This essay has been published under the title"The Population Cycle Drives Human History from a Eugenic Phase into a Dysgenic Phase and Eventual Collapse" in The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 32 (2007) 327-358. During a time in which I was very ill and feedback was impossible, by the editors have been made a number of unauthorized changes, in some cases even distorting the content. In the following you can read the full text of the original authorized version.
In this context, I recommend ", Princeton University Press 2007, by Gregory Clark, too.
The Population Cycle Drives Human History
from a Eugenic Phase into a Dysgenic Phase and Collapse
German Central Office for Genealogy, Leipzig
In the period before the onset of demographic transition, when fertility rates were positively associated with income levels, Malthusian pressure gave an evolutionary advantage to individuals whose characteristics were positively correlated with child quality and hence higher IQ, increasing in such a way the frequency of underlying genes in the population. As the fraction of individuals of higher quality increased, technological progress intensified. Positive feedback between technological progress and the level of education reinforced the growth process, setting the stage for an industrial revolution that facilitated an endogenous take-off from the Malthusian trap. The population density rose and with it social and political friction, especially important at the top of the social pyramid. Thus, from a certain turning point of history, the well-to-do have fewer children than the poor. Once the economic environment improves sufficiently, the evolutionary pressure weakens, and on the basis of spreading egalitarian ideology and general suffrage the quantity of people gains dominance over quality. At present, we have already reached the phase of global human capital deterioration as the necessary prerequisite for a global collapse by which the overpopulated earth will decimate
Key words: IQ; Dysgenics; Democracy; Poverty; Francis Galton; Darwinism; Fertility; Demographic transition; Human capital
The Cycle of Constitutions
About 50 years ago, in the former communist East Germany, I asked my schoolteacher what would happen after communism. He answered: “Nothing else, because communism is the final stage of human history.”
At present, the President of the United States does not stand not alone in his conviction that democracy is the final stage of history to which all the world is headed. However, 2,350 years ago, Aristotle wrote in his “Politics” that democracy is only one stage in history and would be superseded by another stage. From the history of the Greek city-states, he gained the insight that any particular constitution depends on the distribution of poverty and wealth. “There must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of governments as there are different ranks in the society, arising from the superiority of some over others, and their different situations.” But Aristotle knew also: “The first and principal instrument of the politician is the number of the people; he should therefore know how many, and what they naturally ought to be.” And Myrdal added in 1938 (p. 33): “No other factor — not even that of peace — is so tremendously fatal for the destinies of democracies as the factor of population. Democracy, not only as a political form but with all its content of civic ideals and human life, must either solve this problem or perish.” Because the number, density and social structure of a population (Lopreato and Crippen, 1999) are never constant but always changing (Sorokin, 1937; Weiss, 1993), the constitution of a state is never constant, but always changing, too, from monarchy to aristocracy, further to oligarchy and democracy, not in a linear fashion, but with steps backwards and forwards. Sooner or later the cycle of constitutions leads to democracy — according to Aristotle “of all the excellent constitutions ... the worst, but of bad ones, the best.” Necessarily, the deficiencies of democracy (Hoppe, 2001) must be made up by taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed upon the well-to-do. In such a way democracy inevitably degenerates into a corrupt government of the plebs and mobocracy. A “dictatorship of the proletariat”, which in the name of democracy (Somit and Peters, 1997) redistributes without any constraints from poor to rich, from the brave and diligent to the paupers, destroys the economic power of the society in its roots. Finally, the people will hail an autocrat as savior, and after a complete breakdown the cycle starts again.
Is our history actually cyclic (Galtung and Inayatullah, 1997) And if so, in which phase of history are we living today?
We have all grown up with an understanding of history as involving linear progress. We all know a number of indicators, which show a change in one and the same direction — either rising or decreasing — over centuries. When we look at shorter periods, these may include fluctuations and a change of slope. The percentage of people employed in farming has decreased from nearly 100% to 2% in highly developed industrialized nations Accordingly, the productivity of labor rose in all economic sectors over many generations. In the past century life expectancy rose dramatically. There are a lot of further statistics showing a clear trend (Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005): The incidence of divorce has multiplied over just decades. The public view of homosexuality is changing. In Europe the number of Christian believers has been decreasing, with fewer and fewer people attending church. In contrast with this, in France the number of Muslims rose from half a million around 1960 to more than five million forty years later (Gourévitch, 2000); a parallel development took place in Germany and other countries. In many schools in Berlin, Paris, Amsterdam and Southern California indigenous children are only a minority. People keep more and more pet animals; the relative proportion of social spending in German cities is rising; the birth rate is dropping, and so on. Nobody doubts that all these trends (Noelle-Neumann, 1978) — with the exception of the rise in labor productivity, say optimists — cannot continue indefinitely. If so, this would presumably end with a sudden change, a revolution (Goldstone, 1991), or a cataclysm (Chesnais, 1995; Brander, 1998; Laqueur, 2007).
In marked contrast to the unshakable faith of politicians and scholars in the march of progress, all great religions announce — with their own variations — an end of the world, apocalypse and rebirth.
The Rise and Fall of Civilizations
If we look at the history of the rise and decline of mighty empires (Cipolla, 1970), we get the impression that any rise is followed by a decline, progressing according to certain rules (Kennedy, 1987). The best-known example is the decline and fall of the Roman Empire (Christ, 1970). The causes of this have long troubled critical thinkers, because they hope to learn from history something that will help with the preservation of their own society (Galtung, 1996). But in some way deeper insight seems to be blocked since the history of Sparta and Athens repeats itself (Buchanan, 1999).
