia, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Hungary, Latvia, Ethiopia, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. Russia and several countries in East and Central Europe, but also Canada, Mexico, Italy, Switzerland, Norway, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand, New Zealand, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan are in the same league of medium skepticism regarding the army and the press. The United States, Brazil,

Venezuela, Turkey, Finland, several countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Zimbabwe already exhibit lower levels of skepticism in their armed forces and the press. The highest level of trust in the army and the press is to be found in Vietnam, followed by Tanzania, Jordan, India and several nations in Africa and Indonesia.

The **authoritarian character** is highest in Russia, and tends to be high in many countries of East Central Europe and in several developing countries of Africa, Asia, Brazil and Peru. Notable exceptions are Indonesia, which is in the same league as the United States, Uruguay, Chile, Mexico, Bangladesh and Thailand, and also Ethiopia. Lowest rates of the authoritarian character are to be registered in Scandinavia and in Switzerland.

**Tolerance, respect and post-materialism** are highest in Scandinavia, Switzerland and New Zealand, followed by Germany and then Australia, Canada, Italy, Hungary, Macedonia and Uruguay. Considering the very clear correlations of tolerance and respect and post-materialism with “*effective democracy*” (see Chapter 10, below), the low levels of tolerance and respect and post-materialism in Russia and most of the former Communist countries of Eastern Europe bode ill for the future of democracy in those countries. Also in India, Kyrgyzstan, South Korea, India and Bangladesh, the low values of tolerance, respect and post-materialism have to be recalled.

The “**ego company**” bears a lot of resemblance with Hofstede’s “long term orientation” factor. Predictably, it is highest in South Korea, but also the high values in Russia, Germany, the Baltic Republics, Azerbaijan, Romania, Moldavia and Bangladesh have to be observed. Lowest values for the “ego company factor” are to be encountered in several African countries. Also several states in Latin America, East and Southeast Asia are on the lower ranks of this factor. Also most of the developed western democracies and the Muslim nations are not especially characterized by the “ego company”.

The [**predominantly**] **female rejection of the market economy and democracy** is highest in Poland, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, Thailand and South Korea, and also Russia Brazil and the Philippines: these are all countries, which in one form or the other had the experience of authoritarian governments in the not too distant past in the 1970s or 1980s, and where distrust against democracy and the market economy today above all is a distrust along gender lines. Interestingly enough, also Argentina, Ethiopia and Kyrgyzstan belong to this pattern, while Finland, Mexico, and Germany are interesting “outlayers” further to be studied in future political science research. In the following, we list the factor definitions and the countries with the highest and lowest factor scores. Members of the **Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)** are marked in **green colors**.

➤ **Economic permissiveness**

**Definition:**

Justifiable: cheating on taxes

Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport

Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe

Justifiable: claiming government benefits

**Best practice of avoiding it:**

Bangladesh

Zimbabwe

Turkey

Tanzania

Morocco

**Worst practice of avoiding it:**

Serbia

Zambia

Philippines

Moldova

Thailand

➤ **Traditional religion**

**Definition:**

How important is God in your life

Important child qualities: religious faith

Negative loading: never attend religious services

**Highest values:**

Nigeria

Ghana

Jordan

Indonesia

Tanzania

**Lowest values:**

Russian Federation  
Sweden  
Czech Republic  
Estonia  
Germany

### ➤ Racism

#### Definition:

[Rejecting] Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers  
[Rejecting] Neighbors: People of a different race  
Immigrant policy (prevent people from coming)

#### Best practice of avoiding it:

Sweden  
Burkina Faso  
Canada  
New Zealand  
Belarus

#### Worst practice of avoiding it:

Hong Kong  
Bangladesh  
Jordan  
Thailand  
India

### ➤ Generational education gaps

#### Definition:

Highest educational level attained  
Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl  
Negative loading Age  
Negative loading important child qualities: thrift saving money and things

#### Highest values:

Dominican Republic  
Uganda  
Kyrgyzstan  
Nigeria

Peru

**Lowest values:**

Thailand

Mali

Poland

Czech Republic

Slovakia

➤ **Distrust of the army and the press**

**Definition:**

[No] Confidence: The Press

[No] Confidence: Armed Forces

Negative loading: [Right wing] self-positioning in political scale (scale 1-left to 10-right)

**Best practice of avoiding it:**

Viet Nam

Tanzania

Bangladesh

Jordan

India

**Worst practice of avoiding it:**

Germany

Argentina

Macedonia

Trinidad and Tobago

Serbia

➤ **The authoritarian character**

**Definition:**

Lack of social capital (Most people can be trusted [highest numerical value: you just can't be too careful])

Important child qualities: hard work

Important child qualities: obedience

Negative loading: Important child qualities: imagination

Negative loading: Important child qualities: independence



**Best practice of avoiding it:**

Norway  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
New Zealand  
Finland

**Worst practice of avoiding it:**

Russian Federation  
Zimbabwe  
Nigeria  
Uganda  
Trinidad and Tobago

➤ **Tolerance, respect and post-materialism**

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people

Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility

Rejecting sexist position: University is more important for a boy than for a girl

Negative loading: Important child qualities: hard work

**Best practice:**

Sweden  
Norway  
Switzerland  
Finland  
Germany

**Worst practice:**

Mali  
Burkina Faso  
Ethiopia  
Nigeria  
Bangladesh

➤ **The “ego company”**

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility

Important child qualities: independence

Negative loading: Important child qualities: unselfishness

Negative loading: Important child qualities: obedience

**Highest values:**

South Korea

Azerbaijan

Taiwan

Latvia

Estonia

**Lowest values:**

Burkina Faso

Zimbabwe

Jordan

Ghana

Tanzania

➤ The rejection of the market economy and democracy

**Definition:**

Sex (Gender) [in multivariate analysis: female] (1=male; 2=female)

Competition good or harmful

Political system: (It's very bad] having a democratic political system

**Best practice of avoiding it:**

Nigeria

Bangladesh

Morocco

India

Jordan

**Worst practice of avoiding it:**

Poland


Chile

Guatemala


Uruguay

Thailand


**Map 2.1: Economic permissiveness**



Map 2.2: traditional religion




Map 2.3: racism (global rank, avoiding racism).<sup>16</sup> Highest racism: marked in red; lowest racism: marked in blue




<sup>16</sup> The indicator did not produce meaningful maps with the original values, so we transformed it to a ranking.


**Map 2.4: higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)**



Map 2.5: distrust of the army and the press




**Map 2.6: authoritarian character**







**Map 2.7: tolerance and respect + post-materialism**



**Map 2.8: the 'ego' company**



**Map 2.9: [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy**



## 2. 5. Some conclusions from the country factor scores

Looking back on Chapters 2.3 and 2.4 of this article, one might summarize for the general readership of this publication that factor analysis (Promax version) of the 30 variables presented in Table 2.6 yielded nine underlying dimensions (factors), also presented in the quick overview of Table 2.9. Our results suggested the following nine factors to be relevant:

**Table 2.9: The main results of the principal components analysis – *Eigen values* and percentage of variance explained**

	<i>Eigen value</i>	<b>% of variance explained</b>	<b>cumulated % of total variance explained</b>
1) economic permissiveness	2,526	8,711	8,711
2) traditional religion	2,472	8,523	17,234
3) racism	1,688	5,822	23,056
4) higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	1,442	4,974	28,029
5) distrust of the army and the press	1,298	4,475	32,504
6) authoritarian character	1,189	4,099	36,604
7) tolerance and respect + post-materialism	1,143	3,942	40,545
8) the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	1,118	3,854	44,399
9) [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy	1,012	3,489	<b>47,888</b>

Graph 2.2 and 1.3 as well as our maps for the nine newly derived scales on a global level revisit the old debate, started by Huntington, 1993 and 1996. Graph 2.2 and 1.3 explain to us, just where there are the main differences and where are the main similarities between the Muslim/Orthodox global population and the average global citizen. But as the country results (factor scores), reproduced in Table 2.7 explain to us quite well, closer inspection tells us that things turn out to be more complicated than most social science approaches today would predict. Global rank 7 (Latvia), rank 9 (Czech Republic), rank 10 (Slovakia), rank 14 (Estonia), rank 24 (Lithuania) and rank 26 (Bulgaria) on the global **authoritarianism scale** are held by NATO Western allies in Europe, and

Catholic Latin American countries are among the global leaders of the authoritarianism scale. And interestingly enough, there are Muslim or predominantly Muslim societies like Bangladesh, and Indonesia, which are less authoritarian than several key Western allies – the United States, Slovenia, and South Korea; and Jordan is less authoritarian than Spain or Poland.

So what can we say about religious global value differences in the light of Huntington's theories? Based on our data, we could say with great caution that there is a certain trend towards racism and traditional religion in too many places in the global Muslim community (*Umma*), and a lack of the values of tolerance and respect in too many places in the global Muslim community (*Umma*), all compared to the global community of humankind.

The world of global Orthodoxy is characterized also in too many places by a very strong tendency towards the 'ego company' (rejection of the educational values of unselfishness and obedience) and the authoritarian character, and a lack of the values of tolerance and respect and traditional religiosity. Future research would have to highlight not only the global denominational means, but also the global standard deviations, to arrive at more meaningful results.

We used the terms "great caution" because even if a racist trend exists in too many places in several Muslim societies, it is not a characteristic feature of "Islamic culture" as such.

There is a very great variation of these results, documented in Table 2.7 and in our country maps. And we have to consider as well that phenomena of racism and traditional religion, lack of the values of tolerance and respect, all are dependent on the development level. Since the majority of Muslim nations are underdeveloped countries, it is to be expected that their performance could improve over time.

## **2. 6. Adorno's F-scale and global economic growth in the post-2008 crisis era**

Among the results, which have a direct consequence for the explanation of economic growth rates since the global economic crisis of 2008, we find our factor "*authoritarian character*". It emerges that with other statistical predictors of economic growth or social development being constant, the "*authoritarian character*" is not conducive to economic growth in our era. Our concept of the "*authoritarian character*" takes some elements from the classical sociological work by Adorno *et al.* (1950), which defined the "*authoritarian personality*" as

having high average scores on the following variables.<sup>17</sup> Scholarly interest in the F-scale has been enormous ever since the main English language publication Adorno *et al.*, 1950, among the most influential studies being Fahrenberg and Steiner, 2004; Flere, 1991; Meloen, Van Der Linden, and De Witte, 1996; Ray, 1985; Ray, and Lovejoy, 1990; Rubinstein, 1995, Rusby, 2010.

Today, some elements, based on the *World Values Survey*, are completely different from the original Adorno “*F-scale*”, which was intended by its authors to be a measurement scale to assess the potentials of authoritarianism in modern society after the horrors of Nazism and Fascism in Europe:

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<sup>17</sup> <http://www.zonalatina.com/Zldata387.htm>

1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
2. A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.
3. If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.
4. The business man and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor.
5. Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never be understood by the human mind.
6. Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.
7. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.
8. What this country needs most, more than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can put their faith.
9. No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.
10. Nobody ever learned anything really important except through suffering.
11. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.
12. An insult to our honor should always be punished.
13. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.
14. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.
15. Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of the immoral, crooked, and feeble-minded people.
16. Homosexuals are hardly better than criminals and ought to be severely punished.
17. When a person has a problem or worry, it is best for him not to think about it, but to keep busy with more cheerful things.
18. Nowadays more and more people are prying into matters that should remain personal and private.
19. Some people are born with an urge to jump from high places.
20. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.
21. Some day it will probably be shown that astrology can explain a lot of things.
22. Wars and social troubles may someday be ended by an earthquake or flood that will destroy the whole world.
23. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back, if we have enough will power.
24. It is best to use some prewar authorities in Germany to keep order and prevent chaos.
25. Most people don't realize how much our lives are controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
26. Human nature being what it is there will always be war and conflict.
27. Familiarity breeds contempt.
28. Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around and mix together so much, a person has to protect himself especially carefully against catching an infection or disease from them.
29. The wild sex life of the old Greeks and Romans was tame compared to some of the goings-on in this country, even in places where people might least expect it.
30. The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve it.

Table 2.10 explains the factor loadings for our own scale of authoritarianism, achieved by promax rotation. We define the **authoritarian character** by the following **five factor loadings** equal or above the absolute value of .30:

**Table 2.10: the authoritarian character**

	<b>authoritarian character</b>
<b>Most people can be trusted (you can't be too careful)</b>	<b>0,562</b>
<b>Important child qualities: hard work</b>	<b>0,437</b>
<b>Important child qualities: obedience</b>	<b>0,300</b>
Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject)	0,246

Immigrant policy (prohibit people from coming)	0,227
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	0,212
How important is God in your life	0,200
Important child qualities: religious faith	0,166
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	0,049
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers (reject)	0,045
Self-positioning in political scale (right)	0,045
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	0,041
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	0,033
Neighbors: People of a different race (reject)	0,026
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	0,021
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	0,018
Confidence: The Press (no confidence)	-0,010
Sex (Gender) (female)	-0,011
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	-0,028
Confidence: Armed Forces (no confidence)	-0,035
Age	-0,037
Competition good or harmful (harmful)	-0,093
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	-0,104
Important child qualities: unselfishness	-0,107
How often do you attend religious services (never)	-0,119
University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject)	-0,160
Highest educational level attained	-0,195
<b>Important child qualities: independence</b>	<b>-0,508</b>
<b>Important child qualities: imagination</b>	<b>-0,613</b>

Adorno and associates expected a strong tendency of their scale – reflecting conventionalism, authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, anti-intellectualism, anti-intraception, superstition and stereotypedness, power and "toughness", destructiveness and cynicism, projectivity, and exaggerated concerns over sex – to be encountered among the political right (hence also the name “F-scale” for the “F” in the word “fascism”), while there is hardly any empirical connection today between our version of the *World Values Survey*-based authoritarianism scale and the conventional right-left political spectrum. The three religion variables used in our analysis – importance of God in life, the desire for religious education of children, and religious service attendance rate, have just 4% or less of variance in common with the authoritarianism phenomenon.

Table 2.11 shows the average tendencies towards the authoritarian character among the major global denominations. It is simply wrong to attempt to portray adherents of the Muslim religion as more authoritarian as adherents of several Eastern religions, Orthodox and Greek Catholics as well as other Churches inspired by Christianity. The difference between global Roman Catholics and Muslims on this scale is minimal; while several different Protestant Churches are the real strongholds of the spirit of an enlightened education and also social capital (=trust in other people).



**Table 2.11: the authoritarian tendencies in major world denominations (analyses about global denominations with a WVS sample size of below 500 should be considered with utmost care and do not reflect population/country weighted averages but are simple based on global overall WVS samples for the different denominations)**

	<b>n =</b>	<b>authoritarian character</b>
Pentecostal	536	0,50
Independent African Church (e. g. ZCC, Shembe, etc.)	599	0,40
Armenian Apostolic Church	973	0,30
Orthodox	10726	0,19
Hindu	2256	0,16
<b>Muslim</b>	<b>9602</b>	<b>0,13</b>
Roman Catholic	26269	0,10
Ancestral worshipping	783	-0,13
Protestant	12652	-0,14
Evangelical	2586	-0,16
Buddhist	2660	-0,20
The Church of Sweden	1270	-1,17

Graph 2.5 and following now depicts the development of human value scales along the trajectory of different development levels, as measured by the UNDP Human Development Index in global society. While traditional religiosity clearly diminishes with increasing Human Development, distrust of the army and the press, tolerance and respect, and the ‘ego company’ increase with increasing UNDP levels, and there are U-shaped trade-offs between the UNDP Human Development levels and Economic permissiveness, racism, comparative higher education levels of the younger generation, the authoritarian character, and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy.

All this suggests that “modernity” in global society would be characterized by what most sociologists interpret as the phenomena of

- less traditional religion and
- more tolerance and respect

and the negative phenomena of

- more distrust in the army and the press and
- an increasingly ego-centric culture
- the female rejection of democracy and the market economy

In global society, the paths to modernity are indeed not conflict-free, and at middle levels of development we generally reach a climax of societal

- racism
- the generation gap in education
- Economic permissiveness
- the authoritarian character

On average, the Arab States reached a Human Development Index of 0.641 in 2011. In the framework of the general tendencies to be deduced from our theory, we can cautiously predict that Arab nations indeed are currently undergoing the most critical phase in their development. In the light of our analysis based on the trajectories of our global values analysis in comparison to the Human Development Index (UNDP HDI), we can expect for the countries of the Arab world the following to happen: from the level of UNDP HDI = 0.600 onwards, also in the Muslim countries economic permissiveness will decrease, the weight of religious traditionalism will decline, racism already reached its climax and will decline, the education gap between the generations will decline dramatically, tolerance and respect will increase, egoism will decrease, and the trajectory of the authoritarian character and the [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and the press will not increase sharply anymore. Decision makers and democratic civil society will be however confronted with one negative phenomenon. From the level of UNDP HDI = 0.600 onwards, distrust of the army and the press will increase with rising human development (see also Graphs 2. 21 ff.).

Now, our data also can be used to re-analyze the drivers and bottlenecks of global economic growth during the current world economic slump, which began in 2007/2008. Our data are based on the well-known IMF World Economic Outlook data series, and represent the average economic growth rates 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.

Based on stepwise multiple regressions and the macro-quantitative world system analysis “Corvinus University” data set,<sup>18</sup> we can show that under due consideration of the non-linear tradeoffs between economic development levels and subsequent growth rates (“convergence effects”), market size (% of world population) is an important driver of contemporary growth. The authoritarian character is one of its main stumbling blocks. Our analysis is based on n = 62

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854>

countries with complete data and our regression results are based on the SPSS, version XX, and the default options for the multiple regression procedure (i. e. forward regression).

**Table 2.12: the determinants of global economic growth during the current economic crisis (mean economic growth rates, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011) according to IMF data**

	Regression Coefficient B	Standard error	Beta	T	Sig.
Constant	-0,029	18,796		-0,002	0,999
<b>% world population</b>	<b>0,251</b>	<b>0,115</b>	<b>0,199</b>	<b>2,181</b>	<b>0,033</b>
2000 Economic Freedom Score	0,055	0,038	0,175	1,463	0,149
ln GDP per capita	2,458	4,362	0,917	0,564	0,575
ln GDP per capita <sup>2</sup>	-0,280	0,258	-1,818	-1,086	0,282
<b>authoritarian character</b>	<b>-1,893</b>	<b>0,770</b>	<b>-0,291</b>	<b>-2,457</b>	<b>0,017</b>

N = 62 countries, adj. R<sup>2</sup> = 52. 1%; F = 14. 244; error p = .000. Economic growth data are IMF data, and the data matrix is freely available from <http://economics.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854>

## **2.7. The trajectories of global value change along the paths of human development**

In the following, we will further analyze the trajectories of global value change along the paths of development. The Inglehart approach assumes that values largely depend on human security, and that human security is well measured by the UNDP Human Development Index. Now we will analyze the trajectory of value change of the OIC-members, i. e. the Muslim world, and global society separately. Such an analysis yields astonishing results and interesting predictions for the Muslim world at the same time. Knowing the UNDP Human Development Index of a given Arab or Muslim country, we can predict the probable path of value development during the next decade, provided that the UNDP Human Development Index will move in a given, predictable direction.


Based on the trade-off between human values according to the *World Values Survey* and the UNDP Human Development Index, we find that in Muslim


countries there will be several **optimistic tendencies at work**, which could imply that under proper policies being pursued, Muslim countries could overcome with resilience the crisis of modernity. Yes, unfortunately, there is a U-shaped phenomenon of racism in these countries which is strongest at middle UNDP Human Development Index development levels, and there is a plateau curve of human egoism, and an inter-generational education gap, which are all strongest at middle development levels, just as in world society at large. But traditionalist religion, racism, the educational generation gap, the ego company, they all will diminish in their influence over society, when Muslim countries in general and Arab countries in particular will increase their UNDP Human Development Index. Economic permissiveness will decrease in weight, just as tolerance and respect will increase with rising development levels. These empirically robust relationships are one of the reasons for our optimism for the future of the democracy movement in the Muslim world.

Our statistics also imply that the crisis of modernization in the countries of the world system is at times more dramatic than in the countries of the OIC.

We have to note as well that the authoritarian character and the female rejection of democracy and the market economy are at a relatively constant level along the development trajectory:

**Graph 2.5 and Graph 2.6: predicting the future trajectory of the global *Umma*: permissiveness, traditional religion, educational gap, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, the “ego company”, female rejection of markets and democracy as a function of the UNDP Human Development Index in Muslim societies**





## 2.8. The performance of Muslim countries along these trajectories

To our great surprise, the trajectories of our development paths show that Muslim societies would have at least the potential of relatively smoother transitions to a mature, enlightened and humanistic society than the countries of the world system as a whole. How can we dare to advance such an optimistic proposition, which is counter to the explicit or implicit conclusions from most other published social science research around our globe? Our results generally imply that especially the rich and wealthy Muslim societies of our globe have the human and material abilities to initiate democratic reforms towards a full parliamentary democracy, if they did not do so already (perhaps in the framework of a Constitutional Monarchy, British style) at relatively low risk-levels. It should be also noted that one possible framework could be that of a Constitutional Monarchy, British style.<sup>19</sup>

Already 50 years ago, the American political scientist Karl Wolfgang Deutsch had the following message for the countries like the Arab world today, facing the challenges of modernization:

*“[...] Deliberate political and economic intervention into the social mobilization process, on the other hand, might open up some more hopeful*

<sup>19</sup> This parallel is all the more interesting, since Her Britannic Majesty the Queen is also the Head of the global Anglican Church.

*perspectives. Such intervention should not aim at retarding economic and social development, in the manner of the policies of the regime of Prince Metternich in Austria during much of the first half of the 19th century. Those policies of slowing down social mobilization and economic development in the main only diminished the capabilities of the government, paved the way to domestic failures and international defeats and were followed over the course of three generations by the persistent backwardness and ultimate destruction of the state. A more promising policy might have to be, on the contrary, one of active intervention in favor of more rapid and more balanced growth; a somewhat more even distribution of income, related more closely to rewards for productive contributions rather than for status and inheritance; the more productive investment of available resources; and a sustained growth in the political and administrative capabilities of government and of ever wider strata of the population. The crude model outlined above may have some modest usefulness in surveying and presenting in quantitative terms some of the magnitudes and rates of change that would be relevant for understanding the basic problems of such a more constructive policy in developing countries. Somewhat as the economic models of the late Lord Keynes drew attention to the need of keeping the national rates of spending and investment in a country in balance [...]” (Deutsch, 1961: 505-506).*

- a) Economic permissiveness is highest at low levels of Muslim Human Development, while for global society, it reaches a climax at the current average UNDP Human Development Index level of the Arab world. Thus it can be said that development in the Muslim world promises to be more corruption free and shadow economy free than in the rest of the countries of our globe, once these Muslim countries reach the current UNDP Human Development Index level of the Arab world.
- b) Traditionalist religion and racism both in the Muslim world and in global society indeed are evolving in an inverted U-shaped pattern along the trajectory of development, but the climax levels at middle development stages are in fact lower in Muslim countries than in global society
- c) The generational education gap is a problem for Muslim societies too, but still the climax levels are higher in global society
- d) The distrust level concerning the army and the press is certainly a problem for global Muslim development, but still, at high levels of the UNDP Human Development Index, these Muslim societies will reach distrust levels which are in fact lower than in global society
- e) Yes indeed, there is also a problem with the authoritarian character, but in global society the climax level of the authoritarian character phenomenon is far worse than in Muslim countries



- f) At high levels of Human Development, societal egoism and the female rejection of democracy and the market economy are relatively lower than in other mature societies of our globe
- g) What is a problem, indeed, is the future trajectory of Muslim tolerance and respect. Muslim societies – in accordance with the prescriptions of the Noble Quran, have to learn to become open towards immigration and multiculturalism; and to forgo – particularly in the Gulf –the old and useless tradition of “sponsorship”, and to be more respectful toward human rights (included the rights of foreign workers).




