Rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking in the context of rent relations theory development

Latkov, Andrey (2015): Rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking in the context of rent relations theory development.

Abstract

The perspective directions of rent-seeking phenomenon research are allocated in the article. The algorithm of rent-seeking system research is offered. rent-focused behavior and rent-seeking strategies are differenced in the text. The special attention is paid to definition of medium-term and long-term rent-seeking effects directed to assignment of natural-resources rent on example of national economic systems of the UAE and Nauru.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: rent-seeking, rent-focused behavior, rent relations theory, natural and resource rent, rent-seeking effects
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E03 - Behavioral Macroeconomics; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O13 - Agriculture ; Natural Resources ; Energy ; Environment ; Other Primary Products; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q38 - Government Policy

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