Puzzello, Daniela (2007): Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2007)
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Abstract
This experimental study investigates pricing behavior of sellers in duopoly markets with posted prices and market power. The two treatment variables are given by tie breaking rules and divisibility of the price space. The first treatment variable deals with the rule under which demanded units are allocated between sellers in case of a price tie. A change in divisibility is modeled by making the sellers' price space finer or coarser. The main finding is that the incidence of perfect collusion is significantly higher under the sharing tie breaking rule than under the random (coin-toss) one, especially when the price space is less divisible.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Tie-Breaking Rules and Divisibility in Experimental Duopoly Markets |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Collusion, Tie Breaking Rules, Divisibility, Bertrand model |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance |
| Item ID: | 6436 |
| Depositing User: | Daniela Puzzello |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Dec 2007 18:30 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 14:13 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/6436 |
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