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Defensive Intentions Motivate Retaliatory and Preemptive Intergroup Aggression

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Abstract

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Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and causal evidence that the intention to protect the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace.

Keywords: intergroup conflict, parochial altruism, in-group love, out-group hate, defense

What makes people go to war?

Defensive intentions motivate retaliatory and preemptive intergroup aggression

1. Introduction

Intergroup conflict constitutes a complex social dilemma (Bornstein, 2003; Choi & Bowles, 2007). For the individual, participation in intergroup conflict is costly, as it may lead to injury or death, whereas victory benefits all in-group members, e.g., through territorial gains or the establishment of deterrence and safety. Therefore, strong individual incentives to free-ride on the other group members' efforts exist (Bornstein, 2003). Eventually, however, extensive free-riding can cause a breakdown of cooperation within the group, leading to detrimental outcomes for all in-group members. To explain why we observe individually costly engagement in intergroup conflicts, it has been suggested that behavioral traits causing personally costly cooperation with in-group members ('in-group love') and aggressiveness toward out-groups ('out-group hate') might have co-evolved (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007). The empirical evidence gathered to test this co-evolutionary hypothesis is inconclusive, though (Rusch, 2014a).

Although the presence of rivaling out-groups increases individuals' engagement in various types of costly behaviors benefiting the in-group (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Bornstein, 1992; Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, & West, 2010; Puurtinen, Heap, & Mappes, in press), it is still unclear which factors trigger costly behavior to the detriment of out-groups (Fry & Söderberg, 2013). Astonishingly, unconditional 'out-group hate' has been rarely observed in previous research. Instead, in-group cooperation often coincides with the avoidance of intergroup competition (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), even after the experimental induction of a "history of conflict" (Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2012), or in interaction between natural groups with a strong enmity (Weisel & Böhm, in press). In a similar vein, when measuring attitudes towards in-group and out-group

1 members, in-group positivity does not systematically correlate with out-group negativity (e.g.,
2 Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Given the existence of frequent and
3 brutal intergroup aggression in human history (Gat, 2009; Keeley, 1997; Kelly, 2005),
4 however, there must be important motivations causing persistent and spiteful ‘out-group
5 hate’.

6 This study focuses on an important motivator for ‘out-group hate’ that has received
7 little attention in previous research: the intention to protect the in-group from potential out-
8 group threat. Defense preparedness, e.g., conquering territories strategically in order to reach
9 an advantageous position against possible attacks, and preemptive strikes against the potential
10 aggressor, are important factors for explaining intergroup conflicts in hunter-gatherer
11 societies (Gat, 2009) and wars on the country-level (Clausewitz, 1832; Levy, 2011).

12 Why should individuals be more motivated to participate in defensive rather than
13 offensive intergroup actions? Historical evidence (Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013; Rusch,
14 2013) and evidence from animal studies (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; Kitchen & Beehner, 2007;
15 Rusch, 2014a) suggest that the cost/benefit structure of intergroup conflict is different for
16 attacks and defenses. Specifically, across species, the likelihood of aggressive attacks against
17 out-groups decreases with perceived risk of failure (Kelly, 2005), and increases with
18 prospects of individual benefits, including additional reproductive access for the victors
19 (Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013; McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012; Rusch, Leunissen,
20 & van Vugt, in press). This militates against the typically supposed public good structure of
21 intragroup cooperation (Rusch, 2013, 2014b). Costly involvement in group defense, on the
22 other hand, increases with the individual importance of the resources at stake, including
23 vulnerable relatives and reproductive access (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; Rusch, 2014a), as well
24 as with perceived fear of out-groups (De Dreu et al., 2010). Additionally, an unsuccessful
25 defense may have negative consequences for any member of the group, e.g., loss of resources

1 or death, irrespective of whether the individual participated or not in the defensive action,
2 increasing the perception of common fate among group members.

