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Incentives and justice for sequencing problems.

Mitra, Manipushpak and De, Parikshit (2015): Incentives and justice for sequencing problems.

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Abstract

We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the non-increasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms that ex-post implement the just sequencing rule.

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