Global Bond Portfolios and EMU

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Abstract

We examine the bilateral composition of international bond portfolios for the euro area and the individual EMU member countries. We find considerable support for “euro area bias”: EMU member countries disproportionately invest in one another relative to other country pairs. Another striking pattern is the positive connection between trade linkages and financial linkages in explaining asymmetries across EMU member countries in terms of their outward and inward bond investments vis-a-vis external counterparties. At the aggregate level, it is those countries physically closest to the euro area that are both the most important destinations and sources for external bond investment vis-a-vis the euro area. Our empirical results support the notion that financial regionalization is the leading force underlying financial globalization.
1 Introduction

Financial globalization is a key force that is reshaping the nature of the linkages across the major economic zones in the world economy. One dimension of globalization is the rising share of financial assets and liabilities held by foreign investors.¹ However, it is by no means the case that the pattern of foreign ownership is uniformly globalized in the sense that the national identity of investors has ceased to matter. Rather, the “international investor base” significantly differs across countries and regions, reflecting variation in both aggregate economic fundamentals (i.e. some countries are more attractive than others to all investors) and also bilateral linkages (i.e. the demand by an investor in region $i$ for the financial assets issued by region $j$ may be influenced by bilateral economic variables and also common institutional and cultural ties).

Such heterogeneity in the investor base potentially matters for two reasons. First, the cost of capital and the stability of international demand for the assets issued by a given country or region will depend on the characteristics of its international investor base. Second, the bilateral pattern of investment holdings will in itself influence the transmission of financial shocks, the nature of international risk-sharing and also potentially affect exchange rate regime choices.²

In this paper, we investigate these issues by analyzing the bilateral patterns in international bond holdings, with a particular emphasis on European Monetary Union (EMU). We ask various questions about EMU. Do EMU members disproportionately invest in other EMU member countries, relative to other destinations? With respect to external financial linkages, is there systematic heterogeneity in the external bond portfolios (assets and liabilities) of the individual EMU member countries? By addressing such questions, the contribution of the paper is to build a profile of the role of the euro in shaping global bond portfolios.

At an empirical level, we address these questions by exploiting the recent release of the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) that reports the portfolio holdings of 67 investor countries in 220 destination territories. The availability of the CPIS dataset represents a considerable advance relative to previous studies that relied on smaller samples and used data on transactions rather than holdings (see, for example, Portes et al 2001).

In terms of focus, we place a special emphasis on investigating the connections between bilateral

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¹ See, for instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003).
² On the latter, see Devereux and Lane (2003) for some suggestive evidence.
financial holdings and various bilateral ties, such as bilateral trade, physical proximity, bilateral macroeconomic correlations and bilateral cultural and institutional similarities. This is in line with recent theoretical contributions that emphasize the importance of such bilateral factors in determining portfolio allocations in a world still characterised by pervasive frictions in both product and financial markets.


The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. We briefly discuss the relevant theoretical issues in thinking about the geography of bond portfolios in section 2. Section 3 introduces the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) that is the source of the data on international bond holdings and, taking a euro area perspective, describes some broad patterns in the data. A range of empirical questions concerning EMU and the importance of the euro area in international bond holdings are addressed in the econometric analysis in section 4. Finally, directions for future research and some concluding remarks are offered in section 6.

2 A Conceptual Framework

In a benchmark finance model (e.g. the ICAPM), investors should hold the bonds of each issuer in proportion to its share of global bond market capitalisation.\textsuperscript{3} This is the case to the extent

\textsuperscript{3}See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for a more formal treatment and detailed literature review of international asset allocation, with an application to international investment patterns in equity markets. See also the discussion in Burger and Warnock (2004).
that there are no real or financial imperfections that distort international trade in goods or assets, such that the optimal allocation rule is independent of the nationality of the investor. However, the segmentation of product and capital markets, plus informational asymmetries and differences in institutions (such as tax and legal systems) across countries mean that the world is far distant from this benchmark. The presence of such frictions means that the optimal portfolio allocation strategy plausibly varies with the nationality of the investor.