3 In addition to the structural differences between offensive and defensive intergroup
4 encounters that are likely to influence individual perception and behavior, research in social
5 psychology indicates that the perception of an existential threat by being reminded about
6 one's own mortality increases in-group favoritism and out-group derogation (for reviews, see
7 Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Jonas & Fritzsche, 2013). Particularly a threat to the own
8 social identity has been shown to fuel negative attitudes and emotions towards the threatening
9 out-group (e.g., Brewer, 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Such evaluations can culminate in
10 "delegitimizing beliefs", i.e., the attribution of extremely negative characteristics to another
11 group, which, in turn, may justify intergroup aggression and violence (Bar-Tal, 2000).

12 In line with this variety of evidence from various scientific disciplines, the motivations
13 for participating in offensive and defensive intergroup aggression are likely to differ in their
14 structure and strength. We suppose that the negligence of this important difference might
15 explain the ambiguity of the existing experimental evidence, as in previous experiments it
16 was unclear whether subjects would perceive themselves as being on the offensive or the
17 defensive side of the intergroup conflict. We hypothesize that triggering defensive intentions
18 in subjects will cause a greater readiness to engage in costly behavior to the detriment of the
19 out-group than offensive intentions. We conducted an incentivized behavioral experiment to
20 test our hypothesis by means of two different types of defensive intergroup actions: (1)
21 retaliation of previously experienced 'out-group hate' in order to reduce the relative
22 disadvantage compared to the other group ('out-group hate' *ex post*), and (2) preemptive
23 strikes in order to reduce the likelihood of an absolute and relative disadvantage beforehand
24 ('out-group hate' *ex ante*).

25

2. Materials and Methods

Participants face modified versions of an established experimental game modeling intergroup conflict – the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008, 2012). In the IPD-MD, participants are randomly assigned to one of two equal-sized groups. Each participant decides individually and independently how to divide valuable endowment-points between three options: (1) Each point KEPT in the personal account gives the individual a benefit of 1 point with no effect on any other player. (2) Each point contributed to the WITHIN pool of the in-group credits every in-group member with 0.5 points. Contribution to WITHIN has no negative consequences for out-group members, hence indicating peaceful ‘in-group love’ and a disregard or even a positive concern for the out-group’s payoff. (3) Lastly, each point contributed to the BETWEEN pool has the same positive consequences for the in-group as a point contributed to WITHIN, but additionally reduces the payoff of each out-group member by 0.5. Thus, contributing to BETWEEN again indicates ‘in-group love’ but now coupled with spiteful ‘out-group hate’, that is, the concern to minimize the out-group’s absolute or relative payoff.

We contrast the classic IPD-MD game with a group size of $n = 3$ and an endowment of $e = 5$ (see the Procedures section for details), in which all individuals in both groups decide simultaneously and can therefore not be sure whether their actions are defensive or offensive, (subsequently labeled *SIM*) with four other conditions utilizing a similar game structure, but with groups playing sequentially (labeled *SEQ*).

Two of these conditions – *SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-LOVE* – are designed to investigate retaliatory ‘out-group hate’ *ex post*, that is, a response to an aggressive attack from another group. In the *SEQ-HATE* condition, members of one group – the second-movers – simultaneously allocate points contingent on the number of points allocated to BETWEEN by the opposing first-mover group, i.e., we use the so-called strategy vector method to elicit

1 second-movers' complete contribution strategies (Selten, 1967; see the Procedures section for
 2 details). Hence, in *SEQ-HATE*, second-movers are able to retaliate against potential attacks by
 3 the first-movers and therefore avert a relative loss, which is common knowledge among both
 4 first- and second-movers. In the control condition *SEQ-LOVE*, second-movers distribute their
 5 points contingent on the first-movers' contributions to WITHIN. Here, in the absence of any
 6 relative threat through the out-group, one may assume that second-movers' cooperation
 7 (particularly 'in-group love') increases with a higher amount of contributions to WITHIN by
 8 the out-group, as a form of peaceful competition via in-group cooperation (Böhm &
 9 Rockenbach, 2013).

