On Reminder Effects, Drop-Outs and Dominance: Evidence from an Online Experiment on Charitable Giving

Sonntag, Axel and Zizzo, Daniel (2015): On Reminder Effects, Drop-Outs and Dominance: Evidence from an Online Experiment on Charitable Giving. Published in: PLOS ONE , Vol. 10, No. 8 (7 August 2015): pp. 1-17.

Abstract

We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: drop-outs, methodology, charitable giving, payment method, reminders, nudges, dominance
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; NGOs ; Social Entrepreneurship

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