The only exception might be China. But even within China the build-up and break-up of a powerful central state has been repeated several times within the last 3000 years. Traditional Chinese historiography interprets Chinese history as a succession of dynastic cycles. The founder of a line, ruling by the Mandate of Heaven, naturally was a man of ability, drive and action. He eliminated his rivals, unified China, established an effective government, levied moderate taxes and secured the frontiers. Roads were built and irrigation systems repaired. The restoration of peace led to population increase, greater production, and correspondingly greater revenues. Under later rulers the bureaucracy grew like cancer and the costs of government rose. Each dynasty began to experience financial difficulties about a century after its founding. But as taxes increased, more and more peasant proprietors lost their plots to the large landowners, who began to evade taxation. Thus a vicious circle was set in motion rising taxes, falling revenues, neglected roads and dikes, and declining productivity. Finally, under chaotic circumstances, the dynasty disappeared from the stage of history, in a swirl of peasant revolts, warlord coups, and nomadic raids. Curtailed by plague, famine, and war, population numbers diminished dramatically. Then China entered a prolonged period of disunity and disorder (Chu and Lee, 1994) similar to that in Europe following the collapse of the Roman Empire.
When we look at the history of Russia from a broad perspective we can see, after some centuries of rise, the unmistakable signs of decline — with military defeat in the wars against Japan in 1905 and the Powers in 1917. In retrospect the period of communism seems to be nothing other than a period of progressive decay (Collins, 1999), in the break-up of the Soviet UnionThe military victory of 1945 turns out to have been an episode running contrary to the general trend. If we use the terminology of Aristotle, after 1953 the tyranny of Stalin was replaced by the oligarchy of the Politburo. But all this development took place against the background of an egalitarian ideology, as is characteristic for any phase of final
Likewise in smaller communities, rises and collapses have occurred. The best known example is Easter Island (Striening, 2001; Ponting, 2006), one of the most remote inhabited places on earth. The population of Polynesian settlers grew from a handful to 7,000 or even more. In just a few centuries, the people of this island wiped out their forest, drove their plants and animals to extinction, and saw their complex society spiral into chaos and cannibalism. With the disappearance of the food surplus, social hierarchy broke down. By around 1700, the population began to crash to nearly one-tenth of its former number. In 1722, as the first Europeans landed, they found a society in a primitive state. Nobody could comprehend how it was possible that these people had been able to erect the huge stone statues for which the island is famous. Similar crises and population cycles have been reported on an even larger scale from other areas and cultures (Russell and Russell, 1999) for example, from the Maya and the Anasazi.
During the past century the population of the world has multiplied as never before. In the 17th century, at the beginning of the cycle we live in, the world had 400 million inhabitants; when Karl Marx wrote his Communist Manifesto, it had about 1 billion. When I attended school and asked my schoolteacher, in vain, what would happen after communism, the world had about 2 billion inhabitants. In the past century the doubling periods became shorter, so now, in 2007 we have 6.7 billion. Prare of a maximum of 9 or 10 billion around 2040
Around 1970 the ?Club of Rome? predicted that our progress, if there is no substantial change, would lead inevitably to a collapse. The world as a whole threatens to become a Mega-Easter Island (Meadows et al., 2004). In the meantime there are a lot of expert opinions (Wallerstein, 1998; Lee and White, 2001; Kaplan, 2000; Itzkoff 2003a and 2003b; Weiss, 2007) that fix the worldwide collapse some time around 2040. Those who are able to look behind the daily news and are aware of long-term trends, can read the writing on the wall. The present sharp increase in the prices of energy and commodities is likely to prove no transient phenomenon. In the industrialized countries, especially by high input of energy and fertilizers, agrarian yields may be steadily improving; but in the Third world the deserts are eating the savannahs and drinking water is becoming a rarity. Each year, women must go greater distances to collect firewood for cooking. Large areas in poor countries are completely over‑exploited and over-populated and, without any hope of improvement, people are demographically trapped (Diamond, 2005).
Cyclic Decline nstead of the oped-for Equilibrium
However, in the industrialized countries the number of native inhabitants shows no further increase, but a decrease. Over how many generations this number will decrease, nobody knows. For such a development the established authorities of demography have no theory, despite their having been aware of the decline of the birth rate very early and having projected its proximate course and consequences. For decades, professors of demography have been satisfied with the theory of demographic transition, which predicted a stable population would be reached in some unknown future. Yet, to the astonishment of the professors, who seemed to be blind to the fact that equilibriums in nature and society are rare but cycles are common, birth rates were dropping still further and are now far below the level for natural population replacement. But why are birth rates dropping in such a way? Academic demographers can provide hundreds of arguments and opinions, but control variables and causes seem to be hidden from them. The solution of the mystery can be found in the papers of some young economists (Galor and Moav, 2002) to which the present paper will return.
It is not only the industrialized countries of Europe and Asia, but also the white populations of North America, Australia and South Africa, have for decades been falling short of the magical number of 2.0 offspring per woman (Buchanan, 2002). The newly industrialized countries are following suit at a rapid pace (Eberstadt, 1998). Among Arab societies supposed hold-outs of high-birth norms Tunisia and Lebanon have already fallen below replacement fertility (Wattenberg, 2004). In India it is not only big cities no longer generate local births to sustain their current population numbers over the long term, but so does the densely populated federal state of Kerala, governed by communists (Eberstadt, 2001). Many 20th entury population forecasts and demographic assessments are proving famously wrong (Longman, 2004; Steyn, 2006).
In the last 30 years in France (Laulan, 2003) and Germany (Weiss, 2000) a number of books appeared, in which a population policy was called for in order to stop the imminent population implosion. The politicians were blamed for doing nothing, or not enough. In such a way each industrialized country would have culprits of its own. But the similarity of probable outcomes (Demeny, 2003) in nations as different as Japan, Korea, Germany, and Italy suggests that the general trend must have a deeper and more general cause.