The incompleteness of financial markets also means that international diversification strategies may vary across countries. In a multi-currency world, hedging against nominal currency risk is costly, such there may be a preference for bonds issued in the investor’s home currency. In addition, to the extent that a group of countries share a common financial infrastructure, this should raise intra-group financial trade relative to other destinations that may involve higher transactions costs (Martin and Rey 2000). These two factors are especially relevant for the euro area, to the extent that the single currency has both eliminated nominal exchange rate risk among the member countries and lowered transactions costs by improving liquidity through a deepening and broadening of the consolidated euro area bond market, relative to the individual national bond markets that operated prior to the launch of EMU.

In terms of other factors, much recent research has emphasized that information sets vary greatly across investors. This is a popular rationalisation of home bias in portfolios: the multi-country version of this argument is that bilateral investment patterns should correlate with the strength of informational linkages between different country pairs. Again, it may be argued that the single currency has substantially integrated the financial market of the euro area and thereby improved the information flow among member countries.

An additional consideration is that investors in different countries face different “endowment” risks (e.g. non-diversifiable shocks to labour income or tax rates): the basket of international

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4 Our data do not permit us to distinguish between the nationality and currency denomination of a bond issue. However, Burger and Warnock (2004) report that local-currency bonds represent 93 percent of total bonds outstanding for developed-country markets and 78 percent of total bonds outstanding for emerging markets. For advanced-country destinations, there is likely to be a strong overlap between the nationality of the issuer and the currency of issue; for developing-country destinations, in contrast, external investors primarily hold the foreign-currency bonds issued by these countries.

assets that offers the best hedge against these risks may vary on a bilateral basis. In addition, with regard to the segmentation of product markets, there are several reasons to believe that trading partners should receive a higher weight in portfolios. A basic reason is that the volume of trade is a good predictor of the level of bilateral exchange rate volatility (Devereux and Lane 2003, Broda and Romalis 2003). As such, currency risk is minimised by preferring the bonds of major trading partners.

Along another dimension, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) show that the incentive to hold state-contingent foreign assets is increased, the more investors are exposed to consumption risk through fluctuations in the supply of imported goods. At the extreme, a country that just purchases domestic goods is not exposed to external shocks to its level of its consumption and so need not be concerned with hedging against this risk. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) generalize this argument to an N-country setting, with the prediction that bilateral portfolio shares should be positively related to import shares in order to minimize consumption risk. Although the focus of these authors was on international equity portfolios, analogous reasoning may apply to bond allocations. For instance, holding the domestic-currency bonds issued by a trading partner provides a natural hedge against bilateral real exchange rate movements: if the relative price of the import good rises, this is offset by the increased real return for the domestic investor from holding the foreign bond.  

We build our empirical specifications in the econometric work in section 4 on the basis of these theoretical arguments that provide some hypotheses as to why the composition of international bond portfolios may deviate on a country-by-country basis.

3 The Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS)

In this section, we first discuss some features of the CPIS, before presenting an overview of the broad patterns in the data on international bond portfolios, with a primary focus on the euro area as a source and destination for cross-border bond investments.

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6 See Davis et al (2001) for a formal treatment of this point.

7 Whether the hedged return on a foreign bond positively or negatively comoves with the real exchange rate (or the terms of trade) is ambiguous: in general, it depends on the source of the relative price shock and the relative importance of nominal risk versus credit risk in determining the value of the foreign bond. See also a related example in Obstfeld (2004).
3.1 Data Issues

The source of data on bond holdings is the CPIS, which is organised by the International Monetary Fund. After a smaller survey in 1997, the 2001 survey included 67 source countries and 218 destination territories.\footnote{The 1997 survey did not include some important investor nations (e.g. Germany) as a source country, severely limiting its usefulness in examining the investment patterns of the aggregate euro area. However, in the next section, we will compare changes in investment patterns between 1997 and 2001 in order to assess whether EMU membership has influenced portfolio allocations.} Estimated holdings for 2002 have also been released: however, these data do not reflect benchmark surveys by all participants and rely to some extent on extrapolations from the 2001 survey. For this reason, we mainly focus on the 2001 cross-section in this study.\footnote{At any rate, the correlation between the 2001 and 2002 holdings is extremely high.} However, we do also examine the changes in bond portfolios between 1997 and 2001 in seeking to establish the impact of EMU.

