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## **Job satisfaction and motivation of public employees in Spain**

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10 June 2015

Online at <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64950/>  
MPRA Paper No. 64950, posted 10 Jun 2015 10:31 UTC

## 1. Introduction.

The categories of public employment (PE) are regulated by administrative or labour laws and, in general, these workers present a certain uniformity in salaries and job characteristics. Nevertheless, their duties, training, and outcomes are quite diverse and differentiated among the different types of public employees.

In many countries, the variety of functions and duties of the modern state, built on an organizational, bureaucratic, weberian model<sup>1</sup>, defines a series of duties that assume privileges of public power and defense of the general interest for a particular category of public employees. These workers have a special legal regulation through administrative law, and carry out a multitude of functions in the social and economic spheres. The rights and obligations of the typical civil servant do not conform to these criteria and the performance of their duties cannot be regulated by parliament, nor can the continuity of a certain service be guaranteed. These, among many other circumstances, do not make feasible the provision of such jobs within the classic civil servant system. For these categories, in many cases, labour legislation governs private-sector workers in general. In the Spanish case, these boundaries are not clearly established with regard to the different employee unions, nor to the strict application of legislation. Thus, in Spain, public employees regulated by labour laws are also affected by public budgets and other administrative norms (Villoria and Del Pino, 2009).

In the private sector, the existing diversity of jobs, duties, sectors, production, and productivity leads to a differentiated status of workers in terms of salaries, working conditions, access to employment, and tenure. From the perspective of the neoclassical economy, salary and other bonuses, and labour conditions average out among different jobs. That is, the salary differences and working conditions correspond to the characteristics of each job.

However, the same thing does not happen in PE. We consider that those aspects of labour relations that are fairly homogenous in public employment influence motivation and job satisfaction in different and, at times, contradictory ways.<sup>2</sup> Simply stated, treating as equal those who are unequal will produce a distortion in the management of human resources.

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<sup>1</sup>In the traditional weberian model, management proceeds by legally-established procedures that constitute a guarantee for citizens and a limit to the arbitrary use of the law. The continuity and regularity of services are based on routine and the work of a stable staff. The neutrality of public employees is reinforced by a skill-based hierarchical structure.

<sup>2</sup>For example, work-life conditions by gender (see, for recent evidence, García et al., 2011; Giménez and Molina, 2014, Molina, 2015).

The approach to the study of job satisfaction and motivation, as variables indicative of a certain level of productive performance, has generated a broad and significant literature. We find numerous works that analyze those variables, while making no distinction between public and private employees. Other studies deal with the differences in job satisfaction of public and private workers (Demoussis and Giannakopoulos, 2007; Ghinetti, 2007; Luechinger et.al 2010) or comparative analyses between countries of only public workers (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006). Young et al., (1998) analyze the influence of a certain class of incentives on less qualified workers in the public water supply and sanitation sector, while Williams et al. (2012) carry out a similar analysis in the education sector.

In this context, the objective of this work is to analyze two variables, job satisfaction (JS) and motivation (M) of public employees in Spain, which, in accordance with the literature, have great importance in productive performance. As noted, public employees form a quite distinct group, which, however, is governed by fairly homogeneous administrative rules. Consequently, we consider two lines of research: first, whether there is divergence between different groups in their levels of satisfaction and motivation and, second, what are the distinguishing features of that diversity?

The identification of differentials will not require a radical change in labor management, since there are a range of factors that explain and justify the systems of administrative organization under civil law. However, it is possible that public management can incorporate certain elements that appear to encourage job satisfaction and/or motivation in public employee groups. Thus, we believe it is important to examine the relationship of each group to the incorporated variables in order to analyze JS. We consider this to be a useful and interesting contribution to the study of public management, since we find no precedents in the economics or public management literature (see, for example, Lee, 2011).

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the literature on the analysis of JS and M in relation to PE. We note the diversity of the group and propose comprehensive work objectives. In Section 3, we describe our methodology and analyze the dependent and independent variables selected. In Section 4, we present our results. Section 5 contains a discussion of these results, and Section 6 presents our conclusions, policy proposals, the perceived limitations, and the potential extensions of our research.

## 2. Literature

Given that the literature establishes a relationship between job satisfaction and motivation, and job performance and job results, public management that does not deal with the specific character of the job will not optimize human resources. These concerns have led to the development of differing approaches to public management, such as the New Public Management (NPM), which evolved as a non-traditional way of managing PE that prioritizes performance and results. Some of the elements of NPM are the decentralization of organizations, customer-oriented services, the outsourcing and privatization of services, and the evaluation of results, among others.

