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Occidentalism, terrorism, and the Shari'a state: new multivariate perspectives on Islamism based on international survey data

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Abstract

Our article attempts to be yet another empirical contribution to the evolving international debate about global Islamist terrorism. We rely on the analysis of PEW and *World Values Survey* data from Muslim publics in different countries around the globe to analyze by multivariate promax factor analysis and standard OLS multiple regression which factors contributed to the approval or the rejection of terrorist acts, measured by such variables as the opinion on suicide bombing, Shari'a law and the favorability of terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah. We also analyze the drivers of general opinions on Islamic extremist groups and reactions to the ambitions of Iran and its nuclear program.

We arrive at the conclusion that it would be wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with outright support for the immediate "bomb-throwing terror", while neglecting the underlying ideological and dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the *Muslim Brotherhood* or the Turkish *Milli Görüs*, which both start, like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of "Jews and Free Masons" and Western civilization as such, and which for many on both sides of the Atlantic appear as "moderate Islamists" and worthy partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed terrorist groups only can develop. We highlight the role of the omnipresent hatred of America and the West which we term "*Occidentalism*", but also the intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups which still exist in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world, and the Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony. With Bassam

Tibi we also analyze the close connection between the Islamist sharia ideology and the overall aspects of Islamism. Based on PEW data, we show that the two main drivers of Muslim opposition against suicide bombing are the rejection of honor killing and the death penalty against Muslims who chose to leave the Muslim community altogether. Our promax factor analyses confirm the relevance of this approach.

Keywords: Relation of Economics to Social Values; Index Numbers and Aggregation; Labor; Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants • Non-labor Discrimination; Economics of Gender • Non-labor Discrimination; Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy - General, International, or Comparative; Religion

JEL Classification Codes: A13; C43; F66; J15; J16; N30; Z12

1. Introduction

There is increasing solid evidence about the devastating nature of global Islamist terrorism and its thousands of victims each month, from Nigeria to South-East Asia and also, increasingly, in Europe (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014; Neumann, 2014). Robust empirical studies, like the one prepared by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence and BBC World Service, document that now there are at least 5.042 monthly deaths from Islamist political violence on a global level (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014; Neumann, 2014).

2. Earlier empirical studies on the subject

In the vast international literature on the subject, especially two approaches seem to offer promising directions of research for the future. One would be characterized by cross-national data analysis on which sets of characteristics of national states are especially associated with the terror phenomenon and its growth. That is to say, to study the phenomenon by the econometrics and politometrics of terrorism based on national aggregate data. The other approach would be rely on standardized opinion surveys in different countries around the globe and to elicit responses from the publics in the countries affected by terrorism themselves which factors contribute to the approval or the rejection of terrorist acts, so as to be able to project what makes populations resilient or susceptible to terrorism.

While we are well aware with Enders, Hoover, and Sandler, 2014; Sandler 2013, 2014; and Younas and Sandler, 2015 about the relevance of the first mentioned approach, we also should underline that in the economics profession it has become fashionable to analyze the opportunity costs of terrorism (Freitag et al., 2011; Schneider et al., 2015). Supreme values (i.e., preferences shaped by ideology) also play a role in this approach. When conditions are poor, the rewards from terrorism (e.g., solidarity, status) become particularly attractive, while the opportunity costs of terrorism are low (e.g., because economic, non-violent alternatives are scarce). Terrorism, for this school of thought may not only be political and demographic, but also socio-economic in character. The central proposition of this type of analysis is also that poor socio-economic conditions (as indicated by, e.g., low levels of investment, consumption and economic openness) make terrorism more attractive. Freitag et al., 2011; and Schneider et al., 2015 also argue that these opportunity costs (which are also

reflected in country-specific socio-economic conditions) may influence the calculus of terrorists and their supporters. Governments ought to counter terrorism not exclusively by relying on the ‘stick’. Better economic performance will increase the opportunity cost of terrorism and thus make terrorism less likely. Policies that foster growth, investment and economic participation may also yield a dividend in terms of a reduction in terrorism. World economic openness and overcoming bad institutions will also help in the fight against terror.

To analyze the terror problem, also many other scientific approaches were and are being applied. The discipline of comparative research on religions (Ghobadzadeh, 2014; Küng, 2002; Sacks, 2014; Troll, 2005) certainly is an important source of additional information for such endeavors. Also, social scientists themselves increasingly lay the groundwork for comparative analyses of global religions and their doctrines on peace and war (Juergensmeyer et al. 2013; Röhrich 2004, 2010).

Among the published literature on the subject, we should highlight the fact that hard core analyses on the relationship between religious values and terrorism, based on comparative international opinion surveys, are still rather scarce (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 2004; Blaydes and Linzer, 2010; Cifti, 2010; Kostenko et al., 2014; Spierings, 2014; Tessler, 2002, 2004; Tessler and Gao, 2005; Tessler and Robins, 2007; Yeşilada and Noordijk, 2010; and Zussman, 2014). The present essay, without underestimating the benefits of the cross-national data analysis approach, is well within the global comparative opinion research tradition.

Given the sheer magnitude of the Islamist terrorist challenge in the context of overall global terrorism, we share with Heller (2015) the idea that it is time to seriously analyze what sectors of Muslim society who do support extremism think and do, and why they think in such a way, while important other segments of Muslim society oppose radicalism and terrorism and even combat it. Given the still existing real dearth of the debate making use of existing and freely available opinion survey research instruments from many countries around the world like the “*World Values Survey (WVS)*”, the “*PEW data*” or the “*Arab Barometer*” Project, we should conclude that future debates about “Islamist terrorism” should above all be survey-data-driven (Tessler, 2002).

Without hesitation, one can say that Mark Tessler’s research on the drivers of terrorism as reflected in the *Arab Barometer* and *World Values Survey* data today is the leading approach in the expanding sub-field of empirical, individual-level based survey research on terrorism (Tessler, 2002, 2004;

Tessler and Gao, 2005; Tessler and Robins, 2007). Tessler's main variables, measuring Islamism are

- Attitudes Toward Democracy
- Attitudes Toward Western Culture and Society
- Support for Terrorism (9/11 attacks et cetera)

Tessler's widely received empirical analysis, based on Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan, came to the conclusion that Islamic orientations and attachments have at most a very limited impact on views about democracy. Strong Islamic attachments do not discourage support for democracy. Tessler and Robbins (2007) also underline that there is no support for the hypothesis that personal religious involvement, support for the platform of political Islam, or opposition to Western values have an important effect on terror support (see also: Kurzman and Naqvi, 2010). The real drivers of terror support in the MENA region, Tessler believes, are the low levels of confidence in domestic political institutions and the negative assessments of U.S. foreign policy held by Arab publics. Tessler also, at times, seems to blame the State of Israel and its policies for the rise of global Islamism (Tessler, 2004). More recent research, however, has begun to question this consensus.

We mention here first of all Blades and Linzer (2010) with their empirical research on Muslim anti-Americanism as a domestic, elite-led phenomenon that intensifies when there is greater competition between Islamist and secular-nationalist political factions within a Muslim country.

Spierings (2014) with his *World Values Survey* based study on Arab countries linked denominational belonging (affiliation), commitment (religiosity), orthodoxy, Muslim political attitudes, and individual-level political Islamism to the support for democracy and politico-religious tolerance. In Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia, tolerance levels are remarkably lower than "democratic support"; and political Islamist views strongly affect tolerance negatively.

A major recent Turkish study also highlights such aspects. Cifti (2010) underlines that in ten majority Muslim countries perceptions of gender equality are strongly associated with democratic orientations. Political Islamism, measured by the *World Values Survey* item: "*Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office*", negatively affects the democracy indicators (diffuse and specific support for democracy).

A team of Russian authors, Veronica Kostenko, Pavel Kuzmichev and Eduard Ponarin, also should be briefly mentioned here (Kostenko et al., 2014). Their

paper analyses the relationship between the support of democracy and attitudes to human rights: in particular, support for gender equality in the countries covered by the first wave of the *Arab Barometer* project. 80% of democracy supporters in the Middle East equal only 17% of those who understand, value, and support democracy as they do in the Western world.