In the following, we chart for each of our empirically derived value indicators their trajectories in comparison to the Human Development Index already achieved – each time comparing the OIC members (=Muslim countries) with global society at large. For one, our results reveal a surprising new dimension to the entire debate about human values, going back to the discoveries of the great American economist Simon Kuznets and his insights about the development crisis of inequality being most profound at middle development levels.




Like the curve-linear effect between the income level and income inequality, generally known by the term ‘the Kuznets curve’ in global cross-national research nowadays, traditional religion, racism, the gaps in higher education between the different generations, the authoritarian character in Muslim societies clearly present a curve-linear effect. These phenomena cannot be separated from the overall process of the transition of a country from a rural to an urban society. This process implies the concomitant processes of the transition of the employment structure of a society from the primary to the secondary and the tertiary sector. We now invite our readers to look at our summary of global value change in Muslim and global society along the paths of achieved human development.




**Graph 2.7 to Graph 2.15: predicting the future trajectory of global society and the global *Umma*: permissiveness, traditional religion, educational gap, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, tolerance and respect, the “ego company”, female rejection of markets and democracy as a function of the UNDP Human Development Index in global society and in Muslim societies**









## 2. 9. The discovery of a Global Value Development Index and regional value differences at the sub-national level

In the following, we will use the factor analytical scores of this Chapter to calculate a **new Global Value Development Index**, which uses the measurement scales (factors) of our work.

Our global value development index combines law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy.

Hopefully the index, based on our factor analytical model, will be recognized by religious and non-religious readers alike as a measurement scale which expresses the true degree of development of a civil society of a country. Among the factors of Chapter 5, we exclude the extent of traditional religion in the country, because this factor reflects the religious choice of an individual. It also excludes the generational educational gap. It also neglects the factor “ego company”, where different cultural codes of global society might sharply diverge on the assessment whether it constitutes a “good” or “bad phenomenon”.

Thus, our average Global Value Development Index country score combines

- **avoiding economic permissiveness;**
- **avoiding racism;**
- **avoiding distrust of the army and the press;**
- **avoiding the authoritarian character;**

- **tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and**
- **avoiding a [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy.**

The weight, given to each factor, corresponds to the Eigen values listed in Graph 2.4 of this work.

Our country results show that the five best ranked countries of our entire globe are all western democracies with a solid historical anchoring of their societies in the traditions of the Enlightenment – Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia. But we already find among the next five countries Canada, the two developing countries Vietnam and Tanzania, and the EU-member countries Italy (predominantly Roman Catholic, with a long history of liberal Catholicism since the Second Vatican Council) and Finland (predominantly Protestant). Our global value development index, ranks the predominantly Muslim nation of Morocco twelfth – just behind the United States of America – and still ahead the Latin American democracy Uruguay and the EU-country Germany, to be followed by Bosnia and Indonesia. In our Table, we highlighted the member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in green color, while the member countries of the European Union are marked in blue color.

**Table 2.13: The rankings of the countries of the world on a new Global Value Development Index (OIC member countries and Bosnia and Hercegovina are marked in green colors)**


Country	Value Development Index	Global Rank Value Development Index
Switzerland	3,84	1
Norway	3,77	2
Sweden	3,41	3
New Zealand	3,33	4
Australia	2,57	5
Canada	2,50	6
Vietnam	2,38	7
Tanzania	2,23	8
Italy	2,23	9
Finland	2,11	10
United States	2,06	11
Morocco	1,50	12
Uruguay	1,44	13
Germany	1,08	14

Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,07	15
Indonesia	0,91	16
Romania	0,89	17
Spain	0,54	18
Cyprus	0,51	19
Dominican Republic	0,50	20
Bulgaria	0,34	21
Ghana	0,31	22
Zimbabwe	0,26	23
Ethiopia	0,08	24
Turkey	0,06	25
Venezuela	0,03	26
Jordan	0,01	27
Argentina	0,00	28
Poland	-0,07	29
Georgia	-0,11	30
Bangladesh	-0,20	31
India	-0,20	32
Albania	-0,36	33
Macedonia	-0,43	34
Slovenia	-0,47	35
Burkina Faso	-0,51	36
Estonia	-0,66	37
Chile	-0,69	38
South Africa	-0,79	39
Nigeria	-0,81	40
Peru	-0,94	41
Uganda	-0,95	42
Trinidad and Tobago	-1,04	43
Korea, South	-1,28	44
Kyrgyzstan	-1,36	45
Azerbaijan	-1,37	46
Lithuania	-1,53	47
Hungary	-1,69	48
Slovakia	-1,76	49
Brazil	-1,77	50
Czech Republic	-1,81	51
Mali	-1,83	52
Belarus	-1,87	53
Ukraine	-1,99	54
Guatemala	-2,00	55
Mexico	-2,10	56
Armenia	-2,13	57
Latvia	-2,22	58
Russia	-2,27	59
Moldova	-2,59	60
Thailand	-2,85	61

Philippines	-2,86	62
Zambia	-3,25	63

Our map shows that the euro-centric assumptions by European decision makers, which pushed European Union Enlargement ahead of democratic consolidation after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, are utterly wrong. The degree of development of a democratic civil society [characterized by law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy] is very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the European Union in 2004 and after. Our choropleth map of global value development (Map 2.10) then summarizes the results of Table 2.14 at a glance.

**Map 2.10 Combined global value development index (avoiding permissiveness, racism, distrust of the army and the press, authoritarian character, [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy; and practicing the values of tolerance and respect (weighted by the Eigen values of the promax factor analytical model)**





Once more, it emerges that the political geography of global values in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is far away from the imaginary of culturalist scientists and populist politicians alike: even for neighboring countries, culturalist explanation mechanisms utterly fail. Just compare Uruguay and Brazil, both predominantly Roman Catholic; Italy and Hungary, both predominantly Roman Catholic, Morocco and Mali, both predominantly Muslim, or for that matter, Morocco and Spain, just separated by the Straits of Gibraltar; Tanzania and Zambia, two neighboring African countries, and Vietnam and Thailand, two Asian neighboring countries. While Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam are real frontrunners in value development, we find that Brazil; Hungary, Mali, Zambia, and Thailand are real laggards in global value development. These phenomena hold independently of the attained development level of a country, measured by the Human Development Index of the UNDP. All of a sudden we discover how exceptional countries like **Uruguay, Italy, Morocco, Tanzania and Vietnam** really are. Global sociological research would do well to focus on factors which contributed towards their performance.

The *World Value Survey* data also permit the research community to analyze the results not only at the national level, but also at the regional level, where the interviews were recorded.

The idea that global values are often distributed in the nations of the world in a highly regionally contradictory pattern is relatively new in the research literature on the subject. First studies in this direction were published, among others, by Alm, Martinez-Vazque, and Torgler, 2006; Bonini, 2008; Freitag, 2003; Howard, 2002; and Torgier and Schneider, 2007.

Our regional evaluations of the *World Values Survey* data are all available from <https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles> where readers will find the file entitled: “*Regional aspects of socio-religious values according to the World Values Survey*” and “*The global analysis of feminism and its regional implications for the Muslim world*”.

Of the global regions with more than 30 interview partners each, it emerges for example that the **30 most permissive and pessimistic social climates** are located in:

ZM: Copperbelt Province	Zambia
CS: South East Serbia	Serbia and Montenegro
CS: Central West Serbia	Serbia and Montenegro
MD: Vulkaneshtskij	Moldova
MD: Autonomous Gaugasian Republic	Moldova
UA: Zhitomyr oblast	Ukraine
RO: Arges	Romania

BF: Sahel Region	Burkina Faso
UA: Kirovograd oblast	Ukraine
GH: Northern	Ghana
IN: Assam	India
ML: Mopti	Mali
AM: Ararat Marz	Armenia
UA: Southern	Ukraine
UA: Central	Ukraine
BY: Gomel oblast	Belarus
ML: Sikasso	Mali
LV: Ziemeļu reģ.	Latvia
UG: Kampala	Uganda
GT: Altiplano/Centro	Guatemala

The **30 superstars of law-abiding and social trust** (=highest negative loadings on the economic permissiveness factor) we find in the following regions of the world:

BD: Kishoreganj	Bangladesh
TR: East Central Anatolia	Turkey
BD: Feni	Bangladesh
BD: Mymensingh	Bangladesh
TR: Western Black Sea	Turkey
BD: Sylhet	Bangladesh
TR: Western Marmara	Turkey
BD: Chittagong	Bangladesh
BD: Rangpur	Bangladesh
BD: Habiganj	Bangladesh
GE: Samegrelo	Georgia
ZW: Masvingo	Zimbabwe
BD: Brahmanbaria	Bangladesh
ID: Lampung	Indonesia
ZW: Mashonaland West	Zimbabwe
ET: Addis Ababa	Ethiopia
ID: East Java	Indonesia
TR: Eastern Black Sea	Turkey
ZW: Midlands	Zimbabwe
BD: Nator	Bangladesh
VN: northwest	Vietnam
BD: Sirajgonj	Bangladesh
MA: Marrakech-Tensift	Morocco
IN: Punjab	India
TR: Eastern Marmara	Turkey
ID: Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	Indonesia
VN: north central	Vietnam
TR: Western Anatolia	Turkey
BD: Dhaka	Bangladesh
ZW: Mashonaland Central	Zimbabwe
BD: Barisal	Bangladesh

The **30 most traditional religious regions of the world** are to be found in:

BD: Mymensingh	Bangladesh
GH: Brong Ahafo	Ghana
ZM: Western Province	Zambia
BD: Sylhet	Bangladesh
BD: Kishoreganj	Bangladesh
BD: Brahmanbaria	Bangladesh
BD: Comilla	Bangladesh
NG: West	Nigeria
BD: Habiganj	Bangladesh
NG: Middle belt	Nigeria
GH: Eastern	Ghana
GH: Ashanti	Ghana
GH: Northern	Ghana
BD: Rangpur	Bangladesh
NG: North	Nigeria
ID: Lampung	Indonesia
ID: Central Java province	Indonesia
NG: East	Nigeria
GH: Greater Accra	Ghana
NG: Lagos	Nigeria
BF: Central North	Burkina Faso
ID: Banten	Indonesia
GH: Volta	Ghana
ID: West java province	Indonesia
BF: North Region	Burkina Faso
GH: Central	Ghana
UG: Mbale	Uganda
ID: East Java	Indonesia
UG: Tororo	Uganda
ZW: Mashonaland West	Zimbabwe

Equally important, it emerges that the **30 most secularist regions of the entire world** are to be found in:

DE: Ost-Berlin	Germany
RU: Far East	Russia
CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North Bohemia -	Czech Republic
RU: Western Siberia	Russia
DE: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	Germany
RU: Volga; Povolzskij	Russia
DE: Sachsen	Germany
DE: Brandenburg	Germany
DE: Sachsen-Anhalt	Germany
BG: Lovech	Bulgaria
SE: Skåne	Sweden
EE: Isa-Virumaa	Estonia
UA: Vinnytsia oblast	Ukraine
EE: Tartumaa	Estonia

DE: Thuringen	Germany
EE: Laane-Viruma	Estonia
SE: Vasterbotten	Sweden
UA: Kharkiv oblast	Ukraine
UA: Luhansk oblast	Ukraine
VN: northwest	Vietnam
RU: Volgo-Vyatki	Russia
SE: Västra Götaland	Sweden
CZ: Jihoèeský kraj - South Bohemia -	Czech Republic
RU: North Caucasus	Russia
SE: Vasternorrland	Sweden
SE: Stor Stockholm	Sweden
CZ: Západoèeský kraj - West Bohemia -	Czech Republic
RU: Urals	Russia
DE: Berlin	Germany
BG: Razgrad	Bulgaria
SE: Uppsala	Sweden

The 30 most **racist and xenophobic cultures** of the world are to be found in the following regions:

BD: Sirajgonj	Bangladesh
IN: Jharkhand	India
BD: Brahmanbaria	Bangladesh
BD: Kishoreganj	Bangladesh
BD: Feni	Bangladesh
BD: Nator	Bangladesh
BD: Habiganj	Bangladesh
BD: Sylhet	Bangladesh
BD: Chittagong	Bangladesh
BD: Barisal	Bangladesh
ID: Banten	Indonesia
BD: Dhaka	Bangladesh
GH: Eastern	Ghana
TH: The South	Thailand
IN: Assam	India
BD: Mymensingh	Bangladesh
BD: Comilla	Bangladesh
TR: Central Anatolia	Turkey
IN: Madhya Pradesh	India
IN: Rajasthan	India
TH: The North	Thailand
IN: West Bengal	India
IN: Orrisa	India
IN: Bihar	India
VN: northwest	Vietnam
KR: Jeonbuk / North Jeolla	Korea-South
ID: DKI	Indonesia
ZM: Copperbelt Province	Zambia
VN: southeast	Vietnam
ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta	Indonesia

The **least racist and xenophobic cultures** of the world are to be found in the following regions of the world:

BF: Central West	Burkina Faso
MD: Floreshtskij	Moldova
BF: Central North	Burkina Faso
BF: Central Plateau	Burkina Faso
ES: Asturias	Spain
ZW: Midlands	Zimbabwe
ZW: Masvingo	Zimbabwe
BY: Mogilev oblast	Belarus
SE: Stor Stockholm	Sweden
CA: Saskatchewan	Canada
UA: Hmelnytsk oblast	Ukraine
AR: Rosario	Argentina
CA: Manitoba	Canada
BF: Boucle du Mouhoun	Burkina Faso
SE: Skåne	Sweden
RO: Dolj	Romania
UY: Fray Bentos	Uruguay
SE: Uppsala	Sweden
NZ: Wellington	New Zealand
CA: Alberta	Canada
AL: Tirana	Albania
BY: Brest oblast	Belarus
CA: Nova Scotia	Canada
NZ: Hawkes Bay	New Zealand
CA: Ontario	Canada
SE: Vasterbotten	Sweden
MD: Kantemirskij	Moldova
NO: Oslo and Akershus	Norway
NO: Nordland	Norway
CA: British Columbia	Canada
BR: RJ	Brazil

Such comparisons for the hopefully flourishing future research field of regional analyses of human values could be continued endlessly. On a European level, one should not underestimate the long-term implications of such a discourse.

It also emerges, for example that even in highly developed overseas democracies, regional value differences are considerable. Differences between the deeply religious “Bible Belt” in the US South and the relatively secular New England are but one example. Secular Western Turkey quickly catches up with other European regions concerning the “Westernization” of values, while Central Anatolia lags behind. Table 2.13 provides us with a first overview of the highest and lowest placed regions in the current European Union member states


and the EU-accession countries, ranked again by an average Value Development Index score, which combines, as before

- avoiding economic permissiveness;
- avoiding racism;
- avoiding distrust of the army and the press;
- avoiding the authoritarian character;
- tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and
- avoiding a [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy.


The regional index is again built by weighting the regional factor scores according to the *World Values Survey* results by the *Eigen values* of each of these factors.

Tables 2.14 and 2.15 suggest huge national and regional differences in the European Union, which will increase even more after the next proposed round of EU-enlargement. Table 2.15 could be an important checklist for European decision makers in future EU-enlargement negotiations, pinpointing just where the real strengths and weaknesses of candidates in global value development really are situated.

**Graph 2.16: The regional value dimension – nine factor model for the different regions in the US**



**Graph 2.17: The regional value dimension – nine factor model for some European regions**





**Table 2.14: The rankings of the best and the worst ranked regions in the European Union and the candidate and potential candidate countries**

Region where the interview was conducted	Country	avoiding economic permissiveness	avoiding racism	avoiding distrust of the army and the press	avoiding the authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	avoiding a [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy	Regional development index	World Rank	Rank in the enlarged EU
SE: Skåne	Sweden	0,745	0,928	0,309	0,999	0,971	0,584	0,756	3	1
FI: Lappi	Finland	0,764	0,910	0,473	0,824	0,893	0,468	0,722	10	5
SE: Jonköping	Sweden	0,756	0,880	0,238	0,781	0,979	0,528	0,694	21	9
RO: Dolj	Romania	0,889	0,928	0,487	0,294	0,686	0,859	0,690	22	10
DE: Rheinland-Pfalz	Germany	0,659	0,893	0,282	0,743	0,910	0,510	0,666	33	13
IT: Emilia-Romagna	Italy	0,866	0,843	0,281	0,586	0,790	0,569	0,656	43	14
PR: Montana	Portugal	0,860	0,906	0,330	0,430	0,681	0,583	0,632	71	23
<b>CS: Central Serbia</b>	<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	<b>0,807</b>	<b>0,887</b>	<b>0,381</b>	<b>0,325</b>	<b>0,618</b>	<b>0,629</b>	<b>0,608</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>36</b>
CY: Kyrenia	Cyprus	0,830	0,760	0,460	0,446	0,585	0,525	0,601	108	42
ES: Castilla Leon	Spain	0,894	0,891	0,330	0,387	0,626	0,447	0,596	115	49
IT: Campania	Italy	0,770	0,834	0,255	0,486	0,786	0,354	0,581	138	58
<b>TR: Eastern Black Sea</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>0,926</b>	<b>0,740</b>	<b>0,446</b>	<b>0,138</b>	<b>0,693</b>	<b>0,534</b>	<b>0,579</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>60</b>
PR: Metropolitana	Portugal	0,742	0,792	0,360	0,317	0,809	0,394	0,569	157	68
SI: Osrednja Slovenska	Slovenia	0,635	0,799	0,204	0,546	0,743	0,463	0,565	169	73
BG: Ruse	Bulgaria	0,809	0,862	0,459	0,256	0,550	0,427	0,561	178	78
EE: Tartumaa	Estonia	0,808	0,691	0,431	0,263	0,504	0,626	0,554	193	84
<b>MK: Ohridski</b>	<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>0,780</b>	<b>0,728</b>	<b>0,152</b>	<b>0,446</b>	<b>0,687</b>	<b>0,468</b>	<b>0,544</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>99</b>
<b>AL: Tirana</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>0,644</b>	<b>0,923</b>	<b>0,217</b>	<b>0,411</b>	<b>0,483</b>	<b>0,550</b>	<b>0,538</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>104</b>
DE: Thueringen	Germany	0,750	0,818	0,109	0,474	0,714	0,335	0,533	244	110
CZ: Prague	Czech Republic	0,547	0,759	0,295	0,263	0,693	0,619	0,530	257	115

<b>AL: Center</b>	<b>Albania</b>	<b>0,614</b>	<b>0,743</b>	<b>0,355</b>	<b>0,312</b>	<b>0,546</b>	<b>0,602</b>	<b>0,529</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>116</b>
RO: Arges	Romania	0,212	0,735	0,617	0,433	0,424	0,736	0,526	266	121
HU: Central-Hungary	Hungary	0,528	0,680	0,220	0,346	0,814	0,510	0,516	289	130
FI: Vaasan	Finland	0,733	0,669	0,292	0,468	0,733	0,190	0,514	295	132
BG: Sofia-province	Bulgaria	0,677	0,762	0,395	0,323	0,471	0,453	0,513	298	134
SK: Bratislava County	Slovakia	0,425	0,747	0,336	0,303	0,699	0,522	0,505	323	138
LT: Vilnius	Lithuania	0,699	0,782	0,363	0,258	0,454	0,447	0,501	335	140
SI: Pomurska	Slovenia	0,588	0,775	0,233	0,375	0,664	0,366	0,500	337	142
<b>MK: Poloski</b>	<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>0,661</b>	<b>0,842</b>	<b>0,077</b>	<b>0,274</b>	<b>0,604</b>	<b>0,498</b>	<b>0,493</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>149</b>
HU: South-Danubian	Hungary	0,639	0,710	0,260	0,307	0,702	0,285	0,484	374	153
ES: Pais Vasco	Spain	0,505	0,878	0,175	0,388	0,550	0,402	0,483	378	155
EE: Isa-Virumaa	Estonia	0,603	0,839	0,286	0,204	0,411	0,544	0,481	383	157
LV: Daugavpils	Latvia	0,707	0,888	0,242	0,126	0,418	0,500	0,480	386	158
CY: Limassol	Cyprus	0,675	0,723	0,390	0,299	0,585	0,188	0,477	396	160
SK: Northern Slovakia	Slovakia	0,471	0,769	0,338	0,199	0,507	0,506	0,465	419	167
<b>TR: Central Anatolia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>0,821</b>	<b>0,317</b>	<b>0,509</b>	<b>0,318</b>	<b>0,361</b>	<b>0,400</b>	<b>0,455</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>168</b>
LT: Kaunas	Lithuania	0,551	0,711	0,337	0,323	0,423	0,308	0,442	465	171
CZ: Západočeský kraj - West Bohemia -	Czech Republic	0,499	0,642	0,278	0,195	0,448	0,490	0,426	482	172
LV: Ziemeļu reg.	Latvia	0,355	0,881	0,169	0,193	0,423	0,488	0,418	488	174
<b>CS: South East Serbia</b>	<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	<b>0,040</b>	<b>0,662</b>	<b>0,244</b>	<b>0,262</b>	<b>0,505</b>	<b>0,309</b>	<b>0,337</b>	<b>509</b>	<b>176</b>

**Table 2.15: Country ranks of global values**

	avoiding economic permissiveness	traditional religion	avoiding racism	generational education gaps, a growing acceptance of female higher education and the rejection of thrift	avoiding the distrust of the army and the press	avoiding the authoritarian character	tolerance and respect + post-materialism	the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy
<b>Albania</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>12</b>
Argentina	32	32	9	49	66	28	23	30	51
Armenia	54	46	37	11	22	48	62	16	31
Australia	12	51	6	38	54	7	8	49	17
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Bangladesh</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>
Belarus	59	58	5	43	31	62	58	14	37
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>15</b>
Brazil	60	21	7	46	26	60	38	57	61
Bulgaria	23	59	36	33	12	42	44	20	28
Burkina Faso	45	8	2	57	14	55	66	67	13
Canada	16	41	3	32	35	9	9	43	35
Chile	48	31	23	50	49	20	18	52	66

Cyprus	25	33	42	16	27	30	19	48	33
Czech Republic	51	65	48	64	45	59	33	17	27
Dominican Republic	19	18	32	1	52	36	16	28	30
Estonia	40	64	28	20	37	54	42	5	24
Ethiopia	10	17	27	10	61	8	65	38	49
Finland	24	53	35	53	23	5	4	34	54
Georgia	35	30	30	13	20	49	41	8	14
Germany	33	63	15	62	67	6	5	6	48
Ghana	31	2	46	27	6	56	55	64	6
Guatemala	61	12	11	17	55	40	31	62	65
Hong Kong	37	62	67	55	32	14	60	47	57
Hungary	53	57	55	51	59	31	12	27	43
India	34	29	63	44	4	34	54	42	4
Indonesia	6	4	62	9	10	15	26	21	23
Italy	9	34	18	21	44	11	7	29	29
Jordan	21	3	65	19	5	19	24	65	5
Kyrgyzstan	44	42	44	3	36	41	49	11	52
Latvia	56	56	26	30	57	61	36	4	38
Lithuania	47	44	51	29	30	44	45	9	44
<b>Macedonia</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>40</b>
Mali	58	16	45	66	7	43	67	58	22
Mexico	57	24	53	24	39	22	34	56	60
Moldova	64	38	29	42	48	46	46	13	53
Morocco	5	9	22	48	16	45	43	39	2
New Zealand	8	54	4	47	42	4	6	40	9
Nigeria	26	1	43	4	34	65	64	61	1
Norway	17	61	14	14	43	1	2	23	26
Peru	41	20	21	5	62	52	28	51	32

Philippines	65	15	54	23	9	53	59	33	59
Poland	36	23	31	65	38	27	15	36	67
Puerto Rico	13	7	20	12	24	37	10	46	36
Romania	20	27	47	37	13	32	30	7	7
Russian Federation	52	67	16	54	41	67	53	12	58
<b>Serbia</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>
Slovakia	55	40	38	63	25	58	35	19	25
Slovenia	46	52	40	35	60	18	17	26	42
South Africa	39	19	49	18	33	51	32	41	39
South Korea	29	48	61	8	28	17	50	1	62
Spain	27	49	8	60	51	26	22	45	47
Sweden	30	66	1	31	56	2	1	24	21
Switzerland	7	50	10	25	50	3	3	15	19
Taiwan	22	55	52	52	58	23	20	3	56
Tanzania	4	5	41	41	2	29	52	63	8
Thailand	63	25	64	67	40	12	27	53	63
Trinidad and Tobago	42	13	13	59	64	63	25	50	41
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>46</b>
Uganda	49	10	34	2	8	64	56	60	11
Ukraine	62	47	19	39	29	50	51	18	45
United States	15	26	17	45	19	16	14	35	18
Uruguay	18	45	12	58	53	10	13	59	64
Venezuela	38	22	50	15	11	39	21	55	55
Viet Nam	11	60	60	61	1	21	48	22	10
Zambia	66	14	59	6	18	47	61	54	34
Zimbabwe	2	6	33	28	21	66	47	66	20



So, our analysis is fairly pessimistic for the former communist countries and successor states of the former Soviet Union, predominantly Muslim and non-Muslim alike. They excel hardly anywhere by an overwhelmingly positive performance. The history of Communism which began to be implemented in Russia in 1917 destroyed the religious fabric of society and left a hyper-authoritarian society in place. **Russia's global value performance percentile performance scores**, which might be interpreted as a serious question mark about Russia's future trajectory, are the following (see below). The best value performance of Russia is avoiding the distrust of the army and the press, where Russia is only at standardized rank 61 among a hypothetical 100 nations. Avoiding economic permissiveness, Russia is only at standardized rank 78 among a hypothetical 100 nations *et cetera, et cetera*.

avoiding the distrust of the army and the press	61%
avoiding economic permissiveness	78%
tolerance and respect + post-materialism	79%
avoiding the rejection of the market economy and democracy	87%
traditional religion	100%
avoiding the authoritarian character	100%

The degree of development of a democratic civil society, characterized by law-abiding and social capital, avoiding racism; trust of the army and the press; no authoritarian character; a high degree of tolerance and respect + post-materialism; and a female acceptance of the market economy and democracy is very poorly developed in several of the countries, admitted into the European Union in 2004 and after.