These policies have a series of implications for the management of human resources, among which are encouraging teamwork, the participation of employees in decision-making, transversality, and functional and geographic mobility (Jerez and Magan, 2011). We consider that these measures are valid for public administrations of the Anglo-Saxon type, in which public decisions are not as mediated and conditioned by administrative and budgetary laws, as is the case in Spain. That is, commercial and civil law in Spain allows everything that is not expressly forbidden, while the concept of administrative law establishes what administrations can and ought to do, so that anything not considered, cannot be done. A general criterion of Spanish law is fairly explanatory as to how public administration can function and, accordingly how much leeway there can be in the management of human resources, among other aspects of governance. This leads us to approach with caution a general application of NPM to the public sector, and we attempt to analyze PE not as an undifferentiated whole, but with specific attention to particular features. This approach corresponds to what Horner and Hazel (2005) and Moore (1995) propose, regarding the new pragmatism in civil service.

Much of the literature on NPM is insensitive to the diversity of the public sector; it is filled with generalities and platitudes and fails to fully address the complexity of PE (Vigoda and Meiri, 2008). As Echevarria (2008) points out, the key to the organizational design of the Public Sector in general is to try to reconcile the uniqueness of each operational service with the demands of global coherence derived from first principles, such as equity or public service.

Together with the perspective of NPM, a more collectivist and less economic vision of governance is gaining in popularity (O'Flynn, 2007), which gathers certain values that individuals incorporate into civil service. The new paradigm of governance,

Public Value Management (PVM) (Alford, 2002; Stoker, 2006; O'Flynn, 2007), responds to the traditional idea of civil service expected of public employees, and contrasts with the economic philosophy of Public Choice, the inspiration, in our opinion, for NPM

The notion of PVM incorporates diverse objectives, affecting larger numbers of individuals, not only those directly involved, and the consequences are not easy to measure. For instance, we consider a teacher who not only imparts knowledge to her students, but also promotes socialization of the child, with both short- and long-term effects. The awareness of this larger purpose can enrich the personal life of the teacher, beyond the satisfaction she would obtain from simply fulfilling an employment obligation. In other words, the vocational aspects, together with a sense of public service, can be an important feature of professional performance for public employees.

Can these factors be assessed by gathering data on salary and working conditions, or do they require an understanding of the larger, conceptual ideas attaching to *the condition of being a public servant*? Park and Rainey (2012) distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, considering that intrinsic motivation supposes a behavior that comes from the value one perceives in oneself by what one does, having compensations inherent to the work itself that go beyond external influences, i.e. economic compensation (Vandenabeele, 2007). Extrinsic motivation, however, generates behaviors in individuals who respond to compensation, control, oversight, and even threats. Park and Rainey (2012) point out the "intrinsic motivation" that we identify as the sense of public service, is a factor present in public managers (Smith 2004, Smith et al. 2004, and Moynihan and Pandey 2007). They contrast this with company managers, for whom financial rewards, characterized as "extrinsic motivation", are more important as a stimulus of performance. Young et al. (1998) find that, in certain jobs, there is no predominance of extrinsic motivations among less-qualified public workers, that is, that even among this group the idea of civil service continues to be quite important. In general, the importance of intrinsic aspects as motivators of performance is emphasised, and to overlook those factors and emphasize extrinsic aspects can have a negative result for public administration governance (Andersen 2009).

Other authors, such as Williams et al (2012), while not citing specific motivating factors, do refer to many works on the vocational element in civil service among PE, in contrast to the approach inspired by NPM, as Bozeman and Feeney (2009) and Buelens

and Broeck (2007) have pointed out. It is necessary here to remember Herzberg's theory of motivational factors (Herzberg et al. 1959) in order to distinguish between motivation and satisfaction. Thus, motivational factors provide satisfaction when they appear, but they do not necessarily lead to dissatisfaction when they disappear. For Herzberg, the *hygienic* factors - salaries, bonuses, and working conditions - do not provide motivation, but if they are not present at a certain level, they can produce dissatisfaction. Motivational factors are understood to be responsibility, the work itself, and recognition or professional development. This could explain why there are motivated employees who are satisfied with their work and, at the same time, dissatisfied with their salary (Villoria and Del Pino, 2009). According to Casanovas and Garcia (1995) and Pascual (2008), that hypothesis very often applies to senior civil servants. For us, these motivational factors are directly related to "intrinsic motivation" and constitute an important factor in the productive performance of PE, in agreement with the theories of governance mentioned above.

For Bozeman (2002) and Jerez and Magan (2011), public management (governance) is distinguished by a focus on management as that of a business, as opposed to a focus of a more political nature. The first perspective, which is a more individualistic view, as pointed out by O'Flynn (2007), is closer to private management, and specifically to the practices of NPM, while the political focus is a more collectivist view, defending the role of politics. This is not strictly the management of scarce resources with unlimited purposes. For governance in this collectivist approach, the decision-making processes, with different participants and occasionally divergent interests, are important. That is, the results can be as important as the procedures followed in the decision-making process.