In another very influential analysis, based on a rigorous study of openly available data from the Washington-based global public opinion research center PEW, Shafiq and Sinno, 2010 analyzed the effect of educational attainment and income on support for suicide bombing among Muslim publics in six predominantly Muslim countries that have experienced suicide bombings: Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. In their study, Shafiq and Sinno, 2010 find that the effect of educational attainment and income on support for suicide bombings varies across countries and civilian “soft” and military targets. Their multiple regression analysis works with the following PEW survey predictors to explain suicide bombing support rates:

- Age
- Below primary education
- Civil status: married
- Civilians targets
- Gender: Male
- Higher education
- Income quartile (dummy variable, four quartiles used)
- Iraq country dummy
- Number of children
- Political dissatisfaction
- Primary education
- Secondary education

The model starts from the assumption that educational attainment and higher income increase political dissatisfaction, which in turn leads to higher rates of suicide bombing support, while educational attainment and higher incomes themselves decrease support for suicide bombing. Political dissatisfaction has a mediating effect which reduces the extent to which education and income discourage support for suicide bombing. The authors distinguish various country specific effects and note that the effect of education and income on attitudes depends on the country and the target of suicide bombings (civilian or military). The authors voice two important policy recommendations for global decision makers to halt the terrorist tide: one is the continued expansion of education with the adoption of peace education in school curricula that discourages the use of suicide bombing as a tactic. The second policy recommendation is based on the finding that political dissatisfaction reduces the

effectiveness of educational attainment and income. Supporting trade, economic integration and cooperative international security would improve Muslim opinion about Western governments and reduce the widespread feeling in the Muslim world that Islam as such is under threat from the West.

In their multivariate study on PEW Research data on terror support, Victoroff, Adelman, and Matthews, 2012 test the effect of the perception of being the victim of anti-Muslim discrimination on anti-Western political violence. This multivariate analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys 2006 data set surveying 1,627 adult Muslim residents of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain and the 2007 data surveying 1,050 adult Muslim residents of the United States support the conclusions that younger age and perceived discrimination are both associated with support for suicide bombing in these Muslim diaspora populations. Reducing discrimination would reduce the risk of terrorism.

Berger (2014) attempted to distinguish support for violence against civilians from support for violence against military targets and features independent variables that clearly separate views on US foreign policies from views on US culture. His regression model shows that among Egyptian, Pakistani and Indonesian Muslims, perceptions of US policies toward Israel, Middle Eastern oil, or the perceived attempt to weaken and divide the Muslim world are not related to support for attacks on civilians in the United States, but “only” to support for attacks against US military targets. Approval of attacks on US civilians is shaped, instead, by negative views of American freedom of expression, culture, and people, and the disapproval of the domestic Arab political status quo and the notion of a general US hostility toward democracy in the Middle East.

Zhirkov et al., 2014, focusing on Muslim populations in five Muslim-majority countries and four Western European countries, examines the correlates of popular support for terrorist violence. In both samples, support for terrorism is stronger among those who see democracy as a Western political system which is not suitable for Muslim societies. Perceived Western economic dominance is related to more support for terrorism among Muslims in Western Europe. In the Muslim countries, blaming the West for negative international relations is associated with greater support for terrorism. The authors say that the associations found are remarkably similar across the Western European countries but vary considerably across the Muslim countries, preventing generalized interpretations. Nevertheless, the findings would indicate that perceptions about world politics represent an important factor of pro-terrorist views among Muslims. Therefore, the authors suggest that the improvement of the relationships between the West and the Muslim world could reduce support for terrorism.

The following other recent *World Values Survey* and/or PEW data analyses were also well received in the economic literature on terrorism (Schneider et al., 2015):

- Fair and Shepherd (2006): 14 Muslim countries, 2002: Unclear influence of economic conditions on terror support. Support increases with some religious factors (e.g., perceived threat to Islam). Results vary across countries.

- Bueno de Mesquita (2007): 13 Muslim countries, 2002: Support for terrorism not correlated with education, economic situation and attitudes toward the U.S. and democracy. Ambiguous effect of religion on terror support.

- Tessler and Robbins (2007): Algeria and Jordan, 2002: Support for terrorism not dependent upon religion and economic situation. Support increases with negative assessment of U.S. foreign policy and domestic political institutions and leaders.
- Fair et al. (2010): Pakistan, 2009: Support for terrorism depends on the terrorist group and the desire for non-corrupt governments (which in turn is related to support for Sharia law). Results vary across regions.

- Shafiq and Sinno (2010): 6 Muslim countries, 2005: Support for suicide terrorism depends on its target (attacks against Western military targets are seen more favorable than attacks against civilians). Effects of income and education vary across countries and interact with political dissatisfaction.

- Mousseau (2011): 14 Muslim countries, 2002: Approval of Islamist terrorism is linked to urban poverty but not to poor education and religiosity.

Bueno de Mesquita's analysis (2007) is especially noteworthy in this context because of its very broad and encompassing design. The strongest correlates of support for terrorism were the respondents' attitudes toward the United States as a threat to Islam and the respondents' views of the role of Islam in politics—though even these correlations, Bueno de Mesquita notes, were fairly weak. For Bueno de Mesquita terrorism is, among other things, a tool of propaganda. One message of some Islamic terrorist organizations is anti-Americanism. Thus, if terrorism is an effective tool of propaganda, it may be that people who support terrorism (for whatever reason) end up having strongly anti-American sentiments because they are persuaded by the terrorists' message. Another,

related, explanation argues that people who support terrorism have a psychological need to justify this support. As a result, they adopt views that “rationalize” their support for terrorism. Thus, while they may perceive their support for terrorism to be caused by their anti-American views, the opposite might be the case—they may have adopted anti-Americanism to justify support for terror. Willingness to support terrorism, and willingness to become a terrorist, is for Bueno de Mesquita quite a different phenomenon.

3. New perspectives on the drivers of terrorism: Occidentalism, Hating the West, Hating Jews, Hating Israel

For us, it is wrong to define radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with outright support for the immediate “bomb-throwing terror”, while neglecting the underlying ideological and dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the *Muslim Brotherhood* (Lebl, 2014a, 2014b) or the Turkish *Milli Görüş* (Vielhaber, 2012), which both start, like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of “*Jews and Free Masons*” and Western civilization as such, and which for many on both sides of the Atlantic appear as “*moderate Islamists*” and worthy partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed terrorist groups only can develop (Lebl, 2013; Tibi 2013a, 2013b). The United Arab Emirates paper “*Gulf News*” revealed on June 18, 2014 the close ties between two successive US administrations and the Muslim Brotherhood:

For the past decade, two successive US administrations have maintained close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Libya, to name just the most prominent cases. The Obama administration conducted an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2010 and 2011, beginning even before the events known as the “Arab Spring” erupted in Tunisia and in Egypt. The President personally issued Presidential Study Directive 11 (PSD-11) in 2010, ordering an assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other “political Islamist” movements, including the ruling AKP in Turkey, ultimately concluding that the United States should shift from its longstanding policy of supporting “stability” in the Middle East and North Africa (that is, support for “stable regimes” even if they were authoritarian), to a policy of backing “moderate” Islamic political movements. To this day, PSD-11 remains classified, in part because it reveals an embarrassingly naïve and uninformed view of trends in the Middle East and North Africa (Mena) region. The revelations were made by Al Hewan centre in Washington, DC, which obtained the documents in question. Through an ongoing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit, thousands of pages of

documentation of the US State Department's dealings with the Muslim Brotherhood are in the process of being declassified and released to the public."¹

So, in disagreement with Tessler we understand Islamism in a much wider sense. With Tibi (Tibi, 2007, 2012, 2013a, 2013b) one can even say that Islamism is religionised politics, based on the Arabic term *din-wa-dawla* (unity of state and religion) under a system of mandated *shari'a* law. Tibi also argues that the Antisemitism of Islamism is a vital component of the Islamist ideology and very different from both the old Islamic Judeophobia and modern pan-Arab nationalist Antisemitism. Islamist contemporary Antisemitism now assumes the so-called "*Jewish conspiracy against Islam since 622*". Thus our new research strategy, focusing on a much wider understanding of Islamism, attempts to capture the totality of anti-Westernism.