Just how important the dimension of tolerance, respect and postmaterialism is for “*effective democracy*” and how important the closeness to religion (the traditional religion factor) is for economic growth, we realize when we look at the bi-variate scatterplots. “*Effective democracy*” is defined with Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 as the **combination of civil rights with the absence of corruption** (Graph 2.18). The overall Value Development Index shows an interesting trade-off with “effective democracy”: the non-linear effect is certainly stronger than the linear effect. Tolerance and respect and postmaterialism explains almost 2/3 of effective democracy, while the closeness to religion explains more than ¼ of economic growth, 2008-2011:

**Graph 2.18: Value development and closeness to religion as drivers of “effective democracy” and economic growth**





Source: our own calculations from Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 and the results of this work. The Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2012 data are freely available from <http://ips.sagepub.com/content/33/1/41.refs>

### **Finding the necessary combination between liberal values and religion will be an important task for democratic forces around the world.**

Our materials support the verdict that the member countries of the European Union and the European Commission should carefully weigh the costs and benefits of further enlargements, also in terms of the value balances in comparison to the world's leading democracies and the ascending democracies in Latin America and other regions of the world, which conform much better to the essence of the values of the Enlightenment. What is also at stake was recently spelt out by the Turkish political scientist Prof. Suat Kiniklioglu, who remarked recently:

*“An examination of the intense social media discourse in the aftermath of the coup in Egypt as well as the growing failure in Syria illustrates the increasingly blurred lines between the Turkish nation and the ummah as a unit of analysis in the minds of Turkey's conservatives/Islamists. Atilgan Bayar, who is a consultant to the staunchly pro-government news channel A Haber, announced in August 2013 that he accepts Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the “caliph of the earth,” a title used by Ottoman sultans after Yavuz Sultan Selim. Indeed, since the Gezi Park protests, we have seen a more pronounced identification of Erdoğan as the head of an imagined ummah rather than merely as the head of the Turkish government. In view of Erdogan’s domestic troubles,*



*pro-government commentators have established a link between Erdogan's political fate and that of Muslims everywhere. Erdogan's political fortunes are linked to the fate of Muslims from Syria to Egypt, from Myanmar to Africa. This sort of linkage is, of course, astutely constructed from within to be made use of in the domestic political battle.*

*When Erdoğan is elevated to the role of head of the ummah, any sort of criticism of Turkish domestic or foreign policy is equated to being a "pawn of the Zionists," the US or other foreign entities. Alternatively, one who longs for the old authoritarian state, has no foreign policy vision or cannot foresee a stronger role for Turkey is dismissed as a Kemalist. **However, Turkey's conservatives/Islamists are entertaining an extremely dangerous and irresponsible political discourse for domestic political ends. Many conservative voters are unaware of Turkey's real capacity, the situation on the ground in the region or perceptions developed in the last two years vis-à-vis Turkey. They have bought into the grandiose narrative that portrays Turkey as the leader of the Islamic ummah. Exploiting such a religious and unrealistic foreign policy narrative for domestic political objectives is destined to lead to enormous disappointments. Worse, Turkey's reputation and international standing is damaged by this irresponsible exploitation of the Turkish public at large. It is telling that Turkey's conservatives/Islamists desperately feel the need to manipulate the public discourse in such an irresponsible fashion.**"*<sup>20</sup>

### ***3. The global analysis of feminism and its regional implications for the Muslim world.***

In the following Chapter, we will re-analyze the entire question of feminism, religion and Islam anew.

#### **3. 1. Muslim feminism – the view of a quantitative social scientist**

In the following analysis, we particularly try to provide global scholarship with a promax factor analysis of the interrelationships between religion, gender, feminism and social background variables, like age and education.

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<sup>20</sup> [http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/suat-kiniklioglu\\_336109-nation-or-ummah.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists/suat-kiniklioglu_336109-nation-or-ummah.html)

Influential *World Values Survey* oriented studies on the issue of global feminism were, among others, Cao and Stack, 2010; Hayes, McAllister, and Studlar, 2000; and Inglehart, and Norris, 2000. The studies Inglehart, 2002, 2003b, 2007; Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Norris P., 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2010, Inglehart and Welzel, 2003, and 2005. Most of these studies strongly believed that the real difference between the West and the Muslim world is not the commitment towards democracy, which is now very strong in the Muslim world, but different views on gender and family issues. By re-analyzing the data from n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories, we are permitted to compare the average values in different regions of the world, since the large samples, for the first time in cross-national value research, allow us to draw comparisons also on the regional level.

Our Table 3.2 destroys the myth of value “monolithic” Muslim countries, and instead, a startling variety of regional convictions and value patterns emerge, even in countries, where Western knowledge hitherto had little knowledge about them, like Saudi-Arabia.

The Muslim countries contained in our analysis are Albania; Algeria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Burkina Faso; Egypt; Indonesia; Iran; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Morocco; Nigeria; Pakistan; Saudi Arabia; Turkey; and Uganda. They already make up none the less than an estimated 62.55% of the entire Muslim population of our globe. In addition, our analysis is also representative of the large Muslim minorities in China, Ethiopia, India and Russia, whose population comprise an additional estimated 17.55% of the global ‘Umma’. Our analysis is thus the largest ever undertaken analysis on gender relations and religion in the world and in Muslim countries. A peculiarity of the *World Values Survey* Project, must be taken into consideration here: when you introduce only a small additional number of variables into the multivariate analysis you risk reducing the number of individuals with complete data often dramatically. This is mainly due to large cross-country differences in the actual questionnaires fielded in the different countries. In the present analysis, we kept the variables to a minimum. Nevertheless we hope to be able to tap with them the dimensions of religion, gender, feminism and social background variables, like age and education:

Age  
 Education level (recoded)  
 Highest educational level attained  
 How important is God in your life  
 How often do you attend religious services  
 (never?)  
 Important child qualities: religious faith

Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to  
 a job than women (reject)  
 Sex (Gender)  
 University is more important for a boy than  
 for a girl (reject)  
 Woman as a single parent

Our factor analysis explains almost 54% of the total variance. Our analysis is based on none the less than 173231 representative individuals in 83 countries.

**Table 3.1.a Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Data from n = 173231 representative global citizens in 83 countries and territories.**

	<b>initial</b>	<b>extraction</b>
Important child qualities: religious faith	1,000	0,544
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women	1,000	0,387
Woman as a single parent	1,000	0,281
University is more important for a boy than for a girl	1,000	0,459
How often do you attend religious services	1,000	0,570
How important is God in your life	1,000	0,666
Sex (Gender)	1,000	0,438
Age	1,000	0,190
Highest educational level attained	1,000	0,930
Education level (recoded)	1,000	0,921

Our analysis wielded three factors with an *Eigen value* of higher or equal to one.

**Table 3.1.b Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Cumulative variance explained**

	<b>Eigen values</b>	<b>% of variance</b>	<b>cumulated percentage</b>
1,000	2,401	24,009	24,009
2,000	1,768	17,677	41,686
3,000	1,216	12,162	53,848

One can say with certainty that there is no real sharp contradiction between religion and feminism on a global scale. Distance to religious practice has only 4% of the variance in common with the education level (correlation between the two factors is 0.192). Gender determines feminist convictions to some 40%. Furthermore, it is also evident that feminist convictions are not only held by women, but also increasingly by enlightened men. Interestingly enough, our data also show that people supporting typical feminist contentions, like female access to tertiary education and jobs even at a time of crisis (Factor 3), are not necessarily too strongly in support of secularism or the acceptancy of women as a single parent (factor loading 0.352, i. e. 12.39% of variance explained). Single parenthood is a form of household organization very common in Western countries. The argument is that marriage is an outdated institution *et cetera*.

Support for single parenthood by women is rather an expression of the distance towards religion (factor loading of 0.431, i. e. 18.58% of variance explained).

**Table 3.1.c Feminism and religion re-analyzed. The factor loadings**

	<b>distance to traditionalist forms of religion</b>	<b>Generation gap in educational level</b>	<b>feminism</b>
Important child qualities: religious faith	<b>-0,736</b>	-0,093	-0,087
Age	0,115	<b>-0,391</b>	-0,034
How important is God in your life	<b>-0,814</b>	-0,132	-0,032
How often do you attend religious services (never)	<b>0,751</b>	0,081	0,035
Education level (recoded)	0,200	<b>0,959</b>	0,108
Highest educational level attained	0,204	<b>0,964</b>	0,113
Woman as a single parent	<b>0,431</b>	0,100	<b>0,352</b>
Jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women (reject)	0,213	0,154	<b>0,600</b>
Sex (Gender)	-0,155	-0,119	<b>0,606</b>
University is more important for a boy than for a girl (reject)	0,111	0,173	<b>0,669</b>

The correlations between the factors suggest that the often described contradiction between feminism and religion hardly exists today. The squared correlation coefficients indicate that the common variance between the religious and the feminist dimension is below 5%. The correlation between secularism and feminism (see Table 3.1.d) is only 0.106, i. e. only 1.12% of the variance of feminism is explained by secularism. This is a long distance from the often militant contentions of the critics of religion around the globe about the incompatibility between religion and feminism.

**Table 3.1.d Feminism and religion re-analyzed. Correlation matrix of components**

	correlation matrix of the components		
	<b>distance to traditionalist forms of religion</b>	<b>Generation gap in educational level</b>	<b>feminism</b>
<b>distance to traditionalist forms of religion</b>	1,000	0,192	0,106
<b>Generation gap in educational level</b>	<b>0,192</b>	1,000	0,109
<b>feminism</b>	<b>0,106</b>	<b>0,109</b>	1,000

N = 173231 respondents with complete data (global sample = 257597 representative respondents)

In Table 3.1.e we present the country results of our analysis. The countries belonging to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) are marked in green color. There is a startling variety of feminisms and secularisms in the world today. The feminism among the population in predominantly Muslim Bosnia is ranked equally with that in Mexico and Guatemala, and the people of predominantly Muslim Albania are as feminist as the populations in neighboring Romania and the Czech Republic. Albania, the Czech Republic and Romania all had a very harsh communist rule after 1945. Feminism in Turkey is at the same level of development as the one in China and Belarus, *et cetera*.

Turkey's religiosity or distance to religion depends to a large extent on the region of Turkey which you analyze, with the country averages comparable to those of the United States, Colombia, Poland, Mexico, or India. The deeply Roman Catholic population of El Salvador is at the same level of religiosity as the population of Saudi Arabia, and they all are in the same league of religiosity as Catholic Guatemala, predominantly protestant Zambia, and Muslim Algeria and Iran.

**Table 3.1e Feminism and religion re-analyzed (country results)**

OIC members are marked in green color

Country/region	distance to traditionalist forms of religion	Generation gap in educational level	feminism
Albania	0,264	-0,342	0,138
Algeria	-0,682	0,270	-0,403
Andorra	1,059	0,295	0,371
Argentina	0,095	-0,366	0,189
Armenia	0,409	0,367	-0,436
Australia	0,693	0,352	0,121
Azerbaijan	0,139	0,506	-0,435
Bangladesh	-0,817	-0,215	-0,853
Belarus	0,721	0,083	-0,204
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,295	0,055	0,202
Brazil	-0,479	-0,315	0,390
Bulgaria	0,854	0,015	0,274
Burkina Faso	-0,866	-0,741	-0,416
Canada	0,282	0,128	0,388
Chile	0,000	-0,105	0,186
China	0,727	-0,352	-0,134
Colombia	-0,189	0,392	0,492
Cyprus	0,100	0,271	0,236
Czech Republic	1,259	-0,210	0,131
Dominican Republic	-0,347	1,061	0,468

Egypt	-0,885	-0,352	-0,596
El Salvador	-0,638	-0,204	0,480
Estonia	1,104	0,120	-0,001
Ethiopia	-0,562	-0,196	0,366
Finland	0,760	-0,098	0,327
France	1,062	-0,283	0,413
Georgia	0,045	0,348	-0,050
Germany	1,040	-0,113	0,276
Ghana	-1,048	-0,597	-0,234
Great Britain	0,828	0,271	0,242
Guatemala	-0,662	-0,019	0,199
Hong Kong	1,175	0,016	0,110
Hungary	0,882	-0,160	0,292
India	-0,246	-0,064	-0,489
Indonesia	-0,992	0,392	-0,301
Iran	-0,699	0,112	-0,677
Italy	0,058	0,137	0,255
Japan	0,955	0,418	0,299
Jordan	-1,008	-0,092	-0,620
Kyrgyzstan	0,164	0,464	-0,210
Latvia	0,773	0,329	0,065
Lithuania	0,467	0,157	0,102
Macedonia	0,336	-0,021	0,198
Mali	-0,788	-0,768	-0,598
Mexico	-0,202	-0,016	0,218
Moldova	0,148	0,124	-0,050
Morocco	-0,799	-0,721	-0,673
Netherlands	1,033	-0,129	0,385
New Zealand	0,943	0,325	0,447
Nigeria	-0,979	0,172	-0,447
Norway	1,089	0,312	0,488
Pakistan	-1,180	-0,372	-0,361
Peru	-0,365	0,198	0,113
Philippines	-0,721	0,214	-0,347
Poland	-0,195	-0,269	0,268
Puerto Rico	-0,574	0,529	0,299
Romania	-0,175	0,025	0,176
Russian Federation	0,900	0,223	-0,093
Rwanda	-0,776	-0,792	-0,110
Saudi Arabia	-0,646	0,472	-0,812
Serbia	0,337	0,144	0,356
Serbia and Montenegro	0,641	-0,116	0,001
Singapore	-0,336	-0,129	-0,065
Slovakia	0,489	-0,113	0,130
Slovenia	0,703	-0,058	0,223
South Africa	-0,495	0,012	0,111
South Korea	0,531	0,704	0,024
Spain	0,655	-0,436	0,277
Sweden	1,270	0,330	0,484
Switzerland	0,699	0,266	0,360
Taiwan	0,724	0,259	-0,195
Tanzania	-0,899	-0,282	0,116
Thailand	-0,107	-0,512	0,083
Trinidad and Tobago	-0,616	-0,337	0,235
Turkey	-0,237	-0,334	-0,153

Uganda	-0,749	0,102	0,079
Ukraine	0,629	0,206	0,006
United States	-0,147	0,256	0,240
Uruguay	0,570	-0,463	0,586
Venezuela	-0,256	0,064	0,193
Viet Nam	0,851	-0,431	-0,212
Zambia	-0,669	-0,082	0,015
Zimbabwe	-0,915	-0,537	-0,111

### 3. 2. The choropleth maps of global feminism

Let us now return to the quantitative social statistical argument. Our Choropleth maps of feminism are based on more countries but fewer variables than the choropleth maps and the factor analytical results of Chapter 5. Distance to traditional (istic) forms of religion is highest in Scandinavia and in some of the highly industrialized countries of Western and Central Europe with a long-run history of political secularization, like France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Estonia; and distance to traditionalist forms of religion is also high in Japan, Australia, New Zealand, in Russia and China, in the United Kingdom, Hungary and Bulgaria.


Spain, Uruguay, the Ukraine, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic are in the “next league” of secularization, while the populations in Argentina, Canada, and Italy are more secular than the United States, Turkey, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, India, Poland and Romania, which are forming the next “secularization league”. The next group of countries is a group of already more religious nations of Western Christianity – Peru, Brazil and South Africa. Most of the populations in the predominantly Muslim countries in the sample, including Algeria, Morocco, Mali, Saudi Arabia Iran and Bangladesh, belong to the next group and are as religious or secular as the populations in the Catholic countries Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Philippines, and are also on the same level as populations in the African countries Uganda and Zambia. According to our analysis, the most traditionally religious countries on earth are Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, as well as the predominantly Muslim countries Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Indonesia.

In Chapter 5 we already highlighted the factor “educational generation gap”. Our analysis would have to repeat many of the statements, already made there, so we concentrate on the comparative aspects of our analysis for the countries, which were due to insufficient data not included in the analysis of Chapter 5. Saudi Arabia certainly belongs to the group of countries, experiencing the strongest “clash of educational levels” between generations, together with the Dominican Republic, South Korea, Colombia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Japan


and Indonesia. Finally, our choropleth map of feminism (Map 3.3) also shows several interesting results. One is the high degree of feminism achieved not only in Scandinavia, New Zealand and France, but also in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Uruguay. A striking result is also the fact that Ethiopia and Brazil which are two nations which are generally regarded as “developing countries” are already in the same feminism league as most of the Western democracies in the North Atlantic arena. Ethiopia and Brazil are ahead of Australia and South Africa. In this map, also other surprising and notable results emerge, like the position of Indonesia. Indonesia is in the same league of feminism as Turkey, Belarus and China. Concerning feminism, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Bangladesh are the real laggards. Our article would not like to indulge into too many predictions, but these data have to be combined with the knowledge about the generation gap in education, which would imply that in the next years there will be considerable societal clashes and confrontations over gender policy in Saudi-Arabia and Iran.




**Map 3.1: Distance to traditionalist forms of religion**



**Map 3.2: Generation gap in educational level**



**Map 3.3: Feminism**



### 3. 4. The regional geography of Muslim feminism

In the following Table (Table 3.2), we present the factor scores of our analysis at a regional level. For reasons of space, we mention here only regions in Muslim countries which never had undergone a communist development history with its notorious policies of “scientific atheism”. Interested readers and researchers are referred to our website<sup>21</sup> where we made available all the factor scores from all the regions of the world with available data. Our Table is ordered by the amount of feminism in the entire core center of the Muslim world. We also document for each region the development history and denominational characteristics of each region.

Using the facilities of the Microsoft EXCEL program, our readers can easily estimate that the most **secular regions** in the center of the Muslim world outside the orbit of (former) Communism are the Muslim Kemalist Turkish regions of the Aegean (with a factor score of 0.171); the Muslim Shia Iranian region of Kurdistan (factor score of 0.110) and the Muslim Kemalist Turkish region of South Eastern Anatolia, largely populated by Turkey’s Kurdish minority (factor score: -0.154).

The secularism factor scores of some of the more pronouncedly secular Muslim regions range between +0.171 to -0.389:

Turkey	TR: Aegean
Iran	IR: Kordestan
Turkey	TR: South Eastern Anatolia
Turkey	TR: Mediterranean
Saudi Arabia	SA: Hail
Saudi Arabia	SA: Qassim
Bangladesh	BD: Feni
Bangladesh	BD: Tangail

This corresponds exactly to the following results in predominantly non-Muslim highly or medium developed countries, which are members of the OECD or the European Union. The list of these regions includes not only poorer regions of the European Union and some new member countries of the OECD, but also regions in Canada and the United States:

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<sup>21</sup> [https://www.academia.edu/5255298/The\\_global\\_analysis\\_of\\_feminism\\_and\\_its\\_regional\\_implications\\_for\\_the\\_Muslim\\_world](https://www.academia.edu/5255298/The_global_analysis_of_feminism_and_its_regional_implications_for_the_Muslim_world)

Secularism factor scores in OECD or European Union regions ranging between +0.171 to -0.389:

Romania	RO: Mutenia
Canada	CA: Nova Scotia
Romania	RO: Galati
USA	US: New England
Canada	CA: Saskatchewan
USA	US: Northwest
Canada	CA: Newfoundland
Chile	CL: Zona Metropolitana
Italy	IT: Lombardia
Cyprus	CY: Nicosia
Romania	RO: Moldova
Chile	CL: Norte
Romania	RO: Oltenia
Romania	RO: Bucuresti
USA	US: Middle Atlantic States
USA	US: California
Cyprus	CY: Famagusta
Italy	IT: Veneto
Italy	IT: Lazio
Canada	CA: New Brunswick
Romania	RO: Timis
Italy	IT: Sicilia
Romania	RO: Banat
Cyprus	CY: Paphos
Chile	CL: Centro
Romania	RO: Dobrovia
Romania	RO: Sibiu
Canada	CA: Prince Edward Island
Romania	RO: Prahova
USA	US: Rocky Mountain state
Italy	IT: Campania
Romania	RO: Arad
USA	US: South Atlantic
Romania	RO: Buzau
Chile	CL: Sur
Mexico	MX: Centro
Italy	IT: Puglia
Romania	RO: Dolj
Romania	RO: Transylvania
USA	US: East North Central
Mexico	MX: Norte
Mexico	MX: Sur

Romania	RO: Iasi
Cyprus	CY: Larnaca
Romania	RO: Valcea
Romania	RO: Crisana-Maramures (region)
Romania	RO: Arges
USA	US: West North Central
USA	US: West South Central
Romania	RO: Brasov
Cyprus	CY: Limassol

The **very high educational gaps of more than 0.500 between the generations** in the predominantly Muslim regions in:

Indonesia	ID: Dareah Istimewa Yogyakarta
Indonesia	ID: South Kalimantan
Indonesia	ID: DKI
Indonesia	ID: West Nusa Tenggara
Algeria	DZ: Comune 9
Pakistan	PK: Urban Sindh
Iran	IR: Lorestan
Saudi Arabia	SA: Abha \ Khamis
Saudi Arabia	SA: Tabuk
Indonesia	ID: Jakarta province
Algeria	DZ: Comune 4
Indonesia	ID: Banten
Indonesia	ID: East Java
Iran	IR: Mazandaran
Indonesia	ID: Lampung
Iran	IR: Ilam
Saudi Arabia	SA: Dammam \ Khobar
Saudi Arabia	SA: Riyadh
Saudi Arabia	SA: Qassim
Iran	IR: Boyer ahmad

well correspond to the range of results to be observed in the **following regions in core-Western countries:**

Korea-South	KR: Tawjeon / Daejeon
Korea-South	KR: Kwangju / Gwangju
Korea-South	KR: Seoul
Norway	NO: Oslo and Akershus