Looking at the speed at which the birth rate is falling within both old and new industrialized countries, while attending to the distribution of ages at which women marry and bear children, and to similar demographic parameters, the convergence between the developments within Eastern Europe, the historically Catholic Southern Europe and Protestant Europe is impressive to such a degree that it seems there must be an underlying law. But what law? If all industrialized countries, and in the meantime all newly industrialized countries too, despite their different historical backgrounds, are affected by sub-replacement childbearing patterns, the cause must be much deeper than the policy of each country, which — as in ancient Sparta and in Rome — has proved and is proving entirely helpless (Schade, 1974).
of the population cycle is always the progressive concentration of the
inhabitants in the large cities. “At this level all civilizations enter upon a
stage ... of appalling depopulation. The whole pyramid of cultural man vanishes.
It crumbles from the summit, first the world-cities, then the provincial forms
and finally the land itself, whose best blood has incontinently poured into the
towns, merely to bolster them up awhile. At the last, only the primitive blood
Why are big and fierce animals rare? Their place in the food chain is the most exposed and their existence requires a large number of smaller animals — hares, deer and so on — which need plants as fodder. In German we speak of somebody as a “Big Animal” if he is a man of the first rank; but his status also depends upon the large number of poor citizens who work for him or pay taxes. The ecological space of big animals is limited. They themselves are the first to perceive when their space is becoming crowded (Colinvaux, 1980).
As many studies have shown, the peasantry in Central, West and Northern Europe had far more children in the rising phase from the 16th to the middle of the 19th century the age of marriage than did the urban poor (Weiss, 1990) — in whose families two children (Weiss and Munchow, 1998). Because in Europe in contrast to the situation in the new areas of settlement for the white race overseas the number of places for peasants was limited, this social stratum and the upper stratum in the towns were eventually the first to begin using birth control (Clark, 2007).
In the last decade, a handful of young economists became aware that there is no reasonable theory for the fact that a certain point of historical development the well-to-do have fewer children than the poor. From purely theoretical considerations, these economists drew the conclusion that there must have been a turning point in a cycle; from which point onwards the poor had more children than the rich (e la Croix and Doepke, 2003). In the early stages of industrialization, when physical capital was the prime engine of economic growth, societies were marked by a stable class structure. In the second half of the 19th century the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and induced the capitalists to lobby for the provision of universal public education. In such a way a socio-economic transformation of the class structure was triggered in reaction to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining profit rates. However, poor parents had for much longer a greater number of children and invested little in education (Schneider and Schneider, 1996). Hoping they had a gifted child, the price for its education and upward mobility was to renounce the birth of further children (Galor and Moav, 2006). Finally, a widening of the distribution of income and wealth increases the fertility differential between the rich and the poor, which implies that education. Consequently, an increase in inequality lowers average education and, therefore, economic growth. Many nations are arriving at this stage now. For the richer group, wealth becomes by inheritance more and more concentrated among a few rich heirs; on the other hand, the poor masses are growing in numbers and becoming poorer.
How Fast do Things go Downhill?
In 1865 appeared the report of the Englishman Charles Boner, who traveled through Transylvania: But how is it that these German colonists, all thinking men, should thus dwindle away, instead of peopling the land with their race? ... The man of substance could not bear the thought of his possessions being divided. For a middle state he had a decided distaste; and the patrimony could not be increased to provide amply for each member of a numerous family... There are villages where the population has remained stationary for a hundred and more years. In others, where originally every inhabitant was German, with but a few Wallack huts outside the boundary, there is now hardly one Saxon left, and the whole population is Wallack, and the change has taken place since the childhood of men still living. Even from the pulpit, difficult as the subject is, it has been vigorously and eloquently treated... Everywhere, throughout the land, the Saxons, who took the first, are now gradually falling into a secondary position. The Wallacks are increasing so fast, that their ever-growing population displaces and threatens soon to overwhelm entirely the original settlers. ... The number of their representatives in the Transylvanian Parliament is so great, that they carry ever measure by an overwhelming majority. They seek office with avidity. ... Most of these men are in every respect unfit for office. .. In the numerous judicial cases, in which they have to decide between Saxons and Roumain, the Saxons go to the wall. They expected that while their numbers remained stationary, those of their serf dependants would do the same. But their calculations have proved false; the vassals have grown in strength, and the hum of their voices, always raised to demand new concessions, grows louder and louder.
Today, three generations later, this crowding out of the Saxons has been finished. Beyond a small residue there are no more Germans in Transylvania. The two World Wars were only stages in a long development, whose consequences the travel writer foresaw correctly in 1865. If a population has fallen below a critical size it comes then, after a very long decline, within a short time to a complete collapse — in the case of Transylvania to the emigration of the German residual population, in the case of Kosovo to the mass escape of the Serbs.
Let us look at South Africa where a national census was carried out in 1921. The director of the statistical office of the Union of South Africa, C. W. Cousins, commented on the numbers in the following way: While within the last 30 years the non-European population by natural growth has increased around 2,630,000, the European population increased ... its number by only 500,000.” Therefore, in
Cousins’ opinion it wprobably be decided within the next 25-50 years whether the
remain separate from the colored races as a population element proportionally
strong and driving the further development of South Africa or whether the
colored races exceed them so much in number
and peacefully replace them, so that they finally constitute
only a thin upper stratum, which some
envisaged by Cousins in 1921 , took place in 1994he
day on which the mass escape of the whites begins has yet to arrive. For Kenya
this day is already history; the former Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) is
living through it at present. Also in South Africa, the brain drain has long
been underway: qualified young people are emigrating to Europe, Australia or
Canada. If the IQ data given by Lynn and Vanhanen (the blacks of South Africa
average IQ 66, whites 94, coloreds 82) are correct, then from 1890 to 2005 the
average IQ of South Africa sank from 81 to approximately 70 and continues to
Malthus argued that a population increases more than the means for its subsistence. From this
Darwin drew the conclusion that natural selection, which eliminates the unfit,
brings about an equilibrium between propagation and carrying capacity. From
1841 on, when overpopulated Ireland suffered from cruel famines, in consequence
of which, and also by emigration and celibacy, the population of the island
halved from eight million to about four, this seemed to be an example of a
Malthusian collapse. But the theoretical model of Darwin fails in the cases of the
German peasants of Transylvania, of the white population of South Africa and of
the upper and middle stratum of the prosperous industrialized countries. In
order to interpret this behavior and to predict its outcome, we need more
insights than the analogies by Spengler of the growth and final decay of all
In the period before the onset of the demographic transition, when fertility rates are positively associated with income levels, the Malthusian pressure generates an evolutionary advantage for individuals whose characteristics are positively correlated with child quality. Those who are successful in economic competition, those who acquire and hold more property, or develop skills that allow for higher wages, are also more successful reproductively and increase their representation in the population. High-quality individuals generate higher wealth and have more resources for a larger number of offspring of higher quality. As the fraction of individuals of the quality type increase, technological progress intensifies. Positive feedback between technological progress and the level of education reinforces the growth process, setting the stage for an industrial revolution that facilitates an endogenous take-off from the Malthusian trap.