Under the influence of Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) (Bergesen, 2008; Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb and David, 2006; Qutb, Salahi and Shamis, 1979), the idea was proposed in the Muslim world at the beginning of the 1960s that Jews are the enemies of Islam from its inception; and that an independent Jewish political existence would relinquish territory within the "house of Islam" (*Dār al-Islam*). Both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood as well as the Iranian Khomeinite Shi'a movement took up the virulent Antisemitism, so characteristic of the works of Sayyid Qutb (Ganji, 2013).

In this context, the next question arising in this context is what is so specific in Islamist Antisemitism compared to that in the West and the former Communist countries and what leads to such differences in its forms and outcomes. With Heinemann et al. 2007; Kaplan and Small, 2006; Lebl, 2013; Mansur, 2015; Paz, 2015; Tibi, 2007, 2012, 2015; Werbner, 2013; Wippermann, 1983; and Wistrich, 1991, 2004, 2007, 2010 we would contend that Arab Antisemitism was influenced by European anti-Semitic literature (mainly French) published in Arabic in the second half of the 19th Century. Antisemitic themes and arguments were systematically developed by Arab propaganda as a weapon against the Jewish population in Palestine during the Mandate period (1917–48) and even more so against the newly created State of Israel (Heinemann, 2007).

One of the most frequent terms in the literature on the Middle East is the term "*Orientalism*", which of course goes back to the work of the prominent Palestinian intellectual of Palestinian Christian origin and professor of

¹ <http://gulfnews.com/news/mena/libya/us-document-reveals-cooperation-between-washington-and-brotherhood-1.1349207>

comparative literature at Columbia University in New York, Edward Said (1935 – 2003; Said, 1979, 1985). Said focused on what he perceived as the culturally inaccurate representations of the East in the Western study of the Eastern world. But the omnipresent hatred of America and the West could be termed as a set of inaccurate representations of its own - “*Occidentalism*” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2004). In addition, the intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups which still exist in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world (Fine, 2008), the Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony (Rubin, 1998; Rubin and Rubin, 2004) will be additional factors explaining tendencies towards terrorism, especially the MENA region. Especially after the West’s nuclear deal with Iran, it has become fashionable even in Western defense and intelligence analysis circle to talk about the Iranian regime’s “moderation” (Bolan, 2013; Lieber and Press, 2013; Waltz, 2012), while our analysis is rather cautious about such assessments and also has to focus in the quantitative analysis on Iran’s competing, but nevertheless apocalyptic and extremist vision for the Middle East, especially targeted against the State of Israel (Beres, 2015; Eiran and Malin, 2013; Flannery, Deaton and Walton, 2013; Kroenig, 2012; Landau, 2013; Simon, 2013; Terrill, 2014; Wiggington et al., 2015).

To heighten the relevance of this alternative approach, we would like to present here first a glance at the data from the *Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013* (Dataset for web.sav), which we compiled in our Appendix. Our Tables present the PEW data for the following indicators:

- suicide bombing\other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam
- Very favorable, or somewhat favorable, opinion of Hamas
- very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Hezbollah
- very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of al Qaeda
- very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of the Taliban
- Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the country
- unfavorable opinion of Israel
- Iran's nuclear program minor threat or not a threat to the country

The Tables show what an uphill struggle the fight against international terrorism has become.

- In Egypt, Malaysia and Tunisia, more than 10% of the adult population support suicide bombing and the following four terrorist organizations: Hamas; Hezbollah; al Qaeda; and the Taliban.

- In Indonesia and Jordan, there are 10% or more supporters of Hamas; Hezbollah; and Al Qaeda, and 10% or more the resident population in addition support either suicide bombing or the Taliban.
- In Senegal and the Lebanon, 10% or more of the resident population support Hamas and suicide bombing, and in addition are in favor of either the Taliban or Hezbollah.
- More than 10% of the resident population in Pakistan and Nigeria support Hamas and Hezbollah. Of particular concern is also the radicalization of segments of the Israeli Arab population, which supports to a rate of more than 10% Hamas and Hizbollah. In the NATO member country Turkey, there are more than 10% of the resident population which supports suicide bombing and the Taliban.
- What's more, a third or more of the resident population in key Western allies thinks that Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the country: such rates were observed in Canada; Turkey; Czech Republic; Australia; Poland; Greece; Germany; Japan; Britain; South Korea; Spain; and the United States
- Not only in many Muslim countries, but also in NATO member states such as Turkey, Greece, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland, 50% or more of the resident population holds an unfavorable opinion of the State of Israel.
- Iran's nuclear program is seen as constituting only a minor threat or not a threat at all to the country by more than 1/3 of the resident population in key Western allies: Canada; Turkey; Britain; Czech Republic; Spain; Australia; Germany; Japan; France; United States; and Poland.

Just as in the 1930s, today radicalized murderers kill Jews. Today, the murderers are Islamists. The Paris and Copenhagen attacks in 2015 painfully remind us that the relationship between Islamism and Antisemitism hitherto has not been sufficiently dealt with in cross-national opinion research.

4. The Shari'a state, gender repression and terrorism

Tibi also emphasized correctly the close connection between the Islamist sharia ideology and the overall aspects of Islamism (Tibi, 2013a, 2013b). To highlight the relevance of this theoretical focus, we present some data from the 2012-

Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav and the *World Values Survey* (Muslim respondents only in each case).

The PEW data concentrates on *Shar'ia* and its harshest aspects:

- favor making the *Shar'ia* (Islamic law) the official law of the land
- favor the death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion
- favor punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery
- favor stoning people who commit adultery
- If a woman engages in premarital sex or adultery, it is often/sometimes justified for family members to end her life in order to protect the family's honor

The *World Values Survey* (71773 representative Muslims) data presented here focus on “*the Orientalism of the Orient*” in the “real existing Muslim countries” and the three most important WVS variables measuring xenophobia among global Muslim publics:

% Muslims rejecting neighbors of a different race

% Muslims rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers

% Muslims rejecting neighbors: People of a different religion

Our results offer a depressing picture of social realities in many Muslim countries. **50% or more** of the total resident population are in favor or strong favor of the following measures:

- **Shar'ia:** Afghanistan; Iraq; Palestinian Territories; Malaysia; Niger; Iran; Pakistan; Morocco; Bangladesh; Egypt; Indonesia; Jordan; Algeria; Tunisia
- **death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion:** Egypt; Jordan; Afghanistan; Pakistan; Palestinian Territories; Algeria; Malaysia
- **punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery:** Pakistan; Afghanistan; Algeria; Niger; Palestinian Territories; Egypt; Malaysia; Iraq; Jordan
- **stoning people who commit adultery:** Afghanistan; Pakistan; Palestinian Territories; Egypt; Algeria; Niger; Jordan; Iraq; Bangladesh; Malaysia

33% or more of the total resident population are also in favor or strong favor of the following measure:

- **Honor killings (female offender):** Lebanon; Egypt; Jordan; Palestinian Territories; Pakistan; Bangladesh; Niger

More than 20% of the respective Muslim population holds racist and xenophobic attitudes:

Rejecting neighbor of a different race: Libya; Thailand; Bangladesh; Palestine; India; Lebanon; Saudi Arabia; Philippines; Turkey; Egypt; Yemen; Jordan; Indonesia; Malaysia; Azerbaijan; Iran; Iraq; France; Kyrgyzstan; Cyprus; Bosnia; Nigeria; Algeria; Uganda; Mali; Ghana

Rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign workers: Thailand; Libya; Egypt; Malaysia; Bangladesh; Jordan; India; Palestine; Iraq; Lebanon; Indonesia; Turkey; Montenegro; Iran; Cyprus; Saudi Arabia; France; Bosnia; Kazakhstan; Azerbaijan; Kyrgyzstan; Singapore; South Africa; Pakistan; Algeria; Nigeria; Mali; Bosnia; Yemen; Russia; Philippines; Serbia; Ghana

Rejecting neighbor of a different religion: Libya; Yemen; Palestine; India; Saudi Arabia; Bangladesh; Thailand; Jordan; Algeria; Kyrgyzstan; Turkey; Azerbaijan; Indonesia; Lebanon; Iraq; Philippines; Malaysia; Tunisia; Iran; Morocco; France; Nigeria; Cyprus; Ghana; Bosnia; Mali; Albania

Can the “*Open Society*” (Popper, 2012) of the Western world be silent about such phenomena? Or should the West rather support secular forces and such movements as the feminist movement?