While the CPIS represents a major advance in availability of data on bilateral investment positions, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) point out that the survey is imperfect. First, holdings are surely under-reported by some countries due to incomplete coverage or the complexities of tax-driven asset management structures.\footnote{For instance, the German survey did not cover holdings by households.} Second, the bilateral data can be distorted by third-party holdings to the extent that final ownership of assets is not properly traced: this is a larger problem for those countries that primarily surveyed custodians rather than end investors. Third, in relation to debt securities, the survey offers relatively little information on the currency denomination of bonds.\footnote{See the analysis in Geis et al (2004). Even for those countries that do report the breakdown across the major currencies, these data are provided only in the aggregate, rather than on a destination-by-destination basis.} Finally, the CPIS does not report the domestic holdings of investors, such that it does not provide a complete profile of the composition of portfolios but rather only details the geographical breakdown of the cross-border component of investment positions.

It is also important to understand that the CPIS reports only aggregate holdings: it does not provide the decomposition in terms of whether securities are issued (or held) by public or private institutions and or the relative holdings of individual investors versus financial intermediaries. Moreover, it does not give details as to the “age profile” of the holdings in terms of whether particular assets were recently acquired or have been held for a long time. For these reasons, the CPIS, while useful, by no means provides a complete profile of the investor base in international
3.2 Broad Patterns

We begin in Figure 1 by looking at the total international bond holdings of EMU member countries. The euro area aggregate amounts to $2.36 trillion in cross-border assets, or 38.5 percent of GDP. Of these, 62.2 percent of the international holdings are invested in other member countries, with extra-EMU bond holdings representing $890 billion or 14.5 percent of GDP. Of the individual countries, Figure 1 does not include Luxembourg: its cross-border bond holdings amount to nearly 2100 percent of its GDP, with the distribution between intra- and extra-area destinations similar to that for the aggregate. Clearly, this extraordinarily large bond portfolio reflects Luxembourg’s status as a major financial center for European asset management and also highlights that a major proportion of these holdings have not been traced back to the end investor. Albeit to a lesser extent, Ireland also shows up as a major financial center, with a bond portfolio valued at 182.2 percent of its GDP. At the other end of the distribution, Greece has by far the lowest ratio of international bond assets to GDP at 5.1 percent, with most of the other countries in the 20-40 percent range. Another noteworthy feature is that only Greece and Ireland devote more than 50 percent of their portfolios to territories outside the euro area, with the other countries exhibiting much higher levels of ‘euro area’ bias in the allocation of their international bond holdings.

In terms of external destinations, the US and UK are by far the two most popular individual destinations although there is considerable heterogeneity across the member countries. With respect to external bond liabilities, Japan is the single biggest bond investor in the euro area, responsible for about one-third of total external holdings, with the UK a close second and the US and Switzerland also each contributing more than 10 percent of total inward investment into the euro area. In the next section, we attempt to tease out some of the determinants of these various patterns in the relations between the euro area and global bond markets.

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12 Throughout the paper, we focus on the data for long-term debt securities. The CPIS does provide some information on short-term debt securities but there are many more missing observations for this category.
13 Ireland set up an International Financial Services Center (IFSC) in 1987, which has attracted many international firms to establish both back-end and front-end asset management operations there.
14 See Lane (2005) for more description of the basic stylized facts about the geographical composition of bond portfolios.
4 EMU and Cross-Border Bond Portfolios

We begin this section by analysing whether a “euro area bias” is evident in the data. Subsequently, we investigate the external bond holdings of the euro area, in order to establish the determinants of the euro area’s aggregate external bond holdings (both assets and liabilities) and whether there are systematic differences in the external portfolios of the individual EMU member countries.

