The Imbalanced Catch-up to Rational Expectations: Capital Flows during Convergence

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August 2015

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71009/
MPRA Paper No. 71009, posted 28 April 2016 13:34 UTC
The Imbalanced Catch-up to Rational Expectations: Capital Flows during Convergence

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Revised, April 28, 2016

Abstract
How long shall a country take to learn the world technological frontier? What would happen if that country found the same difficulties in learning the true model of its economy? After all, countries catching up often experience life-changing transformations during the catch-up to a balanced growth path. We show that an open economy, learning rational expectations alongside foreign technology, may be characterized by excessive saving and current account surpluses, as often observed in the data and at odds with the standard open economy theoretical predictions, and not fully explained by standard adaptations such as habit formation. Moreover, such a learning process in a large developing country can upset the savings behavior of a fully rational expectations advanced country. In a US-China calibration, we show that this effect can be so strong as to explain important current account imbalances, the savings glut hypothesis, as well as the distribution of factor income.

JEL Classification Numbers: F21, F41, E03

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1 Introduction

The workhorse neoclassical model makes very clear predictions about the relationship between the current account and long term or persistent productivity growth (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). In the face of persistent growth, consumption increases in excess of current output and is supplemented by capital inflows; similar patterns are present for investment decisions, which respond positively to expected future total factor productivity increases. Hence, lower savings and higher investments should be associated with faster technological progress. Faster growing economies should be on the receiving end of international capital flows and these flows should be increasing in productivity growth.

In addition to the emergence of global imbalances, a negative relationship between persistent economic growth and capital inflows has emerged over a longer period starting in 1980s for non-developed economies, the allocation puzzle (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013; Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych, 2014). This premise relies on three key features that deserve greater attention. First, the neoclassical model in relation to these puzzles subsumes perfectly functioning financial markets. Second, analysis often focuses on a representative agent framework, abstracting from life-cycle savings motives and demographic structure. Third, it relies on the ability of agents to rationally forecast the persistent growth component as well as future marginal utility of consumption.

Many explanations for global imbalances and the allocation puzzle focus on the first and second points. In a model of equilibrium global imbalances, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008a) show that uphill capital flows may emerge as a result of depressed supply of safe assets in developing economies. In their non-Ricardian model, financial market frictions translate into a low share of the total claims to future output in the economy that can be traded, depressing autarky interest rates and directing capital abroad in seek of safe assets. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) argue that it is a lack of supply for contingent claims in the presence of idiosyncratic risks and, as a
consequence, precautionary savings motives that can explain current account surpluses. Similar arguments have been made for developing economies on the investment side: Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) argue that a lack of financial intermediation prevents domestic savings from being channeled into productive investments; and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) model financial frictions which prevent loans from being allocated to highly productive investment in the private sector as the source of capital outflows in the Chinese case.

Such frictions may also be able to explain the negative relationship between capital inflows and productivity growth documented in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). Capital market frictions prevent households from being able to borrow against future productivity growth, which is exacerbated in faster growing economies, generating higher pressure to borrow initially and store value as countries continue to transition. This channel relies on the fact that financial development does not allow the supply of financial assets to keep pace with growth in the economy’s demand for assets along the transition, so that agents in countries with higher productivity growth are more susceptible to financial frictions.

However, in a panel of developed and developing economies, Gruber and Kamin (2009) do not find systematic evidence that measures of financial development such as credit to GDP ratio or capitalization of stock markets can explain the direction of observed capital flows. Furthermore, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), point out that the allocation puzzle is strongest for developing economies that are the most financially integrated (and perhaps equipped with more developed financial markets).

Central to the emergence of both imbalances and the puzzling allocation of capital, is an underlying positive relationship between savings and economic growth. The work of Carroll and Weil (1993) highlights the causal channel running from economic growth to household saving, which can be accounted for in a model of habit formation where agents adjust consumption slowly (Carroll and Weil, 1993; Carroll, Overland, and Weil, 2000). In this paper, we show that in otherwise standard small open economy and a two large country
neoclassical model, agents learning to become rational in their consumption decisions along with technological convergence introduces a form of consumption persistence. This novel channel of persistence can explain the emergence of global imbalances between two large regions that we calibrate to the China and United States case. Additionally, we show that the effect is increasing in the growth of total factor productivity, and thus it can also explain the allocation puzzle.

At the root of our mechanism is indeed a positive correlation between saving rate and rate of growth, however, as we document in Section 8, habit formation is not enough to generate proximity of the model’s predictions to the data. In other words, the extent of underconsumption observed from many fast-growing converging economies cannot be sufficiently explained with habit formation in an open economy model.

Models with an overlapping generation structure may also predict positive relationship between savings and growth, differing from the standard neoclassical model (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009). Recent research has focused on the demographic structure in explaining a feedback loop that allows causation in both directions. Mehlum, Torvik, and Valente (2013) in a two sector, overlapping generations (OLG) economy, derive the "savings multiplier" of economic growth that emerges via more redistribution to a young generation of savers and by increasing the cost of old age care. The model is able to explain why faster-growing economies exhibit higher saving rates absent any additional market imperfections.