Without question, oppressive **gender relations play a key part in the set-up of the “Shari’a state”**. In the theoretical literature of the social sciences, gender relations in the Muslim world were debated at length (Ahmed, 1992; Moghissi, 2005; Moghadam, 1994; Bouachrine, 2014). Ever since Goldin’s work (1995) on the U-shaped female labor force participation rate function in international economic development across countries and over time, economists observed for a long time low international rates of female labor force participation in the predominantly Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Gaddis and Klasen, 2014; Ganguli, Hausmann and Viarengo, 2014; Lechman and Kaur, 2015; Tsani, Paroussos, Fragiadakis, Charalambidis and Capros, 2015; Verme, 2015; Verme, Barry and Guennouni, 2014). This observation is all the more relevant in our context since there is a growing agreement in recent literature (de Haan, 2015; Kabeer, 2012; Kabeer and Natali, 2013) that *per se* gender equality, particularly in education and employment, significantly

contributes to economic growth (Gaddis and Klasen, 2014). Deficiencies in the educational systems compound the gender imbalances in the region, as highlighted by a recent study by the Brookings Institution (Steer, Ghanem and Jalbout, 2014). These structures play also an increasing role in transnational migration, since there is a very high importance of differential labor force participation rates of different cohorts of migrants in the leading countries of global inward immigration over recent years (Donato, Piya and Jacobs, 2014). Facing such consistent socio-geographic and historical gender imbalances, international comparative research does not exclude anymore the “*religious factor*” and the overall “*gender ideology*” of a society (Besamusca, Tijdens, Keune and Steinmetz, 2015). Since the days of summer 2015 and the onset of the “European refugee crisis” (Baldacchino and Sammut, 2015; Carpenter, 2015; Carrera and Lannoo, 2015; Cooper, 2015; Hann, 2015; Hildebrandt, 2015; Martin, 2016; Mertes, 2015; Peters and Besley, 2015; Stewart, 2015), cultural differences on gender issues between the Muslim world and the West, which were highlighted in the theoretical literature for a long time (Moghadam, 2002; see also: Carol and Koopmans, 2013; Ghumman and Ryan, 2013; Göle, 2014; Helbling, 2014), were again being highlighted in the framework of econometric work on “oppressive gender relations” in the Muslim world (Tausch and Heshmati, 2016). Such an analytical focus seems to be well supported by the mainstream of Muslim feminist literature (Mojab, 2001; Mir-Hosseini, 2011). Politometric work, based on the *World Values Survey* underlined Muslim support for patriarchal values as being robust against various controls. But rising levels of education, labor market participation, and an emancipative trend diminish Muslim support for patriarchy, especially among women (Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Adamczyk, 2013; Alemán and Woods, 2015; Blaydes and Linzer, 2012; Norris and Inglehart, 2012; Lussier and Fish, 2012). A leading feminist study published in 2012 (Mahmood, 2012) pleaded in defense of the veil and said that more attention should be given to Islamic virtues of female modesty or piety, especially given that many of the women who have taken up the veil frame their decision precisely in these terms.

5. Methods and data

In this essay, we used the following freely available and downloadable data files from global opinion surveys:

- PEW Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013 Dataset for web.sav.²

² <http://www.pewglobal.org/>

- PEW 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav. – Muslim respondents only³
- *World Values Survey*. The data from the “*World Values Survey*”, the world’s largest collection of representative opinion surveys, are covering some 90% of the global population. The chosen SPSS data-files from the WVS data base is “WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014”. The global Muslim sample (71,773 representative Muslims) was drawn from this WVS file by selecting persons with the denominations given as “Druse” (18), “Muslim” (62,115), “Shia” (4,058), and “Sunni” (5,583). Our analysis is thus based on the largest survey of global Muslim opinion ever undertaken, and covers a large portion of the global population.

In order not to overburden our essay with tables and statistical data, we have made our results available for the specialists, interested in following up more closely our research results in the Appendix to this essay. Any researcher around the globe with a proper access to the SPSS XXII statistical program and the available data should be able to reproduce our findings on a 1:1 basis. For this reason, our presentation of the results will be rather brief.

In our empirical work, we took great care to properly take into account the fact that often in the PEW and WVS project, the highest numerical values of a variable express something else than the original PEW variable labels. Our appendix tables take all these points into proper consideration and guide the interested readers on what true variable labels the highest numerical values of the PEW and WVS data actually express in our multivariate analysis. Since the PEW data were not especially designed for a multivariate analysis, missing data had to be especially eliminated from the analysis.

Our multivariate analysis uses the SPSS XXII standard statistical package for the social sciences, and we use ordinary cross tables, and the promax factor analysis procedures as the chosen statistical methods presented at length in a recent work (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015; see also: Blalock, 1972; Clauß and Ebner, 1970; Davidov, Schmidt and Billiet, 2011; Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; IBM, 2011; Rummel, 1970).

In the following, we briefly deal with the choice of our variables for the multivariate analysis. In our following lists, the variables used as a proxy to measure terror support are printed in bold indented letter.

³ <http://www.pewglobal.org/>

Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013

Q164. Gender (female)

Q121. suicide bombing is never justified

Q9A. very unfavorable opinion of the United States

Q9E. very unfavorable opinion of Russia

Q4. economic situation in (survey country) –very bad?

Q9D. [un]favorable opinion of Iran

Q9G. very unfavorable opinion of the United Nations

Q178. religion not at all important in life

In a follow-up investigation, also the following variables were used

Q6. Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?

Q9I. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Israel?

Q9J. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hamas?

Q9K. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah?

Q11E. Do you think that Iran's nuclear program is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?

Q11H. Do you think that Islamic extremist groups are a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?

PEW 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims dataset

Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of life'

Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim religion and its practices

Q22b. know nothing about the Christian religion and its practices

Q36. Religion not at all important in life

Q54. Not justified for family members to end life of a woman if she engages in premarital sex or adultery to protect the family's honor

Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran

Q78. completely disagree: A wife must always obey her husband

Q89. Rejecting suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets

Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion

Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery?

Q92d. Oppose stoning people who commit adultery

Q95. Gender (female)

World Values Survey

Important child qualities: religious faith

Reject opinion: jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women

Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl

Reject opinion: traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil

Reject opinion: wife must obey

Never attends religious services

Reject opinion: only laws of the Shari'a

Gender (female)

Highest educational level attained

6. What drives people into terrorism? The empirical results

In Table 1, we highlight one of the main results of this study: the multiple regression results with the PEW data base on the World's Muslims, which show that the two main drivers of Muslim opposition against suicide bombing is the rejection of honor killing and the death penalty against Muslims who chose to leave the Muslim community altogether.

The results for the determinants of the variable

Q89. Some think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified... Others believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified...?

are a straightforward indication based on 17614 interviewed Muslim persons around the globe that the Shari'a dimension has been grossly neglected in earlier comparative opinion research on transnational terror support rates.