Investment in human capital increased gradually in the pre-industrial era due to a gradual increase in the representation of individuals with higher inherited qualities. The demographic transition generated a reversal in this relationship. In the Malthusian regime there is a positive correlation between income and fertility rates whereas in the modern growth regime this correlation is negative (Lam, 1997). Once the economic environment improves sufficiently, the evolutionary pressure weakens, and the quantity of people gains dominance over quality.
obal Human Capital Deterioration
At present, in all industrialized countries, even in the newly industrialized and the developing countries, women with middle and higher education have far fewer children than uneducated women — e.g. in China it is only half the number. For men, since they often marry downward, the negative relationship between social status and child number is not pronounced in such an outspoken way, but verifiable. Since the genotypic value of IQ and educational status are highly correlated, from these data there follows a worldwide dysgenic development, a worldwide decrease of the genotypic IQ.e who is poor is not automatically dull; to be rich, moderate intelligence is often sufficient.
The middle class, to which in industrialized countries about a third of the population belongs, determines by number of children whether the society goes up or down in the cycle. The offspring of the middle class supplies the largest percentage of socially upward mobile individuals and in each generation the highest absolute number of the highly gifted, with an IQ above 123 (Weiss, 1992). The highly gifted originate only to a small degree from the marriages of the highly gifted themselves, because the highly gifted proportion of any population is always very small. Beginning in the rising phase, with the formation of a meritocratic society, with the expansion of the educational system and by educational selection, nearly all gifted from the lower classes are sieved out. In the end nearly all women with medium and high IQ can be found in corresponding jobs and occupations, which make the rearing of a large number of children difficult. The childlessness or child paucity of the upper third of society has the consequence that average IQ is decreasing, and the cycle enters its phase of descent, which is now being reached world‑wide (Itzkoff, 2003b).
Already in the last quarter of the 19th century, the decrease of birth rates in the upper stratum led to the assumption of a threat of an accompanying decrease of the average giftedness of a nation (Blacker, 1952). But, contrary to all such expectations, cognitive test scores, which are not natural constants and can be influenced by many factors, were rising over many decades. In view of the Flynn Effect the argument that a dysgenic development was imminent seemed to be ridiculous (Neisser, 1998). However, to geneticist (Weiss, 2000) it seems certain that — in analogy with the acceleration of human height — such a rise could only be a rise in phenotypic values and not in genotypic ones. For example, in a representative study of the National Institute of Demography of France (Gille et al., 1954) it was shown that in any social stratum the average IQ of later-born sibs is lower than the IQ of first- and second-born. In any social stratum the seventh child of a sibship has an IQ that is about 10 points lower than the IQ of the firstborns. It is not that in any stratum the least intelligent parents have the most children; but if parents have to distribute their care and money among a larger number of children each later‑born child gets less. From this we can conclude that on its own the decreasing and smaller size of sibships in the general population contributed heavily to the past phenotypic IQ increase appearing as the Flynn Effect
Hence, to measure and prove a dysgenic trend of IQ is extremely difficult. the sea level is rising or falling remains fixedThe IQ, however, is a relative measure always to the median of a reference population which is only in an idealized population and distribution of test scores identical with the arithmetic mean of a Bell Curve. Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) chose the median of the United Kingdom 1979 as the score 100 of their Greenwich IQ. But no country can claim to be resistant to any change. In the 2000 and 2003 PISA (Programme for International Students Assessment) studies, 500 and 100 are chosen as mean and standard deviation (Rost, 2005; Rindermann, 2006), with the result that in 2003, by the first time inclusion of Turkey into the sample of reference, the average "PISA-IQ" of Germany and other countries rose without their contributing anything to such an effect. Educational politicians in industrialized countries could even be more proud of their nations rising IQ if Brazil and other third‑world nations would be included in the sample from which the general mean is calculated and even prouder if the nations were weighted by the total numbers of school children in the respective countries (Weiss, 2006).
In order to minimize such methodological pitfalls we set out in the following the (by Rindermann, 2007) corrected arithmetic mean of the PISA scores of the Netherlands (528), New Zealand (525) and the United Kingdom (528) as IQ 100; 15, corresponding to 527; 100. In 2000 and 2003, PISA subjects were aged 15 years. It is a pity that Lynn and Vanhanen do not give the average birth years of their data sets but it can be assumed that the subjects in their collection came from the parental generation of the PISA subjects.
In the study “Child poverty in rich countries in 2005” the poverty threshold is defined as the percentage of children living in households with incomes below 50 per cent of the national median income. The percentage of children living in poverty could be high, because many children are born to the poor or because the well-to-do have relatively less children. In the area of the former West Germany, for example, more than 40% of women with an academic degree remain childless (Weiss, 2002). “The Report series has regularly shown, there is a close correlation between growing up in poverty and the likelihood of educational under-achievement, poor health, teenage pregnancy, substance abuse, criminal and antisocial behavior, low pay, unemployment, and long term welfare dependence. Such problems are associated with, but not necessarily caused by, low income (for example, low levels of parental education or parental skills)” (UNICEF, 2005, p. 6).