Korea-South	KR: Taegu / Daegu
Sweden	SE: Stor Stockholm
New Zealand	NZ: Coastal-North Otago
Sweden	SE: Uppsala
Portugal	PR: Sur
Korea-South	KR: Kyeongbuk / North Gyeongsang
Portugal	PR: Montana
Korea-South	KR: Kyeonggi / Gyeonggi Do
Korea-South	KR: Kyowugi Do
Korea-South	KR: Jeonnam / South Jeolla
Korea-South	KR: Pusan / Busan
New Zealand	NZ: Wellington
Korea-South	KR: Kangwon / Gangwon Do
Sweden	SE: Vasterbotten
Germany	DE: Ost-Berlin
Korea-South	KR: Kyeongnam / South Gyeongsang
GB (UK)	GB: Eastern
Sweden	SE: Skåne
Korea-South	KR: Chungnam / South Chungcheong
Australia	AU: New South Wales
Portugal	PR: Oeste
Sweden	SE: Halland
Latvia	LV: Kurzeme
Romania	RO: Bucuresti
Germany	DE: West-Berlin
Japan	JP: Kanto
Cyprus	CY: Paphos
Portugal	PR: Centro
Korea-South	KR: Chungbuk / North Chungcheong
Sweden	SE: Västra Götaland
Norway	NO: South Eastern Norway
Portugal	PR: Metropolitana
Latvia	LV: Daugavpils

### The feminism factor loadings of the predominantly Muslim regions in

Bangladesh	BD: Kishoreganj
Turkey	TR: Aegean
Turkey	TR: Eastern Marmara
Turkey	TR: Eastern Black Sea
Indonesia	ID: Bengkulu province
Indonesia	ID: West Nusa Tenggara

are in the **same range of the development of feminism in core-western regions of:**

Finland	FI: Etelä-Savo
Korea-South	KR: Taegu / Daegu
Finland	FI: Kymen
Germany	DE: Brandenburg
Bulgaria	BG: Varna
Czech R	CZ: Středočeský kraj - Central Bohemia -
Spain	ES: C Valenciana
Korea-South	KR: Seoul
Germany	DE: Thuringen
Korea-South	KR: Chungbuk / North Chungcheong
Mexico	MX: Norte
Romania	RO: Brasov
Estonia	EE: Parnumaa
Romania	RO: Arges
Latvia	LV: Kurzeme
Spain	ES: Aragon
Hungary	HU: East Hungary
Korea-South	KR: Kyeongbuk / North Gyeongsang
Italy	IT: Veneto
Mexico	MX: Sur
Cyprus	CY: Limassol
Czech R	CZ: Jihočeský kraj - South Bohemia -
Hungary	HU: North Hungary
Korea-South	KR: Kyowgyi Do
USA	US: East North Central
Chile	CL: Sur
Korea-South	KR: Kangwon / Gangwon Do
Australia	AU: Victoria (Vic)
GB (UK)	GB: London
Slovenia	SI: Obalno-Kraska
Romania	RO: Sibiu
Czech R	CZ: Jihomoravský kraj - South Moravia -
Estonia	EE: Tartumaa
Italy	IT: Puglia
Slovakia	SK: Central Slovakia
Spain	ES: Navarra
Korea-South	KR: Pusan / Busan
Australia	AU: Western Australia (WA)
Australia	AU: Tasmania (Tas)
Korea-South	KR: Kyeonggi / Gyeonggi Do
Australia	AU: South Australia (SA)



Slovakia	SK: Northern Slovakia
Australia	AU: New South Wales and ACT (NSW&ACT)
New Zealand	NZ: Southland
Bulgaria	BG: Razgrad
Korea-South	KR: Chungnam / South Chungcheong
Latvia	LV: Latgale
Chile	CL: Centro
Estonia	EE: Laane-Viruma
Romania	RO: Prahova
Spain	ES: Murcia
Mexico	MX: Centro occidente
Australia	AU: Queensland (Qld)
Romania	RO: Moldova
Czech R	CZ: Severoèeský kraj - North Bohemia -
Korea-South	KR: Incheon
Cyprus	CY: Iskele (Karpas)
Romania	RO: Banat
Romania	RO: Caras-Severin
Germany	DE: Schleswig-Holstein
Latvia	LV: Liepaja
Bulgaria	BG: Haskovo
Cyprus	CY: Paphos
Romania	RO: Transylvania

There is already a significant feminist movement and a significant rethinking of the religious traditions in the light of gender justice in the entire Muslim world, and not just in Muslim post-communist countries. The rise of women is to be achieved as part of society's advancement towards freedom, and Arab countries can achieve this goal by eradicating all infringements on human dignity, and specifically by guaranteeing full citizenship and the enjoyment of all human rights for all women on an equal footing with men.

**Table 3.2: Feminism and religion - regional value analysis for the Muslim world ranked by the feminism factor in descending order**

Description of the region	Country	Region	N =	distance to traditionalist forms of religion	Generation gap in educational level	feminism
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Kishoreganj	60	-1,211	-0,498	0,182
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Aegean	131	0,171	0,098	0,135
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Eastern Marmara	102	-0,434	0,064	0,120
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Eastern Black Sea	49	-0,408	-0,068	0,099
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Bengkulu province	191	-1,038	0,085	0,053
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: West Nusa Tenggara	57	-1,129	0,778	0,028
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Faridpur	50	-1,214	-0,462	-0,002
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Western Black Sea	85	-0,529	-0,310	-0,046
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: South Kalimantan	33	-1,192	0,830	-0,088
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Western Marmara	47	-0,651	-0,608	-0,091
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 6	67	-0,741	0,437	-0,125

Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: East Central Anatolia	71	-0,558	-0,483	-0,132
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Western Anatolia	125	-0,452	-0,145	-0,133
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: East Java	481	-0,974	0,576	-0,135
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Urban NWFP	148	-1,163	0,353	-0,146
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Istanbul	245	-0,448	-0,205	-0,147
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 1	306	-0,709	0,262	-0,164
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Urban Sindh	212	-0,979	0,704	-0,176
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 4	87	-0,835	0,587	-0,206
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: South Eastern Anatolia	123	-0,154	-0,673	-0,212
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	45	-0,726	1,098	-0,233
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Jakarta province	192	-0,869	0,620	-0,253
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Lampung	97	-1,123	0,566	-0,253
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Beni Swaif	75	-1,015	-0,254	-0,268
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: DKI	116	-0,863	0,809	-0,271
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Menofia	121	-1,120	-0,438	-0,279
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 13	96	-0,605	-0,584	-0,282
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: North Eastern Anatolia	49	-0,508	-0,275	-0,290
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Canal zone	174	-0,922	-0,396	-0,290
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Mediterranean	152	-0,325	-0,307	-0,303

Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Urban Punjab	525	-1,038	0,171	-0,304
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: MADABA	39	-0,904	-0,048	-0,307
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Urban Baluchistan	46	-1,274	0,084	-0,333
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Central Java province	593	-0,991	0,232	-0,334
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 2	161	-0,606	0,263	-0,348
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Sinai	99	-0,949	0,118	-0,352
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 10	114	-0,690	-0,575	-0,360
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Doukkla - Abda	95	-0,597	-0,674	-0,364
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Qalubia	197	-0,973	-0,349	-0,371
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 9	31	-0,821	0,760	-0,378
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Jambi province	189	-1,038	-0,029	-0,390
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Coxex Bazar	44	-0,441	-0,602	-0,393
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Rural Punjab	527	-1,254	-1,070	-0,407
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: Banten	111	-1,044	0,587	-0,413
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Gharbia	174	-0,873	-0,375	-0,417
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Giza	274	-0,862	-0,063	-0,419
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: North Khorasan	30	-0,905	-0,250	-0,443
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Lorestan	121	-0,599	0,678	-0,448
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Alex	401	-0,971	-0,260	-0,449
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 9	247	-0,676	-0,632	-0,458

Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Fayoum	98	-1,055	-0,771	-0,460
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 7	226	-0,729	-0,873	-0,467
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: MA`AN	36	-0,793	-0,221	-0,469
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Chittagong	113	-0,677	0,254	-0,486
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Cairo	773	-0,887	-0,022	-0,488
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Dammam \ Khobar	216	-0,509	0,536	-0,489
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 7	175	-0,624	0,305	-0,494
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Al Madinah	93	-0,977	0,324	-0,497
Muslim	Indonesia	ID: West java province	670	-1,001	0,323	-0,506
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: KARAK	77	-0,640	-0,226	-0,508
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Damietta	50	-0,860	-0,440	-0,512
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Fars	269	-0,581	0,421	-0,518
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Kafr El shiekh	97	-0,758	-0,537	-0,519
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Rural Sindh	203	-1,368	-1,165	-0,532
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Ilam	34	-0,760	0,557	-0,545
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Feni	40	-0,375	0,411	-0,547
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 5	117	-0,808	-0,913	-0,563
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Kerman	165	-0,703	-0,065	-0,566
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Golestan	94	-0,681	0,321	-0,583
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Behaira	197	-0,809	-0,554	-0,588
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Khozestan	173	-0,541	0,176	-0,591
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Kordestan	45	0,110	0,329	-0,594
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: JARASH	42	-0,803	-0,132	-0,594

Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Lower Egypt	1126	-0,882	-0,314	-0,595
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Region 6	63	-0,576	-0,831	-0,596
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: TAFELA	50	-0,847	-0,100	-0,609
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Sharkia	224	-0,877	-0,444	-0,617
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Hormozgan	86	-0,827	-0,299	-0,620
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: MAFRAQ	61	-0,873	-0,111	-0,623
Muslim Kemalist	Turkey	TR: Central Anatolia	75	-0,555	-0,304	-0,624
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Tehran	765	-0,591	0,196	-0,630
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Ghom	68	-0,733	0,421	-0,632
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: AMMAN	368	-0,799	-0,061	-0,638
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: IRBID	176	-0,815	-0,173	-0,639
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: BALQA	76	-0,838	-0,450	-0,641
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Ardabil	71	-0,776	0,024	-0,651
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Assuiot	123	-0,807	-0,374	-0,651
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 5	119	-0,590	0,103	-0,654
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Isfahan	269	-0,753	0,290	-0,654
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Hail	70	-0,331	0,282	-0,662
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: East azarbayjan	287	-0,796	-0,024	-0,672
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Gilan	167	-0,699	-0,060	-0,676
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Rural NWFP	112	-1,438	-1,201	-0,679
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Comilla	81	-1,191	0,243	-0,680
Muslim	Pakistan	PK: Rural Baluchistan	43	-1,467	-1,165	-0,683

Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: AQABA	53	-0,674	0,042	-0,685
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Mazandaran	259	-0,767	0,574	-0,687
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 3	114	-0,710	0,001	-0,696
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Aswan	49	-1,038	-0,129	-0,699
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Grand Casablanca	328	-0,903	-0,600	-0,702
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Sohag	123	-0,841	-0,677	-0,705
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Khorasan	331	-0,777	-0,174	-0,718
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: AJLOON	49	-0,843	-0,546	-0,726
Arab Muslim	Jordan	JO: ZARQA	162	-0,849	-0,445	-0,726
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: West azarbayjan	177	-0,675	-0,131	-0,732
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Ghazvin	79	-0,848	-0,202	-0,744
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Nator	35	-0,448	-0,467	-0,749
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Dakahlia	249	-0,885	-0,470	-0,763
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Kermanshah	139	-0,692	0,077	-0,764
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Sistan and balouchestan	58	-0,962	-0,203	-0,766
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Qena	100	-0,964	-0,552	-0,778
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Hamadan	136	-0,809	-0,258	-0,780
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Rabat-Salé-Zemmour	164	-0,850	-0,554	-0,781
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Bushehr	49	-0,597	-0,092	-0,784
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Jeddah	296	-0,810	0,415	-0,788
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Rangpur	63	-1,016	0,127	-0,795
Arab Muslim	Saudi	SA: Tabuk	73	-1,057	0,631	-0,807

	Arabia					
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Sylhet	75	-1,241	-0,288	-0,823
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Upper egypt	990	-0,794	-0,523	-0,847
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Makkah	93	-0,750	0,481	-0,862
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Yazd	85	-0,813	0,268	-0,862
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Luxor	50	-0,959	-0,555	-0,865
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Marrakech-Tensift	194	-0,969	-0,883	-0,873
Arab Muslim, former French colony	Algeria	DZ: Comune 8	58	-0,590	0,260	-0,884
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Gaibandha	48	-0,784	0,281	-0,889
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Barisal	105	-0,507	0,234	-0,892
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Abha \ Khamis	96	-0,704	0,641	-0,909
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Boyer ahmad	37	-0,666	0,513	-0,913
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Semnan	70	-0,774	0,173	-0,937
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Riyadh	293	-0,496	0,534	-0,951
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Markazi	96	-0,815	-0,420	-0,955
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Zanjan	80	-0,979	-0,376	-0,957
Muslim Shia	Iran	IR: Chaharmahal	49	-0,683	0,099	-0,960
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Mymensingh	118	-1,295	-0,292	-0,981
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Gharb-Chrarda	102	-0,819	-0,877	-0,989
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Dhaka	195	-0,585	0,273	-0,992
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Fès-Boulemane	102	-0,833	-0,758	-1,006



Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Menya	148	-0,922	-0,793	-1,032
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Meknès-Tafilalet	120	-0,944	-0,730	-1,046
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Jhenaidah	35	-0,723	-0,578	-1,056
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Chaouia-Ouardigha	41	-0,869	-0,875	-1,079
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Tangail	70	-0,389	-0,745	-1,096
Arab Muslim	Egypt	EG: Ismailia	49	-0,989	-0,583	-1,110
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Sirajgonj	60	-0,484	-1,031	-1,139
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Taif	38	-0,617	-0,087	-1,172
Arab Muslim	Morocco	MA: Tanger-Tétouan	32	-1,040	-0,799	-1,207
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Brahmanbaria	69	-1,137	-1,010	-1,213
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Habiganj	47	-1,060	-0,629	-1,266
Arab Muslim	Saudi Arabia	SA: Qassim	98	-0,358	0,521	-1,311
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Sherpur	32	-0,747	-0,641	-1,357
Muslim	Bangladesh	BD: Rajshahi	50	-0,605	-1,066	-1,634

## 4. The implosion of “self-expression” in the West and further doubts about the correctness of Inglehart’s theory in the light of the new direct measurements of self-expression values from the *World Values Survey*, 2010-2014

The idea that self-expression values in the West are imploding, while in other regions of the world they are rising is a major turn-around in existing global value research. An explanation for this could be that the crisis nowadays in the West brought about this change. This Chapter will document this tendency extensively. We take the Inglehartian theory at its face value, and just perform some simple operations, based on elementary algebra and simple bi-variate statistics to show that the implosion indeed happened. Any social science researcher and graduate student around the globe can perform these calculations. The question in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 is not whether or not Inglehart’s theory is correctly explaining the world, but only which consequences can be drawn from it in a time perspective.

But we also highlight the fact in Chapter 4.3 that the latest wave of *World Values Survey* data, wave 6, 2010-2014, released in May 2014, i.e. as this article goes to the press, contains an item which directly asked 74,044 respondents in 52 countries whether they think that self-expression is an important value for child education. The correlation between these data and Inglehart’s self-expression index is negative and the  $R^2$  between the two variables is almost 20%.

A look at the time series element in the *World Values Survey* data shows that indeed, global value change seems to correspond to various ups and downs. To this end, we calculated from the original WVS website Inglehart’s own data ([http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder\\_published/article\\_base\\_54](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/article_base_54)) which countries – in descending order – had very high increases or decreases in non-traditional values over the preceding WVS Survey.

Let us recall that **self-expression values are defined by:**

- Respondent gives priority to self-expression and quality-of-life (measured by the four-item materialist/**post-materialist values index**, documented in the WVS data) .59

- Respondent describes self as very **happy** .58
- Respondent **has signed and would sign a petition** .59
- **Homosexuality is always justifiable** .54
- You should be **trusting people** .44

## 4.1. The implosion

Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a seem to indicate awareness of the possibility of a real implosion of value development across time:

*“Modernization theory needs to be revised for several reasons. First, modernization is not linear, moving indefinitely in the same direction. Industrialization leads to one major process of change, bringing bureaucratization, hierarchy, centralization of authority, secularization, and a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. But the postindustrial phase of modernization brings increasing emphasis on individual autonomy and self-expression values, which erode the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and make democracy increasingly likely to emerge. The process is not deterministic; a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also matter. Moreover, modernization's changes are not irreversible. Economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain—and during the 1990s in most Soviet successor states.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010a)*

Similarly, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009 highlight:

*Thus, other things being equal, high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting bringing more emphasis on self-expression and participation in decision-making. This process is not deterministic, and any forecasts can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a given country's leaders and nation-specific events also shape what happens. Moreover, modernization's changes are not irreversible. Severe economic collapse can reverse them, as happened during the Great Depression in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain and during the 1990s in most of the Soviet successor states. Similarly, if the current economic crisis becomes a twenty-first-century Great Depression, we could face a struggle against renewed xenophobia and authoritarianism. (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009)*

First, our Table 4.1 will explain our methodology to measure the **trend towards secular values**. Our measurement will provide us with a clear-cut and simple trend measure of secular values over time. Table 4.2 will explain our

methodology to measure the **trend towards self-expression values**; we equally hope to provide our readers with a simple and at the same time convincing measure of dynamic change along this Inglehartian category. Graph 4.1 and Table 4.3 will explain our methodology to measure the **resilience of the trend towards self-expression values**; and Graph 4.2 and Table 4.4 will explain our methodology to explain the principal component “economic growth” for the years 2008 to 2011 by showing the clear-cut **relationship between the resilience of global value change towards self-expression values and economic growth during the current crisis period**. Our methodology thus is based on simple first differences (Tables 4.1, Tables 4.2), and then standard linear OLS bi-variate regression analysis (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4).

So, to start with, Table 4.1 shows that there is an unabated tendency towards secularization and away from traditional religion in Canada, the United States, Puerto Rico, Australia, Venezuela, New Zealand, Israel, the UK, and Sweden. The “comeback” of religion above all had to be observed in former communist countries, like Estonia, Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Serbia.

Table 4.2 is again based on simple differences. Jordan, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Turkey, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Tanzania, Algeria, Georgia, and the Ukraine are the “superstars” according to Inglehart’s self-expression values; while at the same time, self-expression has severely contracted in Sweden, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and in other leading Western democracies.

Graph 4.2 is the bi-variate scatterplot and linear regression analysis between the trend values from Table 4.1 on the x-axis and the trend values from Table 4.2 on the y-axis. The trend values between the two variables and their residuals can be seen in Graph 4.1 and also in Table 4.3: Table 4.3 clearly defines our concept of the resilience of the trend towards self-expression. Again so-called Third World countries or developing countries are in the lead, while the countries of the West are imploding.

Graph 4.2 describes the bi-variate scatterplot and linear regression analysis between the resilience of the trend towards self-expression values on the x-axis and the principle components of world economic growth during the crisis years 2008-2011 on the y-axis. Table 4.4 uses these concepts to highlight then the dynamics of global growth in the contemporary period. The Table again shows the devastating extent of the current economic crisis in the West and the upsurge of developing countries – several Muslim countries among them.

Let us thus start with the presentation of the time trend for Inglehart’s “*secular values*”. The twenty most dramatic inroads against traditional religion had to be registered in: Canada; United States; Puerto Rico; Australia; Venezuela; New

Zealand; Israel; Great Britain; Sweden; Tanzania, United Republic Of; Dominican Republic; Argentina; Nigeria; Peru; South Africa; Brazil; Chile; Mexico; Norway; and Uruguay.

The **comebacks of religion and the receding of the “secular” tendencies** presented themselves in the following countries (in descending order):

Estonia; Russian Federation; Belarus; Ukraine; Latvia; Lithuania; Moldova; Bulgaria; Armenia; Taiwan Province of China; Serbia and Montenegro; Japan; Albania; South Korea; Romania; Azerbaijan; Georgia; Macedonia, Republic of; Slovenia; Hungary; Croatia; Kyrgyzstan; Czech Republic; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Slovakia; Germany; Indonesia:

**Table 4.1: Value change – secular values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**

	TRADITIONAL/SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES WVS 1-4/2006	TRADITIONAL/SECULAR RATIONAL VALUES FIFTH WAVE	Value change Secular values
Canada	-0,042	1,328	1,370
United States	-0,346	0,955	1,301
Puerto Rico	-0,894	0,267	1,161
Australia	0,075	1,066	0,990
Venezuela	-0,822	0,119	0,941
New Zealand	0,408	1,217	0,809
Israel	0,147	0,948	0,801
Great Britain	0,321	1,121	0,800
Sweden	1,234	1,966	0,732
Tanzania, United Republic Of	-0,937	-0,290	0,647
Dominican Republic	-0,444	0,152	0,596
Argentina	-0,247	0,346	0,593
Nigeria	-0,816	-0,230	0,586
Peru	-0,489	0,090	0,579
South Africa	-0,506	0,062	0,568
Brazil	-0,452	0,107	0,559
Chile	-0,431	0,106	0,537
Mexico	-0,267	0,261	0,528
Norway	0,704	1,199	0,495
Uruguay	0,020	0,499	0,479
Philippines	-0,450	0,013	0,463
Spain	0,239	0,701	0,462
Egypt	-0,713	-0,252	0,461
Netherlands	0,780	1,217	0,437
Algeria	-0,734	-0,316	0,418
Uganda	-0,586	-0,214	0,371
Jordan	-0,882	-0,524	0,358
Zimbabwe	-0,772	-0,419	0,353

Poland	-0,275	0,058	0,334
Pakistan	-0,763	-0,438	0,325
Singapore	-0,278	0,038	0,316
France	0,730	1,039	0,309
Bangladesh	-0,671	-0,369	0,302
Switzerland	0,706	0,962	0,256
Turkey	-0,360	-0,136	0,224
Viet Nam	-0,125	0,061	0,186
India	-0,080	0,090	0,171
Finland	0,688	0,848	0,160
Italy	0,235	0,284	0,049
Indonesia	-0,339	-0,343	-0,005
Germany	0,812	0,796	-0,016
Slovakia	0,516	0,448	-0,068
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,226	0,038	-0,188
Czech Republic	1,093	0,893	-0,200
Kyrgyzstan	0,032	-0,227	-0,259
Croatia	0,543	0,282	-0,261
Hungary	0,429	0,153	-0,276
Slovenia	0,617	0,332	-0,286
Macedonia, Republic of	0,304	0,008	-0,296
Georgia	-0,042	-0,354	-0,312
Azerbaijan	0,018	-0,304	-0,322
Romania	0,172	-0,208	-0,379
South Korea	0,591	0,187	-0,404
Albania	0,329	-0,100	-0,428
Japan	1,152	0,700	-0,452
Serbia and Montenegro	0,503	0,028	-0,475
Taiwan Province of China	0,422	-0,138	-0,560
Armenia	0,390	-0,190	-0,580
Bulgaria	0,766	0,110	-0,656
Moldova	0,444	-0,223	-0,666
Lithuania	0,494	-0,228	-0,722
Latvia	0,902	0,157	-0,745
Ukraine	0,658	-0,199	-0,857
Belarus	0,714	-0,162	-0,877
Russian Federation	0,852	-0,166	-1,019
Estonia	1,011	-0,099	-1,109

We now apply the same simple first difference methodology to the dynamics of “self-expression”. The twenty superstars of self-expression development according to the Inglehart theory are: Jordan; Zimbabwe; Pakistan; Turkey; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Tanzania, United Republic Of; Algeria; Georgia; Ukraine; Moldova; Romania; Egypt; Uganda; Poland; Azerbaijan; Venezuela; Russian Federation; Macedonia, Republic of; and Kyrgyzstan.

