Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives

Missios, Paul and Plourde, Charles (1997): Transboundary Renewable Resource Management and Conservation Motives. Published in: Marine Resource Economics , Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996): pp. 29-36.

Abstract

A simple, two-country theoretical model of transboundary fishing conflicts in which one country has a nonlucrative incentive to conserve the fish stock is presented to examine the effect of such a conservation motive on the steady state stock level and to analyze how this stock level is affected by the division of the harvest. It is demonstrated that a conservation motive for one or both countries serves to increase the stock level and that this level is dependent on the harvest share of the country with the motive. A brief application to the Canada-European Union turbot and Canada-United States salmon disputes suggests consistency between the principles of the model and reality.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Conservation, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries managment, turbot, salmon, renewable resources
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery ; Aquaculture; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy

References

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