Zeger van Walt et al. (2008) highlight some of the values that operate in the public sector, compared to the private sector. These values represent different policies, and include accountability, collegiality, transparency, social justice, sustainability, and as many as twenty others. In our research, we first emphasize diversity among public employees, with a rating among occupations. Second, we note the differences between various degrees of satisfaction and the related labor issues. We consider that JS has a significant relationship to job performance. We note, too, another variable related to job performance and the idea of public service, which is motivation.

### 3. Data and methodology.

The literature on job satisfaction usually incorporates variables related to personal characteristics (race, marital status, etc.), family (children, spouse's occupation, renter or homeowner, etc.), social (membership of social or sports clubs, religion, etc.), income, and certain variables related to the actual work (working hours, type of contract, employment, training, etc.). The simplest standard model of the utility of work is:

$$u = u ( y, h, i, j )$$

where  $u$  is the utility of the work,  $y$  is income,  $h$  are working hours, and  $i$  and  $j$  are vectors that gather personal characteristics of the individual and characteristics of the job, respectively.

Given the characteristics of the organization of Spanish public administration, we have chosen *Occupation*, following the National Classification of Occupations (CNO-94), as our criterion of PE. *Occupation* gathers the administrative category (also related to the training of the employee, although they do not always match), salary and, in many cases, the activity or productive subsector to which they are assigned (for example, in the Health Sector there are qualified superiors, doctors, mid-level qualified individuals, and nurses). In other cases, customer service administrators or security personnel, the classification by occupations allows for the formation of homogenous groups. For example, an administrator serving the public in a large hospital is much more like an administrator in a municipal office than like any other health worker, doctor, or nurse. The private sector is different, and the characteristics of the sector prevail over those of the occupation. Perhaps a clerk in a small catering company, for example, has pay and working conditions quite different from an administrator of a multinational company.

Our data come from the Spanish Survey of Labor Conditions (ECVT, *Encuesta de Condiciones y Vida en el Trabajo*) 2006-2010, which are employed in a pool format. Regarding our independent variables, the characteristics of employment are very much influenced by the selection of occupations we have made as a classifying criterion of PE. Furthermore, we do not consider working hours because, in theory, the length of the day and the annual calculation of the working day are quite similar for all public employees. The structure of the day, however, can certainly be important, and it marks differences between occupations. In terms of personal characteristics, we incorporate

only *Age* and *Gender*. The rest of the explanatory variables of JS gather job aspects or work relationships.

(Table 1 about here)

Regarding personal variables, the literature maintains that women are more satisfied with their work because they find other values, different from those of men, that are largely salary-oriented (Souza-Poza and Souza-Poza, 2000; Kaiser, 2002; Sloane and Williams, 2000; Clark, 1997). Regarding age, older workers tend to be more satisfied (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Clark et al. 1996, Jürges, 2001).

*Salary* is controversial in the analysis of public employment. Some authors, such as Pascual (2008) and López Casanovas and Garcia (1995) point to a widespread complaint among higher-level employees that motivates their departure from public administration, i.e. they feel they are underpaid. From this, it could be deduced that such high-level employees have low salary satisfaction. Something similar arises from the level of education. Nevertheless, Park and Rainey (2012) indicate that public employees have more intrinsic motivation (or motivational factors, in Herzberg's classification), i.e. a certain sense of public service. In the private sector, on the contrary, extrinsic factors predominate (economic compensation). These authors point out that to insist on extrinsic aspects for the public sector can be counterproductive. The rest of the variables show a direct correlation between job satisfaction and motivation. They are questions of degrees of satisfaction with different aspects of the nature of labour. The range is between 1 and 10, with higher numbers signifying more job satisfaction and greater motivation

Our dependent variables, JS and M, are the responses to a literal question with scores from 1 to 10. Regarding motivation, this is a factor obtained through analysis of main components from two questions: the degree of motivation and the satisfaction with the degree of personal development with the job performed. The factor has a Cronbach's alpha of 0.72, indicating a high level of reliability regarding the incorporated variables.

#### **4. Empirical results.**

Among the highlights of Table 2, we see a higher level of JS in professions linked to Education, from childhood to university level. Specifically, the higher scores are related to *satisfaction with the actual work, the degree of personal development, salary, satisfaction with the work organization, and knowledge of the hierarchy and*



*objectives of the organization.* Some quite disparate professions, such as security personnel (the Police, and the Civil Guard, among others) and physicians, show low levels of satisfaction with the schedule, the workday, and break time. In general, the professional categories of middle or lower managers show lower levels of satisfaction in most variables, except in satisfaction with the activity done, and the degree of personal development arising from the work. In contrast, these categories show satisfaction levels that are higher than some groups of more qualified workers in relation to schedules and the workday. The variables *satisfaction with the activity performed* and *degree of personal development* maintain high levels, together with *vacation and leave*, in almost all occupations. The monthly income variable is a fairly good indicator of wage levels established by management in accordance with professional categories, closely linked to academic qualifications, with group A, corresponding to Senior Management (University Graduate) to group E, which includes employees who occupy a position that does not require special qualifications, although in many cases the individual has higher training than formally required by the administrative category occupied.

