The "Self-Defeating Morality" of the Lockean Proviso

Makovi, Michael (2015): The "Self-Defeating Morality" of the Lockean Proviso. Published in: Homo Oeconomicus , Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2015): pp. 235-274.

Abstract

Locke's theory of appropriation includes the “Lockean Proviso,” that one may appropriate ownerless resources only if one leaves enough for others. The Proviso is normative and obviously may be rejected on normative grounds. But it is less obvious that it may have to be rejected for positive reasons. According to Hoppe, private property is a means for minimizing social conflict under conditions of scarcity. But the Lockean Proviso would actually exacerbate social conflict. According to Demsetz, property emerges precisely when scarcity arises and there is not enough left for everyone. Accordingly, the Lockean Proviso may be logically incompatible with the very purposes of the establishment of property. Or the Proviso may constitute what Derek Parfit calls "self-defeating morality." Several adaptations of the Proviso – including Nozick's – are rejected as well, based on the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons of subjective utility and the problem of economic calculation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Locke, Nozick, appropriation, proviso, property
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law

References

Block, W. (2011), “Review of Ostrom’s Governing the Commons,” Libertarian Papers 3:21.

Block, W., and Jankovic, I. (unpublished), “Tragedy of the Partnership: A Critique of Elinor Ostrom.”

Brennan, J. (2015), “On Systematic Justifications of Private Property in Rawls, Locke, and Nozick,” Bleeding Heart Libertarians (blog, Mar. 31st). <http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2015/03/on-systematic-justifications-of-private-property-in-rawls-locke-and-nozick/> [accessed: 2 April 2015].

Buchanan, J. and Tullock, G. (1962), The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Butler, E. (2012), Public Choice – A Primer, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs. <http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/public-choice-a-primer> [accessed” 12 September 2014].

Brutzkus, B. (1935), Economic Planning in Soviet Russia, London: Routledge.

Coase, R. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica 4: 386–405.

Cornell, N.W. and D. W. Webbink. (1985), “Public Utility Rate-of-Return Regulation: Can It Ever Protect Customers?, in: R.W. Poole, Jr. (ed.) (1985). Unnatural Monopolies: The Case for Deregulating Public Utilities. Lexington, Massachusetts / Toronto, Canada: Lexington Books: 27-47.

Creveld, M. (1999), The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Demsetz, H. (1967), “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” American Economic Review 57: 347-359.

DiLorenzo, T.J. (1988). “Property Rights, Information Costs, and the Economics of Rent Seeking,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft: 318-332.

Feser, E. (2005), “There is No Such Thing as an Unjust Initial Acquisition,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22: 56-80.

Fitz-Claridge, L. (2015), “'Wilt Chamberlain Revisited' Revisited: Interpretive, Practical, and Theoretical Problems for Fried’s Left-Lockeanism,” Libertarian Papers 7: 55-69. <http://libertarianpapers. org/article/4-fitz-claridge-wilt-chamberlain-revisited-revisited/> [accessed: 22 March 2015].

Fried, B. (1995), “Wilt Chamberlain Revisited: Nozick’s ‘Justice in Transfer’ and the Problem of Market-Based Distribution,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24: 226-245.

Hayek, F. (ed.). (1935), Collectivist Economic Planning, London: Lowe and Brydone. <http://mises.org/document/3581/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Hayek, F. (1945), “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35:519-530.

Hayek, F. (1968) and trans. Snow, M. (2002), “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5: 9-23. <http://mises.org/sites/default/files/qjae5_3_3.pdf> [accessed: 22 March 2015].

Higgs, R. (1997), “Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and Why Prosperity Resumed after the War,” The Independent Review 1:561-590. <http://www.independent.org/publications/tir/ article.asp?a=430> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Hoff, T. (1981 [1949]), Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. <http://mises.org/document/4329/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Hoppe, H. (2004), “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property,” in: Enrico Colombatto (ed.), The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Property Rights, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing: 48-63 <http://mises.org/library/ethics-and-economics-private-property> [accessed: 29 March 2015].

Hoppe, H. (2006 [1993]), The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute [Kluwer Academic Publishers]. de Jasay, A. (1997), Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order, New York: Routledge.

Kinsella, S. (1998), “Against Politics: On Government, Anarchy, and Order” (book review), The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1: 85-93. <https://mises.org/document/1055/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Kinsella, S. (2007), “The Blockean Proviso,” Mises Economics Blog (September 11th) <http://archive.mises.org/7127/> [accessed: 23 November 2013].

Kinsella, S. (2009), “Down with the Lockean Proviso,” Mises Economics Bl.og (March 13th) <http://archive.mises.org/9611/> [accessed: 5 November 2013].

Leoni, B. (2009 [1965]), “The Problem of Economic Calculation in a Planned Economy,” in: C. Lottieri (ed.), Law, Liberty, and the Competitive Market, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction: 39-82.

Locke, J. (1689), The Second Treatise on Government.

Long, R. (2002), “Why Does Justice Have Good Consequences?” Alabama Philosophical Society 2002 Presidential Address (Oct. 26th). <http://praxeology.net/whyjust.htm> [accessed: 14 September 2014].

Long, R. (2012), “Eudaimonist Libertarianism,” Bleeding Heart Libertarians (blog, Feb. 4th). <http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/ 2012/02/eudaimonist-libertarianism/> [accessed: 14 September 2014].

Long, R. (2013), “Eudaimonism and Non-Aggression,” Bleeding Heart Libertarians (blog, Feb. 4th). <http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/ 2013/04/eudaimonism-and-non-aggression/> [accessed: 14 September 2014].