A high percentage of children in poverty could provide a strong hint as to a dysgenic trend in the respective country; a small percentage could hint at a eugenic trend (Weiss, 2007b). Indeed, the 8 richest countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Czech Republic, France) in the "Child Poverty League" (UNICEF, 2005, P. 4) with no more than 7.5% of their children living in poverty have on average no IQ decrease; Finland, where only 2.8% children live in poverty, even has an IQ-increase of 6 points. But Germany (losing 6 points, down to a mean IQ of 96), Italy (children poverty 16.6%; IQ loss 7 points) and Mexico (children poverty 27.7%; IQ loss of 17 points) exhibit a clearly dysgenic trend.
Now we put these
poverty percentages in context with the percentage of children who got a
PISA-IQ of 88 and lower. The fifteen countries
have a below-average percentage of low IQ children (Denmark, Finland, Norway,
Sweden, Switzerland, Czech Republic, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria,
Japan, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand) have on average the same mean
IQ as given by Lynn and Vanhanen. However, the eight countries with an above
Australia and Canada show an IQ‑increase despite high percentages of children in poverty. Maybe a dysgenic trend is checked by selective above‑average IQ immigration.
Very disquieting are IQ changes in Latin American and third world countries: Argentina has a Lynn-and-Vanhanen-IQ of 96 (PISA‑IQ 77); Brazil 87 (68); Chile 93 (81); Indonesia 89 (72); Mexico 87 (70); Peru 90 (63); Uruguay 96 (79).
The downward trend has an easy explanation: In Brazil, for example, as early as 1970, the 2.5% of women living in the top income group had two children or less (Wood and de Carvaiho, 1988, 191). However, in the four poorest strata, comprising 48.5% of the population, women had an average of 7.4 children. Consequently their share of the population grew to 58% in 2000, while the share of the top income group dwindled to 1.4%. In contrast with this, in 12 national fertility surveys taken around 1970, Finland was the only country with a positive relationship between husband's income and education and achieved fertility (Jones, 1982).
the World Population Prospects (2006) we find a table (p. 7. Table I, 2) of the
countries and areas accounting for about 75 per cent of the world population
(estimates and medium, 2005 and 2050). In 2005 24
countries made up to 74.7 per cent of the world population. If we weight the
average IQ (taken from Rindermann, 2007)of these countries with their population
in millions, we obtain an average IQ of 90. In 1950, by the analogous
calculation, we obtain an average of 94; in 2050, however (with newcomers as
Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan and Colombia on the list, all with populations
more than 60 millions and an average IQ below 80), we predict an average IQ of
only 86. I we
take the list of countries by population in 2005 and extend the list by a
further 31 countries, reaching in such a way up to 90 per cent of world
population, we correct the world average IQ to 88. But a difference of plus or
minus two seems to be within the limits of error of measurement for any such
average, because for some countries the values are only estimates. Considering
that at any time any such world average is heavily influenced by the value of
China, doubt should be entertained whether the average IQ of China is indeed
105. This may hold for the coastal
regions, but perhaps not for the provinces in the interior. In view of the fact
that within Germany the IQ difference (Ebenrett et al., 2003) between the
prosperous regions in the south and economically backward federal states in the
former East German northeast amounts to about 10 IQ points (the same size as the
difference between Massachusetts and Mississippi; McDaniel, 2006), why should
the situation in China be different? Also, for decades in China, as in most
countries all over the world, highly qualified women bear only half the number
of children as unqualified women
On the basis of a “List of countries by population in 1907” (Wikipedia, entry from the Nuttall Encyclopaedia) we are able to calculate a world average IQ of 94, the same as in 1950. Given the available demographic data, hence from about 1960 to about 2040, the world average IQ is dropping about 8 points under the assumption of stable average IQ for each country. However, as shown above for some Latin American countries, these averages are not stable but in obvious decline. A decline can also be expected for numerous industrialized countries because of immigration of unqualified workforce from the Third World, dysgenic birth rates or selective emigration of qualified people (for example from former communist East Europe to the West). Summarizing from all these data we conclude that a drop of world average IQ of more than 10 points, even up to one standard deviation of about 15 points, seems to be real and imminent. This means a drop of about 3 points per generation, or even up to 5 points.
Independently, on the basis of the IQ data given by Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) and statistics of the U.S. Census Bureau, Lynn and Harvey (2007) calculated the average world's IQ, confirming the general trend downward. They found a mean of IQ 93 in 1950, of IQ 90 in 2000 and of IQ 87 in 2050. This is in very good agreement with our results here: IQ 94 in 1950, IQ 90 or 88 in 2005, IQ 86 in 2050.
Beside the rise in prices of energy and raw materials, environmental pollution and so on, mankind also faces population pollution. This is a word that could easily be misunderstood and therefore "human capital deterioration" might be a better term. If nature had a plan to destroy the greater part of mankind and in this way protect the earth against exploitation, human capital deterioration would be the surest way to reach this goal. And because in a democratic society population pollution is politically non-existent and even impossible by definition, the success of the counter-strike of nature against a species intelligent enough to propagate and fill the earth, but not intelligent enough to understand and to regulate its ultimate resource – the population – seems to be guaranteed.
An important threshold value is IQ 105. A person scoring 105 and above can acquire higher education, can operate a small business successfully or be an independent craftsman. In the world-wide web one finds a table published by a scientist writing under the pseudonym “La Griffe du Lion”. It shows a linear relationship between the percentage of the population with an IQ above 105, crucial for economic power, and the gross national product of the country. From the major gene theory of IQ (Weiss, 1992) follows that the frequency m2 of the dull allele M2 is the square root of (1 ‑ f), where f is the "smart fraction". The frequency of the bright allele ml (1 m2).The smart fraction f follows from the Hardy-Weinberg‑Law in power 2 + 2 in m2 + m2 power 2, where f ml power 2+2m1m2.