4.1 Do EMU Member Countries Invest Disproportionately in Each Other?

Do EMU member countries invest disproportionately in each other? To address this question, we consider a sample of source countries that includes 11 EMU member countries and 11 other high-income countries from outside the euro area, to form a sample of 22 source countries.\(^{15}\) By contrasting the behavior of members and similar non-members, we can investigate whether a country pair where both are members of the euro area has a different investment pattern than other country pairs.

Our general specification is

\[
\log(BOND_{ij}) = \phi_i + \phi_j + \rho EURO_{ij} + \gamma \log(IMP_{ij}) + \beta Z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad i = \{HIGH - INC\} \tag{1}
\]

where the dependent variable is the level of source country \(j\)’s bond holdings in destination country \(i\). We include a pair-wise dummy \(EURO_{ij}\) that takes the value 1 if both the source and destination countries are members of the euro area and 0 otherwise. To the extent that the various control variables capture the natural variation in bilateral bond investment patterns, the pairwise \(EURO\) dummy variable will measure the impact of joint membership of the euro area ‘over and above’ the other linkages that tie together the various pairings among EMU member countries. The inclusion of country dummies for each source and host countries means that we control for all characteristics that determine a country’s general propensity to invest externally and to be a recipient of inward investment respectively (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004 for an extended

\(^{15}\) These are the US, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Canada, Iceland, Australia and New Zealand. These countries are advanced economies that are structurally similar to the EMU member countries and as such form a natural comparator group. Luxembourg is excluded as a source country due to its special status as an offshore centre.
discussion of this specification). As such, we rather seek to explain portfolio asymmetries: why does country A disproportionately invest in destination X, whereas country B relatively over-weights destination Y?

The inclusion of double fixed effects means that our list of regressors is confined to bilateral variables that vary across country pairs $(i,j)$. In addition to the volume of imports, we consider in a range of specifications a set of other variables that may proxy for informational linkages, the scope for diversification and institutional similarities between country pairs. Finally, since there are a large number of zero or small-value bilateral holdings in the data (in terms of bond holdings in the smaller developing countries), we restrict attention to positions in excess of $1$ million.

We also provide some time-series evidence on this question by looking at changes in portfolio allocation between 1997 and 2001. The number of investor countries is reduced, since the 1997 survey covered a smaller number of countries — from this high-income group, two EMU members (Germany and Greece) and one important non-member (Switzerland) are excluded. Table 8 shows the growth in foreign bond holdings for each member country between 1997 and 2001. In most cases, the growth in holdings in other member countries far exceeds the growth in the aggregate portfolio: the differential is especially striking for Finland, Italy and Spain.

In order to conduct a more formal investigation, we adopt the specification

$$
\Delta \log(BOND_{ij}) = \phi_i + \phi_j + \rho \text{EURO}_{ij} + \gamma \Delta \log(IMP_{ij}) + \beta_1 \Delta Z^1_{ij} + \beta_2 Z^2_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad i = \{HIGH-INC\}
$$

(2)

where $Z^1$ is a set of regressors that are entered in first differences and $Z^2$ are entered in levels.

The empirical results are shown in Table 1: columns (1)-(3) report levels specifications, while the findings from the differences specifications are displayed columns (4)-(6). In column (1), we just include the EURO dummy as the sole bilateral regressor (in addition to the fixed source

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16 If we just restricted the set of source countries to the euro area members, a euro dummy could only be included by dropping the “double fixed effects” specification and employing a panel version of the specification similar to equation (3) below. It turns out that a euro dummy is highly significant in such a specification. However, since it is not possible to include source and host country dummies, this alternative approach cannot rule out that omitted factors correlated with EMU membership is responsible for its significance.

