To Regulate or to Deregulate? The Role of Downstream Competition in Upstream Monopoly Vertically Linked Markets

Polemis, Michael and Eleftheriou, Konstantinos (2015): To Regulate or to Deregulate? The Role of Downstream Competition in Upstream Monopoly Vertically Linked Markets.

Abstract

This paper attempts to cast light to the relationship between Cournot-Bertrand controversy and monopoly regulation. To this purpose, we use a simple model of a vertically linked market, where an upstream regulated natural monopoly is trading via two-part tariff contracts with a downstream duopoly. Combining our results to those of the existing literature on deregulated markets, we argue that when the downstream competition is in prices, efficiency dictates regulating the monopoly with a marginal cost based pricing scheme. However, this type of regulation leads to significant welfare loss, when the downstream market is characterized by Cournot competition.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bertrand; Cournot; Marginal cost pricing; Regulation; Vertical relations
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation

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