10 Two additional conditions – *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* and *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE*
 11 – aim to test whether the desire to defend the in-group can also cause an offensive display of
 12 'out-group hate' *ex ante*. Such defense-motivated attacks are historically well documented,
 13 e.g., the Israeli strike against Egyptian airfields in 1967. Moreover, there is recent evidence
 14 that aggression between individuals increases if it serves to protect one's own self (Abbink &
 15 de Haan, 2014; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013), particularly when the interaction
 16 partner is an out-group member (De Dreu et al., 2010). In the *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE*
 17 condition, first-movers can reduce the negative effect of second-movers' 'out-group hate' on
 18 themselves. Each point contributed to the own BETWEEN pool preemptively reduces the
 19 negative effect of out-group members' subsequent BETWEEN-contributions by 0.05 points
 20 until it may reach its minimum of 0 (from initially 0.5 points). For example, if the sum of
 21 first-movers' contributions to BETWEEN is 5 points, each point potentially contributed to
 22 BETWEEN by the second-movers reduces first-movers' payoff only by $0.5 - (5 \times 0.05) =$
 23 0.25 points. Hence, contributions of 10 or more points to BETWEEN by the first-movers
 24 completely remove the potential threat of losing points in this condition (because $0.5 - (10 \times$
 25 $0.05) = 0$), while still harming the second-movers with maximum severity (in the example
 26 case, each out-group member loses $10 \times 0.5 = 5$ points). Note, however, that keeping points

1 and free-riding on the protective contributions of the other in-group members is still payoff
2 maximizing from the individual perspective because the intragroup public good dilemma
3 remains unchanged. Should first-movers' contribute to BETWEEN in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-*
4 *STRIKE*, though, this could be explained by two motivations: either (1) the intention to
5 preemptively defend against absolute and relative harm caused by the out-group, or (2) the
6 desire to attack and harm the out-group without having to fear retaliation. To disentangle
7 these two motivations, we conducted a control condition *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE* in which we
8 removed the second-movers' BETWEEN pool. Here, second-movers can only choose
9 between keeping points and contributing to WITHIN. Thus, first-movers do not have to fear
10 second-movers 'out-group hate' and should thus only contribute to BETWEEN if they
11 intended to harm the out-group without worrying about retaliation.

12 **2.1 Participants and Design**

13 In total, 216 students (131 male and 85 female) from various academic disciplines of a
14 German university participated in the experiment ($MD_{\text{age}} = 24$, $M_{\text{age}} = 24.47$, $SD = 5.12$).
15 Treatment of participants was in agreements with the ethical guidelines of the German
16 Research Foundation (*Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft*) and the German Psychological
17 Society (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie*). All participants gave their written informed
18 consent to participate voluntarily and were assured that all statistical analyses and reports
19 would be anonymous. Decisions were incentivized. To avoid potential losses, participants
20 received an additional flat-fee of €4. On average, participants earned €7.40 in the 45-minute
21 experiment.

22 The sessions of 24 participants each were randomly assigned to one of five
23 experimental between-subjects conditions: *SIM*, *SEQ-HATE*, *SEQ-LOVE*, *SEQ-*
24 *PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE*, and *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE*. Because the sequential (*SEQ*)
25 conditions assign two roles randomly to participants (first-mover and second-mover), there

1 was one session assigned to *SIM* and there were two sessions assigned to each of the other
 2 conditions in order to have 24 independent observations in each condition. One session was
 3 filled with a research assistant, because one subject did not show up; the data of the assistant
 4 were excluded from all analyses.

