Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs

De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2015): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs.

Abstract

The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity constrained sellers beyond duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. The main focus is on the equilibrium payoffs under triopoly. The paper also includes insightful examples highlighting features of equilibrium which can arise in a triopoly but not in a duopoly. Most notably, the supports of the equilibrium strategies need not be connected, nor need be connected the union of the supports; further, an atom may exist for a firm different from the largest one.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; Price game; Oligopoly; Triopoly; Mixed strategy equilibrium
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D47 - Market Design; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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