Table 1: Explaining the rejection of suicide bombing – multiple regression results from the PEW data – the World’s Muslims

	Regression coefficient B	Standard error	Beta	T	Error p
Constant	1,922	0,037		51,559	0,000
Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of life'	0,003	0,003	0,007	0,956	0,339
Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim religion and its practices	0,070	0,009	0,057	7,755	0,000
Q54. Not justified for family members to end life of a woman if she engages in premarital sex or adultery to protect the family’s honor	0,231	0,006	0,287	39,365	0,000
Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran	0,032	0,005	0,050	6,206	0,000
Q78. Completely disagree: A wife must always obey her husband	0,014	0,007	0,015	1,953	0,051
Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion	0,253	0,016	0,135	15,833	0,000
Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery?	0,070	0,015	0,039	4,599	0,000
Q95. Gender (female)	0,033	0,012	0,019	2,688	0,007

N = 17614 representative Muslim citizens of the globe; adj. R² = 16.6%; F = 437,899; error p = .000

Appendix (1); (4); and (6) were already presented in the text above.

Data Appendix (2) shows the first promax factor analysis, based on 17615 PEW interview partners. There are four factors which explain almost 65% of the variance of the variables. There is a predominantly Sunni opinion current, supporting terror and rejecting the West in a way, as predicted by the analysis of “*Occidentalism*” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2004). While the more religious Sunni elements are relatively moderate in their apprehensions against the ambitions of the Shia regional power Iran, it is the more secular and female Sunni elements of society which hold critical opinions of Iran and its partner Russia. Factor three expresses opposition against terrorism in some countries worst affected by economic crisis. This factor contradicts the popular but wrong assumption that economic poverty is a 1:1 driver of terror support. Factor four expresses the dimension of a pronounced male secularist trend. Our Tables also show the correlation of components, especially the stronger positive trade-off between Sunni Occidentalism and the Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran. The factor loading of -0.276 between “*suicide bombing is never justified*” and the predominantly Sunni *Occidental* world view indicates the relationship between these two processes. Our Tables also present the country factor scores for the four factors of the model.


Appendix (3) presents an in-depth analysis of the PEW Global Survey data with $n = 4690$ respondents. The entire analysis explains more than 57% of the total variance. Factor 1 represents an opinion current critical of Iran and the Shia terrorist group Hizbollah. Factor 2 again represents Occidentalism and hatred of the West, while factor 3 is an opinion current, critical of the terrorist organization Hamas and Islamist extremism in general. Factor 4 highlights the close terrorist competition between radical anti-Western non-secular and secular forces in the Middle East, which are all too often forgotten nowadays in Western analyses. So factor 4 is the kind of under-class secular and radicalism and terror support, which can be found especially in the Lebanon but also partially among the population of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Factor 5 again expresses a certain opinion current among male persons, distancing themselves from terrorism.

We again show the correlation of the promax factors, and we also construct an Index of the resilience against terrorism, based on the country factor scores, weighted by the Eigenvalues of the factors, and the direction of influence on a process of the resilience against terrorism (Factor 1, 3, and 5 are untransformed, while factors 2 and 4 had to be multiplied by -1 to arrive at an indicator of the acceptancy of the West and no under-class secular radicalism and terror support). Senegal and Turkey are the two Muslim societies most resilient


against terrorism, followed by Nigeria, Indonesia, Tunisia, Malaysia, followed by Jordan, Egypt and Pakistan, with the Lebanon and the Palestinian territories showing the least resilience against terrorism.

Appendix 5 shows the results of our factor analysis for the PEW data base “The World’s Muslims”. More than 57% of the total variance of the variables are explained by four factors – rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence, secularism, no deeper knowledge of world religions, and under-class feminism. We show the correlations between the factors, and the country factor scores. Graph 1 summarized the most important factor loadings, and Graph 2 the country results for Factor 1:

Graph 1: rejecting the Shari’a state



Graph 2: country results for rejecting the Shari’a state



Appendix 7 analyses the *World Values Survey* data for Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The sample underlining our analysis is $n = 9267$ individuals. The total variance explained is more than 46%.

There are three factors which emerge from our analysis: feminism, the female distance to the Mosque, and the rejection of Shari’a and veiled politics. In our appendix, we not only show the Eigenvalues and the factor loadings, but also the correlations of the components and the country factor scores.

7. Conclusions and prospects

Our article attempts to be yet another empirical contribution to the evolving international debate about global Islamist terrorism. We rely on standardized opinion surveys in different countries around the globe to elicit responses from the publics in the countries affected by terrorism themselves which factors contribute to the approval or the rejection of terrorist acts. We survey the existing literature and arrive at the conclusion that it would be wrong to define

radical Islamism only in terms of the identification with outright support for the immediate “bomb-throwing terror”, while neglecting the underlying ideological and dangerous radicalism and also ongoing radicalization of such organizations as the *Muslim Brotherhood* or the Turkish *Milli Görüş*, which both start, like the most radicalized factions of Islamist terrorism, from the intense hatred of “*Jews and Free Masons*” and Western civilization as such, and which for many on both sides of the Atlantic appear as “moderate Islamists” and worthy partners of dialogue, while in reality they provide the fertile ground from which the armed terrorist groups only can develop. We try to develop categories which are relevant for the empirical analysis: the omnipresent hatred of America and the West which we term “*Occidentalism*” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005); the intense competition between Islamist and secular, Marxist terror groups which still exist in the Middle East and the entire Muslim world (Fine, 2008), and the Sunni/Shia competition as well as regional quests for hegemony (Rubin, 1998; Rubin and Rubin, 2004).

With Tibi we also analyze the close connection between the Islamist sharia ideology and the overall aspects of Islamism (Tibi, 2013a, 2013b). Based on PEW data, we show that the two main drivers of Muslim opposition against suicide bombing are the rejection of honor killing and the death penalty against Muslims who chose to leave the Muslim community altogether.

Our promax factor analyses confirms that there is a predominantly Sunni opinion current which is supporting terror and rejecting the West in a way, as predicted by the analysis of “*Occidentalism*” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005; Rubin and Rubin, 2004). Support for Hamas and support for Islamist extremism in general go hand in hand. There is also an important current of under-class secular radicalism and terror support, which can be found especially in the Lebanon and among the population of the Palestinian Occupied Territories. We also can show that rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence go hand in hand. Our empirical analysis also supports the view that there is an important current of feminism, the female distance to the Mosque, and the rejection of Shari’a and veiled politics in the Muslim world.

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Data Appendix

(1) Terror support data and Iranian regime support data from Pew Research Global Attitudes Project Spring 2013 Dataset for web.sav – global survey

	suicide bombing\other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam
Palestinian territories	61,20
Lebanon	32,60
Malaysia	26,50
Egypt	25,00
Senegal	18,20
Turkey	16,40
Jordan	11,30
Tunisia	10,60
Israel	7,70
Nigeria	7,60
Indonesia	6,40
Pakistan	4,00

	Very favorable, or somewhat favorable, opinion of Hamas
Palestinian territories	47,80
Egypt	45,10
Tunisia	44,50
Jordan	42,70
Lebanon	32,00
Malaysia	24,60
Indonesia	23,00
Nigeria	16,00
Israel	13,70
Pakistan	11,60
Senegal	10,70
Turkey	8,10

	very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of Hezbollah
Palestinian territories	43,10
Lebanon	40,80
Tunisia	33,60
Indonesia	27,10
Malaysia	26,50
Jordan	25,10
Egypt	19,10
Pakistan	14,60
Israel	14,10
Nigeria	13,70
Senegal	9,70

Turkey	7,50
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	very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of al Qaeda
Palestinian territories	34,00
Indonesia	22,10
Egypt	18,40
Malaysia	14,50
Tunisia	14,00
Jordan	13,10
Senegal	9,40
Nigeria	8,70
Turkey	7,40
Lebanon	0,80

	very favorable or somewhat favorable opinion of the Taliban
Palestinian territories	28,80
Egypt	25,60
Indonesia	20,80
Malaysia	17,80
Senegal	15,10
Tunisia	12,40
Turkey	10,80
Nigeria	9,30
Jordan	8,60
Lebanon	3,10