(Table 2 about here)

With respect to the averages of the independent variables from Table 2, two large groups are observed. In one such group, there are four very similar variables: *Degree of satisfaction with the organization*, *Relationship among employees*, *Trust in superiors*, and *Evaluation of superiors*. In the other group are three very similar variables: *Satisfaction with autonomy*, *Satisfaction with participation in decision-making*, and *Satisfaction with salary*. In general, most of the variables do not show large differences, but significant nuances appear as to how selected variables influence different professions. Regarding Occupations, also from the averages of Table 2, we see some fairly homogenous groups, clearly differentiated from other groups. There are two large subgroups, one composed of less-qualified individuals who work as office and administrative staff, and another, in which we find fairly homogenous groupings as, for example, education and healthcare, that we can highlight, a priori, as vocational, and two other groupings that also present certain homogeneities: middle management in social sciences, managers with Professional and Security training (Civil Guards, the Police, and others) and a group of managers and senior technicians in various social sciences and pure sciences.

The multivariate analysis carried out consists of 17 regressions, one for each occupation, with JS as the dependent variable and two regressions more with the total of the sample and the variables JS and M. From the multivariate analysis, the results by occupation show a wide variety of significant variables in the different groups. We now present results related to JS and, for reasons of space, we do not show results for motivation disaggregated by occupation. Satisfaction with the actual job appears to be the most important, with elevated coefficients and with a positive sign in all professional groups. Satisfaction with salary appears with a lesser coefficient, but it is significant and positive in many groups. Labour and human relations present disparate values in coefficients and in significance, being positive or negative, depending on the occupation. Knowledge of the organizational structure, and its objectives, shows varied coefficients in significance and in sign. Gender shows little variation across the different groups, and age appears to be negative except for Managers and degreed employees in the pure Sciences.

(Table 3 about here)

With regard to regressions for the group of public employees in our sample, we can see that JS shows the greatest coefficients in satisfaction with the actual job, with the work organization, and with salary. For the PE group, all variables except three (*Training for work*, *Satisfaction with break time*, and *Relationships with co-workers*) appear to be significant.

The aggregate results corresponding to Motivation exhibit some differences from those corresponding to JS. In this case, the three non-significant variables are different from the previous case, being related to knowledge of the organisation, dissatisfaction with flextime, and with vacation and leave.

## **5. Discussion of the results.**

The descriptive results and the multivariate analysis signal a clear diversity within the PE collective. We have carried out a broad classification of 17 Occupations, and we believe that it fairly approximates labour diversity, given the differences that appear among diverse groups with regard to the co-variables and their influence on JS when we perform the regressions for each of the occupational groups. We are conscious of the possible endogeneity that can arise between occupations and JS and M, given that access to public employment in Spain requires preparation for a public examination and assessment. Thus, we suppose that the choice of profession is the preferred one that can

provide, a priori, greater JS. Unfortunately, jobs with cross-sectional data make it difficult to overcome problems of endogeneity. We believe, however, that any possible endogeneity can be dealt with by the number and type of the co-variables that we incorporate. For example, we can see in the JS of licensed professionals in public health that salary, or workday, or schedule provides more or less JS than other variables, and we can determine what influence those co-variables have on other occupations.

Regarding questions of extension, it has already been indicated that we have not extended these regressions to occupational groups via Motivation, although the results of our aggregated regressions are presented in line with Motivation and JS. The diversity of these groups is sufficiently high that we limit ourselves to only those few questions that we consider most relevant.

This variety of results confirms one of the essential hypotheses of this work, which is that the diversity of the collective of PE, for various reasons, is managed with criteria of high levels of homogeneity. This circumstance is overlooked by the modern theories of public management, as in the case of NPM. Although these theories should come down to the specific case to be operational, it seems pertinent to begin by recognizing this diversity in the group of PE. Differences between the PE groups also call into question some of the proposals made for reforming the public sector in Spain, relative to human resources. Specifically, there is a proposal that refers to the creation of a single model of 'the civil service', promoting horizontal and vertical mobility of public employment (Pascual, 2008).

In our descriptive analysis, we classify, according to certain criteria of homogeneity, the various occupations as well as the co-variables. From among the occupational groups, those who have university studies, compared with those who do not, show significant differences, and within these two large groups, different subgroups appear. Among university graduates, we can highlight two subgroups whose jobs can be considered vocational: professionals in education, at all levels, and those in health, medicine, and nursing.