17 However, results are very similar if we include these data points.

18 These countries are still included as destination countries in the survey.

19 We still include the double fixed effects in this specification ...

20 Due to its offshore role, we exclude Luxembourg from this exercise.
and host country dummies). The dummy variable is highly significant, both statistically and economically. This basic specification suggests that the level of cross-border bond investment between two members of the euro area is 331 percent higher than between any other country pair in the sample.\textsuperscript{21}

In column (2), we include those bilateral variables that are most plausibly correlated with the joint membership of the euro area: the volume of bilateral imports; the level of bilateral exchange rate volatility; and joint membership of the European Union. In addition, we include some popular gravity-type variables: distance, a colonial dummy, a border dummy and a common language dummy. We also add the correlation of output growth rates between the source and destination countries and a tax treaty dummy to the specification. The former is intended to capture the scope for bilateral risk diversification, to the extent that output growth is a good proxy for bond returns.\textsuperscript{22}

Despite the inclusion of these controls, the euro dummy remains highly significant: in terms of magnitude, it now implies a 114 percent ‘euro bonus’ in terms of bilateral bond investment. That the euro dummy remains significant even with the inclusion of these regressors tells us that the effect is not simply attributable to the elimination of exchange rate volatility among the member countries, the high level of intra-EMU trade or common membership of the EU.

In turn, this indicates the explanation for the euro effect lies in the institutional impact of EMU in terms of the unification of the euro area bond market and the importance of ‘truly zero’ currency risk in determining the composition of bond portfolios. At one level, EMU acts to reduce transactions costs due to the greater liquidity of the unified market and the elimination of currency conversion and hedging costs. At another level, EMU has altered the basic properties of the bonds issued by governments and corporations in the member countries - these now are much closer substitutes due to the absence of currency risk.

Finally, at the cost of a major reduction in sample size (in effect, the set of destination countries now comprises only major industrial and middle-income countries), we include a dummy variable for ‘common legal origin’ in column (3). This variable is intended to capture a basic level of

\textsuperscript{21}If the fixed effects are excluded, the estimated value for the \textit{EURO} dummy is 6.26 (\(t = 34.3\)) and the \(\text{adj.}R^2 = 0.16\).

\textsuperscript{22}See Chen (1991) and Ilmanen (1995). Data on bond returns are only available for a fairly-small subset of the countries in our sample.
institutional similarity between the source and destination countries and has been found to have some explanatory power for bilateral patterns in equity investments (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004). Although the estimated coefficient for the EURO dummy does fall in value in column (3), it still indicates that cross-border bond investment is 99 percent larger among euro area member countries than between other country pairs.

With respect to the other explanatory variables, the level of imports and distance are highly significant in both columns (2) and (3). As was discussed in section 2, there are multiple hypotheses as to why portfolio holdings are skewed towards trading partners and geographically-proximate destinations. Regarding the role of trade, this may reflect an optimal risk diversification strategy; alternatively, trade in goods may also be a good information vehicle. Regarding distance, this also has a information interpretation but may also proxy for institutional similarity or lower transactions costs. Further research is required to discriminate between these various hypotheses.

The other individually-significant regressors are colonial relationship (positive) and common language (positive) - each of these variables have the expected sign. In addition, the common legal origin variable is highly significant in column (3), indicating that institutional similarity may be important in determining bilateral holdings. The border variable is now also significant, albeit with a negative sign. However, the colonial and common language dummies are not individually significant in this smaller sample, perhaps suggesting that these variables are more relevant in explaining allocations across less-advanced economies that are not included in this smaller sample.

We turn to the time-series evidence in columns (4)-(6), by looking at changes in portfolio allocation between 1997 and 2001. The number of investor countries is reduced, since the 1997 survey covered a smaller number of countries — from this high-income group, two EMU members (Germany and Greece) and one important non-member (Switzerland) are excluded.23 Table 2 shows the growth in foreign bond holdings for each member country between 1997 and 2001. In most cases, the growth in holdings in other member countries far exceeds the growth in the aggregate portfolio: the differential is especially striking for Finland, Italy and Spain.