	Islamic extremist groups are a minor threat or not a threat to the country
China	70,70
Jordan	61,80
El Salvador	59,10
Egypt	56,10
Palestinian territories	54,00
Venezuela	52,40
South Africa	51,40
Canada	51,20
Mexico	50,00
Turkey	49,40
Brazil	48,30
Malaysia	47,00
Israel	46,60
Czech Republic	45,60
Australia	45,40
Poland	44,60
Chile	43,40
Greece	42,70

Indonesia	42,50
Germany	41,40
Ghana	41,20
Japan	39,70
Russia	39,60
Argentina	39,20
Kenya	38,80
Britain	36,50
South Korea	36,20
Philippines	35,90
Spain	35,90
United States	34,50
Bolivia	32,70
Pakistan	32,00
Nigeria	30,10
Lebanon	28,30
France	27,60
Tunisia	23,00
Italy	22,30
Uganda	21,60
Senegal	21,10

	unfavorable opinion of Israel
Lebanon	98,30
Jordan	95,40
Palestinian territories	93,90
Egypt	92,00
Turkey	85,60
Tunisia	85,10
Greece	70,90
Malaysia	70,90
Indonesia	70,80
Spain	67,10
China	65,90
France	65,30
Germany	62,80
Italy	61,70
Pakistan	51,00
Poland	50,50
Czech Republic	46,80
Senegal	44,80
Britain	44,20
Russia	37,70
United States	25,20
Nigeria	23,70

	Iran's nuclear program minor threat or not a threat to the country
China	64,80
Palestinian territories	59,40
Nigeria	57,10
Jordan	54,20
Tunisia	52,70
Egypt	52,50
Venezuela	51,90
Indonesia	50,80
Kenya	50,70
Pakistan	50,20
Canada	49,50
Turkey	49,50
Russia	48,10
South Africa	47,80
Britain	47,70
Czech Republic	47,70
Lebanon	47,20
Mexico	46,80
El Salvador	46,60
Spain	46,30
Australia	45,90
Germany	42,90
Japan	42,10
France	41,80
Ghana	40,10
Malaysia	39,70
Argentina	39,10
United States	38,70
Poland	38,20
Philippines	37,30
Brazil	36,90
South Korea	32,70
Chile	31,00
Bolivia	30,40
Senegal	29,60
Greece	29,40
Uganda	26,00
Italy	22,90
Israel	20,40

(2) Multivariate analysis of suicide bombing and Iranian regime support, based on N = 17615 PEW respondents from the Global Attitudes Survey, 2013

	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated of % variance explained
Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	2,026	25,323	25,323
Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	1,108	13,855	39,178
people in economic crisis countries against terror	1,046	13,072	52,250
male secularism	1,018	12,724	64,974

	Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	people in economic crisis countries against terror	male secularism
Q164. Gender (female)	-0,089	0,287	-0,081	-0,603
Q121. suicide bombing is never justified	-0,276	-0,027	0,764	-0,023
Q9A. very unfavorable opinion of the United States	0,834	0,207	0,038	-0,015
Q9E. very unfavorable opinion of Russia	0,356	0,792	0,045	-0,010
Q4. economic situation in (survey country) –very bad?	0,324	0,059	0,668	0,023
Q9D. unfavorable opinion of Iran	0,163	0,861	-0,017	0,048
Q9G. very unfavorable opinion of the United Nations	0,822	0,271	-0,046	0,083
Q178. religion not at all important in life	-0,022	0,224	-0,062	0,809
	Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	<i>Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran</i>	people in economic crisis countries against terror	male secularism

correlation of components	Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	people in economic crisis countries against terror	male secularism
Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	1,000	0,226	0,013	0,040
Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	0,226	1,000	-0,018	0,023
people in economic crisis countries against terror	0,013	-0,018	1,000	-0,007
male secularism	0,040	0,023	-0,007	1,000

	Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	people in economic crisis countries against terror	male secularism
Egypt	0,323	0,335	-0,083	-0,072
Indonesia	-0,840	-0,524	0,214	-0,237
Israel	-0,170	-0,082	0,008	0,607
Jordan	0,297	0,464	0,158	-0,039
Lebanon	0,152	-0,069	0,157	0,271
Malaysia	-0,532	-0,523	-0,764	-0,165
Nigeria	-0,671	-0,171	0,243	-0,062
Pakistan	0,578	-0,719	0,779	-0,061
Palestinian territories	0,794	0,182	-0,710	-0,077
Senegal	-1,348	-0,616	-0,330	-0,288
Tunisia	-0,045	0,036	0,544	0,188
Turkey	0,384	0,643	-0,244	0,169

	Predominantly Sunni Occidentalism and terror support	Sunni more secular negative opinion on Russia and Iran	people in economic crisis countries against terror	male secularism
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(3) Multivariate analysis of terror support and Iranian regime support from N = 4690 (in depth analysis from PEW Global Survey data), R² = 57,210 %

	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated of % variance explained
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	2,492	19,166	19,166
Occidentalism	1,821	14,011	33,177
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	1,087	8,364	41,542
under-class secular radicalism and terror support	1,030	7,922	49,464
male secular distance from terrorism	1,007	7,746	57,210

	Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Occidentalism	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism
Q6. Now thinking about your personal economic situation, how would you describe it – is it very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?	0,149	0,186	-0,167	0,436	-0,037
Q9A. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?	0,020	0,835	-0,151	0,138	-0,041
Q9D. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Iran?	0,808	0,218	-0,041	0,168	-0,079
Q9E. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Russia?	0,651	0,396	-0,063	0,081	0,039
Q9G. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very	0,108	0,785	-0,060	0,208	0,036

unfavorable opinion of the United Nations?					
Q9I. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Israel?	0,166	0,538	-0,079	-0,010	-0,076
Q9J. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hamas?	0,484	-0,033	0,603	0,025	0,371
Q9K. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Hezbollah?	0,810	-0,039	0,263	-0,022	0,198
Q11E. Do you think that Iran's nuclear program is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?	-0,567	0,151	-0,110	0,013	0,305
Q11H. Do you think that Islamic extremist groups are a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to (survey country)?	0,007	0,095	-0,762	0,019	0,095
Q121. suicide bombing\other forms of violence against civilian targets never justified	0,087	-0,137	0,339	-0,477	0,326
Q164. Gender	0,052	0,038	0,003	0,005	-0,785
Q178. How important is religion in your life – very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?	0,053	-0,006	0,315	0,791	0,205
	Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Occidentalism	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism

Correlation of components	Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Occidentalism	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	1,000	0,113	0,159	0,050	0,072
Occidentalism	0,113	1,000	-0,196	0,161	-0,024
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	0,159	-0,196	1,000	0,010	0,269
under-class secular radicalism and terror support	0,050	0,161	0,010	1,000	0,008
male secular distance from terrorism	0,072	-0,024	0,269	0,008	1,000

Country		Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Occidentalism	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism
Egypt	Mean	0,328	0,298	-0,330	0,214	-0,217
	N	622	622	622	622	622
Indonesia	Mean	-0,341	-0,872	0,282	-0,547	0,104
	N	497	497	497	497	497
Jordan	Mean	0,322	0,433	-0,226	0,028	-0,053
	N	697	697	697	697	697
Lebanon	Mean	-0,270	0,067	0,082	0,574	-0,205
	N	521	521	521	521	521
Malaysia	Mean	-0,423	-0,411	0,011	-0,441	-0,169
	N	269	269	269	269	269
Nigeria	Mean	-0,126	-0,579	0,162	-0,314	0,493
	N	132	132	132	132	132
Pakistan	Mean	-0,782	0,203	-0,009	-0,469	0,676