Another fairly homogenous subgroup comprises less-qualified employees who show general dissatisfaction with the majority of the co-variables and, in particular, with their salary or income. Interestingly, the literature (Lucifora and Meurs, 2006; Ghinetti, 2007) points out that the public sector has models of labour relations and salaries which are more egalitarian. That is to say, wage differentials are delimited by levels among those who earn more and those who earn less, giving rise to the flight to

the private sector by certain senior management employees who perceive themselves to be underpaid (Pascual, 2008 and López Casanovas and García, 1995). The literature on France and Italy points to a case similar to that of Spain. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) observe that the public sector pays less than is needed to attract, retain, and motivate more qualified workers, and pays more of the opportunity cost to those who are less qualified. Nevertheless, our results are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, we observe greater equality but, at the same time, we do not perceive a sense of unrest among the higher professions regarding salary. It is the less-qualified professions who demonstrate more dissatisfaction with their salary when, in comparison with higher occupations, the difference is more delimited than in the private sector.

In all occupations, satisfaction with the actual job appears significant, and with an elevated coefficient. It is logical to consider this being due to a certain spirit of public service among public employees, which links to the question of “intrinsic motivation” and Herzberg’s motivational factors. We also believe that the aspect of endogeneity, mentioned above, may also underlie the significance of this co-variable.

Another interesting result refers to age. In the majority of occupations, age appears with a negative coefficient, perhaps reflecting the routine aspect that many professions note about administrative work, especially bureaucracy, but there are some categories, such as that of University Professor, in which creativity and innovation must make up the base of their work, in research as well as in teaching, but age nevertheless shows a negative coefficient.

This coefficient could signal lower chances of promotion, and the reality of a limited administrative career, although it reaches the highest levels in almost all occupations. In general, although the coefficients are not excessively disparate, they do show differences among the different occupations, which would require detailed attention to each. Examples would be satisfaction with the workday or work organization of doctors, and the lesser satisfaction with the schedule expressed by security personnel (the Police and the Civil Guard, among others).

## **6. Conclusions and extensions.**

We have carried out an analysis of the variables in the levels of job satisfaction and motivation of public employees in Spain, through a classification of occupations. Our first working hypothesis is that public employees constitute a heterogeneous group, which nevertheless, is treated with a certain level of uniformity. Our results indicate that

the importance that public employees assign to the performance of the work done, and their working conditions, are clearly sources of job satisfaction. We consider that an underlying variable for these employees is the idea of public service, from the perspective of *Public Value Management*. This perspective is in the line, as previously pointed out, of the approach of more egalitarian work relations. This is significant at a time when criticisms of the public sector has intensified, and many voices demand management philosophies closer to the private model, which is seen as a superior and more efficient system for public management. Our results do not fully support this notion.

However, differences appear among the various groups of PE that require a more detailed analysis than the one we have been able to achieve with the available data, which constitutes a potential weakness in, and a possible extension of, this work. At the same time, those areas that show lower levels of JS should be analyzed more closely in order to implement policies aimed at improving the possible shortcomings of the corresponding group. As a general result, we consider that the levels of JS with salary, and various other aspects of the job, call into question the implementation of some modern management techniques and, in particular, certain proposals of NPM, that can diminish the sense of public service. Nor, when we consider the diversity of PE, do we think it is appropriate to envisage public employment as a monolithic structure. In the same way, questions related to functional and geographical mobility demand a more precise analysis of the special characteristics of each group.

An extension of this research, which we consider necessary, would relate the organization of work to the results, outputs, and outcomes obtained. It is not about turning to theories from the *New Public Management* to constantly compare resources and results of management techniques, but we believe that it is necessary to verify the social perception of the results of the work of PE. We consider that this should be done through a disintegrated approach for each professional group, as we have classified them in this study. This work could begin with a more precise questionnaire, with the perceptions of public service as a reference point, permitting our results to be measured and compared without losing sight of the role of the PE as public servant.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age	8103	18	77	43,89	10,166
Gender	8103	1	2	1.54	.498
Knowledge organogram	8103	0	10	7.41	2.442
Knowledge objectives	8103	0	10	7.41	2.508
Sat job organization	8103	0	10	6.78	2.177
Sat actual work	8103	0	10	7.84	1.708
Sat autonomy and independence	8103	0	10	7.33	2.112
Sat participation in decisions	7941	0	10	6.68	2.577
Sat workday	8103	0	10	7.63	1.995
Sat flexibility of schedule	8103	0	10	6.44	3.065
Sat leave time	8103	0	10	6.93	2.532
Sat vacation permitted	8103	0	10	7.93	2.049
Academic training suits work	8100	0	10	6.96	3.008
Sat training received	7986	0	10	6.13	2.824
Income	8103	1	9	3.74	1.453
Employee-management Relations	7895	0	10	6.96	2.225
Relationship with colleagues	7967	0	10	7.76	1.725
Confidence in Superiors	7887	0	10	6.99	2.359
Confidence in colleagues	7892	0	10	7.84	1.761
Sat with salary	8084	0	10	6.32	2.164
Evaluation of Superiors	7768	0	10	6.99	2.266
Job Satisfaction	8103	0	10	7.51	1.687