We see in the basic specification that is reported in column (4) of Table 1 that bond holdings indeed grew significantly more quickly between members of the euro area than between other country pairs; the estimated coefficient indicates intra-EMU bilateral holdings grew by an additional

23These countries are still included as destination countries in the survey.
129 percent. It turns out that the inclusion of the other regressors in columns (5)-(6) only slightly reduces the estimated coefficient, with the estimated magnitude in the range of $[86, 125]$ percent.

With regard to the control variables, the growth in imports between 1997 and 2001 is significantly positive only in the smaller sample in column (6). The only other significant results are that a common border reduces holdings in column (5) and countries that share a common legal origin experienced faster growth in bilateral bond holdings, as is shown in column (6). For the former, a possible interpretation is that part of the portfolio adjustment has been to reallocate away from contiguous countries towards fellow members of the euro area.

Overall, the results in Table 1 strongly indicate that the extent of bilateral financial integration is stronger between EMU member countries than between other country pairs. To the extent that the process of portfolio adjustment began before 1997 and was not completed by the 2001, our estimates may actually understate the impact of EMU on bond allocations. Of course, this finding requires more extensive testing by exploring other specifications and econometric techniques, but these initial steps establish a benchmark for such future empirical investigations.24

4.2 What Drives Variation in the External Bond Portfolios of Individual Member Countries?

In this subsection, we explore heterogeneity across euro-area members in terms of their external bond holdings: the exposure of member countries to external country risk is asymmetric to the extent that such heterogeneities are important. As in Table 1, we again employ the ‘double fixed effects’ specification

$$
\log(BOND_{ij}) = \phi_i + \phi_j + \gamma \log(IMP_{ij}) + \beta Z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad i \in \{EMU\} \quad (3)
$$

where the set of source countries is restricted to members of the euro area and the set of destination countries now includes only destinations outside the euro area.25 The results are reported in columns

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24 As one robustness check, we entered distance in a non-linear (quadratic) format. This was done in view of the close geographic proximity of EMU member countries (relative to other country pairs). In general, the results are very similar for the EURO dummy. See Lane (2005).

25 We exclude Luxembourg as a source country, in view of its predominant role as an offshore center. The external investment pattern for Luxembourg-associated holdings is reasonably similar to the euro area average, with the exception that a lower weight is attached to the UK and a higher weight to ‘other Europe.’ The results are also essentially unchanged if Ireland (the other main euro area offshore center) is excluded.
We begin in column (1) by including just imports as a bilateral regressor. This variable is highly significant: the greater is the import dependence of a member country on a given external destination, bond holdings in that country are 67 percent higher. We expand the specification to include some gravity-type variables, plus the correlation in growth rates and the tax treaty dummy in column (2). Finally, again at the cost of a major reduction in sample size, we include a dummy variable for ‘common legal origin’ in column (3). The imports variable remains highly significant in these broader specifications and its magnitude slightly increases to [80,88] percent. It is important to emphasize that the import variable is largely unaffected by the inclusion of these gravity variables, despite their importance in explaining bilateral trade patterns. This suggests that the volume of trade per se is important in determining bond investment patterns, as opposed to imports merely proxying for these other informational variables.

Among the other explanatory variables, the tax treaty dummy is significantly positive in both columns (2) and (3) - again, this is best interpreted as an indicator of institutional similarity. That the correlation in growth rates enters in a significantly positive manner is on the surface puzzling - a diversification motive should point to reducing allocations to those countries that share a business cycle with the home country. Distance is not significant: since the euro area countries are close to one another, differences in the distances to particular external partners are relatively small, such that this variable may not have much marginal explanatory power. Finally, the colonial and common language dummies are significant in columns (2) but not in column (3): as before, this may be explained by the greater importance of these variables in explaining allocations to developing country destinations that are featured more heavily in the sample in column (2) than in column (3).  