The following countries witnessed an implosion of their self-expression processes: Sweden; Netherlands; New Zealand; Switzerland; Australia; Finland;

Norway; Japan; Great Britain; Canada; Germany; United States; Czech Republic; France; South Korea; Spain; and Israel:

**Table 4.2: Value change - selfexpression, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**

	<b>SURVIVAL/SELF- EXPRESSION VALUES WVS 1- 4/2006</b>	<b>SURVIVAL/SELF- EXPRESSION VALUES FIFTH WAVE</b>	<b>Value change self- expression</b>
Jordan	-0,621	0,620	1,241
Zimbabwe	-0,765	0,398	1,163
Pakistan	-0,669	0,335	1,004
Turkey	-0,443	0,530	0,973
Bangladesh	-0,426	0,545	0,971
Nigeria	-0,276	0,624	0,900
Tanzania, United Republic Of	-0,125	0,774	0,899
Algeria	-0,441	0,426	0,867
Georgia	-0,664	0,174	0,838
Ukraine	-0,947	-0,132	0,816
Moldova	-0,993	-0,249	0,744
Romania	-0,780	-0,045	0,735
Egypt	-0,175	0,553	0,728
Uganda	-0,300	0,416	0,716
Poland	-0,353	0,329	0,683
Azerbaijan	-0,644	0,015	0,659
Venezuela	0,243	0,877	0,633
Russian Federation	-0,912	-0,292	0,621
Macedonia, Republic of	-0,600	0,009	0,610
Kyrgyzstan	-0,555	0,035	0,590
Brazil	-0,124	0,452	0,576
Philippines	-0,071	0,491	0,562
South Africa	-0,054	0,483	0,537
Armenia	-0,678	-0,141	0,537
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,662	-0,142	0,520
Peru	-0,061	0,453	0,514
Puerto Rico	0,431	0,938	0,507
Chile	-0,065	0,427	0,492
Belarus	-0,819	-0,328	0,491
Lithuania	-0,645	-0,158	0,487
Dominican Republic	0,113	0,535	0,422
Bulgaria	-0,701	-0,279	0,421
Hungary	-0,518	-0,103	0,415
Singapore	-0,158	0,226	0,384
Taiwan Province of China	-0,663	-0,298	0,364
Estonia	-0,737	-0,384	0,353
Indonesia	-0,332	-0,016	0,316
Argentina	0,052	0,355	0,303
Albania	-0,525	-0,225	0,301


Mexico	0,235	0,493	0,257
India	-0,101	0,151	0,252
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,288	-0,062	0,226
Latvia	-0,600	-0,390	0,209
Slovenia	-0,220	-0,045	0,175
Uruguay	0,185	0,287	0,102
Viet Nam	0,124	0,224	0,100
Slovakia	-0,184	-0,088	0,096
Italy	0,165	0,236	0,071
Croatia	-0,173	-0,104	0,069
Israel	0,111	0,111	-0,001
Spain	0,057	0,010	-0,046
South Korea	-0,041	-0,331	-0,290
France	0,259	-0,120	-0,378
Czech Republic	0,086	-0,300	-0,386
United States	0,951	0,530	-0,421
Germany	0,298	-0,137	-0,434
Canada	0,841	0,389	-0,452
Great Britain	0,661	0,193	-0,468
Japan	0,206	-0,328	-0,534
Norway	0,536	-0,110	-0,645
Finland	0,610	-0,075	-0,686
Australia	1,025	0,329	-0,695
Switzerland	0,732	-0,033	-0,766
New Zealand	1,130	0,242	-0,888
Netherlands	0,794	-0,098	-0,893
Sweden	0,902	-0,326	-1,228

From these materials, it is now very easy to deduce an analysis of the resilience of the trend towards self-expression, based on the residuals from Graph 4.1: resilient are those political cultures, which are above the regression line, and not resilient are those political cultures, which are below the regression line. The x-axis is constituted by the value change in the direction of secular values, while the y-axis is constituted by the trend towards self-expression values.

Table 4.3 analyses the results from the exercise undertaken, and explained in Graph 4.1.



**Graph 4.1: calculating the resilience of the trend towards self-expression: value changes towards secularism (x-axis) and towards self-expression (y-axis), deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**



Among the twenty countries of our globe with a strong resilience of the self-expression tendencies, there are a very large percentage of Muslim countries (i.e. members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) among them. Let us think for an instance Inglehart’s theory to its end: the twenty superstars of a resilient trend towards self-expression are, according to the Inglehartian theory: Jordan; Zimbabwe; Pakistan; Tanzania, United Republic Of; Bangladesh; Nigeria; Turkey; Algeria; Venezuela; Egypt; Uganda; Puerto Rico; Georgia; Poland; Brazil; Philippines; South Africa; Peru; Romania; and the Ukraine.

The most notable implosions or slow developments of self-expression – independent from the secularization process – had to be noted by contrast in the following twenty countries, which are all western democracies, i.e. members of the European Union or the OECD: Sweden; Netherlands; Switzerland; New Zealand; Finland; Japan; Norway; Australia; Germany; Czech Republic; South Korea; France; Great Britain; Canada; United States; Croatia; Latvia; Spain; Slovakia; Italy;

**Table 4.3: Resilience of the trend towards self-expression values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**

	<b>Value change secular values</b>	<b>Value change self-expression</b>	<b>trend value</b>	<b>Residual = resilience of trend towards self-expression</b>
Jordan	0,358	1,241	0,208	1,032
Zimbabwe	0,353	1,163	0,210	0,953
Pakistan	0,325	1,004	0,216	0,788
Tanzania, United Republic Of	0,647	0,899	0,141	0,758
Bangladesh	0,302	0,971	0,221	0,750
Nigeria	0,586	0,900	0,156	0,744
Turkey	0,224	0,973	0,240	0,734
Algeria	0,418	0,867	0,195	0,672
Venezuela	0,941	0,633	0,073	0,560
Egypt	0,461	0,728	0,185	0,543
Uganda	0,371	0,716	0,205	0,511
Puerto Rico	1,161	0,507	0,022	0,485
Georgia	-0,312	0,838	0,364	0,474
Poland	0,334	0,683	0,214	0,468
Brazil	0,559	0,576	0,162	0,414
Philippines	0,463	0,562	0,184	0,378
South Africa	0,568	0,537	0,160	0,377
Peru	0,579	0,514	0,157	0,356
Romania	-0,379	0,735	0,379	0,356
Ukraine	-0,857	0,816	0,490	0,326
Chile	0,537	0,492	0,167	0,325
Moldova	-0,666	0,744	0,446	0,298
Azerbaijan	-0,322	0,659	0,366	0,293
Dominican Republic	0,596	0,422	0,153	0,269
Macedonia, Republic of	-0,296	0,610	0,360	0,250
Kyrgyzstan	-0,259	0,590	0,351	0,238
Singapore	0,316	0,384	0,218	0,166
Argentina	0,593	0,303	0,154	0,149
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,475	0,520	0,401	0,119
Armenia	-0,580	0,537	0,426	0,111
Russian Federation	-1,019	0,621	0,527	0,093
Mexico	0,528	0,257	0,169	0,088
Hungary	-0,276	0,415	0,355	0,059

Lithuania	-0,722	0,487	0,459	0,029
Indonesia	-0,005	0,316	0,293	0,023
India	0,171	0,252	0,252	0,000
Belarus	-0,877	0,491	0,495	-0,003
Bulgaria	-0,656	0,421	0,443	-0,022
Taiwan Province of China	-0,560	0,364	0,421	-0,057
Uruguay	0,479	0,102	0,180	-0,078
Albania	-0,428	0,301	0,391	-0,090
Israel	0,801	-0,001	0,106	-0,106
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,188	0,226	0,335	-0,109
Viet Nam	0,186	0,100	0,248	-0,149
Slovenia	-0,286	0,175	0,358	-0,183
Estonia	-1,109	0,353	0,548	-0,195
Italy	0,049	0,071	0,280	-0,209
Slovakia	-0,068	0,096	0,307	-0,211
Spain	0,462	-0,046	0,184	-0,231
Latvia	-0,745	0,209	0,464	-0,255
Croatia	-0,261	0,069	0,352	-0,283
United States	1,301	-0,421	-0,010	-0,411
Canada	1,370	-0,452	-0,026	-0,426
Great Britain	0,800	-0,468	0,106	-0,574
France	0,309	-0,378	0,220	-0,598
South Korea	-0,404	-0,290	0,385	-0,675
Czech Republic	-0,200	-0,386	0,338	-0,724
Germany	-0,016	-0,434	0,295	-0,729
Australia	0,990	-0,695	0,062	-0,757
Norway	0,495	-0,645	0,177	-0,822
Japan	-0,452	-0,534	0,396	-0,930
Finland	0,160	-0,686	0,254	-0,940
New Zealand	0,809	-0,888	0,104	-0,992
Switzerland	0,256	-0,766	0,232	-0,998
Netherlands	0,437	-0,893	0,190	-1,083
Sweden	0,732	-1,228	0,122	-1,350

In Graph 4.2 we will now highlight the close, observable relationship between the resilience of the trend towards self-expression and the principle component of economic growth rates calculated from IMF data during the crisis years from 2008 to 2011 (see <http://economics.uni-corvinus.hu/index.php?id=47854>). The resilience of self-expression is explaining more than 1/5 of economic growth in the world system.

Muslim countries are among the trend leaders in both directions, i.e. the resilience of self-expression, and economic growth during the crisis years.

**Graph 4.2: the resilience of the self-expression value trend and current economic growth, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates and from IMF data**




Table 4.4 now highlights these trends and residuals; it is to be seen that member countries of the OIC – commonly called the “Muslim world”, are both among the positive and negative residuals from Graph 4.2.

**Table 4.4: the resilience of the trend towards self-expression and economic growth, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates and from IMF data**

	resilience of self-expression	principal component economic growth 2008-2011	trend value principle component economic growth	residual (growth driven by other factors beyond value change)
India	0,000	1,590	-0,225	1,815
Uruguay	-0,078	1,138	-0,285	1,423
Argentina	0,149	1,195	-0,109	1,305
Viet Nam	-0,149	0,930	-0,339	1,269
Peru	0,356	1,187	0,050	1,137
Belarus	-0,003	0,902	-0,227	1,129
Indonesia	0,023	0,867	-0,207	1,073
Singapore	0,166	0,931	-0,096	1,028
Nigeria	0,744	1,335	0,350	0,986
Uganda	0,511	1,139	0,169	0,970
South Korea	-0,675	0,044	-0,745	0,789
Sweden	-1,350	-0,514	-1,266	0,751
Tanzania, United Republic Of	0,758	1,096	0,360	0,736
Dominican Republic	0,269	0,691	-0,017	0,708
Azerbaijan	0,293	0,688	0,001	0,686
Bangladesh	0,750	0,962	0,354	0,609
Moldova	0,298	0,509	0,005	0,504
Albania	-0,090	0,188	-0,294	0,482
Israel	-0,106	0,174	-0,307	0,480
Philippines	0,378	0,473	0,067	0,406
Australia	-0,757	-0,472	-0,809	0,337
Switzerland	-0,998	-0,663	-0,994	0,331
Brazil	0,414	0,323	0,095	0,228
Kyrgyzstan	0,238	0,184	-0,041	0,225
Chile	0,325	0,230	0,026	0,204
Netherlands	-1,083	-0,959	-1,060	0,101
Slovakia	-0,211	-0,295	-0,387	0,092
Egypt	0,543	0,263	0,194	0,068
Finland	-0,940	-0,887	-0,950	0,062
New Zealand	-0,992	-0,959	-0,990	0,031
Germany	-0,729	-0,802	-0,787	-0,015


Czech Republic	-0,724	-0,831	-0,783	-0,048
Poland	0,468	0,082	0,137	-0,054
Georgia	0,474	0,013	0,141	-0,128
Turkey	0,734	0,202	0,342	-0,140
Norway	-0,822	-1,055	-0,859	-0,196
Canada	-0,426	-0,781	-0,553	-0,228
Russian Federation	0,093	-0,406	-0,153	-0,253
Macedonia, Republic of	0,250	-0,373	-0,032	-0,341
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,109	-0,655	-0,308	-0,347
Mexico	0,088	-0,525	-0,156	-0,369
France	-0,598	-1,078	-0,686	-0,393
Jordan	1,032	0,169	0,572	-0,403
Japan	-0,930	-1,352	-0,942	-0,410
United States	-0,411	-0,985	-0,542	-0,443
South Africa	0,377	-0,381	0,067	-0,448
Algeria	0,672	-0,243	0,294	-0,538
Pakistan	0,788	-0,168	0,383	-0,551
Bulgaria	-0,022	-0,795	-0,242	-0,553
United Kingdom	-0,574	-1,266	-0,668	-0,599
Armenia	0,111	-0,822	-0,139	-0,683
Slovenia	-0,183	-1,105	-0,366	-0,739
Lithuania	0,029	-1,085	-0,202	-0,883
Spain	-0,231	-1,322	-0,402	-0,919
Estonia	-0,195	-1,391	-0,375	-1,015
Ukraine	0,326	-0,995	0,027	-1,022
Croatia	-0,283	-1,470	-0,443	-1,028
Italy	-0,209	-1,446	-0,386	-1,060
Venezuela	0,560	-0,856	0,208	-1,063
Hungary	0,059	-1,248	-0,179	-1,070
Zimbabwe	0,953	-0,590	0,511	-1,101
Romania	0,356	-1,066	0,050	-1,117
Latvia	-0,255	-2,229	-0,421	-1,808

## 4.2. The choropleth maps of the implosion process

Our Choropleth maps underline our contentions. A pure Inglehartian world values analysis would have to come to the conclusion that the value basis of Western society is eroding.


So while the methodology of the two approaches – Inglehart’s and our own – is different, the same conclusions can be drawn from it. Map 4.5 is the final verdict then in the debate about these issues: being based on Table 4.3, it just shows how powerful the Tsunami of the crisis of 2008 hit the world of the North Atlantic arena, and how the geography of global development is changing to the detriment of the hitherto dominant West.

**Map 4.1: Inglehart Secular Values – most recent data, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**







**Map 4.2: Inglehart Self-Expression Values - most recent data, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**




**Map 4.3: DYN Secular values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**



**Map 4.4: DYN self-expression values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**



**Map 4.5: Resilience of self-expression values, deduced from the original data from the calculations by Inglehart and associates**



### **4.3. The direct measurement of self-expression values in the *World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014* with the item “*important child qualities: self-expression*” and the consequences for Inglehart’s theory**

We now invite our readers to have a renewed look at Map 4.15 in Chapter 4 and at the left, first column of Table 4.1. This would be the world view, which Inglehart’s theory would suggest, very much in the spirit of classical modernization theory. The Western countries, especially the Protestant countries, are seen as islands of modernity and their self-expression culture as a robust precondition of “*effective democracy*”. The data, emerging from the first four waves of the *World Values Survey*, provided some large-scale evidence to maintain such a theory. However, with all the extensions of the *World Values Survey* project over the last decades, both in terms of geography as well as the completeness of the data, also on such phenomena as the shadow economy, the world of Map 4.15 somehow receded into the memory about a world order, which no longer exists and which was severely shattered in its foundations by the *tsunami* of the global economic crisis of 2008. As we tried to show in this article, it was also shattered by the long shadows of the internal corrosion, which social decay and the loss of values brought about long before the 2008 crisis hit the North Atlantic arena. The very last wave of the *World Values Survey* project, released in May 2014, contains for the first time an item for the direct measurement of “self-expression”: not how advanced quantitative sociology tries to impute its values from the knowledge about different other variables, but what ordinary citizens of our globe understood it to be. In presenting these data in the following Table 4.5, and Maps 4.7 and 4.8, we close this Chapter on the dynamics of self-expression values with a note of caution. Some of the countries on top of the list might still sound familiar from the research, presented by Inglehart over decades, culminating in his article in 2000 (Inglehart/Baker) for the “*American Sociological Review*”, while other countries hitherto were considered to be laggards in self-expression development. According to the “online data analysis” version of the newly presented *World Values Survey* website, nowadays Estonia; Azerbaijan; South Korea; Slovenia; Poland; Cyprus; Germany; Uruguay; Turkey; Sweden; Taiwan; Chile; Australia; Japan; Ukraine; New Zealand; Russia; Colombia; Belarus; and Morocco are now the global leaders in “*self-expression*” values, while the United States, for example, is only rank 39 of the 52 nations, and Russia is rank 17. Not only the top 20 are ahead of the United States, but also Kuwait; Romania; Kazakhstan; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; Jordan; Ghana; Lebanon; Netherlands; Peru; Nigeria; Libya; Egypt; Zimbabwe; Armenia; Qatar; Mexico; Tunisia; and Algeria.

**Table 4.5 World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Important child qualities: Self-expression**


	<b>Important child qualities: Self-expression</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>62,90</b>
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	<b>53,60</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	<b>49,90</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>48,80</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>41,00</b>
<b>Cyprus</b>	<b>39,30</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>39,20</b>
Uruguay	38,60
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>37,90</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>37,60</b>
Taiwan	37,50
<b>Chile</b>	<b>36,40</b>
<b>Australia</b>	<b>36,30</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>33,60</b>
Ukraine	32,30
<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>32,10</b>
Russia	32,10
Colombia	31,50
Belarus	29,80
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>29,70</b>
<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>29,40</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>29,00</b>
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	<b>28,60</b>
<b>The Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>	<b>25,30</b>
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>24,60</b>
Ghana	23,20
<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>23,10</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>23,00</b>
Peru	22,90
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>22,80</b>
<b>Libya</b>	<b>22,50</b>
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>20,60</b>
Zimbabwe	20,60
Armenia	19,70

Qatar	19,60
<b>Mexico</b>	<b>18,60</b>
Tunisia	18,30
Algeria	17,80
<b>United States</b>	<b>17,60</b>
Pakistan	16,70
Trinidad and Tobago	15,30
Singapore	13,70
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	<b>13,50</b>
Ecuador	12,60
Iraq	12,60
Philippines	11,50
<b>Malaysia</b>	<b>10,70</b>
China	10,50
Rwanda	8,70
<b>Spain</b>	<b>8,30</b>
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	<b>8,30</b>
<b>Yemen</b>	<b>6,50</b>

Graph 4.3 portrays the relationship between the response rates from Table 4.5 and the middle column of Table 4.2. Data are available from the following countries: Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Chile; Egypt; Estonia; Germany; Japan; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russia; Singapore; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; and Zimbabwe.

The correlation between the two variables, as is to be easily seen from Graph 4.3, is negative, and the  $R^2$  is 19.1%:


**Graph 4.3: World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014: Important child qualities: Self-expression and the Inglehart self-expression scores (latest data, see Table 4.2**




Maps 4.7 and 4.8 portray the Choropleth maps, to be derived from Table 4.5. In the concluding Chapter 12 we show that both of Inglehart’s main aggregates – traditional/secular and survival/self-expression values - can well be measured by the factors derived in this work. Maps 4.7 and 4.8 contain an important message in the context of the debates of Chapter 4.1 and Chapter 4.2: self-expression values have shifted geographically around the globe, and various Western countries are in a real crisis.



**Map 4.7: The direct measurement of self-expression values in the *World Values Survey*, Wave 2010-2014 – the values from Table 4.5**



**Map 4.7: The direct measurement of self-expression values in the *World Values Survey*, Wave 2010-2014 – the natural logarithm of the values from Table 4.5**



## 5. Hofstede, Ralston *et al.*, Inglehart and the future of world development

In many European countries, bitter debates on human values take place, be it on matters of sexuality, family policy, religion, or – increasingly – on the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union. Similar debates are to be witnessed in many other Western countries outside the European Union. For us as empirical social scientists, the main questions arising out of such debates are for example: what are the empirical relationships between acceptancy of prostitution and acceptancy of homosexuality on a global scale? Is there a positive, a non-existent, or a negative correlation between the two?

The following Chapter is intended to provide new and additional insights into our rethinking of the *World Values Survey* data and analysis. For one, we would like to present a still more conclusive proof of the interrelationship between the different types of permissiveness and the weight these factors have in relationship to the other variables, contained in the *World Values Survey* data. Based on our analysis of the complete available data based on 28 items from the *World Values Survey* from 70 countries of the world, including the OIC member countries Albania; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Burkina Faso; Indonesia; Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Mali; Nigeria; Turkey; and Uganda we attempt to show the interrelationships between permissiveness, the shadow economy, educational values, and other socio-political variables, like fundamental positions on the market economy and democracy. Much of what we will be presenting will be a counterpoint to the hitherto dominant interpretations offered by Professor Ronald Inglehart, who seems to suggest that for a society to have an effective democracy, it needs to have very pronounced self-expression values, including the acceptancy of homosexuality.

In the second part of this Chapter, we will then look at the summary relationships between our own new factors and those presented by Hofstede and Inglehart. We will come to the conclusion that our factors sufficiently correlate with the factors presented by Hofstede and Inglehart, without implying what we perceive to be their shortcomings.

## 5. 1. One, two, three types of permissiveness and their effects on value systems

We have maintained throughout this work that Inglehart overlooks the negative side-effects of secular and self-expression values. We have shown in the previous chapters that this is especially relevant for the issue of the shadow economy.

To re-iterate our point, we should not underestimate the role which self-expression values, associated by Inglehart and associates with participation in decision making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and growing tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians play for their theory of democracy, which rests, according to them on a culture of trust and tolerance in which people place high value on individual freedom and self-expression and have activist political orientations:

*“The shift from survival to self-expression values is linked with the rise of postindustrial society. It reflects a cultural shift that occurs when younger generations emerge who have grown up taking survival for granted. Survival values give top priority to economic and physical security and conformist social norms. **Self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, participation in decision making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and growing tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, gays and lesbians. Growing emphasis on these values produces a culture of trust and tolerance in which people place high value on individual freedom and self-expression and have activist political orientations. These attributes are crucial to democracy – and thus explain how economic growth, which takes societies from agrarian to industrial and then from industrial to post-industrial, leads to democratization.** The unprecedented economic growth of the past 50 years has meant that an increasing share of the world’s population has grown up taking survival for granted. Time series data from the values surveys indicates that mass priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression, participation in decision-making and a relatively trusting and tolerant outlook. **Both dimensions are closely linked with economic development: the value systems of high-income countries differ dramatically from those of low-income countries.** Every nation that the World Bank defines as high income ranks relatively high on both dimensions -- with a strong emphasis on both self-expression and secular-rational values. All of the low-income and lowermiddle income societies rank relatively low on both dimensions. The upper-middle income countries fall somewhere in between. To a remarkable degree, the values and beliefs of a given society reflect its level of*

*economic development—just as modernization theory implies.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009)*

In the following, we will now extend the argument by using Schumpeter’s hypothesis (Schumpeter, 1950) about the generalized loss of family values as the possible trigger of the overall decline of the capitalist order.

To arrive at an empirical and theoretical synthesis of our analysis, we will attempt to show the relationship between the decay of traditional family values, the loss of religious values and the rise of the shadow economic mentality. To this end, we will perform a promax factor analysis for a very large number of countries with complete data on

- Acceptance or rejection of income inequality
- Democratic values
- Economic and social values, rejection of the shadow economy, government benefits fraud, bribery and corruption
- Family values and sexual norms
- Opinions on markets and state intervention
- Religious values
- Values guiding the education of children – independence; hard work; feeling of responsibility; imagination; tolerance and respect for other people; thrift, saving money and things; determination and perseverance; religious faith; unselfishness; obedience

Are the convictions of religious human beings incompatible with modernization and “*effective democracy*”, and are religiously motivated persons, sharing traditional religious values, the antithesis to the values of “*selfexpression*”, which implies a low importance given to religion in society, a low importance of obedience in child education, a weak sense of national pride, a disconnection of one’s life from the pride of one’s parents, the full acceptancy of divorce and abortion, no desire for limits on selling foreign goods, and little respect for authority in society? As Inglehart and associates seem to suggest? Or are Barro and Schumpeter right in their conviction that the belief in eternal judgment brings about an improvement of the societal ethics of contractual obligations (Barro) or that traditional family values are important for the existence of the capitalist enterprise and economic growth (Schumpeter) which threatens to be substituted by a socialist bureaucracy?