Table 2. Average independent variables by occupation

	Degree of satisfaction in current job	Knowledge of organization of work	Knowledge of the objectives of the company	Degree of satisfaction with the organization of work	Degree of satisfaction with the possibility of promotion	Degree of satisfaction with the actual work	Degree of satisfaction with autonomy/independene	Degree of satisfaction with the level of participation in decision-making	Degree of satisfaction with the level of motivation	Degree of satisfaction with the workday	Degree of satisfaction with the flexibility of working hours	Degree of satisfaction with the time off work
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
High managers: 10-17	7,72	8,46	8,44	7,38	4,42	8,08	7,87	7,91	7,36	7,46	7,23	7,07
Graduates pure sciences: 20	7,40	7,55	7,41	6,30	4,50	7,54	7,50	7,00	6,55	7,78	7,15	7,60
Senior Health Doctors: 21	7,23	7,50	7,52	6,12	5,45	7,90	7,34	6,57	6,72	7,26	5,56	5,52
University Professors: 221	7,97	8,30	8,47	6,56	6,90	8,24	8,37	7,62	7,79	7,50	8,21	7,61
Prof. Secondary: 222-223	7,71	8,43	8,50	7,31	4,85	8,03	8,04	7,41	7,40	7,83	5,69	7,00
Senior Managers: 23-25	7,63	8,13	8,01	6,61	4,91	7,93	7,70	7,27	6,79	7,65	7,21	7,42
Middle managers pure sciences:26	7,52	8,07	7,72	7,02	4,67	7,60	7,40	6,60	7,02	7,57	7,33	7,43
Health nurses and others: 27	7,36	7,37	7,38	6,37	5,37	8,13	7,41	6,99	6,85	7,53	5,69	6,05
Primary/childhood teachers: 28	7,94	8,28	8,37	7,50	5,11	8,40	8,03	7,76	7,67	7,71	5,26	6,47
Middle managers: 29	7,40	7,66	7,60	6,52	5,37	7,77	7,33	6,90	6,55	7,58	6,95	7,13
Managers FP specialists:30-35	7,39	7,73	7,55	6,56	5,41	7,63	7,16	6,47	6,56	7,76	6,95	7,39
Administrators: 40-43	7,27	7,18	7,25	6,57	5,44	7,52	7,14	5,88	6,29	7,99	6,51	7,29
Admin. Customer service: 44-50	7,46	7,04	7,12	6,79	4,96	7,71	7,08	6,12	6,57	7,77	6,88	7,17
Assist. customer service: 51	7,45	6,73	6,88	6,72	4,94	7,97	7,01	6,35	6,84	7,41	6,39	6,64
Security personnel CG/Police: 52	7,45	8,08	7,94	6,51	5,82	7,95	7,00	6,50	6,96	7,25	6,13	7,00
Qualified workers office staff:53-86	7,48	6,44	6,47	6,90	5,18	7,80	7,13	6,47	6,82	7,47	6,51	6,91
Non- qualified: 90-98	7,40	5,95	6,02	6,87	4,67	7,44	6,86	5,90	6,57	7,65	6,70	7,07

	Degree to which academic training suits job	Degree of satisfaction with training	Usefulness of training received from the company in relation to the job	Net monthly income	Employee-management relations	Relationship with colleagues	Confidence in superiors	Confidence in colleagues	Satisfaction with salary	Evaluation superiors	Degree of satisfaction with vacations and breaks
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
High managers: 10-17	7.47	6.34	7.82	4.99	7.40	7.51	7.43	7.98	6.94	7.27	8.04
Graduates pure sciences: 20	7.82	6.26	7.24	4.60	6.64	7.55	6.79	7.53	6.09	7.06	7.96
Senior Health Doctors: 21	9.01	5.70	7.45	5.58	6.26	7.57	6.52	7.90	6.42	6.59	7.46
University Professors: 221	9.27	6.66	7.64	5.47	7.06	7.25	7.06	7.44	6.87	7.20	8.30
Prof. Secondary: 222-223	8.47	6.30	7.28	4.92	7.50	7.78	7.43	7.89	7.07	7.22	8.68
Senior Managers: 23-25	7.88	6.28	7.74	4.43	6.84	7.54	6.94	7.73	6.69	7.13	8.08
Middle managers pure sciences:26	8.32	6.23	7.35	4.32	7.38	7.70	7.43	7.81	6.73	7.21	8.17
Health nurses and others: 27	8.71	6.49	7.70	4.81	6.05	7.74	6.36	7.82	6.70	6.69	7.46
Primary/childhood teachers: 28	8.44	6.95	7.61	4.17	7.73	8.02	7.60	8.13	6.99	7.55	8.74
Middle managers: 29	7.08	6.41	7.68	3.67	6.74	7.57	6.78	7.83	6.28	6.94	7.93
Managers FP specialists:30-35	6.84	6.15	7.42	3.73	6.80	7.62	6.81	7.74	6.26	6.86	8.10
Administrators: 40-43	5.87	5.85	7.25	3.29	6.75	7.57	6.79	7.52	5.73	6.81	7.98
Admin. Customer service: 44-50	5.68	5.78	7.51	2.85	7.08	7.67	7.10	7.70	5.89	7.03	7.84
Assist. customer service: 51	6.97	6.14	7.80	2.85	6.64	7.77	6.83	7.83	5.70	6.89	7.39
Security personnel CG/Police: 52	6.55	6.31	7.91	4.60	6.48	7.84	6.55	7.93	6.02	6.68	7.70
Qualified workers office staff:53-86	5.57	5.88	7.79	3.13	7.15	8.05	7.23	7.97	6.15	7.12	7.43
Non- qualified: 90-98	4.48	5.33	7.64	2.34	7.21	8.00	7.03	7.81	5.98	6.97	7.72