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26 If the fixed effects are excluded, the estimated import coefficient is 0.56 (t = 26.74) and the adj $R^2 = 0.39$.
27 As noted earlier, we have inadequate data on bond returns to study in more detail the relation between the comovements in bond returns and allocations. In related work, Couerdacier and Guibaud (2005) argue that the apparent positive association between the bilateral comovements in equity returns and bilateral equity holdings can be explained by reverse causation: an increase in bilateral portfolio holdings in equilibrium raises the correlation in equity returns.
28 The colonial dummy actually enters with a negative sign. Its loss of significance in column (3) may also be related to the inclusion of the common legal origin dummy that is highly correlated with the colonial dummy.
4.3 External Bond Investment in EMU Member Countries: Sources of Heterogeneity

In columns (4)-(6) of Table 3, we examine which bilateral factors are important in determining asymmetries in the distribution of inward investment across the individual member countries of the euro area. For this purpose, we again use a “double fixed effects” specification

\[
\log(BOND_{ij}) = \phi_i + \phi_j + \gamma \log(IMP_{ij}) + \beta Z_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad j \in \{EMU\} \tag{4}
\]

Here, the set of source countries is restricted to non-members of EMU and the destinations are the set of member countries.\(^{29}\)

As before, we start in column (4) by just including imports as a regressor. This is significantly positive - the distribution of inward bond investment across the member countries is positively related to variation in the strength of the trading links with external investing nations. Similar to columns (2)-(3), we expand the specifications in columns (5)-(6) to include a larger number of regressors, with an attendant reduction in sample size.

In these expanded regressions, few variables are individually significant - while there is high overall explanatory power, the correlations among the regressors mean that individual significance is lost. (One way to think about this is that there is little variation in bilateral imports in these samples, once the gravity-type variables are entered into the specification.) As in columns (2)-(3), the correlation in growth rates is significantly positive in column (5). The common language dummy in significant in column (6) - taken together with the result in column (3), this indicates that a common language is more important for explaining inward investment into the euro area than outward investment.

5 Conclusions

This paper has exploited the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey to build a profile of the euro area as both a source and destination for international bond investment. We have documented the importance of the aggregate euro area in global bond markets but highlighted that there are substantial asymmetries in the external patterns of outward and inward investment with respect to the individual member countries.

\(^{29}\)We exclude Luxembourg as a destination country.
Our results are strongly indicative that EMU has had a substantial impact on global bond portfolios. In both levels and differences, cross-investment among euro area members is substantially greater than among other country pairs, even controlling for other characteristics that may generate strong investment linkages across the euro area. As a caveat, the biggest source of uncertainty about our results is that the 2001 data are perhaps too premature to establish the full impact of EMU on international bond portfolios, to the extent that holdings are adjusted only gradually over time. To settle this question will require a longer span of data to become available, such that these specifications should be re-estimated as new releases of the CPIS become available.

In terms of understanding the sources of the “euro” bias, more research is required. In contrast to the literature that investigates the impact of EMU on trade in goods, there are two factors at work in terms of its impact on bond trade that are not easily separated - EMU both reduces bilateral trading costs and, by fundamentally altering the risk and payoff profiles of the bonds issued by the individual member countries, also changes the elasticity of substitution between these bonds.30

A second message from our empirical work is that there are asymmetries across member countries in terms of the bilateral composition of their bond assets and liabilities. Another extension of this line of research is to push the analysis further by examining the extent to which the observed asymmetries in portfolios across euro area members and between the euro area and the rest of the world materially contributes to asymmetries in wealth dynamics across these countries and regions. In this regard, the Argentina default provided an interesting localised example (Italian retail investors were among the main European financial casualty in that episode.) However, in the event of a more widespread crisis in international financial markets, such asymmetries may pose a more serious problem at both the European and global levels in terms of the optimal design of policy responses.

Finally, another direction for future research is to understand the implications for EMU for asset pricing and the degree of financial development. A unified market for euro-denominated securities

30 See Lane (2006) for an overview of the impact of EMU on goods trade. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a general survey of the impact of shifts in trading costs on the volume of goods trade - this relation turns on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (which is typically assumed to be a fixed parameter). Martin and Rey (2004) study the impact of a reduction in cross-border trading costs on asset trade - but again take the elasticity of substitution between assets to be fixed.
with lower transactions costs raises the value of these assets, reducing required yields and the cost of capital. In addition, increased cross-holdings increases the correlation in returns across countries, altering the international transmission mechanism for financial shocks. Accordingly, the macroeconomic and financial impact of greater financial integration within the euro area (and between the euro area and the rest of the world) presents an exciting research agenda for economists.