The countries with complete data for these questions are a fair sample of the available data from the *World Values Survey* project

1. Albania

2. Andorra

3. Argentina

- |                              |                           |                              |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| 4. Armenia                   | 26. Hong Kong             | 49. Serbia                   |
| 5. Australia                 | 27. Hungary               | 50. Serbia and<br>Montenegro |
| 6. Azerbaijan                | 28. India                 | 51. Slovakia                 |
| 7. Bangladesh                | 29. Indonesia             | 52. Slovenia                 |
| 8. Belarus                   | 30. Italy                 | 53. South Africa             |
| 9. Bosnia and<br>Herzegovina | 31. Japan                 | 54. South Korea              |
| 10. Brazil                   | 32. Jordan                | 55. Spain                    |
| 11. Bulgaria                 | 33. Kyrgyzstan            | 56. Sweden                   |
| 12. Burkina Faso             | 34. Latvia                | 57. Switzerland              |
| 13. Canada                   | 35. Lithuania             | 58. Taiwan                   |
| 14. Chile                    | 36. Macedonia             | 59. Tanzania                 |
| 15. Croatia                  | 37. Mali                  | 60. Thailand                 |
| 16. Cyprus                   | 38. Mexico                | 61. Trinidad and<br>Tobago   |
| 17. Czech Republic           | 39. Moldova               | 62. Turkey                   |
| 18. Dominican<br>Republic    | 40. New Zealand           | 63. Uganda                   |
| 19. Estonia                  | 41. Nigeria               | 64. Ukraine                  |
| 20. Ethiopia                 | 42. Norway                | 65. United States            |
| 21. Finland                  | 43. Peru                  | 66. Uruguay                  |
| 22. Georgia                  | 44. Philippines           | 67. Venezuela                |
| 23. Germany                  | 45. Poland                | 68. Viet Nam                 |
| 24. Ghana                    | 46. Puerto Rico           | 69. Zambia                   |
| 25. Guatemala                | 47. Romania               | 70. Zimbabwe                 |
|                              | 48. Russian<br>Federation |                              |

The questions chosen from the WVS are the following:

1. How important is God in your life
2. How often do you attend religious services
3. Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them
4. Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport
5. Justifiable: cheating on taxes
6. Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe
7. Justifiable: homosexuality
8. Justifiable: prostitution
9. Justifiable: abortion
10. Justifiable: divorce
11. Justifiable: euthanasia
12. Justifiable: suicide
13. Important child qualities: independence
14. Important child qualities: hard work
15. Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility
16. Important child qualities: imagination
17. Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people
18. Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things
19. Important child qualities: determination and perseverance
20. Important child qualities: religious faith
21. Important child qualities: unselfishness
22. Important child qualities: obedience
23. Self-positioning in political scale (left to right)
24. Income equality (rejection or acceptance)

- 25. Private vs. state ownership of business
- 26. Competition good or harmful
- 27. Political system: Having the army rule (reject)
- 28. Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject)

Table 5.1 shows the percentages of the total variance explained by our investigation for each variable of our model.

**Table 5.1: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the combined *World Values Surveys* on religion, on what is justifiable, and on democracy (quantitative analysis of “*Permissiveness*”)**

	initial	extraction
How important is God in your life	1,000	0,642
How often do you attend religious services	1,000	0,617
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	1,000	0,532
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	1,000	0,615
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	1,000	0,642
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	1,000	0,550
Justifiable: homosexuality	1,000	0,641
Justifiable: prostitution	1,000	0,610
Justifiable: abortion	1,000	0,655
Justifiable: divorce	1,000	0,601
Justifiable: euthanasia	1,000	0,527
Justifiable: suicide	1,000	0,491
Important child qualities: independence	1,000	0,501
Important child qualities: hard work	1,000	0,639
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	1,000	0,560
Important child qualities: imagination	1,000	0,468
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people	1,000	0,491
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	1,000	0,516
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	1,000	0,430
Important child qualities: religious faith	1,000	0,561
Important child qualities: unselfishness	1,000	0,573
Important child qualities: obedience	1,000	0,433
Self-positioning in political scale	1,000	0,578
Income equality	1,000	0,601
Private vs. state ownership of business	1,000	0,632
Competition good or harmful	1,000	0,546
Political system: Having the army rule	1,000	0,381
Political system: Having a democratic political system	1,000	0,293

The nine factors to be extracted from the data for more than 90.000 representative respondents in 70 countries are the following:

- moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’)
- acceptancy of the shadow economy(‘Permissiveness 2’)
- distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’)
- educational values: independence and imagination
- distance to market economy values
- education values: responsibility and tolerance
- educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving
- right wing acceptance of inequality
- educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work

Contrary to Inglehart’s expectations about a positive role of the low importance given to religion in society, and divorce and abortion being fully accepted, it emerges that the two factors of permissiveness (permissive family values and the loss of hard-core Max Weberian economic values) are closely interrelated with one another and with the loss of religious values, and that the three Barro-type and Schumpeterian “*permissiveness factors*” together already explain some 30,4% of the total variance of individual opinions under investigation on a global scale.

**Table 5.2: The *Eigen values* for our analysis of latest edition of the combined *World Values Surveys* on religion, on what is justifiable, and on democracy (quantitative analysis of “*Permissiveness*”)**

	Total	initial <i>Eigen values</i>	
		% of variance	cumulated percentage
1,000	4,506	16,094	16,094
2,000	2,525	9,017	25,110
3,000	1,476	5,273	30,383
4,000	1,301	4,646	35,030
5,000	1,224	4,372	39,402
6,000	1,120	3,999	43,401
7,000	1,107	3,953	47,354
8,000	1,065	3,802	51,156
9,000	1,002	3,578	54,734

Table 5.3 shows the factor loadings for each of the variables analyzed here. The variables with a high importance for “effective democracy”, i. e. tolerance and respect for other people, rejection or acceptance of corruption, and the assessment of democracy as such and vis-à-vis military rule, are highlighted in our Table 5.3. **Nowhere there is a notable negative or positive factor analytical loading of beyond 0. 333 (>10% of variance explained)**



**confirming that religious people are antidemocratic, right-wing, and pro or anti-market.**

In addition, the structure of the factor loadings even suggests the following:

- a) distance from religion is even a motive to reject a democratic political system
- b) moral/sexual permissiveness goes hand in hand with economic and social decay

	<b>moral (sexual) permissiveness ('Permissiveness 1')</b>	<b>distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')</b>
Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject)	-0,099	<b>0,125</b>
Competition good or harmful (harmful)	0,038	0,004
Private vs. state ownership of business (state)	-0,064	-0,027
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	<b>0,213</b>	0,056
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	<b>0,239</b>	0,088
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	<b>0,104</b>	0,001
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	<b>0,218</b>	-0,043

Table 5.4 shows the all-important correlations between the promax factors, extracted from the correlation matrix between the variables of our model. Table 5.5 and Maps 5.1 to 5.9 show the country values for our analysis (“factor scores”) as well as the cascades of moral and social decay in the Western countries and also the evidence for the Muslim countries with available data. Graph 5.5 finally summarizes the pessimistic research findings, which rather support the views of Barro and Schumpeter against the logic, proposed by Inglehart.

**Table 5.3: multivariate model, based on 91649 global representative respondents with complete data from 70 countries and territories, based on the *World Values Survey* from the combined latest edition [2012] of global opinion investigation, integrating the fifth wave of investigations, 2005-2008. Is (*Permissiveness*) really a precondition of democracy? – Some continued doubts about implications of the Inglehart School**

<i>If highest numerical values differ from the variable name, the highest values of the indicator for the multivariate analysis are mentioned in brackets</i>	moral (sexual) permissiveness ( <i>'Permissiveness 1'</i> )	acceptancy of the shadow economy ( <i>'Permissiveness 2'</i> )	distance from religion ( <i>'Permissiveness 3'</i> )	educational values: independence and imagination	distance to market economy values	education values: responsibility and tolerance	educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	right wing acceptance of inequality	educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work
Competition good or harmful (harmful)	0,038	0,134	0,004	0,080	0,719	0,006	-0,138	-0,100	0,138
How important is God in your life	-0,380	-0,019	-0,789	-0,149	0,071	-0,122	-0,071	0,130	0,036
How often do you attend religious services (never)	0,352	-0,003	0,770	0,075	-0,037	0,159	0,063	-0,115	-0,011
Important child qualities: determination and perseverance	0,028	0,039	0,304	0,160	-0,065	0,041	0,523	0,074	-0,058
Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility	0,095	-0,032	0,157	0,138	-0,038	0,730	-0,006	-0,007	-0,013
Important child qualities: hard work	-0,145	0,021	0,010	-0,259	-0,013	-0,346	-0,011	0,117	-0,675
Important child qualities: imagination	0,165	-0,025	0,062	0,610	0,015	-0,076	0,071	-0,152	0,085
Important child qualities: independence	0,105	0,010	0,164	0,695	-0,067	0,176	0,061	0,058	-0,044
Important child qualities: obedience	-0,150	0,014	-0,286	-0,437	0,122	-0,459	-0,177	0,007	0,251
Important child qualities: religious faith	-0,255	-0,031	-0,743	-0,196	0,032	-0,171	-0,105	0,064	0,052
Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things	-0,116	0,019	0,083	-0,004	-0,009	-0,080	-0,650	0,066	-0,146
<b>Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people</b>	<b>0,134</b>	<b>-0,118</b>	<b>-0,045</b>	<b>-0,298</b>	<b>-0,004</b>	<b>0,532</b>	<b>0,274</b>	<b>-0,125</b>	<b>0,058</b>
Important child qualities: unselfishness	0,019	-0,013	0,031	-0,180	-0,011	-0,218	0,094	0,003	0,658
Income equality (large differences needed)	-0,025	-0,002	-0,032	-0,086	-0,002	-0,026	0,186	0,711	-0,185
Justifiable: abortion	0,788	0,146	0,436	0,110	-0,107	0,139	0,157	-0,120	-0,054
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public	0,213	0,774	0,056	0,005	0,123	-0,033	-0,028	-0,007	0,016

transport									
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	0,239	0,783	0,088	0,013	0,042	-0,047	-0,015	0,015	-0,033
Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them	0,104	0,725	0,001	0,027	0,181	-0,056	-0,118	0,018	0,073
Justifiable: divorce	0,769	0,094	0,331	0,082	-0,102	0,174	0,184	-0,132	0,002
Justifiable: euthanasia	0,692	0,149	0,414	0,067	-0,095	0,140	0,089	-0,046	-0,008
Justifiable: homosexuality	0,779	0,127	0,219	0,198	0,000	0,226	0,189	-0,182	0,102
Justifiable: prostitution	0,759	0,283	0,167	0,134	0,007	0,084	0,098	-0,102	0,040
<b>Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe</b>	<b>0,218</b>	<b>0,728</b>	<b>-0,043</b>	<b>0,021</b>	<b>0,115</b>	<b>-0,108</b>	<b>-0,118</b>	<b>0,071</b>	<b>0,022</b>
Justifiable: suicide	0,668	0,295	0,207	0,132	0,043	0,047	0,010	-0,070	0,018
<b>Political system: Having a democratic political system (reject)</b>	<b>-0,099</b>	<b>0,232</b>	<b>0,125</b>	<b>-0,038</b>	<b>0,300</b>	<b>-0,044</b>	<b>-0,395</b>	<b>0,035</b>	<b>0,197</b>
<b>Political system: Having the army rule (very bad)</b>	<b>0,253</b>	<b>-0,231</b>	<b>0,173</b>	<b>-0,030</b>	<b>-0,342</b>	<b>0,214</b>	<b>0,436</b>	<b>-0,288</b>	<b>-0,195</b>
Private vs. state ownership of business (state)	-0,064	0,073	-0,027	-0,099	0,762	-0,059	-0,027	0,049	-0,064
Self-positioning in political scale (right wing)	-0,145	0,008	-0,114	0,051	-0,058	-0,033	-0,220	0,717	0,116
	<b>moral (sexual) permissiveness ('Permissiveness 1')</b>	<b>acceptancy of the shadow economy ('Permissiveness 2')</b>	<b>distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')</b>	<b>educational values: independence and imagination</b>	<b>distance to market economy values</b>	<b>education values: responsibility and tolerance</b>	<b>educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving</b>	<b>right wing acceptance of inequality</b>	<b>educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work</b>

**Table 5.4: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the combined *World Values Surveys* on religion, on what is justifiable, and democracy (quantitative analysis of “*Permissiveness*”) - The inter-correlations between the promax factors**

				correlation matrix of the components					
	moral (sexual) permissiveness ( <i>Permissiveness 1</i> )	acceptancy of the shadow economy ( <i>Permissiveness 2</i> )	distance from religion ( <i>Permissiveness 3</i> )	educational values: independence and imagination	distance to market economy values	education values: responsibility and tolerance	educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	right wing acceptance of inequality	educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work
<i>moral (sexual) permissiveness (Permissiveness 1)</i>	1,000	0,199	0,348	0,130	-0,082	0,194	0,203	-0,183	0,013
<i>acceptancy of the shadow economy (Permissiveness 2)</i>	<b>0,199</b>	1,000	0,040	0,050	0,195	-0,102	-0,156	0,073	0,051
<i>distance from religion (Permissiveness 3)</i>	<b>0,348</b>	0,040	1,000	0,178	-0,074	0,154	0,101	-0,070	-0,098
educational values: independence and imagination	<b>0,130</b>	0,050	<b>0,178</b>	1,000	-0,031	0,168	-0,029	-0,011	0,009
distance to market economy values	-0,082	<b>0,195</b>	-0,074	-0,031	1,000	-0,084	-0,194	0,014	0,138
education values: responsibility and tolerance	<b>0,194</b>	<b>-0,102</b>	<b>0,154</b>	<b>0,168</b>	-0,084	1,000	0,170	-0,100	-0,031
educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	<b>0,203</b>	<b>-0,156</b>	<b>0,101</b>	-0,029	<b>-0,194</b>	<b>0,170</b>	1,000	-0,103	-0,146
right wing acceptance of inequality	<b>-0,183</b>	0,073	-0,070	-0,011	0,014	<b>-0,100</b>	<b>-0,103</b>	1,000	-0,055

educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work	0,013	0,051	-0,098	0,009	0,138	-0,031	-0,146	-0,055	1,000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------	-------	-------	--------	-------	-------	--------	--------	--------	-------

N = 91649,000 global representative citizens with available data

**Table 5.5: promax factor analysis, based on the latest edition of the combined *World Values Surveys* on religion, on what is justifiable, and democracy (quantitative analysis of “*Permissiveness*”) - The data [country means from Promax factor analysis] for new maps of global values from 70 countries and territories, based on the *World Values Survey* from the combined latest edition [2012] of global opinion investigation, integrating the fifth wave of investigations, 2005-2008 [Member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are highlighted in green color]**

Country/region	moral (sexual) permissiveness ( <i>Permissiveness 1</i> )	acceptancy of the shadow economy ( <i>Permissiveness 2</i> )	distance from religion ( <i>Permissiveness 3</i> )	educational values: independence and imagination	distance to market economy values	education values: responsibility and tolerance	educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	right wing acceptance of inequality	educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work
Albania	-0,313	0,058	0,077	-0,143	-0,381	-0,276	-0,217	-0,035	-0,185
Andorra	1,525	-0,134	0,705	0,004	0,119	0,490	0,409	-0,477	-0,185
Argentina	0,221	-0,141	-0,200	0,001	0,266	0,261	0,174	-0,206	-0,078
Armenia	-0,160	0,528	0,567	-0,227	0,320	-0,279	0,097	0,282	-0,516
Australia	0,732	-0,361	0,497	0,056	-0,306	0,187	0,350	-0,293	0,310
Azerbaijan	-0,518	0,266	0,204	0,105	-0,098	-0,002	-0,110	-0,070	-0,695
Bangladesh	-1,017	-0,677	-0,819	0,598	-0,228	-0,058	-0,116	0,864	-0,363
Belarus	0,098	0,541	0,873	-0,529	0,074	-0,153	-0,098	0,184	-0,672
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-0,287	-0,312	0,107	-0,086	-0,306	-0,107	0,091	-0,186	-0,029
Brazil	-0,204	0,555	-0,652	-0,381	0,297	-0,210	-0,264	-0,010	0,358

Bulgaria	0,282	-0,075	0,881	-0,120	-0,052	-0,287	0,095	0,072	-0,346
Burkina Faso	-0,435	0,061	-0,930	-0,667	-0,002	-0,888	-0,004	0,044	-0,260
Canada	0,515	-0,293	0,120	0,117	-0,251	0,241	0,381	-0,276	0,211
Chile	-0,087	0,200	-0,297	0,093	0,603	0,270	-0,163	-0,436	0,646
Croatia	0,589	0,624	0,382	0,193	-0,734	0,073	0,383	-0,315	-0,342
Cyprus	0,046	-0,165	-0,147	-0,140	0,011	0,007	0,083	-0,317	0,175
Czech Republic	0,940	0,227	1,054	-0,476	-0,179	-0,006	0,048	0,080	-0,464
Dominican Republic	-0,132	-0,307	-0,680	-0,323	0,125	0,289	0,386	0,507	-0,287
Estonia	0,154	0,025	1,102	-0,271	-0,159	0,062	0,266	-0,070	-0,794
Ethiopia	-0,771	-0,294	-0,654	0,764	-0,137	-0,622	-0,316	0,440	0,006
Finland	0,610	-0,155	0,585	0,390	-0,080	0,707	0,122	-0,409	0,525
Georgia	-0,536	-0,042	-0,079	-0,181	-0,115	0,030	0,167	0,444	-0,690
Germany	0,709	-0,205	0,784	0,766	-0,085	0,691	0,145	-0,732	-0,128
Ghana	-0,556	-0,222	-1,048	-0,565	0,211	-0,722	0,540	0,586	-0,349
Guatemala	-0,210	0,519	-0,861	-0,319	0,510	-0,104	-0,335	0,328	0,564
Hong Kong	0,019	-0,042	0,842	0,128	0,165	-0,490	-0,440	-0,092	0,184
Hungary	0,380	0,450	0,803	-0,065	-0,274	0,361	0,114	-0,554	0,136
India	-0,359	-0,085	-0,269	-0,062	-0,104	-0,498	-0,261	-0,175	-0,105
Indonesia	-0,946	-0,250	-1,047	0,359	0,521	-0,083	-0,570	0,980	0,276
Italy	-0,002	-0,370	-0,059	0,083	-0,032	0,483	0,411	-0,217	0,120
Japan	0,305	-0,397	0,846	0,594	-0,154	0,534	0,222	-0,033	0,327
Jordan	-1,029	-0,102	-1,192	-0,053	0,231	-0,505	-0,137	0,280	0,694
Kyrgyzstan	-0,628	0,192	0,238	0,165	0,232	-0,113	-0,266	0,140	-0,290
Latvia	0,370	0,471	0,842	-0,400	-0,129	0,165	0,117	0,072	-0,731
Lithuania	-0,184	0,234	0,475	0,017	-0,122	-0,022	-0,063	0,018	-0,475
Macedonia	-0,417	-0,082	0,240	0,154	-0,441	0,373	0,018	-0,232	0,479
Mali	-0,005	0,500	-0,822	-0,286	0,300	-0,716	-0,253	0,358	-0,148
Mexico	-0,169	0,469	-0,363	0,076	0,294	-0,083	-0,361	0,065	0,689
Moldova	-0,252	0,530	0,139	-0,151	0,360	-0,058	-0,132	0,122	-0,539
New Zealand	0,752	-0,411	0,603	0,152	-0,395	0,194	0,444	-0,270	0,131
Nigeria	-0,707	-0,193	-1,083	-0,805	0,025	-0,951	0,439	0,154	-0,460
Norway	0,799	-0,328	0,672	0,850	-0,201	0,769	0,372	-0,401	0,275
Peru	-0,172	0,012	-0,570	-0,397	0,145	0,072	0,090	0,098	-0,147
Philippines	-0,315	0,713	-0,807	0,070	0,580	-0,392	-0,500	0,466	0,201
Poland	-0,114	-0,004	-0,498	-0,063	0,765	0,426	-0,463	0,199	0,403

Puerto Rico	-0,365	-0,325	-0,896	-0,438	-0,012	0,320	0,076	0,128	0,492
Romania	-0,174	-0,149	-0,247	0,089	-0,467	0,097	-0,049	0,035	-0,455
Russian Federation	-0,093	0,386	1,186	-0,650	0,467	-0,092	-0,279	0,177	-0,580
Serbia	0,393	1,353	0,119	0,132	0,312	-0,205	-0,129	0,216	-0,018
Serbia and Montenegro	-0,060	-0,171	0,611	-0,168	-0,400	-0,137	0,335	-0,147	-0,396
Slovakia	0,544	0,379	0,166	-0,469	0,128	0,027	-0,018	-0,199	-0,519
Slovenia	0,621	0,191	0,662	0,255	-0,277	0,376	0,173	-0,395	0,228
South Africa	-0,274	0,009	-0,654	-0,206	-0,043	-0,222	-0,061	-0,042	-0,049
South Korea	-0,088	-0,051	0,555	0,613	0,167	0,241	-0,529	0,161	-0,567
Spain	0,833	-0,177	0,409	-0,242	0,240	0,092	0,229	-0,477	-0,213
Sweden	1,309	-0,185	0,895	0,624	-0,320	0,852	0,248	-0,270	0,344
Switzerland	1,003	-0,255	0,364	0,418	-0,349	0,641	0,370	-0,632	0,170
Taiwan	-0,112	-0,165	0,745	0,279	0,073	0,487	-0,489	0,382	-0,010
Tanzania	-0,786	-0,517	-0,977	-0,035	-0,249	-0,783	0,121	-0,044	0,076
Thailand	-0,384	0,613	-0,369	0,254	0,763	-0,285	-0,540	0,520	0,574
Trinidad and Tobago	-0,372	0,056	-0,804	-0,551	0,050	-0,196	0,019	0,284	-0,129
Turkey	-0,629	-0,438	-0,290	-0,143	0,408	-0,192	-0,229	0,066	-0,111
Uganda	-0,695	0,272	-0,839	-0,574	-0,538	-0,701	0,339	0,206	-0,225
Ukraine	-0,061	0,604	0,566	-0,311	0,248	-0,219	-0,053	0,221	-0,469
United States	0,237	-0,287	-0,307	-0,012	-0,464	0,114	0,220	-0,121	0,088
Uruguay	0,429	-0,288	0,285	0,138	0,286	0,288	0,179	-0,342	0,749
Venezuela	-0,403	-0,057	-0,455	-0,227	0,133	0,075	-0,291	0,145	0,550
Viet Nam	-0,791	-0,233	0,853	0,196	0,186	-0,340	-0,657	1,352	0,066
Zambia	0,006	0,641	-0,768	-0,204	0,320	-0,647	0,125	0,423	-0,156
Zimbabwe	-0,910	-0,501	-0,958	-0,854	-0,363	-0,610	0,454	-0,436	-0,301
<b>Country/region</b>	<b>moral (sexual) permissiveness (<i>'Permissiveness 1'</i>)</b>	<b>acceptancy of the shadow economy (<i>'Permissiveness 2'</i>)</b>	<b>distance from religion (<i>'Permissiveness 3'</i>)</b>	<b>educational values: independence and imagination</b>	<b>distance to market economy values</b>	<b>education values: responsibility and tolerance</b>	<b>educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving</b>	<b>right wing acceptance of inequality</b>	<b>educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work</b>

For the analysis of the choropleth maps of global values, it's again necessary, as in previous Chapters, to analyze in more detail the factor definitions (loadings which are higher than or are equal to 0.5) as well as the countries with the highest and lowest factor scores each.

