Note on tax enforcement and transfer pricing manipulation

Rathke, Alex Augusto Timm (2015): Note on tax enforcement and transfer pricing manipulation.

Abstract

This note proposes the segregation of independent endogenous and exogenous components of tax penalty probability to introduce a formal demonstration that enforcement and tax penalties are negatively related with income shifting.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: income shifting; transfer pricing; tax enforcement, tax penalty.
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

References

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