	N	204	204	204	204	204
Palestinian territories	Mean	-0,090	0,544	-0,530	0,469	-0,411
	N	504	504	504	504	504
Senegal	Mean	-0,186	-1,581	0,437	-0,332	-0,002
	N	286	286	286	286	286
Tunisia	Mean	-0,198	0,008	0,222	-0,218	0,112
	N	450	450	450	450	450
Turkey	Mean	0,707	0,455	0,391	0,064	0,447
	N	508	508	508	508	508
Country		Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Occidentalism	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism

original factor	Eigenvalue	re-interpretation for the Index construction	weight applied on the original factor scores
Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	2,492	Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	2,492
Occidentalism	1,821	Liking the West	-1,821
Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	1,087	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	1,087
under-class secular radicalism and terror support	1,030	no under-class secular radicalism and terror support	-1,030
male secular distance from terrorism	1,007	male secular distance from terrorism	1,007

	Critical of Iran, critical of Hizbollah	Liking he West	Against Hamas, against Islamist extremism	No under-class secular radicalism and terror support	male secular distance from terrorism	Resilience of civil society against Islamist terrorism
Senegal	-0,463	2,879	0,475	0,342	-0,002	3,232
Turkey	1,762	-0,828	0,425	-0,066	0,450	1,742
Nigeria	-0,314	1,055	0,177	0,324	0,497	1,739
Indonesia	-0,851	1,588	0,306	0,563	0,104	1,710
Tunisia	-0,494	-0,015	0,242	0,224	0,113	0,070
Malaysia	-1,053	0,748	0,012	0,455	-0,170	-0,009
Jordan	0,802	-0,788	-0,245	-0,029	-0,054	-0,313
Egypt	0,817	-0,543	-0,358	-0,220	-0,218	-0,523
Pakistan	-1,948	-0,370	-0,010	0,483	0,680	-1,165
Lebanon	-0,672	-0,122	0,089	-0,591	-0,207	-1,502
Palestinian territories	-0,223	-0,992	-0,576	-0,483	-0,414	-2,688
	Critical of Iran,	Liking he West	Against Hamas, against Islamist	No under-class secular	male secular distance from	Resilience of civil society

	critical of Hizbollah		extremism	radicalism and terror support	terrorism	against Islamist terrorism
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(4) Support for the Shari'a state based on 2012-Pew-Religion-Worlds-Muslims_dataset.sav – Muslim respondents only

	favor making the Shar'ia (Islamic law) the official law of the land
Afghanistan	98,70
Iraq	90,50
Palestinian Territories	89,80
Malaysia	86,30
Niger	84,20
Iran	82,90
Pakistan	82,40
Morocco	82,30
Bangladesh	81,20
Egypt	74,70
Indonesia	72,10
Jordan	70,00
Algeria	69,10
Tunisia	53,80
Kyrgyzstan	34,60
Lebanon	29,40
Tajikistan	26,50
Kosovo	21,20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	14,00
Albania	13,10
Turkey	12,70
Kazakhstan	10,80
Azerbaijan	6,90

	favor the death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion
Egypt	88,30
Jordan	82,40
Afghanistan	80,30
Pakistan	73,70
Palestinian Territories	61,50
Algeria	59,60
Malaysia	57,90
Bangladesh	44,00
Iraq	41,10
Niger	30,50
Thailand	23,10
Lebanon	18,10
Tunisia	16,60
Indonesia	16,30
Russia	9,20

Kyrgyzstan	9,10
Turkey	8,60
Tajikistan	8,50
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4,40
Kosovo	3,20
Albania	2,20
Azerbaijan	1,30
Kazakhstan	0,80

	favor punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery
Pakistan	82,10
Afghanistan	81,80
Algeria	79,30
Niger	78,50
Palestinian Territories	72,70
Egypt	69,60
Malaysia	58,90
Iraq	54,90
Jordan	53,20
Bangladesh	49,80
Thailand	42,10
Indonesia	38,70
Kyrgyzstan	35,70
Tunisia	26,40
Russia	23,00
Lebanon	22,90
Tajikistan	20,20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	15,80
Turkey	13,50
Kazakhstan	13,10
Albania	9,80
Kosovo	9,70
Azerbaijan	5,60

	favor stoning people who commit adultery
Afghanistan	84,90
Pakistan	83,50
Palestinian Territories	81,60
Egypt	78,60
Algeria	72,90
Niger	68,20
Jordan	64,80
Iraq	57,20

Bangladesh	52,90
Malaysia	52,30
Thailand	45,40
Indonesia	42,70
Tunisia	26,90
Kyrgyzstan	26,00
Lebanon	23,20
Tajikistan	22,90
Azerbaijan	15,00
Russia	14,10
Turkey	9,80
Kosovo	9,30
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8,00
Albania	6,10
Kazakhstan	5,80

	If a woman engages in premarital sex or adultery, it is often/sometimes justified for family members to end her life in order to protect the family's honor
Lebanon	45,10
Egypt	39,00
Jordan	38,80
Palestinian Territories	38,70
Pakistan	37,10
Bangladesh	34,50
Niger	34,50
Algeria	29,40
Thailand	27,00
Tunisia	26,80
Tajikistan	24,20
Malaysia	20,80
Russia	18,80
Turkey	18,80
Kosovo	18,60
Kyrgyzstan	18,10
Albania	12,80
Morocco	10,30
Indonesia	8,20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7,20
Azerbaijan	6,80
Kazakhstan	4,40

(5) Multivariate analysis of the PEW “The World’s Muslims” data on support for the Shari’a state and suicide bombing

	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated of % variance explained
rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence	3,360	28,001	28,001
secularism	1,291	10,758	38,759
no knowledge of world religions	1,146	9,551	48,310
feminism	1,085	9,044	57,354

	rejecting the Shari’a state and Islamist violence	secularism	no knowledge of world religions	under-class feminism
Q2. Standing at the bottom of the 'ladder of life'	0,010	0,043	-0,214	<i>0,476</i>
Q22a. know nothing about the Muslim religion and its practices	0,172	0,550	0,556	0,012
Q22b. know nothing about the Christian religion and its practices	-0,052	-0,075	0,799	-0,008
Q36. Religion not at all important in life	0,289	0,774	0,031	-0,036
Q54. Not justified for family members to end life of a woman if she engages in premarital sex or adultery to protect the family’s honor	0,607	0,039	0,181	<i>0,419</i>
Q65. Does not read or listen to the Koran	<i>0,428</i>	0,747	0,029	-0,031
Q78. completely disagree: A wife must always obey her husband	0,288	0,639	-0,133	0,248
Q89. Rejecting suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets	0,554	0,033	<i>0,333</i>	<i>0,424</i>
Q92b. Oppose death penalty for people who leave the Muslim religion	0,767	0,394	-0,019	-0,063

Q92c. Oppose punishments like whippings and cutting off of hands for crimes like theft and robbery?	0,784	<i>0,425</i>	-0,115	-0,133
Q92d. Oppose stoning people who commit adultery	0,813	<i>0,451</i>	-0,134	-0,095
Q95. Gender (female)	0,034	0,041	0,102	0,660
	rejecting the Shari'a state and Islamist violence	secularism	no knowledge of world religions	under-class feminism

Correlation of components	rejecting the Shari'a state and Islamist violence and gender ideology	secularism	no knowledge of world religions	under-class feminism
rejecting the Shari'a state and Islamist violence and gender ideology	1,000	0,370	0,042	0,111
secularism	0,370	1,000	-0,022	-0,083
no knowledge of world religions	0,042	-0,022	1,000	0,165
under-class feminism	0,111	-0,083	0,165	1,000

Country	rejecting the Shari'a state and Islamist violence and gender ideology	secularism	no knowledge of world religions	under-class feminism
Albania	0,710	1,638	0,055	0,057
Algeria	-0,720	-0,646	0,043	0,249
Azerbaijan	0,835	0,799	0,243	0,100
Bangladesh	-0,413	-0,234	0,017	-0,285
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0,782	0,631	-1,022	0,370
Egypt	-1,048	-0,429	-0,099	-0,254
Indonesia	0,278	-0,655	0,271	0,297
Jordan	-0,748	-0,538	-0,257	0,099
Kazakhstan	0,852	1,025	0,203	0,233
Kosovo	0,638	1,000	0,211	-0,355
Kyrgyzstan	0,357	0,355	0,239	0,037
Malaysia	-0,499	-0,775	-0,187	0,482
Niger	-0,730	-0,618	-0,121	-0,620