Table 3: Lineal Regressions. Dependent variables: Job satisfaction (JS) and Motivation (M)

	High managers	Graduates pure sciences	Health doctors	Prof University	Prof secondary	Graduates social	Middle managers pure sciences	Middle Health graduates	Prof. childhood education	Middle managers social
Dependent Variable: Job Satisfaction.										
Age	0.01261	0.00365	-0.00733	-0.00425	-0.01722***	0.00584	-0.02298**	-0.01595**	-0.01823***	-0.00799
Gender	0.16633	-0.07527	-0.07457	0.03087	0.05013	0.17931	0.51144**	0.09129	0.03805	0.21756
Knowledge organogram	-0.00180	-0.25268***	-0.01197	0.03871	-0.03043	-0.01034	0.08726	0.02416	0.02205	-0.10099**
Knowledge objectives of the organization.	-0.06173	0.12967**	-0.01527	-0.02072	-0.01771	0.01182	0.02118	-0.03120	0.00968	0.12757***
Satisf. organization of work	0.10873	0.07395	0.22138***	0.09282*	0.12439***	0.11654***	0.05561	0.18999***	0.13931***	0.04651
Sat actual work	0.25624***	0.37412***	0.29451***	0.24660***	0.45439***	0.37295***	0.28359***	0.20871***	0.30253***	0.32287***
Sat autonomy and independence	-0.07869	0.06306	0.06390	0.21287***	0.10375***	0.05002	0.12693*	0.07797	-0.00503	0.13292***
Sat participation decisions	0.16633**	0.00398	0.00777	0.04599	0.02144	0.03956	0.08043	0.03590	0.05203**	0.00054
Satisfaction with the workday	0.02812	0.04794	0.13030***	0.09646	0.00707	0.01757	0.20832***	0.09919***	0.11116***	0.06050
Satisf. flexibility schedule	0.12995***	0.00183	-0.00781	0.07681	0.02423*	0.03220	0.01293	0.00173	0.01964	0.06265*
Satisf. break time	-0.10498**	0.19220**	-0.00263	0.01650	0.02488	0.03232	-0.28997***	0.06313***	0.02400	-0.01793
Satisf. Vacation and leave	0.08843	-0.15889*	0.02888	0.02442	0.07391**	0.12919***	0.22051***	0.05374	0.01963	0.02981
Academic Training suits job	-0.00629	0.07525	0.01216	-0.06046	-0.00417	0.02376	-0.07102	0.01974	0.00248	0.00689
Satisf training received	0.05943*	-0.01903	-0.00738	0.02782	0.01638	0.05228**	0.03726	0.05385**	0.03306*	0.02865
Income	0.00210	0.16880	-0.03462	0.07844	0.02229	-0.08555*	0.03125	-0.11321*	0.00382	-0.08533
Employee/management relations	0.31922***	0.16054*	0.00297	-0.01863	0.00370	0.02435	0.02468	0.05070	0.01872	0.10012**
Relationships with colleagues	-0.09681	0.17674*	0.02110	-0.07010	0.05060	-0.06962*	0.11081	0.02610	0.03148	0.05073
Confidence in superiors	0.00046	0.04358	0.12020***	-0.00362	0.02199	-0.01306	0.08179	-0.00477	0.01836	-0.04466
Confidence in colleagues	-0.01149	-0.05266	-0.05940	0.13431*	-0.02725	0.07710**	-0.09320	-0.00662	-0.00402	0.00293
Satisfaction with salary	0.06623	0.09101	0.12806***	0.06363	0.06277**	0.06431**	0.14381**	0.11731***	0.09431***	0.16147***
Evaluation of superiors	-0.00866	-0.01181	0.00305	0.02584	0.00868	0.05168*	-0.02442	0.06048*	0.00950	0.07469**
Const	0.63009	-0.12779	1.31999**	0.55982	1.26079***	0.20601	0.33520	1.24056**	1.74697***	0.47964