References


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31 See, for example, Martin and Rey (2000, 2004).


International Monetary Fund (2000), The Results of the 1997 Comprehensive Portfolio Investment Survey, Washington, DC.


Figure 1: International Bond Holdings. Ratios to GDP. Source: Author’s calculations, based on CPIS data.
Table 1: Is there a Euro Bias?

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<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(1.94)*</td>
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<td>(1.43)</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Estimation is by pooled least squares, with “double fixed effects.” Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Marginal R2 is the explanatory power of the bilateral variables in explaining the residuals from an ‘only fixed effects’ regression. See Appendix B for the definitions and data sources for the variables.
Table 2: Changes in Holdings for EMU Member Countries 1997 to 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World</th>
<th>Euro Area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>103.7</td>
<td>170.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>138.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>192.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>349.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>106.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>344.6</td>
<td>1064.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>216.8</td>
<td>219.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>124.6</td>
<td>196.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>317.4</td>
<td>914.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Percentage growth in each country’s international bond holdings: aggregate and in other euro area countries.
Table 3: Heterogeneity in the External Bond Portfolios of EMU Member Countries

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Out</th>
<th>(2) Out</th>
<th>(3) Out</th>
<th>(4) In</th>
<th>(5) In</th>
<th>(6) In</th>
</tr>
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<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(10.4)***</td>
<td>(6.93)***</td>
<td>(2.9)***</td>
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<td>(1.44)</td>
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<td>-0.41</td>
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<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.72</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.65</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.72)***</td>
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<td>(.33)</td>
<td>(.82)</td>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<td>(2.67)***</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td>(1.85)*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correl(Growth Rates)</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.43</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.73)*</td>
<td>(2.08)**</td>
<td>(1.94)*</td>
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<td>(3.4)***</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.72)</td>
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<td>(.56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adj R2</td>
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<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marginal R2</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimation is by pooled least squares, with “double fixed effects.” Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * refer to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels respectively. Marginal R2 is the explanatory power of the bilateral variables in explaining the residuals from an ‘only fixed effects’ regression. See Appendix B for the definitions and data sources for the variables.
Appendix

A Countries and regions participating in the 2001 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey

Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR of China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR of China, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.

B Data Sources

This paper largely draws upon the databank constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004).

Long-term debt securities: issued by host country residents and held by source country residents. Source: 2001 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.

Total international bond issues. Source: BIS.

Source-country imports: Imports of goods by source countries from host countries (average 1997-2001). Source, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. For external source countries, imports from the euro area is the sum of imports from the individual member countries.

Distance: logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).

Correlation in growth rates: correlation between the GDP growth rate in the source and host country. Source: authors’ calculations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host countries have a legal system with a common origin (common law, French, German, or Scandinavian). Source: authors’ elaborations based on La Porta, López de Silanes, and Shleifer (2003).

Exchange Rate Volatility. Exchange rate data are from IFS. Measured as standard deviation of monthly log difference in the bilateral nominal exchange rate over 1998-2001.

Tax treaty: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the source and host country have a tax treaty enacted prior to 1999. Source: authors’ elaborations based on treaty data taken from www.unctad.org.

Common Language: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country share a common language. For aggregate euro area, this takes value 1 if the partner shares a common language with any EMU member country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).

Colony dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship. For aggregate euro area, this takes value 1 if the partner shares a colonial history with any EMU member country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).

Europe dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if the country is a member of ‘broad Europe’, defined by inclusion in the European football championship.

Euro dummy: takes the value 1 if both source and host countries are members of the euro area.

EU dummy: takes the value 1 if both source and host countries are members of the European Union.