Pakistan	-0,923	-0,583	0,524	0,285
Palestinian Territories	-1,001	-0,421	-0,323	-0,113
Russia	0,565	0,630	-0,104	0,076
Tajikistan	0,545	0,253	0,025	-0,250
Tunisia	0,295	-0,345	0,291	-0,290
Turkey	0,586	0,353	-0,295	0,009
Country	rejecting the Shari'a state and Islamist violence and gender ideology	secularism	no knowledge of world religions	under-class feminism

(6) World Values Survey data on Occidentalism in the Muslim world

World Values Survey 71773 representative Muslims from

Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bosnia; Bosnia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Canada; China; Colombia; Croatia; Cyprus; Egypt; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Great Britain; Guatemala; Hong Kong; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lebanon; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia; Malaysia; Mali; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Palestine; Peru; Philippines; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Serbia and Montenegro; Singapore; Slovenia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; United States; Uzbekistan; Viet Nam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

	% Muslims rejecting neighbors of a different race	N =
Libya	55,80	2050
Thailand	47,70	65
Bangladesh	45,30	2684
Palestine	43,90	997
India	43,80	983
Lebanon	39,90	622
Saudi Arabia	38,00	1457
Philippines	36,60	123
Turkey	34,40	7825
Egypt	34,10	2830
Yemen	34,00	1000
Jordan	33,20	3499
Indonesia	32,80	2778
Malaysia	30,40	1509
Azerbaijan	29,00	2794
Iran	28,00	5080
Iraq	27,80	1188
France	27,70	47
Kyrgyzstan	26,50	2111
Cyprus	24,90	497
Bosnia	24,90	317
Nigeria	24,10	2189
Algeria	23,90	2476
Uganda	23,70	169
Mali	22,10	1426
Ghana	21,30	404
Rwanda	19,70	305
Tanzania	18,60	469
Macedonia	18,20	506
Germany	17,80	146

Morocco	16,90	3633
Tunisia	16,90	1205
Georgia	15,70	166
Serbia and Montenegro	15,20	33
Montenegro	14,70	68
Uzbekistan	14,40	1426
Ethiopia	13,90	158
Kazakhstan	13,80	756
Bulgaria	12,20	238
South Africa	11,70	273
Russia	11,20	366
Pakistan	11,10	2459
China	11,10	117
Serbia	10,40	125
Bosnia	9,50	485
Great Britain	9,30	43
Burkina Faso	9,20	818
Singapore	9,20	557
Albania	8,80	706
Slovenia	7,30	41
Sweden	5,40	37
Finland	4,80	63
Trinidad and Tobago	3,20	124
Netherlands	1,90	53
Canada	1,70	58
Australia	0,00	33

	% Muslims rejecting neighbors: Immigrants/foreign n workers	n =
Thailand	61,50	65
Libya	58,70	2050
Egypt	58,60	2830
Malaysia	57,70	1509
Bangladesh	48,30	2684
Jordan	47,90	3499
India	42,30	983
Palestine	39,80	997
Iraq	38,90	1188
Lebanon	38,60	622
Indonesia	37,00	2775
Turkey	36,60	7826
Montenegro	36,20	69
Iran	35,20	5079
Cyprus	35,00	497
Saudi Arabia	33,30	1457
France	31,90	47
Bosnia	29,00	317
Kazakhstan	28,50	755
Azerbaijan	28,10	2794
Kyrgyzstan	28,00	2111
Singapore	27,30	557
South Africa	26,00	273
Pakistan	25,60	2459
Algeria	25,50	2476
Nigeria	24,50	2189
Mali	24,50	1426
Bosnia	24,50	485
Yemen	24,20	1000
Russia	24,10	365
Philippines	22,60	124
Serbia	21,60	125
Ghana	20,80	404
Tanzania	19,20	469
Tunisia	18,80	1205
Rwanda	18,70	305
Morocco	18,10	3630
Ethiopia	17,70	158
Macedonia	16,00	506
Serbia and Montenegro	15,20	33

Germany	14,40	146
Uganda	14,20	169
Georgia	13,90	166
Uzbekistan	12,40	1426
Burkina Faso	11,20	818
Albania	10,30	706
Bulgaria	8,40	238
Slovenia	7,30	41
Trinidad and Tobago	6,40	125
China	3,40	117
Australia	3,00	33
Great Britain	2,30	43
Finland	0,00	63
Canada	0,00	58
Netherlands	0,00	53
Sweden	0,00	36

	rejecting neighbors: People of a different religion	n =
Libya	54,80	2050
Yemen	53,30	1000
Palestine	50,30	997
India	46,30	600
Saudi Arabia	40,80	1457
Bangladesh	40,10	2684
Thailand	40,00	65
Jordan	37,90	3499
Algeria	37,10	2476
Kyrgyzstan	36,30	1336
Turkey	35,70	6231
Azerbaijan	35,70	973
Indonesia	35,50	2782
Lebanon	35,40	622
Iraq	34,00	5792
Philippines	30,60	72
Malaysia	29,90	1509
Tunisia	29,70	1205
Iran	29,50	5080
Morocco	27,70	2354
France	27,70	47
Nigeria	27,60	1397
Cyprus	27,10	498
Ghana	25,00	404

Bosnia	24,60	317
Mali	24,10	1426
Albania	22,10	706
Rwanda	17,70	305
Pakistan	16,30	2459
Germany	16,20	148
Uzbekistan	15,70	1426
Serbia and Montenegro	15,20	33
Kazakhstan	14,00	756
Russia	12,60	261
Burkina Faso	11,70	818
Ethiopia	11,40	158
Singapore	10,30	321
South Africa	8,60	81
Bulgaria	7,10	238
Georgia	5,40	166
China	5,00	100
Slovenia	4,90	41
Trinidad and Tobago	1,60	125
Netherlands	0,00	53
Great Britain	0,00	43
Canada	0,00	36
Sweden	0,00	32

(7) Multivariate analysis on Occidentalism and support for the Shari'a state with data from the *World Values Survey*, WVS, n = 9267 with complete data

	Eigenvalue	% of variance explained	Cumulated % of variance explained
feminism	1,753	19,480	19,480
female distance to the Mosque	1,357	15,080	34,560
rejecting Shari'a and veiled politics	1,046	11,619	46,178

	feminism	female distance to the Mosque	rejecting Shari'a and veiled politics
Important child qualities: religious faith	0,065	0,028	-0,539
Reject opinion: jobs scarce: Men should have more right to a job than women	0,551	0,046	0,152
Reject opinion: University is more important for a boy than for a girl	0,599	0,253	0,041
Reject opinion: traits in a woman: Woman wearing veil	0,331	-0,040	0,721
Reject opinion: wife must obey	0,578	0,272	0,204
Never attends religious services	0,029	0,741	0,014
Reject opinion: only laws of the Shari'a	0,146	0,048	0,699
Gender (female)	0,279	0,772	-0,015
Highest educational level attained	0,560	-0,347	-0,009

Correlation of components	feminism	female distance to the Mosque	rejecting Shari'a and veiled politics
feminism	1,000	0,102	0,184
female distance to the Mosque	0,102	1,000	0,021
rejecting Shari'a and veiled politics	0,184	0,021	1,000

Country/region	feminism	female distance to the Mosque	rejecting Shari'a and veiled politics
Algeria	0,398	-0,021	0,182
Bangladesh	-0,079	-0,231	0,718
Indonesia	0,612	-0,297	0,288
Iraq	-0,375	0,233	-0,095
Jordan	0,041	0,252	-0,156
Nigeria	-0,331	-0,617	0,620
Saudi Arabia	0,017	-0,130	-0,327
Egypt	-0,061	0,128	-0,277