5 **2.2 Procedures**

6 Participants pre-registered for experimental sessions online (Greiner, 2004). On arrival,
 7 each person was randomly allocated to a cubicle. All the interactions and corresponding
 8 decisions in the experiment were computer-mediated using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
 9 2007). Participants were given written instructions (see electronic supplementary material).
 10 The experimenter read the instructions aloud. It was explained that each participant is
 11 randomly assigned to a group of size $n = 3$ that is matched with another three-person group
 12 (labeled the blue and the green group). In all conditions except *SIM*, each group was
 13 randomly given either the role of the first-movers or the second-movers. Each participant was
 14 endowed with $e = 5$ points (1 point = €0.50) and had to decide how to allocate these points
 15 among three behavioral options (except in the *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE*/second-mover
 16 condition, where subjects only had two options). Allocations affected the personal outcome,
 17 as well as the in-group and the out-group members' outcomes. In order to have an equal
 18 amount of behavioral observations for each potential response pattern of second-movers
 19 without deceiving participants, we used the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967).
 20 Accordingly, second-movers indicated their responding contribution for each amount
 21 potentially contributed to *WITHIN* (*SEQ-LOVE*) or *BETWEEN* (*SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-*
 22 *PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE*), respectively, by the first-movers. This yields $n \times e + 1 = 3 \times 5 + 1 =$
 23 16 responses in *SEQ-HATE* (0 to 15 points) and 11 responses in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRKE*
 24 (0 to 10 or more points), but only the stated response to the actual behavior of first-movers

1 was eventually payoff-relevant.¹ Neutral labels were used in the instructions, e.g., ‘decision
 2 making task’, ‘project A’ (WITHIN pool), and ‘project B’ (BETWEEN pool), and there was
 3 no use of potentially emotion-laden words like ‘cooperation’, ‘competition’, ‘aggression’ etc.
 4 Participants could ask clarifying questions before the experiment started. To make sure that
 5 they had understood the game structure properly, participants had to correctly answer some
 6 test questions before making their allocation decision anonymously. Afterwards, participants
 7 answered a post-experimental questionnaire, including demographics. At the end, each
 8 participant received individual payoff information, and was paid in private.

9 **3. Results**

10 The dataset containing individual-level behavioral observations used for the following
 11 analyses can be found in the electronic supplementary material.

12 **3.1 Retaliatory ‘Out-Group Hate’**

13 Figure 1 displays the contributions in *SIM*, as well as first-movers’ contributions in
 14 *SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-LOVE*. On average, first-movers overall contributions, i.e., all points not
 15 KEPT, in *SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-LOVE* are similar to the overall contributions of players in
 16 *SIM*, *SIM*: $M = 2.63$, $SD = 2.34$, *SEQ-HATE*: $M = 2.92$, $SD = 2.19$, *SEQ-LOVE*: $M = 2.61$, SD
 17 $= 1.56$; one-way ANOVA: $F(2, 68) < 1$, $p > .250$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$. In line with previous research,
 18 participants in *SIM* show little ‘out-group hate’, contributing less than 10 % of points to
 19 BETWEEN. Importantly, ‘out-group hate’ does not significantly differ between first-movers
 20 in the two sequential conditions and players in the simultaneous condition, *SIM*: $M = 0.42$, SD
 21 $= 1.18$, *SEQ-HATE*: $M = 0.50$, $SD = 1.29$, *SEQ-LOVE*: $M = 0.65$, $SD = 0.94$; one-way
 22 ANOVA: $F(2, 68) < 1$, $p > .250$, $\eta_p^2 = .007$. Overall, first-movers’ contribution patterns look
 23 very similar across conditions.