From the “Table of IQs, smart fractions and GDP” the national frequencies for Ml and M can easily be calculated. For the Congo the frequency of Ml is near zero, for Singapore near 0.20, which is my estimate for highly developed Eurasian populations (Weiss and Weiss, 2003). The power of a nation does not depend on its mere numbers, but of the number in its cognitive elite. This is the lesson learned from these data.
decrease in the world’s average IQ from 94 in 1950 to 86 in 2050 means a
decrease of the gene frequency of Ml from 0,12 to 0,05 and a decrease of the
smart fraction with an IQ above 105 from 22% to
means a relative decrease of about 4% per generation. This is the reality that
we have to face. In an economical
healthy society with an average IQ of 100 the smart fraction
comprises 36% of the population.
In 1998 each percentage point increase was worth about $600 to the per capita GDP (gross domestic product). Consequently, a country with an average IQ of 100 had a real GDP per capita of about $22,000 (as, for example, Germany), with IQ 94 of $13,000 and with IQ 86 only $6,000 (as in the Philippines). In 2050, our future will have to reckon with such relations. Of course, a correlation between IQ and individual contribution to GDP in the same direction can also be found within countries.
The Cycle Cannot be Stopped Because our Understanding of its Course Comes too Late
years ago, Marx understood as an eminent analyst
the entire world becomes irrevocably part of a meritocratic
society and everything will become a commodity.According to Marx, history has to be understood as an unbroken series of class struggles, and each epoch would have a population law of its own. But which law, when and why? Perhaps we make progress in our understanding if we regard each social class or stratum, each religious group or intsself‑interestacting structure including even the state bureaucracy as a biological species
strives to maximize its size and its portion of the social cake at the expense
of all the others. Since humans belong to a species that is able
of conscious birth control, therefore the social groups and strata, for which
the crowding effect becomes noticeable at first and for
which emigration plays as pressure valve no important role, will
begin with birth control.Since
such control begins in the different social strata at different times, their
numerical weights shift. When this became obvious around 1900, it induced
Galton to found the eugenic countermovement (Soloway, 1990). In view of the
small numbers of children in the upper stratum, Galton predicted a drop in the
general intellectual level. However, the opposite came about. Improved living
conditions, better education and the smaller numbers of sibshipsled, after 1900 in all industrialized countries, to a clear rise of the IQ test scores of about 15 IQ points. Although this Flynn Effect could only be phenotypic and not genotypic, to the broader public the arguments by Galton and his adherents seemed to be exaggerated and untrustworthy. As we know today, the decline in IQ test scores predicted by Galton, as measured by phenotypic values, needs two or three generations, or nearly a century, to be expressed in test scores. But within this century the political climate has changed fundamentally (Scheler, 1921). Today, 100 years after Galton, his political aim to promote the birth of gifted children is no longer up-to-date (Lynn, 2001), since all men must be seen as genetically equal in intellectual endowment. Therefore, Galtons goal has nowhere the slightest chance of being realized as a national policy (Lee, 2000; Reiss, 2000; Burch 2005); so there seems no hope that the march of the lemmings into the Great Chaos may be stopped. When the insight began, it did not immediately produce the expected consequences, and once the consequences eventuated, any effective policy is mentally handcuffed by egalitarian ideology.
Myrdal (1940, 188ff.) wrote far‑sightedly: The basic principle for population policy in a democratic country ... is, that a very large number of births must be regarded as undesirable. ... In a democratic society we cannot accept a way of things whereby the poor, ignorant, and inexperienced maintain the stock of population. ... .The deepest dilemma of democratic population policy is that we do not desire ... a reversal of industrialization and rationalization. ... The general method of population policy can be described as a transfer of income from individuals and families without children to families with children. ... In a democracy a population policy is a contradiction in itself. ... It is not, like much other reform policy, the relatively simple question of inducing a majority to tax a minority for its own benefit. It is just the contrary: to ask a majority to tax itself severely in favor of a minority. For the majority of every population ... consists of citizens who are either unmarried or have no child burdens at all, or only very light ones. ... For the overwhelming majority of every people, distributional reforms in the interest of the reproducing families mean economic sacrifice. Until now, nowhere can such a policy or even a eugenic one be maintained in the necessary long run required for any chance of success.
Among rodents — Homo we find density‑dependent regulation (Schafer, 1971), resulting in constant fluctuations of numbers, by which any plague of mice or rats is followed by the subsequent collapse of their populations. Among social mammals, which usually live in a social hierarchy, the breakdown of the population and a new start are forced upon nature by a chain of events: crowding and hence strong intraspecific competition leads to a striving for equality and to the destruction of social hierarchy (Leyhausen, 1968). A population with a destroyed hierarchy is becoming more and more incompetent and unable to act, and the individuals are fighting each other. In an overcrowded cage with rhesus monkeys we see murder and homicide, and with rodents apathy, sterility and cannibalism (Calhoun, 1962). Such cruelties have also been reported from overcrowded and undernourished camps of prisoners-of-war. Not only on Easter Island has this cycle has been fulfilled in all its stages and its cruelties, but also several times in other and more complex human societies.
It is that, by means
of this regulation of population density and behavioral changes being in a
feedback loop, a full cycle requires the complete destruction of social
hierarchy and a total disorientation of the female individuals
‑their diversion away from the successful reproduction and rearing
of offspring. Today’s humans call such behavior “emancipation” and
"feminism." Under healthy conditions the
exhibition of virility, the heat of the deer and the courtship of cocks, among
men the exhibition of social prestige and prestige consummation, have the
purpose of underlining the membership of a certain class. In ascending
societies, the men with the largest power also have the most attractive women
and the largest number of descendants. In societies, however, are beyond the turning point of the cycle, the courtship of men and women, their awareness of the latest fashions, the brand of their cars, their prestige journey to the Seychelles and their cooing on the telescreens become ends in themselves not related in any way with the number and quality of their children. In the working life, educated women are set under an achievement pressure, which if at all permits only one child. Only
a few can pay for service personnel that can make a full‑time job and a
family with many children compatible. The ideal of a fully employed mother is a
beautiful one with three children a discontinuation of professional activity for some years is a benefit for both mother and children.
