The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment.

Solferino, Nazaria and Solferino, Viviana and Taurino, Serena Fiona (2015): The economic analysis of a Q-learning model of Cooperation with punishment.

Abstract

A Q-learning model is devised in order to see whether individuals can "learn" how to cooperate, when a virtuous system of punishment and reinforcement is adopted. The paper shows that, if it is possible to free-ride and not being adequately punished, there will always be an incentive to deviate from cooperation. Conversely, even if the others did not cooperate, it is still possible to have someone who cooperates when individuals are pushed by strong intrinsec motivations. Cooperation can be a learning process. It is possible to trigger a learning process that leads individuals to be equally cooperative. This happens much more easily, the more responsible the individuals are. It also depends on proper punishment.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperation, punishment, q-learning models.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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