¹ The strategy space in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* was limited from 0 to “10 or more” points because the strategic consequences of own contributions were the same if at least 10 points were contributed to

1 Figure 2 displays allocations of points KEPT (panel A), contributed to WITHIN (panel
 2 B), or contributed to BETWEEN (panel C) of second-movers in *SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-LOVE*.
 3 Similarly to first-movers, overall contributions of second-movers do not significantly differ
 4 between *SEQ-HATE* and *SEQ-LOVE* (*SEQ-HATE*: $M = 3.14$, $SD = 0.36$, *SEQ-LOVE*: $M =$
 5 2.63 , $SD = 0.36$; repeated-measures ANOVA: $F(1, 46) < 1$, $p > .250$, $\eta_p^2 = .021$). Moreover,
 6 the effect of first-movers' contributions to BETWEEN (*SEQ-HATE*) or WITHIN (*SEQ-*
 7 *LOVE*) has no impact on overall contributions of second-movers, $F(15, 690) < 1$, $p > .250$, η_p^2
 8 $= .021$. There is a weak interaction effect of first-movers' contributions and condition on
 9 second-movers overall contributions, $F(15, 690) = 1.577$, $p = .074$, $\eta_p^2 = .033$. Simple slopes
 10 indicate that aggregated contributions to WITHIN and BETWEEN increase as a function of
 11 first-movers' contributions to WITHIN (*SEQ-LOVE*), $F(15, 345) = 1.841$, $p = .028$, $\eta_p^2 =$
 12 $.074$, but not as a function of first-movers' contributions to BETWEEN (*SEQ-HATE*), $F(15,$
 13 $345) < 1$, $p > .250$, $\eta_p^2 = .024$ (see Figure 2, panel A: white bars but not grey bars are
 14 decreasing).²

15 More importantly, supporting our hypothesis, we indeed find a significant interaction
 16 effect of first-movers' contributions and condition on second movers' 'out-group hate',
 17 repeated-measures ANOVA: $F(15, 690) = 6.602$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .126$. While there is a
 18 significant increase of second-movers' 'out-group hate' in *SEQ-HATE*, $F(15, 345) = 8.817$, p
 19 $< .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .277$, we observe no such effect in *SEQ-LOVE*, $F(15, 345) < 1$, $p > .250$, $\eta_p^2 =$
 20 $.027$ (see Figure 2, panel C: grey bars but not white bars are increasing). This result indicates
 21 that the second-movers retaliate against the first-movers' (potential) aggression by increasing
 22 their 'out-group hate'. In fact, at a certain point aggressive contributions to BETWEEN by
 23 second-movers even exceed their peaceful contributions to WITHIN, increasing up to almost
 24 the quadruple compared to the *SIM* condition.

² The increasing overall contributions in *SEQ-LOVE* are particularly driven by an increase of peaceful contributions to WITHIN, $F(15, 345) = 2.428$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .126$.

3.2 Preemptive ‘Out-Group Hate’

Although the results presented so far strongly support the hypothesis that spiteful ‘out-group hate’ increases as a response to the opponents’ harmful acts, they do not answer the question as to how conflicts start in the first place. We hypothesize that the desire to defend the in-group is not only important for the participation in vindictive intergroup actions but might also play a crucial role in motivating attacks in the form of preemptive strikes.

Figure 1 displays the contributions of first-movers in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* and *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE*. A comparison of the overall contributions in *SIM*, *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* and *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE* reveals a significant difference between conditions, one-way ANOVA: $F(2, 69) = 5.005, p = .009, \eta_p^2 = .127$. We observe the highest overall contributions in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* ($M = 3.08, SD = 1.89$), moderate contributions in *SIM* ($M = 2.63, SD = 2.34$), and the lowest in *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE* ($M = 1.42, SD = 1.28$). The distribution of points to WITHIN and BETWEEN is particularly important for the focus of the present paper. Supporting our hypothesis, we find that ‘out-group hate’ significantly differs between these conditions (one-way ANOVA: $F(2, 69) = 11.691, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .253$). As Figure 1 shows, ‘out-group hate’ is more than four times larger in *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* ($M = 1.75, SD = 1.82$) than in *SIM* ($M = 0.42, SD = 1.18$), Bonferroni: $p = .001$. In contrast, ‘out-group hate’ is virtually not present in *SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE* ($M = 0.08, SD = 0.28$) – in fact, there are only 2 out of 24 subjects who each contribute just one point to BETWEEN – which does significantly differ from *SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE* (Bonferroni: $p < .001$). This strongly supports our conjecture that the intention to protect the in-group may indeed cause offensive actions against out-groups and leads to considerable ‘out-group hate’.