When we look back at the history of past high civilizations, it is noticeable that it a long time before the collapse and internal decay began (Knaul, 1985). From a certain point on there were nearly only failures. The economy stagnated and the finances of the state and of the cities fell more and more into disorder. The number of people depending on welfare rose from year to year, although each new ruler declared it an aim to lower this number. The security of the citizens was no longer guaranteed; the relationship between man and woman had likewise changed the relationship between young and old. The whole society seemed to be stricken by an illness and incapable of making and implementing the right decisions. Although nobody wanted the decline, the states and their inhabitants steered with internal logic to an abyss in such a way, as if they had no other goal falling into the abyss. Today, is not our situation similar (Burnham, 1964)?
If a biological species over-exploits its ecological space, then natural selection will be directed against the species as a whole and will regulate the species by a catastrophe to a size that makes a new start possible. Whereas in the ascending phase individual selection plays a large role and the allele frequencies of genes, which are positively correlated with achievement parameters — especially with the IQ — rise, in the descending phase group selection becomes decisive. This density‑dependent switching from individual selection to group selection is the crucial point in our argumentation, leading far beyond Darwin and Marx (Witting, 1997). The respective population has the same fate as an army after a lost battle. Members of the defeated group are liable to be killed or enslaved, and the tribe is decimated or even extinguished. if the earth would weary of a populationis over‑exploiting its space, a certain point evolution show its limits to such a population and program ita certain point of no return toward a collapse. Until now all such catastrophes, if they concerned human populations, were regional ones. or the first time mankind as a whole has set the controls for a global collapsehe different regions of the world are in different, but more and more rapidly converging phases of th cycle.
If we assume that
man was enabled by hundreds of thousands of years of the evolution of his brain
to think logically, to be imaginative and creative, even to work scientifically
(Mokyr, 2005), in order to improve the natural conditions of his life in
several large steps (Boserup, 1981)the consequence in particular after the step of industrialization of his excessivein
the 20th Century even explosive
a development from the point of view of the maltreated earth must be seen as an
errorhas to be corrected. The earth is weary of the many humans and has the task, in order to protect itself against contamination, climatic change and exploitation of all its resources, to destroy the majority of humans within a short period. This will happen in the Great Chaos.
lready during the 19th century in Central Europe, crowding had the effect that the percentage of people depending on welfare rose and rose. The villages, where they had their right of domicile (Heimatrecht) were obliged to support the old and disabled. When the number of people who had moved away into the cities grew exceedingly, the villages became unable to fulfill their obligations. In order to relieve the distress of the urbaniz masses, the German Chancellor Bismarck issued the first social laws, also with the intent to undermine the position of socialists and communists pressing for general equality. If the poor had children, they demanded and received support; he poorer the mother was,
lawful stages of the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist), the social systems, the political conditions and number of children born in the various social strata.
The pogroms in the Ukraine, which drove
hundreds of thousands of Jews westwards to Central Europe, were nothing but a further manifestation of the struggle in a more and more crowded area(Weiss, 2000). If the members of another race or another people were overrepresented in the upper stratum, they sooner or later the target of social unrest
In 1941, the religious community of the Parsis peaked at 115,000. These 0.03% of population provided 7% of all engineers and 5% of all physicians of the entire country. Parsi female literacy today is 97%, the highest in India. For generations their women have been educated, they study and may late and end up having fewer children. Since 1953 their birth rate sunk under the magic number of two, at present even less than one. Therefore, 2020 there will only about 23,000 Parsis in India. Many capable people went abroad, and among the shrinking remainder, cases of dependency on social welfare are growing. The Parsis symbolize ‑ even in a more pronounced way than the secularized Jews ‑ the fate of the industrialized society and of its elites, who are drowning in a sea. The Parsis are only one generation ahead. The Parsis, who were characterized by a book title (Kulke, 1974) as "engines of social change", share their fate with the childless feminists. Having exterminated themselves some day, the changes embodied by them will again have disappeared.
A complete turn‑around of the cycle of constitutions presupposes that during the long upturn the average IQ of a population increases considerably, witch burnings are stopped and the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) develops, which is a condition of industrial society. Prussia, Saxony,
England and other states were constitutional states
before they became democracies (Zakaria, 2003). These states reached the apex
of their economic ascent before 1890 at a time when, according to our present
lights, they were not developed democracies.
States with only short phases of upswing and a low average IQ have no chance to reach the stage of fully developed democracy at all, but oscillate between oligarchy and tyranny, before they are drawn into the abyss. Despite this insight being such a simple one, it cannot be shared by politicianscould save billions of dollars of military expenditures with which they intend to force upon people a political order (Chua, 2003)only grow by themselves over very long periods of time. ho believes, for example, that it would be possible to establish civil society in the Congo by general suffrage, shows only that he is a prisoner of the current spirit of the agehe same incapability misguides world hunger assistance and prevents proper action against mass immigration into the First Word. In decades economic boom, just Europe before 1890, states with authoritarian governments and a high average IQSouth Korea, Taiwan, SingaporeMalaysia.
During the upswing, there is a phase in all states with a very young population, with numerous young men – third‑born, fourth‑born, fifth‑born sons – searching for a purpose in their li. As numerous statistics have confirmed, from such a structure of population nearly inevitably follows an expansive and belligerent policy. Whe this failed and not let off sufficient steam by overseas emigration, egalitarian ideology blazed the trail for communism and social democracyculminated in the revolutions of 1917 and 1919 in Russia and Germany. The structure of population and of ageFrance around 1790 and the German Reich and Russia around 1910, today obtains in Iran, the Sudan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Congo and other troubled regions (Heinsohn, 2003). For the hour, which will be shown by the hand of history in Europe to be 2030, it makes nearly no difference whether England, Germany, Italy or Russia have been in World War I and II on the side of the victors or not. In all essential symptoms of crisis they are similar, and in the abyss of history there is space for all.
