Economic indicators for the presence of tacit collusion in merger control under varied focal points

Proctor, Adrian (2013): Economic indicators for the presence of tacit collusion in merger control under varied focal points. Published in: World Competition , Vol. 2, No. 38 (1 June 2015): pp. 253-280.

Abstract

This article discusses how different focal points in a market can lead to different collusive agreements and how merger analysis can identify markets that may be vulnerable to these potential agreements. Focal points based on customer allocation and geographic markets are considered with recent UK examples of this type of analysis. The focal point firms are using for coordination can affect the transparency required to maintain coordination and how targeted or effective any punishment for deviation can be.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Identifying Tacit Coordination, Customer Geographic Focal points, Collusion, Merger Analysis.
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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Proctor, Adrian J. ‘Identifying Geographic or Customer-Based Collusion’. World Competition 38, no. 2 (2015): 253–280. 2015 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands) with the permission of Kluwer Law international.

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