### **Factor definitions:**

#### ➤ **moral (sexual) permissiveness ('Permissiveness 1')**

#### **Definition:**

Justifiable: abortion

Justifiable: homosexuality

Justifiable: divorce

Justifiable: prostitution

Justifiable: euthanasia

Justifiable: suicide

#### **Highest values:**

Andorra

Sweden

Switzerland

Czech Republic

Spain

#### **Lowest values:**

Jordan

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Zimbabwe

Viet Nam

#### ➤ **acceptancy of the shadow economy ('Permissiveness 2')**

#### **Definition:**

Justifiable: cheating on taxes



Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport

Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe

Justifiable: claiming government benefits even if one is not entitled to them

**Highest values:**

Serbia

Philippines

Zambia

Croatia

Thailand

**Lowest values:**

Bangladesh

Tanzania

Zimbabwe

Turkey

New Zealand

➤ distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')

**Definition:**

How often do you attend religious services (never?)

negative loading: How important is God in your life

negative loading: important child qualities: religious faith

**Highest values:**

Russian Federation

Estonia

Czech Republic

Sweden

Bulgaria

**Lowest values:**

Jordan

Nigeria

Ghana

Indonesia

Tanzania

➤ **educational values: independence and imagination**

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: independence

Important child qualities: imagination

**Highest values:**

Norway

Germany

Ethiopia

Sweden

South Korea

**Lowest values:**

Zimbabwe

Nigeria

Burkina Faso

Russian Federation

Uganda

➤ **distance to market economy values**

**Definition:**

Favoring private or state ownership of business (state ownership)

Competition good or harmful (harmful)

**Highest values:**

Poland

Thailand

Chile

Philippines

Indonesia

**Lowest values:**

Croatia

Uganda

Romania  
United States  
Macedonia

➤ **education values: responsibility and tolerance**

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: feeling of responsibility

Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people

*Negative loading: obedience (-0,459)*

**Highest values:**

Sweden  
Norway  
Finland  
Germany  
Switzerland

**Lowest values:**

Nigeria  
Burkina Faso  
Tanzania  
Ghana  
Mali

➤ **educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving**

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: determination and perseverance

Negative loading: Important child qualities: thrift, and saving money and things

**Highest values:**

Ghana  
Zimbabwe

New Zealand

Nigeria

Italy

**Lowest values:**

Viet Nam

Indonesia

Thailand

South Korea

Philippines

➤ right wing acceptance of inequality

**Definition:**

Self-positioning in political scale (right wing)

Income equality (large differences needed)

**Highest values:**

Viet Nam

Indonesia

Bangladesh

Ghana

Thailand

**Lowest values:**

Germany

Switzerland

Hungary

Spain

Andorra

➤ educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work

**Definition:**

Important child qualities: unselfishness

Negative loading: important child qualities: hard work

**Highest values:**

Uruguay

Jordan

Mexico

Chile

Thailand

**Lowest values:**

Estonia


Latvia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Belarus

**Map 5.1: moral (sexual) permissiveness (*'Permissiveness 1'*)**




source: our own calculations and [http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly\\_and\\_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html](http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html)

**Map 5.2: acceptance of the shadow economy (*'Permissiveness 2'*)**




**Map 5.3: distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')**







**Map 5.4: educational values: independence and imagination**




**Map 5.5: distance to market economy values**




**Map 5.6: educational values: responsibility and tolerance**



**Map 5.7: educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving**




**Map 5.8: right wing acceptance of inequality (global rank, right wing acceptance of inequality).<sup>22</sup> High right-wing acceptance of inequality: marked in blue; low right-wing acceptance of inequality: marked in red**



<sup>22</sup> The indicator did not produce meaningful maps with the original values, so we transformed it to a ranking.

**Map 5.9: educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work**



## 5. 2. Hofstede, Ralston *et al.* , Inglehart and our typologies

We have now almost reached the end of our journey. With lots of data, shown in Tables, Graphs and Maps, we have tried to present our picture of the analyses, as they emerge from the data of the *World Values Survey*, and the *Arab Opinion Index*. In Table 5.6 we provide our readers with clear-cut Pearson-Bravais correlation coefficients between the data presented by Hofstede and Inglehart and the factor scores from our own analytical dimensions, presented in this work on the bases of promax factor analysis with individual data from up to more than 80 countries. Table 5.7 shows the Pearson-Bravais correlations between the Ralston *et al.* dimensions and our results. In many ways, we can show that Hofstede's Power Distance, Individualism versus Collectivism, Long-Term Orientation, and Indulgence versus Restraint very well correspond to our own factor analyses. The same happens with Inglehart's main dimensions, traditional versus secular, and survival versus self-expression. In all cases, however, we could avoid some of the problematic assumptions, still inherent in the research by Hofstede and Inglehart. Our factors show correlations of  $\pm .500$  and more with those mentioned dimensions of Hofstede's and Inglehart's research. Hofstede's other factors – Masculinity versus Femininity, and Uncertainty Avoidance, found no confirmation of a correlation of  $\pm .500$  or more with our own factors. But this does not necessarily imply that Hofstede's research is falsified on this point. It might also very well be that

- 1) relationships between phenomena changed over time or
- 2) Hofstede's samples (employees of the transnational corporation IBM) exhibit other tendencies and correlations as the populations at large.

In the following, we list the comparisons of the research results by Hofstede and Inglehart and our own with more detail. The data for this exercise are freely available from

[https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth\\_maps\\_of\\_global\\_values\\_and\\_background\\_variables](https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_background_variables)).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Readers are reminded here that the mentioned EXCEL files, downloadable from [https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth\\_maps\\_of\\_global\\_values\\_and\\_background\\_variables](https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_background_variables) serve a dual purpose: easy data documentation for standard variables, used in this work, and the drawing of choropleth maps. For that very reason, data for Hongkong and Macau, which are territories belonging to the People's Republic of China, could not be used further. Likewise, we should draw our reader's attention that available data for Taiwan, Province of China, were used in the choropleth maps.

### **Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by Hofstede and Inglehart:**

- traditional religion
- the 'ego' company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)
- feminism analysis: distance to traditionalist forms of religion
- feminism analysis: feminism
- re-analysis: moral (sexual) permissiveness ('Permissiveness 1')
- re-analysis: distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')
- re-analysis: education values: responsibility and tolerance
- re-analysis: educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work

### **Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by Hofstede only:**

- authoritarian character
- tolerance and respect + postmaterialism
- re-analysis: educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving
- re-analysis: right wing acceptance of inequality

### **Our own factors which confirmed the theoretical work by Inglehart only:**

- economic permissiveness

### **Our own factors which confirmed earlier theories by a correlation of less than +/-0.50:**

- Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity
- Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index



## **Our own factors which were absent from earlier theoretical attempts:**

- racism
- higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
- distrust of the army and the press
- [predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy
- re-analysis: acceptancy of the shadow economy ('Permissiveness 2')
- re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination
- re-analysis: distance to market economy values

**Table 5.6: Hofstede, Inglehart and the factors from our work – Pearson Bravais correlations of the country results**

	Hofstede: Power Distance	Hofstede: Individual ism vs. Collectivis m	Hofstede: Masculinit y versus Femininity	Hofstede: Uncertain y Avoidance Index	Hofstede: Long- Term Orientatio n	Hofstede: Indulgenc e versus Restraint	Inglehart: Traditiona l/Secular Values	Inglehart: Survival vs. Self- Expressio n Values
economic permissiveness	0,304	-0,138	0,064	0,162	0,091	-0,051	0,272	-0,715
traditional religion	0,447	-0,439	0,288	0,082	-0,546	0,179	-0,911	0,110
racism	0,426	-0,491	0,087	-0,247	0,189	-0,401	-0,362	-0,020
higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	-0,086	-0,038	-0,210	-0,019	0,047	0,119	-0,310	-0,087
distrust of the army and the press	-0,435	0,332	-0,043	0,371	-0,058	0,246	0,424	-0,405
authoritarian character	0,567	-0,365	0,200	0,355	0,086	-0,374	-0,238	-0,297
tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	-0,686	0,597	-0,071	-0,079	-0,196	0,530	0,293	-0,247
the ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	-0,067	0,122	-0,196	-0,032	0,796	-0,600	0,640	0,700
[predominantly] female rejection of the market economy and democracy	0,094	-0,238	-0,065	0,461	-0,039	0,191	0,146	-0,140
feminism analysis: distance to traditionalist forms of religion	-0,424	0,526	-0,159	-0,086	0,523	-0,057	0,916	0,300
feminism analysis: feminism	0,349	-0,064	0,247	-0,013	0,513	0,446	0,531	-0,399
re-analysis: moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’)	-0,560	0,650	-0,076	-0,028	0,130	0,180	0,705	0,561

re-analysis: acceptancy of the shadow economy ('Permissiveness 2')	0,386	-0,210	-0,038	0,150	0,045	-0,133	0,236	-0,439
re-analysis: distance from religion ('Permissiveness 3')	-0,383	0,404	-0,222	-0,029	0,578	-0,304	0,913	0,065
re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination	-0,326	0,081	-0,152	-0,218	0,130	0,104	0,277	0,456
re-analysis: distance to market economy values	0,431	-0,480	0,025	0,212	-0,182	0,006	-0,229	-0,230
re-analysis: education values: responsibility and tolerance	-0,594	0,522	-0,104	0,154	0,095	0,260	0,555	0,476
re-analysis: educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	-0,631	0,654	-0,033	0,054	-0,020	0,171	0,185	0,330
re-analysis: right wing acceptance of inequality	0,470	-0,564	-0,042	-0,204	-0,025	-0,213	-0,321	-0,324
re-analysis: educational values: favoring unselfishness, rejecting hard work	-0,110	-0,035	0,097	-0,039	-0,595	0,665	-0,280	0,549
	<b>Hofstede: Power Distance</b>	<b>Hofstede: Individualism vs. Collectivism</b>	<b>Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity</b>	<b>Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index</b>	<b>Hofstede: Long-Term Orientation</b>	<b>Hofstede: Indulgence versus Restraint</b>	<b>Inglehart: Traditional/Secular Values</b>	<b>Inglehart: Survival vs. Self-Expression Values</b>

In the following two Tables, we evaluate the relationship of the Ralston *et al.* factors with the other aggregates, presented in this article. Again, the data for this exercise are freely available from [https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth\\_maps\\_of\\_global\\_values\\_and\\_background\\_variables](https://www.academia.edu/7504018/Choropleth_maps_of_global_values_and_background_variables).<sup>24</sup> The Ralston *et al.* values (raw country scores) were listed in Ralston, Egri, Reynaud *et al.*, 2011. Ralston *et al.*'s factors *Affective Autonomy* and *Harmony* do not achieve any correlations which have more than 25% of variance in common with our own factors, and in addition, the following dimensions from our own research are untapped, it seems, by the Ralston *et al.* factors (to judge from the less than 25% of variance they have in common with the Ralston *et al.* factors):

- racism
- higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)
- distrust of the army and the press
- female rejection of the market economy and democracy
- re-analysis: shadow economy mentality ('Permissiveness 2')
- re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination
- re-analysis: education values: unselfishness and being against hard work
- feminism analysis: Generation gap in educational level

In addition, the following factors from Hofstede and Inglehart are untapped; it seems, by Ralston *et al.*'s theories (again to judge from the less than 25% of variance they have in common with the Ralston *et al.* factors)

Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity

Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index

Inglehart: Self-Expression Values (WVS 1-4, 2006)

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<sup>24</sup> See note before.

**Table 5.7: The correlations of the country results of Ralston *et al.* with the country results by Hofstede, Inglehart and the factors from our work**

	Embedde dness	Hierarchy	Mastery	Affective Autonom y	Intellectu al Autonom y	Egalitaria nism	Harmony
Chapter 5: traditional religion	<b>0,567</b>	0,370	0,403	0,167	0,453	<b>0,598</b>	0,263
Chapter 5: racism	0,373	0,370	0,111	-0,391	-0,364	-0,193	-0,108
Chapter 5: higher education of the younger generation (education gap between the generations)	0,185	0,156	0,379	0,344	0,444	0,208	0,214
Chapter 5: distrust of the army and the press	-0,333	-0,469	-0,249	0,214	0,382	0,033	-0,073
Chapter 5: authoritarian character	<b>0,518</b>	0,325	0,299	-0,058	-0,016	0,015	0,350
Chapter 5: tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	<b>-0,525</b>	-0,556	-0,284	0,145	0,228	0,100	-0,137
Chapter 5: the ‘ego’ company (rejection of obedience + unselfishness)	-0,341	-0,180	-0,331	-0,210	-0,400	<b>-0,640</b>	-0,395
Chapter 5: female rejection of the market economy and democracy	0,162	-0,070	-0,133	-0,148	0,094	0,113	-0,044
Chapter 12 re-analysis: moral (sexual) permissiveness (‘Permissiveness 1’)	<b>-0,727</b>	<b>-0,642</b>	-0,462	0,171	-0,018	-0,230	-0,148
Chapter 12 re-analysis: shadow economy mentality (‘Permissiveness 2’)	0,093	-0,261	-0,145	-0,281	-0,133	-0,156	0,044
Chapter 12 re-analysis: distance from religion (‘Permissiveness 3’)	<b>-0,516</b>	-0,337	-0,372	-0,191	-0,486	<b>-0,641</b>	-0,249
Chapter 12 re-analysis: educational values: independence and imagination	-0,299	-0,187	-0,202	-0,089	-0,096	-0,092	-0,340
Chapter 12 re-analysis: distance to market	0,497	<b>0,557</b>	0,122	-0,219	-0,039	0,172	0,023

economy values							
Chapter 12 re-analysis: education values: responsibility and tolerance	<b>-0,518</b>	<b>-0,533</b>	-0,370	0,028	0,210	-0,052	-0,154
Chapter 12 re-analysis: educational values: determination and perseverance and being against saving	<b>-0,557</b>	<b>-0,598</b>	-0,230	0,220	0,267	-0,007	-0,016
Chapter 12 re-analysis: right wing acceptance of inequality	0,452	<b>0,545</b>	0,188	-0,206	-0,394	-0,110	-0,068
Chapter 12 re-analysis: education values: unselfishness and being against hard work	0,160	0,054	0,165	0,100	0,274	0,490	0,161
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: distance to traditionalist forms of religion	<b>-0,702</b>	<b>-0,616</b>	<b>-0,542</b>	-0,082	-0,283	<b>-0,557</b>	-0,390
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: Generation gap in educational level	-0,181	-0,115	-0,042	0,191	0,116	-0,191	-0,252
Chapter 6: feminism analysis: feminism	<b>-0,677</b>	<b>-0,749</b>	<b>-0,516</b>	0,145	0,207	-0,101	-0,392
Hofstede: Power Distance	<b>0,570</b>	<b>0,569</b>	0,365	-0,216	-0,119	-0,002	0,258
Hofstede: Individualism vs. Collectivism	<b>-0,567</b>	<b>-0,532</b>	-0,328	0,251	0,136	-0,078	-0,147
Hofstede: Masculinity versus Femininity	-0,187	-0,065	-0,103	0,028	0,065	0,052	-0,046
Hofstede: Uncertainty Avoidance Index	0,050	-0,238	-0,080	-0,091	0,325	0,213	0,362
Hofstede: Long-Term Orientation	-0,378	-0,218	-0,400	-0,322	-0,488	<b>-0,685</b>	-0,379
Hofstede: Indulgence versus Restraint	0,062	-0,006	0,203	0,492	<b>0,501</b>	<b>0,586</b>	0,210
Inglehart: Secular Values (WVS 1-4, 2006)	<b>-0,705</b>	<b>-0,619</b>	<b>-0,635</b>	-0,187	-0,351	<b>-0,709</b>	-0,447
Inglehart: Self-Expression Values (WVS 1-4, 2006)	-0,412	-0,243	-0,154	0,437	0,207	0,154	-0,223
	<b>Embedde dness</b>	<b>Hierarchy</b>	<b>Mastery</b>	<b>Affective Autonom y</b>	<b>Intellectu al Autonom y</b>	<b>Egalitaria nism</b>	<b>Harmony</b>

The Ralston *et al.* factor “Embeddedness” has the highest correlation with the absence of sexual permissiveness (permissiveness 1 – Chapter 12 of this work). Hierarchy is most closely correlated with the absence of feminism (see Chapter 6 of this work). Mastery is closely related to the absence of secular values from Inglehart’s theory; and Egalitarianism also has almost 50% of variance with that Inglehartian factor (absence of secular values) in common. Affective Autonomy and Harmony are only weakly connected to the other global value aggregates, presented in this article. Intellectual Autonomy is somehow related to Hofstede’s Indulgence Factor, but the other correlations are relatively small. Ralston *et al.*’s Egalitarianism is strongest in religious societies; it negatively correlates with Hofstede’s long-term orientation and our “ego factor”.

Table 5.8 now shows the correlations of the country scores from Ralston *et al.*’s work with standard socio-economic indicators. Interestingly enough, Muslim population shares and OIC membership present high correlations with the Ralston *et al.* factors “Embeddedness”, “Hierarchy” and “Mastery”. For the other correlations of the Ralston *et al.* factors, we refer our readers to Table 5.8

**Table 5.8: The correlations of the country results of Ralston *et al.* with country aggregate and value research data**

	Embedde dness	Hierarchy	Mastery	Affective Autonom y	Intellectu al Autonom y	Egalitaria nism	Harmony
Membership in the Islamic Conference	<b>0,677</b>	<b>0,613</b>	<b>0,537</b>	0,098	0,089	0,321	0,480
Muslim population share per total population	<b>0,678</b>	<b>0,613</b>	<b>0,526</b>	0,074	0,059	0,298	0,459
% women in government, all levels	-0,301	-0,346	-0,116	0,291	0,148	0,041	-0,123
2000 Economic Freedom Score	-0,261	-0,124	-0,145	0,239	0,065	-0,061	-0,412
ecological footprint (g ha /cap)	-0,327	-0,237	-0,206	0,288	0,026	-0,182	-0,251
ESI-Index Environment Sustainability Index (Yale Columbia)	-0,369	-0,482	-0,313	0,134	0,219	-0,016	-0,103
Happy life years	-0,382	-0,260	-0,276	0,288	0,130	0,050	-0,149
Happy Planet Index, HPI	0,198	0,206	0,119	-0,028	0,087	0,302	0,260
homicide rate	0,130	0,123	0,142	0,082	0,215	0,170	-0,009
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%)	0,003	0,169	0,105	0,287	0,081	-0,098	-0,162
Life Satisfaction (0-10)	-0,311	-0,193	-0,220	0,338	0,143	0,098	-0,097
WVS: mean acceptance competition	0,032	-0,063	-0,133	-0,006	0,254	0,187	-0,002
WVS: mean acceptance gov benefits fraud	0,235	0,116	0,083	0,015	0,263	0,205	0,149
WVS: mean left-right position	0,433	0,440	0,297	-0,134	-0,204	0,148	0,238
Shadow economy as % of the GDP	0,456	0,325	0,265	-0,153	0,083	0,149	0,254
Global tolerance index	<b>-0,595</b>	<b>-0,609</b>	-0,404	0,329	0,250	-0,076	-0,361
Human development index (HDI) value 2004	<b>-0,610</b>	<b>-0,563</b>	-0,498	0,080	0,015	-0,218	-0,386
ln GDP per capita	<b>-0,594</b>	<b>-0,552</b>	-0,492	0,149	0,036	-0,224	-0,386
Middle class share (share of quintiles 2-4), average	-0,484	-0,379	-0,456	-0,097	-0,432	<b>-0,553</b>	-0,377



60-96							
principal component growth 2008-2011, final version	0,399	<b>0,596</b>	0,403	-0,024	-0,067	0,136	0,115
quintile share income difference between richest and poorest 20%	0,224	0,227	0,269	0,169	0,389	<b>0,437</b>	0,130
social security expenditure per GDP average 1990s (ILO)	<b>-0,626</b>	<b>-0,728</b>	-0,494	0,079	0,145	-0,115	-0,172
Total crimes (per capita)	-0,473	<b>-0,576</b>	-0,251	0,220	-0,006	-0,040	-0,238
unemployment rate	0,283	0,009	0,182	-0,037	0,169	0,356	0,287
Value Development	-0,359	-0,128	-0,049	0,213	0,077	0,093	-0,085
World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness	<b>-0,549</b>	-0,337	-0,387	0,186	-0,153	-0,315	<b>-0,521</b>

### 5. 3. On sexual behavior values and effective democracy

In these concluding remarks we will first of all visit current debates in France and in Europe. These days, we read stories in the leading world newspapers like the one below which tell us a lot about the conflicts about global values in countries like Europe today. *Is prostitution justifiable? Is homosexuality justifiable? Are both justifiable? Is one justifiable, the other is not? Are both not justifiable?* The French Socialists, it seems, for example, seem to think that one is not, and the other is. President Hollande and his administration put considerable political energy into legalizing homosexual marriages and prohibiting prostitution. But global citizens hold another view, and there is a **high positive correlation of 0.632 between the two items in the World Values Survey, based on 218877 individuals from around the globe.** For a correlation at the individual level from such a large global survey, the coefficient is very high indeed.

I.e. people in favor of the complete acceptability of homosexuality will also be in favor of the complete acceptability of prostitution and vice versa. But empirical *World Values Survey* research has many surprises in store for all ideological camps, and empirical *World Values Survey* research more often than not contradicts ideologies, left and right, religiously motivated and secularist alike.

The Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* brought the recent debate to a point, when it said:

*“Hürriyet November/22/2013: French lawmakers will next week consider a bill that punishes the clients of prostitutes and has sparked fierce debate in a country with a long history of liberal attitudes to sex. The bill, which the government says is aimed at preventing violence against women, has come under fire from celebrities like Catherine Deneuve and Charles Aznavour, leading intellectuals and prostitutes themselves. Spearheaded by Women's Rights Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, the law will fine clients of prostitutes 1,500 euros (\$2,025) for a first offense and double that for repeat offenders. Prostitution itself is legal in France but soliciting, pimping and minors selling sex are prohibited. The government estimates about 20,000 prostitutes operate in France. [...] About 60 people, including Deneuve, Aznavour and former culture minister Jack Lang released an open letter this month opposing the bill and calling for "a real debate" on prostitution "without ideological prejudice." Surprising some, among the most vocal opponents of the bill has been the*

*philosopher and feminist Elisabeth Badinter, who has pleaded that "the state has no place legislating on individual sexual activity." Badinter said she saw no direct link between male sexuality and violence against women, accusing some of having "a stereotypical view that is very negative and moralistic and which I reject." Her remarks drew a sharp rebuke from Health Minister Marisol Touraine. [...] It comes after a deeply divisive debate on another contentious sexuality issue -- the legalisation of gay marriage. President Francois Hollande's Socialist government legalised homosexual marriages and adoptions earlier this year, but only after tens of thousands took to the streets in a series of protests to denounce the move. Europe is also in the midst of a wider debate over prostitution, which is legal in several countries on the continent."*

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/fierce-debate-as-france-looks-to-punish-prostitutes-clients.aspx?pageID=238&nID=58376&NewsCatID=351>

The emotionalized and very bitter debate in France took place without any real reference to the empirical realities of global values "on the ground". France, like many other European countries, seems to be disconnected from empirical global *World Values Survey* science research. The freely available archive of all the leading French language scholarly journals, *Persee*, lists just 17 articles mentioning the word "*World Values Survey*" at all.<sup>25</sup> Not a single article of these 17 articles deals with the problem of homosexuality, which was the issue of a real ideological warfare in the country recently. So we can say that French language social science hardly works at all with the *World Values Survey*.