Machan, T. (2007), “A Brief on Business Ethics - The Essential Ideas,” IEA Discussion Paper No. 17 (July 25th), London: Institute of Economic Affairs. <http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/a-brief -on-business-ethics-the-essential-ideas-web-publication> [accessed: 12 September 2014]

Mack, E. (1990), “Self-Ownership and the Right of Property,” The Monist 73: 4 (Oct.): 519-543. Mack, E. (1995), “The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean Proviso,” Social Philosophy and Policy 12: 186-218.

Mack, E. (2014), “Robert Nozick's Political Philosophy,” in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.). <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/nozick-political/> [accessed: 14 September 2014].

Miller, Jr., F. (2013), “Aristotle and Business: Friend or Foe?” George Mason University Workshop in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (lecture, April 23rd). <http://www.peter-boettke.com/ppe-workshop/ spring-2013/> → <http://www.peter-boettke.com/app/download/ 7024744304/Miller_paper.pdf> [accessed: 13 September 2014].

Nozick, R. (1974), Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.

Nozick, R (1977), “On Austrian Methodology,” Synthese 36: 353-392.

Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Palmer, T. (2009 [2005]), “John Locke Lite: The Strange Philosophy of a 'Left Libertarian',” Realizing Freedom: Libertarian Theory, History, and Practice, Washington, DC: Cato Institute: 639-644. (Rpt. from Reason (blog), January 2005.) <http://reason.com/archives/ 2005/01/01/ john-locke-lite/1> [accessed: 23 June 2014].

Palmer, T. (2012), “Bismarck's Legacy,” After the Welfare State, ed. T.G. Palmer. Ottawa, IL. Jameson Books: 33-54. <http://students forliberty. org/p-content/uploads/2012/04/After-the-Welfare-State-PDF1.pdf> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Palmer, T. (2013), “Some Thoughts on Inequality of Wealth and the Moral Claims We May Make on Each Other,” Cato Unbound (blog, March 21st). <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/03/21/tom-g-palmer/some-thoughts-inequality-wealth-moral-claims-we-may-make-each-other/> [accessed: 12 September 2013].

Palyi, M. (1949), Compulsory Medical Care and the Welfare State, Chicago: National Institute of Professional Services. <http://mises.org/ document/5156/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Parfit, D. (1979), “Is Common-Sense Morality Self-Defeating?,” Journal of Philosophy 76: 533-545.

Pasour Jr, E. C. (1987). “Rent Seeking: Some Conceptual Problems and Implications.” The Review of Austrian Economics 1: 123-143.

Poole, Jr., R.W. (ed.). (1985). Unnatural Monopolies: The Case for Deregulating Public Utilities. Lexington, Massachusetts / Toronto, Canada: Lexington Books.

Porter, B. (1994), War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics, New York: The Free Press.

Ricketts, M. (1987). “Rent Seeking, Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and Property Rights.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft: 457-466.

Rothbard, M. (1991), “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” Review of Austrian Economics 5: 51-76. <http://mises.org/ daily/2401> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Rothbard, M. (1998), The Ethics of Liberty, New York and London, New York University Press. <http://mises.org/rothbard/ethics/ethics.asp> [accessed: 24 June 2014]

Rothbard, M. (2011a [1982]), “Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution,” Economic Controversies, Auburn, Alabama: The Ludwig von Mises Institute: 367-418 <http://mises.org/document/6301/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Rothbard, M. (2011b [1956]), “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” Economic Controversies, Auburn, Alabama. The Ludwig von Mises Institute: 289-333 <http://mises.org/document/ 6301/> [accessed: 24 June 2014].

Sapper, A. and M. Baker. (2014), “Why Federal Agencies Run Amok,” Forbes (April 14th). <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/ 2014/04/ 14/why-federal-agencies-run-amok/> [accessed: 11 September 2014]

Schmidtz, D. (1991), The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument, Boulder, CO: Westview.

Steele, D. (1992), From Marx to Mises: Post Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic Calculation, LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

Stevens, J. (1993), The Economics of Collective Choice, Boulder, CO: Westview.

Tullock, G. ([1971b] 2004), “The Cost of Transfers,” in: G. Tullock, (2004). Virginia Political Economy (The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock vol. 1, ed. C. K. Rowley). Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund, 2004: 180-193. Reprinted from Kyklos 24: 629-643.

Tullock, G. (1998). “The Fundamentals of Rent-Seeking.” The Locke Luminary 1:2 (Winter) Part 2. <http://gallery.economicus.ru/cgi-bin/ frame_rightn_newlife.pl?type=school&links=.%2Fin%2Ftullock%2Fworks%2Ftullock_w2.txt&img=works.jpg&name=pubchoice> [accessed: 1 March 2015].

Tullock, G. (2003). “The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept” [sic]. International Journal of Business and Economics 2: 1-8. <http://www.ijbe.org/table%20of%20content/pdf/vol2-1/vol2-1-1.pdf> [accessed: 1 March 2015].

Tullock, G. (2004). Virginia Political Economy (The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, vol. 1, ed. C.K. Rowley). Indianapolis, Indiana: Liberty Fund.

Vallentyne, P. (2012), “Libertarianism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.). <http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/libertarianism/> [accessed: 22 June 2014].

Werner, P. (2013), “Self-ownership and non-culpable proviso violations,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics (August 28th): 1-17.

Widerquist, K. (2010), “Lockean Theories of Property: Justifications for Unilateral Appropriation,” Public Reason 2: 3-26.