4. Discussion

1 We have argued that the intention to protect the own group may be an important
2 motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in intergroup conflicts. Our results clearly show that having the
3 option of retaliation in order to decrease relative losses of the own group causes individually
4 costly, off-equilibrium strategy choice, i.e., ‘out-group hate’. Furthermore, the findings
5 indicate that preemptive ‘out-group hate’ is displayed only when it serves to prevent
6 (potential) future aggression against the in-group, i.e., groups use defense-motivated first-
7 strikes to avoid absolute and relative losses. Besides these main findings, the experiment
8 provides further support for the ‘intergroup comparison – intragroup cooperation hypothesis’
9 (Böhm & Rockenbach, 2013; see also Burton-Chellew & West, 2012) by showing that
10 intragroup cooperation increases as a function of the out-group’s peaceful cooperation, i.e.,
11 first-movers’ WITHIN-contributions in the condition *SEQ-LOVE*.

12 Our findings provide direct and causal evidence that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked
13 by manipulating the extent to which conflict parties perceive themselves to be in a vulnerable
14 position. However, ‘out-group hate’ still is collectively destructive and likely to cause
15 retaliation since the complete elimination of competition is often unlikely. Thus, a cascade of
16 strikes and counter-strikes may eventually lead to mutual losses and conflict perpetuation
17 (Halevy et al., 2012; Leibbrandt & Sääksvuori, 2012).

18 Our results and experimental manipulations are likely to stimulate further research on
19 intergroup conflict and aggression in different directions. For instance, accessing retaliatory
20 ‘out-group hate’ through responses to expected harmful actions by the out-group using the
21 strategy vector method may be considered as a rather “cold” and deliberate response. We
22 decided to use the strategy vector method in order to avoid deception of participants.
23 However, future research may investigate whether automatic responses due to “hot”
24 emotional states like anger, which have been shown to elicit in-group biased behaviors toward
25 out-groups (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), further increase ‘out-group hate’.

1 Moreover, although our experiment provides first behavioral evidence that realistic threat
2 induces ‘out-group hate’, in real-world intergroup relations threats are often rather symbolic
3 (e.g., due differences between group morals, standards, beliefs, and attitudes; see Stephan &
4 Stephan, 2000). Therefore, it is an interesting question for future research whether the
5 manipulation of perceived symbolic threats also increases ‘out-group hate’ in a behavioral
6 setting.

7 The present results have important implications for peace research and research on
8 group aggression more generally: Once the threat of aggression against the in-group – either
9 currently or in the future – is credibly removed, individuals show virtually no ‘out-group hate’
10 in our experiment, substantially reducing the risk of violent intergroup conflict. Furthermore,
11 being able to observe (or expect) out-groups’ peaceful and unthreatening cooperation may
12 spark increased peaceful cooperation by the observing group as well.

Competing Interests

None of the authors has competing interests.

Author Contributions

RB, HR, and ÖG designed the study, RB conducted the experiment and analyzed the data;

RB, HR, and ÖG wrote the paper and acknowledged the final version of the manuscript prior to submission.

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Figure Captions

Figure 1. Mean points KEPT, contributed to the WITHIN pool, and contributed to the BETWEEN pool by experimental condition. Each experimental condition with $N = 24$ participants. Error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure 2. Second-movers' mean points (A) KEPT, (B) contributed to the WITHIN pool, and (C) contributed to the BETWEEN pool by the expected aggregated contribution to the BETWEEN pool (*SEQ-HATE* condition) or the WITHIN pool (*SEQ-LOVE* condition) of first-movers. Each experimental condition with $N = 24$ participants. Error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.

Figure 1.




Figure 2.