N	142	82	339	135	555	295	60	321	726	283
aic	42.159.126	23.638.114	106.892.86 7	37.078.399	158.924.055	83.454.565	13.375.868	95.793.946	211.557.052	92.752.105
bic	48.661.945	28.932.896	115.310.06 7	43.470.003	168.425.785	91.565.911	17.983.426	104.091.116	221.649.662	100.772.088
R2	0.66333	0.76315	0.58780	0.56798	0.55343	0.62656	0.84158	0.59066	0.45227	0.60838
<b>* p&lt;.1; ** p&lt;.05; *** p&lt;.01</b>										

	Managers FP Specialists	Administrators	Administr. customer service	Aux customer service	Security CG Police	Qualified office personnel	Non-qualified	Total Public Employees	Total Public Employees
Depen Var: Job Satisfaction								<b>Depend Var: Job Satisfaction</b>	<b>Dependent Variable Motivation</b>
Age	-0.00588*	-0.0154***	-0.00758	-0.00321	-0.01838**	-0.00120	-0.00026	-,008***	-,005***
Gender	0.00938	-0.05929	-0.09662	0.23208	-0.04554	0.07696	-0.06722	-,073***	0,007
Knowledge organogram	-0.00497	-0.04568	-0.04154	-0.06114**	0.01708	-0.00287	-0.05063**	-,021***	-0,002
Knowledge objectives organiz.	-0.01232	0.00980	0.01735	0.07843***	0.01500	-0.00644	0.03554*	,014**	,007**
Satisf. organization job	0.14328***	0.11947***	0.12435***	0.15731***	0.15489***	0.12994***	0.11112***	,112***	,039***
Sat actual work	0.32658***	0.37121***	0.28578***	0.20126***	0.32067***	0.24857***	0.28766***	,299***	,222***
Sat autonomy/ independence	0.08309***	0.00398	0.05259	0.05014	0.08214**	0.07573***	0.04434*	,063***	,049***
Sat participation decisions	0.02243	0.07067***	-0.00337	0.09317***	0.03950	-0.02204	0.00371	,022***	,052***
Satisfaction with the workday	0.06126***	0.01946	0.13550***	0.12934***	0.12036***	0.09240***	0.11798***	,084***	,011***
Satisf. flexibility schedule	0.02448*	0.02990*	-0.01217	0.00618	-0.00382	0.01085	0.06754***	,024***	-0,003
Satisf. Break time	0.00572	0.07310***	0.04344	0.01407	0.04367	0.02317	0.00382	0,01	-,007***
Satisf. Vacation and leave	0.03558	0.09226***	0.05847*	0.03887	0.00077	0.07901***	0.02149	,051***	-0,004
Academic training suits job	0.01448	-0.02908	0.01190	-0.01071	-0.00969	-0.02407*	0.03079**	-0,004	,015***
Satisf training received	0.03235***	0.02380	0.05730***	0.03015	0.00418	0.07489***	0.01131	,038***	,012***
Income	-0.00191	0.11571**	-0.06648	-0.09258*	-0.05605	0.00438	-0.01550	-,027***	,017***
Employee/Management relations	0.02876	-0.00066	0.09428***	0.03738	-0.00710	0.00586	-0.01030	,026***	,034***
Relationship with colleagues	0.00161	0.03628	-0.02257	-0.00568	0.02871	0.00194	0.00915	-0,001	,016***
Confidence in superiors	0.02852	0.02077	-0.02744	-0.00642	-0.04818	0.00419	0.04662*	,023***	,026***
Confidence in colleagues	0.04775**	-0.01889	0.03442	0.05734	0.08652*	0.03014	0.00385	,034***	,020***
Satisfaction with salary	0.09936***	0.08660***	0.11766***	0.12847***	0.12341***	0.13213***	0.12186***	,112***	,014***

Evaluation of superiors	0.02093	0.03226	0.05865**	0.03232	0.04054	0.05292***	0.06287***	,071***	,054***
Const	0.81569***	1.28509***	0.99859**	1.08274***	1.19560*	0.98243***	1.10743***	1,119***	-3,925***
N	1241	461	482	588	325	859	712	7236	7236
aic	366.671.414	137.543.958	159.050.175	193.086.509	103.777.548	263.846.062	232.874.411	2.483.711.211	2.000.711.211
bic	377.943.494	146.637.434	168.241.652	202.715.308	112.101.963	274.308.754	242.924.182	2.499.111.188	2.799.111.188
R2	0.60687	0.58871	0.59492	0.55371	0.61745	0.60386	0.58912	0.574	0.645

\* p<.1; \*\* p<.05; \*\*\* p<.01