Current debates in Europe on issues of human values have acquired an almost quasi-religious character, with each side claiming that it is in the sole possession of truth, while in reality the complex relationships between value patterns are often overlooked. Tables 5.9 and 5.10 pick out the two issues which were at the heart of the recent debates in France – **the acceptancy of homosexuality, and the acceptancy of prostitution**. Looking at the partial correlations between the acceptancy of homosexuality and 20 other *World Values Survey* key-indicators of trust and behavior, we find that apart from the high correlations with acceptancy rates for such phenomena as divorce, abortion, and large-scale non-confidence in Churches, which mainstream secular and left of the middle socio-political currents in Europe will perceive as largely unproblematic, **there are also significant and higher correlations between the unconditional acceptancy of homosexuality with accepting a bribe, avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, and the generalized loss of trust in basic institutions of democratic society**. We used *World Values Survey* data WVS,

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25

<http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revues/alph? Prescripts Search tabs1=advanced& Prescripts Search oai=false& Prescripts Search revueDisplay=advanced>

version “wvs1981\_2008\_v20090914.sav”, IBM-SPSS 21 software, and partial correlation (keeping constant income and education level). Our correlations are based on the WVS data for all the representative citizens of our globe with complete available data:

**Table 5.9: Was Schumpeter right after all? The loss of capitalist family values as measured by social acceptancy rates of homosexuality and their correlates from the *World Values Survey***

	Control variables: Income level & Education level (recoded)		
	<b>Justifiable: homosexuality</b>		
	<b>partial correlation</b>	<b>error p</b>	<b>df</b>
Justifiable: prostitution	0,628	0,000	43318
Justifiable: divorce	0,475	0,000	43318
Justifiable: abortion	0,474	0,000	43318
Justifiable: suicide	0,419	0,000	43318
Justifiable: euthanasia	0,397	0,000	42476
No confidence: Churches	0,217	0,000	43318
Justifiable: drinking alcohol	0,197	0,000	14292
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	0,188	0,000	43318
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	0,167	0,000	43318
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	0,164	0,000	43318
No confidence: Armed Forces	0,123	0,000	43318
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	0,105	0,000	42795
No confidence: The Government	0,086	0,000	43318
No confidence: The Civil Services	0,081	0,000	43318
No confidence: Parliament	0,078	0,000	43318
No confidence: The Press	0,076	0,000	43318
No confidence: Television	0,072	0,000	43318
No confidence: Major Companies	0,060	0,000	42066
No confidence: The Political Parties	0,058	0,000	42473
No confidence: Labor Unions	0,017	0,001	39781

**Table 5.10: Social acceptancy rates of prostitution and their correlates from the *World Values Survey***

	Control variables: Income level & Education level (recoded)		
	<b>Justifiable: prostitution</b>		
	<b>partial correlation</b>	<b>error p</b>	<b>df</b>
Justifiable: homosexuality	0,628	0,000	43318
Justifiable: abortion	0,491	0,000	43566
Justifiable: suicide	0,454	0,000	43566
Justifiable: divorce	0,434	0,000	43566
Justifiable: euthanasia	0,385	0,000	42476
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe	0,299	0,000	43566
Justifiable: cheating on taxes	0,272	0,000	43553
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport	0,231	0,000	43566
Justifiable: drinking alcohol	0,214	0,000	14325
No confidence: Churches	0,188	0,000	43566
Justifiable: claiming government benefits	0,162	0,000	42795
No confidence: Armed Forces	0,113	0,000	43566
No confidence: The Government	0,093	0,000	43566
No confidence: The Civil Services	0,092	0,000	43566
No confidence: Parliament	0,085	0,000	43323
No confidence: The Press	0,069	0,000	43566
No confidence: Television	0,066	0,000	43566
No confidence: The Political Parties	0,062	0,000	42473
No confidence: Major Companies	0,056	0,000	42066
No confidence: Labor Unions	0,043	0,000	39781
No confidence: The Police	0,040	0,000	43566
No confidence: The United Nations	0,018	0,000	41746
No confidence: The Women's Movement	0,018	0,000	40824

Whatever way, the French Socialists overlooked the fact that the global citizens, saying homosexuality is always justified, will also have a high tendency to say as well that prostitution is always justified. The correlation between the two phenomena, independent from income and education, is 0.628, i.e. 39.4% of the variance is in common. Considering that these are results from individual interviews across the globe and across cultures, this correlation is really extraordinary. So if there is a majority of citizens voting “yes” in a hypothetical

global referendum on legalizing prostitution and gay marriages, the same constituencies would be in favor or against the motion.

Beyond this specifically European point, a larger issue emerges, which really goes to the heart of the whole argument, i.e. **whether changing sexual norms away from the standards of the father/mother/child family, prescribed by the major world religions, should be important for democracy.** Inglehart and Welzel (2009) are very explicit about this, making it very clear that for them it is a vital issue for the future of democracy:

*“[...] Modernization does not automatically lead to democracy. Rather, it, in the long run, brings social and cultural changes that make democratization increasingly probable. Simply attaining a high level of per capita GDP does not produce democracy: if it did, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would have become model democracies. (These countries have not gone through the modernization process described above.) But the emergence of postindustrial society brings certain social and cultural changes that are specifically conducive to democratization. Knowledge societies cannot function effectively without highly educated publics that have become increasingly accustomed to thinking for themselves. Furthermore, rising levels of economic security bring a growing emphasis on a syndrome of self-expression values -- one that gives high priority to free choice and motivates political action. Beyond a certain point, accordingly, it becomes difficult to avoid democratization, because repressing mass demands for more open societies becomes increasingly costly and detrimental to economic effectiveness. Thus, in its advanced stages, modernization brings social and cultural changes that make the emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions increasingly likely.*

*The core idea of modernization theory is that economic and technological development bring a **coherent set of social, cultural, and political changes.** A large body of empirical evidence supports this idea. **Economic development is, indeed, strongly linked to pervasive shifts in people's beliefs and motivations, and these shifts in turn change the role of religion, job motivations, human fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms. And they also bring growing mass demands for democratic institutions and for more responsive behavior on the part of elites. These changes together make democracy increasingly likely to emerge, while also making war less acceptable to publics.**” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009).*

At one point in their essay, they maintain:

*“The shift from traditional to secular-rational values is linked to the shift from agrarian to industrial societies. Traditional societies emphasize religion, respect*

*for and obedience to authority, and national pride. These characteristics change as societies become more secular and rational.*

*The shift from survival to self-expression values is linked to the rise of postindustrial societies. It reflects a cultural shift that occurs when younger generations emerge that have grown up taking survival for granted. Survival values give top priority to economic and physical security and conformist social norms. **Self-expression values give high priority to freedom of expression, participation in decision-making, political activism, environmental protection, gender equality, and tolerance of ethnic minorities, foreigners, and gays and lesbians.** A growing emphasis on these latter values engenders a culture of trust and tolerance in which people cherish individual freedom and self-expression and have activist political orientations. These attributes are crucial to democracy -- and thus explain how economic growth, which takes societies from agrarian to industrial and then from industrial to postindustrial, leads to democratization. The unprecedented economic growth of the past 50 years has meant that an increasing share of the world's population has grown up taking survival for granted. Time-series data from the values surveys indicate that mass priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security to an emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression, participation in decision-making, and a relatively trusting and tolerant outlook.” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2009)*

This shift away from traditional family values now happens in advanced Western democracies at an unprecedented scale. The replacement of “traditional gender roles” by concepts like “parent 1” and “parent 2” in official documents has already begun in several industrialized western democracies, including the United States of America:

*“The words “mother” and “father” will be removed from U.S. passport applications and replaced with gender neutral terminology, the State Department says. “The words in the old form were ‘mother’ and ‘father,’” said Brenda Sprague, deputy assistant Secretary of State for Passport Services. **“They are now ‘parent one’ and ‘parent two.’”** A statement on the State Department website noted: “These improvements are being made to provide a gender neutral description of a child’s parents and in recognition of different types of families.” The statement didn't note if it was for child applications only. The State Department said the new passport applications, not yet available to the public, will be available online soon. Sprague said the decision to remove the traditional parenting names was not an act of political correctness. “We find that with changes in medical science and reproductive technology that we are confronting situations now that we would not have anticipated 10 or 15 years ago,” she said. Gay rights groups are applauding the decision. “Changing the term mother and father to the more global term of parent allows many different*

types of families to be able to go and apply for a passport for their child without feeling like the government doesn't recognize their family," said Jennifer Chrisler, executive director of Family Equality Council. Her organization lobbied the government for several years to remove the words from passport applications. "Our government needs to recognize that the family structure is changing," Chrisler said. "The best thing that we can do is support people who are raising kids in loving, stable families."

(<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/07/passport-applications-soon-gender-neutral/>)

Major mainstream religious denominations like the Roman Catholic Church now began to join the debate on **"parent 1"** and **"parent 2"** by voicing their absolute discontent:

***"ROME, September 13, 2013 (LifeSiteNews.com) – Replacing terms like mother and father with "Parent 1 and Parent 2" is not an innocuous defense of "equality" but the beginning of a complete re-write of Italian society, a prominent Italian cardinal said this week. Changing the categories of family life and genealogy could send "a real earthquake" through the social structure. The expression, that has already been proposed for all official documents related to public housing and kindergarten placements in the city of Venice, will make "the category of fatherhood and motherhood disappear, to be replaced by the generic category of 'parenting,'" the Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, Carlo Caffarra, said. Speaking in a keynote address at a conference at the Teatro Manzoni in Bologna this week, Cardinal Caffarra identified the largest question facing Italian society: "Is marriage a reality at the disposal of the men, or does it have a 'hard core' that is not open to human preference?"***  
(<http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/cardinal-replacing-mom-and-dad-with-parent-1-and-2-will-send-an-earthquake>)

From the perspective of developing countries, striving for stable institutions of democracy, one really has to question whether at the end of the day the political decision makers should start re-writing the identity cards and passports of their citizens and start hosting "love parades" in the name of "tolerance for gays and lesbians", said to be so important for achieving effective democracy? Should they follow the lead of the Parliamentary Assembly of the "Council of Europe" ([http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefDocDetails\\_E.asp?FileID=12456](http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefDocDetails_E.asp?FileID=12456)) and adopt new legislation of their own also to eliminate the words „father" and "mother" from official documents and can they hope then that their political system would become "an effective democracy" by adopting such measures?

Let us return for a moment to the Choropleth maps 3.11 and 3.12 of this work and the data on "effective democracy". As Alexander, Inglehart and Welzel, 2011, explain, the freedom ratings of the index of effective democracy are



provided in two indices: The *civil liberties ratings* and the *political rights ratings*, which are averaged to obtain an *overall index of democratic rights*. This component index is transformed into a 0-to-100 range. The dimension of effectiveness in the index is provided by the use of the World Bank's *Rule of Law index*.

If we keep development levels – as in Map 3.12 of this work – constant, it emerges that hard core, economic and social “bread and butter” feminism indicators and economic freedom indicators are far more influential than value change indicators in bringing about effective democracy even at low levels of development. Inglehart's “*self-expression*” scale achieves about the same results as Hofstede's “*power distance*” and our own “*authoritarian personality*” scale. The absence of militarism and of an oil exporting economy has also a beneficial effect on “*effective democracy*”. So, while feminism and a free economy generally affect effective democracy in a positive fashion, we have to emphasize as well that Maastricht-type of savings programs and also very high inward migration rates are not a driver, but a bottleneck of effective democracy.

**Table 5.11: the drivers of “*effective democracy*” irrespective of development level**



	<b>Pearson correlation with effective democracy</b>	<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>
% women in government, all levels	0,484	23,383
WEF closing of global gender gap overall score 2009	0,461	21,278
Investment Freedom	0,449	20,144
closing political gender gap	0,449	20,119
WEF Global Gender Gap Report Political Empowerment 2009	0,449	20,119
Dummy for oil exporting	-0,447	19,949
WEF Gender Gap Report Economic Participation and Opportunity 2009	0,439	19,298
% women in government, sub ministerial level	0,436	19,041
UNDP gender empowerment index	0,433	18,773
military personnel rate ln (MPR+1)	-0,419	17,579
Hofstede: Power Distance	-0,419	17,573
Inglehart: Self-Expression	0,419	17,557
Hofstede: Individualism vs. Collectivism	0,409	16,702
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: authoritarian character	-0,402	16,131
Protestant population share, 2000	0,398	15,855
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: feminism analysis: feminism	0,398	15,811

average surplus-deficit 2000-2007	-0,387	15,002
military expenditures per GDP	-0,373	13,915
% women in government, ministerial level	0,373	13,898
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: tolerance and respect + postmaterialism	0,372	13,826
Immigration - Share of population 2005 (%)	-0,371	13,800
Ratio of estimated female to male earned income	0,371	13,734
Tausch: Global tolerance index	0,368	13,578
Property Rights	0,348	12,088
Financial Freedom	0,346	11,996
Kearney technological globalization	0,346	11,993
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: re-analysis: right wing acceptance of inequality	-0,328	10,747
Heshmati/Karoui/Tausch: Value Development Index	0,326	10,650

Source: our own calculations from <https://uibk.academia.edu/ArnoTausch/Documentation-for-books-and-articles> - Analysis of the shadow economy

Graph 5.1 highlights the politically, socially and ethically robust and globally applicable message of our article on the drivers of “*effective democracy*”: a sound gender political agenda, ending the political discrimination of women, and economic freedom will be conducive to “*effective democracy*”. Nevertheless the path towards “*effective democracy*” will be one of ups and downs, and especially in developing countries, there will be also certain limits for a too rapid economic liberalization.

**Graph 5.1: the drivers of “effective democracy”**



**5.4. A glance at the *World Values Survey* wave, 6, 2010-2014**

As the manuscript to this article was about to be finished, the new data of the *World Values Survey*, 2010-2014 were released, containing yet another enormous wealth of new data, including on the Muslim world. We have chosen to concentrate on two phenomena, which received a large attention on the pages of this article – tolerance and democracy. *World Values Survey* data for the 6<sup>th</sup> wave are now available for Algeria; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Chile; China; Colombia; Cyprus; Ecuador; Estonia; Germany; Ghana; Iraq;

Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lebanon; Libya; Malaysia; Mexico; Morocco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Singapore; Slovenia; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Taiwan; The Occupied Palestinian Territories; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Yemen; and Zimbabwe.

In Table 5.12 we calculate a simple UNDP Human Development Index type of Index of Tolerance, minimizing the rejection of neighbors with the following characteristics among the publics of the above mentioned countries of wave 6 of the *World Values Survey*:

- People who speak a different language
- People of a different religion
- Immigrants/foreign workers
- People of a different race

According to the *World Values Survey* data, the most tolerant nation on earth according to the minimization of rejection rates of the four mentioned categories of neighbors is Uruguay, followed by Sweden; New Zealand; Spain; Trinidad and Tobago; Poland; Rwanda; Colombia; Chile and Australia.

Uzbekistan, Morocco and Kazakhstan are nowadays ahead of Germany; and Pakistan, Qatar and Tunisia are more tolerant than the EU-member country Romania. Muslim countries such as Turkey (which is still ahead of the OECD-member country South Korea), have still a poor performance.

**Table 5.12: Xenophobia rates in the world system, 2010-2014: rejecting different types of neighbors**

	Rejection rate in %	Rejection rate in %	Rejection rate in %	Rejection rate in %	Index of tolerance (0-1)
	People who speak a different language	People of a different religion	Immigrants/foreign workers	People of a different race	Overall tolerance index
Uruguay	2,50	2,90	1,70	1,60	0,993
Sweden	3,20	3,70	3,50	2,80	0,971
New Zealand	5,50	1,40	5,90	2,90	0,955
Spain	3,10	3,10	7,50	4,80	0,949
Trinidad and Tobago	6,70	2,90	6,80	1,50	0,943

Poland	3,20	4,60	7,20	5,50	0,939
Rwanda	7,70	4,80	5,40	3,50	0,924
Colombia	7,50	6,50	4,70	3,20	0,922
Chile	5,40	5,80	7,60	5,60	0,917
Australia	9,90	4,00	10,50	5,00	0,885
Zimbabwe	6,90	7,10	13,70	8,10	0,863
Slovenia	5,00	8,50	13,60	10,90	0,858
China	6,60	9,20	12,20	10,50	0,852
United States	12,90	3,40	13,60	5,60	0,851
Taiwan	7,00	4,50	20,20	8,40	0,845
Peru	10,90	12,30	10,70	9,30	0,820
Netherlands	14,50	2,70	19,60	8,20	0,806
Uzbekistan	7,10	15,10	12,30	14,00	0,806
Mexico	14,10	15,60	11,60	10,20	0,776
Morocco	11,30	18,90	10,80	13,80	0,767
Kazakhstan	11,30	12,10	27,80	11,20	0,736
Ukraine	11,60	15,00	19,30	16,90	0,733
Germany	13,40	14,10	21,40	14,80	0,725
Singapore	10,20	10,80	35,80	12,60	0,709
Pakistan	12,00	23,80	20,90	15,70	0,689
Qatar	9,80	11,60	46,00	8,80	0,681
Tunisia	12,90	29,70	18,80	16,90	0,659
Romania	16,70	19,10	21,30	23,50	0,642
Russia	18,90	14,30	32,20	17,20	0,629
Ghana	21,90	22,50	20,20	19,90	0,612
Philippines	30,70	16,30	14,10	21,60	0,599
Belarus	17,60	18,00	33,40	23,10	0,590
Cyprus	14,40	20,10	35,50	24,80	0,586
Nigeria	23,70	26,50	20,10	20,90	0,577
Estonia	16,50	20,70	37,50	25,40	0,558
Algeria	18,10	42,70	28,00	19,80	0,513
Japan	19,90	32,60	36,30	22,30	0,499
Armenia	16,20	56,60	18,40	31,80	0,451
Kyrgyzstan	25,90	34,10	30,70	28,10	0,450
Jordan	27,40	28,70	37,20	27,20	0,441
Iraq	27,80	28,20	39,00	27,70	0,430

Kuwait	28,90	29,00 <sup>26</sup>	37,20	28,10	0,425
Turkey	30,00	36,80	30,50	35,80	0,377
Ecuador	34,20	32,10	34,60	34,50	0,358
Lebanon	32,40	33,80	40,40	36,30	0,330
South Korea	33,30	31,10	44,20	34,10	0,329
Yemen	31,30	53,30	24,20	34,00	0,329
Malaysia	29,20	30,30	59,70	31,30	0,306
Azerbaijan	26,30	34,80	40,60	58,10	0,269
The Occupied Palestinian Territories	39,20	50,30	39,90	44,00	0,177
Libya	39,30	54,10	59,00	55,10	0,028

Table 5.13 and Maps 5.9 to 5.12 list the *World Values Survey* results for the average importance given by the global publics to democracy and the standard deviation of this indicator. Where the standard deviation is low, opinions on democracy – either way – are undivided, while high standard deviations indicate that the publics are – often bitterly – divided on the issue of democracy.

Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very high internal divisions on this issue are Tunisia; Mexico; Romania; Armenia and Yemen. While there is a general consensus that democracy is important, there are important dissenting voices. Nostalgia for past more authoritarian patterns of government can go hand in hand with economic discontent with present conditions. Countries with an above than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are the **Netherlands; Egypt; Sweden; Turkey; and Cyprus. For anyone, attempting to turn back the clocks of history in such countries could result to be a very costly error. The recent introduction of internet censorship in Turkey would be just one example showing the relevance of this hypothesis.**

Countries with still a below than average importance assigned to democracy, but already very high internal divisions on the issue are **Libya; Philippines; Qatar; the Occupied Palestinian Territories; and Russia.** In these countries and

<sup>26</sup> To be able to work with the full number of countries with otherwise available data, we had to impute the missing observation for Kuwait for the variable “*rejecting neighbors: of a different religion*” from the closely correlating variable: “*rejecting people of a different race*”. Since the two variables correlate with each other to the tune of +0.87 (explained R<sup>2</sup> = 75.21%), we used the linear OLS regression function

$$y (\text{religio-phobia}) = 0.9644 * \text{racism} + 1.9079$$

from Table 12.12 to arrive at the imputed value of 29.0% religio-phobic people in Kuwait. This is the only instance in this book that we use such an imputation.

territories, **debates on the issue of democracy will surge, one way or the other. While the average importance assigned to democracy is still lower than the world average, the divisions on the issue are already very high, and unforeseen events could trigger a popular movement for more participation and democracy.** Finally, countries with a below than average importance assigned to democracy, and very low internal divisions on this issue are Singapore; Rwanda; South Korea; Estonia; and Lebanon. One might expect that the current stagnation in the democratic development of the country will continue: publics don't assign a great importance to democracy, and they are hardly divided on this issue.

Table 5.13 and our maps also have another, more immediate and direct implication: the dire state of the support of democracy in many Western countries, currently hit by the economic crisis and austerity packages, and the surge of democracy in the Muslim world and the Arab world in particular. That Egypt is ahead of Germany, Uzbekistan ahead of the EU-members Poland and Spain, and a number of other Arab and Muslim countries in general ahead of the United States; and Qatar ahead of the EU-member Estonia with justification should be celebrated by the Arab and Muslim readership of this article. Such comparison could be continued endlessly, and it is time for our readers now to lay down this article and start to click:

<http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSONline.jsp>




**Table 5.13: The importance of democracy**

	<b>Importance of democracy (1-10)</b>	<b>standard deviation: importance of democracy</b>
Sweden	9,29	1,53
Cyprus	9,15	1,60
Uruguay	9,00	1,61
<b>Egypt</b>	<b>8,95</b>	<b>1,51</b>
Germany	8,94	1,70
Taiwan	8,91	1,61
Netherlands	8,87	1,40
Australia	8,83	1,90
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	<b>8,79</b>	<b>1,77</b>
Zimbabwe	8,77	1,90
New Zealand	8,73	1,94
Poland	8,70	1,91
Spain	8,64	1,61
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	<b>8,62</b>	<b>1,81</b>
Armenia	8,62	2,13
<b>Malaysia</b>	<b>8,61</b>	<b>1,63</b>
Trinidad and Tobago	8,61	2,09
<b>Turkey</b>	<b>8,57</b>	<b>1,58</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>8,57</b>	<b>2,25</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	<b>8,54</b>	<b>2,28</b>
<b>Chile</b>	<b>8,53</b>	<b>1,95</b>
Ecuador	8,51	1,82
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>8,49</b>	<b>2,09</b>
<b>Yemen</b>	<b>8,49</b>	<b>2,13</b>
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>8,46</b>	<b>2,38</b>
China	8,43	1,59
Ghana	8,43	1,84
<b>United States</b>	<b>8,41</b>	<b>2,05</b>
Peru	8,39	2,08
<b>Qatar</b>	<b>8,34</b>	<b>2,49</b>
<b>South Korea</b>	<b>8,31</b>	<b>1,82</b>
<b>Estonia</b>	<b>8,30</b>	<b>1,93</b>
<b>Jordan</b>	<b>8,29</b>	<b>2,07</b>
<b>Japan</b>	<b>8,27</b>	<b>2,00</b>
<b>Kuwait</b>	<b>8,17</b>	<b>2,37</b>
Colombia	8,13	2,24
<b>Libya</b>	<b>8,13</b>	<b>2,68</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	<b>8,12</b>	<b>2,32</b>



<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>8,11</b>	<b>2,17</b>
Azerbaijan	8,08	2,02
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>8,04</b>	<b>2,56</b>
Lebanon	8,01	1,96
Iraq	7,95	2,13
Kyrgyzstan	7,89	2,20
Nigeria	7,86	1,99
Pakistan	7,85	2,07
Ukraine	7,83	2,35
The Occupied Palestinian Territories	7,78	2,44
Rwanda	7,69	1,78
Singapore	7,65	1,58
Belarus	7,48	2,24
Russia	7,42	2,42

**Map 5.9: The importance of democracy (1-10) – World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014**




source: our own calculations and [http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly\\_and\\_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html](http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-with-excel.html)




**Map 5.11: Where the value of democracy is weakly or strongly contested: standard deviations of the importance, assigned by publics to democracy (1-10) – *World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014***

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**Map 5.12: Where the value of democracy is weakly or strongly contested: standard deviations of the importance, assigned by publics to democracy (1-10) – *World Values Survey, Wave 6, 2010-2014* - - close-up for the Middle-East region**



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