Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs

De Francesco, Massimo A. and Salvadori, Neri (2015): Bertrand-Edgeworth games under triopoly: the payoffs.

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The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capacity constrained sellers beyond duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. The main focus is on the equilibrium payoffs under triopoly. The paper also includes insightful examples highlighting features of equilibrium which can arise in a triopoly but not in a duopoly. Most notably, the supports of the equilibrium strategies need not be connected, nor need be connected the union of the supports; further, an atom may exist for a firm different from the largest one.

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