Prospects after the Turning Point
The cycle in which we live and
is running the
end of the 17th Century to the 21st Century, consists of rises and fallsnever straight downwards,
but in waves, sometimes accelerated, sometimes braked. When does a society
reach the point of no return? It is in a figurative sense like the point at
which the power train of a rocket goes out. From this point on the flight
follows the laws of a ballistic curve, initially still rising, but then slowly
declining and finally more and more rapidly falling. For the German Reich this
point undoubtedly was already reached between the years 1880 and 1890, for
England two or three decades earlier. This point not to be mistaken for the peak of a culture, from which the fall is more or less rapid constantly downward. In Germany this peak, recognizable particularly from the prestige of Germanlanguage
science, lay after 1918.
The point of no return, which there is no any escape from the cycle of constitutions, is the introduction of general suffrage. Unaware of the consequences, the masses cheer always measures that will make their momentary situation easier, but result in the long run a degradation of the overall economy, and finally lead into disaster. The politician, who wants to win an election and power, only to extol the increased dose of the actions that caused the situation – ever-progressive social redistribution (Anrich, 1973). If a party tries to steer against the stream,
There are individual politicians who see through the vicious circle and would like to break through ithese are men and women against the time. hey have chanceto be permanently successful. The transformation of society is an inexorable political process, in all trends and slogans – secularization, modernization, globalization, feminism (Kingsley 1937; Kingsley and van der Oeven, 1982) and so on – have their proper place, hich our civilisation is heading toward its goal, the Great Chaos.
In a wellestablished democracy a certain framework is given to all thinking and acting, which has the effect that the society cannot break away before it reach its goal. A journalist who breaks away from these rules loses his position, a university teacher likehim will never be offered a chair, and for a politician of a people’s party a wrong slip of the tongue will mean its end. Reading de Tocqueille we become aware that what we today political correctness is nothing new, but an essential part of any democratic society (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).
For many decades I lived and worked in a communist country in the honest belief that factual knowledge on the inheritance of intelligence could contribute to create a more rational world and to counter utopian-egalitarian efforts and their devastating consequences (Pinker, 2002). Up to about 1960 in the free world the publication and discussion of behavioral genetic research no serious problems. However, about 1970 I noticed with astonishment, as a locked-out spectator in East Germany, the intellectual climate in the Western world (Brand, 1996). At first this was from my point of view nothing than a swelling spirit of the age, which sooner or later would become obsolete with the further progress of genetics. But when from year to year more and more a misconception (Pearson, 1997), it opened my eyes deeper insights.
Today in 2007 more than 200 scientific studies with the objective discover genes for schizophrenia, but only one methodicallyinsufficient study IQ. In many countries this research target is taboo, although the search for IQ genes is methosimpler and more promising than the search for genes underlying schizophrenia. There does not seem to be any foundation will make the necessary financial means available fund a search for the genetics of high intelligence. It can only be hoped that IQ genes will be discovered as byproducts of research targeted at genes of dyslexia, alzheimer and so on. As a result each deviation of a defined norm upward or downward will be attributed a defined medical condition. In such a way one will come to terms with the findings.
Already today, pedagogy sees the highly creative gifted mostly as cases endangering the ed psychological consulting.German educational psychology published its last book on intelligence testing in 1974. Despite the tests measure IQ (Lehrl, 2005), the terms intelligence and IQ are not mentioned once in the official reports (Weiss, 2002). It is by many who claim to be authorities that individuals who are more intelligent than others because of their genetic endowment do not exist. There are supposed to be no stupid individuals, but only people (Anger et al., 2006). Thsuggest that their condition can be remedied by increased expenditure on their education. Today, donors such as Bill Gates are providing billions of dollars for research against diseases or as support for the poor. foundations would have the few millions which needed for a successful IQ genetics. Today, a Bill Gates would be torn by the mass media if he wsome millions for IQ geneticswho trying it are “fascists”. All people are equal is the only permitted message, and inequalities have social causes can be abolished.
The Great Chaos does not mean the apoaypse. In the cataclysms the large and highly specialized animals always disappeared the smaller and unassuming species survived. The question is actually only whether after the Great Chaos a new Dark Age will last for a long time in which a large part of our civilization is lost or whether a sufficient number of capable engineers will survive. ho predicts that the earth will have only 2 billion inhabitants at the end of this century, contrary to maximum of 9 or 10 billion around 2040, to be confirmedhopes
Anyone who has travelled across Australia or British Columbia knows that a highly developed civilisation is compatible with a small population density. Until now no disaster could mankind
the hand-axe. Hitherto the course of technological evolution was not a cycle
but a spiral. In the lap of our old world the new one is to be recognized by
the fact that millions of lowly qualified are set free nd become unemployed forever. World-wide billions of humans become superfluous. In this most critical phase of evolution around 2035
proportion of old-aged pensioners in the industrialized states is culminating, before after 2050
declining population numbers promise relief. History must pass through a
bottleneck which may turn out to be the passage
through the purgatory of the Great Chaos.
I did not claim at any time that population density or population quality determines the course of history (Weiss, 2007a). They are, however, constituents in a dynamic cycle of economics and constitutions in which each step a feedback human capital (Williamson, 2006). Politics is nothing more than the foam on the waves. Politicians believe themselves to be the drivers of history, but they themselves are driven and try to regulate something that regulates itself alone (Flynn, 2001). As individuals some may achieve an understanding of what is happening, but in mass societies they lack the power and ability to thwart the statistical laws of history.
(= speech, held at the opening of the Bevölkerungspolitische Kongresse in Köln 1921). In: Scheler, Max: Gesammelte Werke,
 Appendix: Cognitive ability values for countries, corrected overall cognitive ability because according to Rindermann the United Kingdom has a corrected value of IQ 102, we corrected all averages by subtracting 2 (equally to a Greenwich UK-IQ of 100).