Further, research in this area highlights implications of the interaction of economic growth and financial frictions in a life-cycle framework for private saving. Coeurdacier, Guibaud, and Jin (2012) consider demographic structure with economic growth differentials and heterogeneous borrowing constraints in a two country model calibrated for China and the US. Their model is able to replicate divergence of private savings rates, global imbalances and falling interest rates, while making predictions for the age-specific savings behavior in the presence of economic growth.

To the third point, to our knowledge, little work has considered the role
that expectation formation has on the savings and investment decisions of agents in developing economies and thus, to the issues surrounding equilibrium international capital flows.

In the present paper, we incorporate extrapolative expectations (where agents rely on their more recent experience) into a small open economy, dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model that can be brought to the data. We use a reduced form of learning, where agents forming expectations are learning to rationally forecast their future marginal utility, that is endogenous to the path of development. When this occurs, we show that a negative pattern between realized economic growth and capital inflows may emerge that is strengthened for higher productivity growth. Global imbalances are present when we extend the same features of the model to a two country world.

A growing literature in macroeconomics has found important support empirically for alternative expectation formations. Fuster, Laibson, and Mendel (2010) incorporate extrapolative expectations into a standard macro forecasting model and show that, in a wide variety of settings, observed macroeconomic variables such as consumption, inflation, output and investment are better approximated by the incorporation of expectations based on some form of extrapolation bias. Similar approaches have been used for statistical learning by Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and behavioral model by De Grauwe (2012).

Although we highlight an expectational mechanism, we view our approach to be complementary to the friction channels that may affect savings and investment decisions in developing economies. When agents use more recent experience to form expectations as transition begins, this represents a market friction between what is optimal given the true model and what agents judge to be optimal. This channel operates via a distortion in agents’ optimal savings behavior.

The basic intuition behind our results is as follows. At the beginning of a transition to a balanced growth path associated with a higher productivity levels, agents must learn to forecast rationally along with the new model of their economy. As this occurs, they rely on more recent experience for forming
their expectations. Agents at the beginning of transition tend to underestimate the extent of their marginal utility of consumption and the unconstrained consumer smooths consumption to a new level that reflects the increase in perceived marginal utility of income. Consumption is therefore too low and excess saving flows out of the economy. This mechanism is augmented with higher productivity growth and higher convergence. Our expectational mechanism is consistent with the well documented positive relationship between savings and economic growth, but goes a step further in that it offers an additional channel that supports causation running from economic growth to savings.

Our results have major implications not only for the pattern of capital flows between and among converging economies. Even in a closed economy setting, our channel impacts the shape and level of capital accumulation during convergence. Both the level of capital to labor ratio and its shape over the transition are affected, offering new results for the distribution of factor income for converging economies. These implications are discussed in greater detail in Section 8.

2 Stylized Facts

Among the empirical facts well documented by the international economic literature has been the emergence of the global imbalances documented in Figure 1, which shows current account as a ratio to world GDP for a select group of economies. Current account imbalances emerged from the mid 1990s and increase towards the late 1990s after the east Asian financial crisis. For the United States deficits persist throughout the 2000s, with a significant improvement from 2006 to 2007 and a further improvement after the financial crisis. Current account deficits do not return to previous levels after the financial crisis.

The US deficits are matched by current account surpluses from fast growing, emerging economies on the whole, most particularly developing Asia, oil producing economies, and former Soviet countries. A sizable current account surplus arises in most of these economies starting in the late 1990s.
As a consequence of current account imbalances, large (in absolute value) net foreign asset positions—particularly for the United States and China—has emerged, shown in Figure 2. This figure shows both the reported net foreign asset position over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and also the cumulative sum of capital account deficits for the two countries using the same dataset. Both series are filtered of business cycle frequencies using an Hodrick-Prescott filter.

The US and China held positions that were relatively small as a percentage of GDP until the mid-1990s, when current account imbalances between the two countries emerged. The growth in magnitude of these international investment positions accelerated into the 2000s and were reduced after the financial crisis. For the US case, however, the reduction is less pronounced relative to US GDP.

There is robust evidence of a negative relationship between economic growth and the capital account shown in Figure 3. This figure shows the relationship between the cross-sectional average capital account over GDP and average trend total factor productivity growth over the period 1995 to 2011 for non-
OECD countries.¹

This evidence tells us that not only does capital flow out of fast growing, developing economies, this relationship is extenuated in faster growing, higher investing developing economies. This is an extension of the findings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) for a sample including transition economies and for the time period 1995 to 2011.

Our parsimonious model, introduced in the following section, and numerical exercises, are able to replicate the salient features of the emerged stylized facts introduced above. We provide particular explanation for the imbalances emerging between the United States and China since the 1990s and the evidence for a negative relationship between productivity growth and capital inflows over the same period.

¹The sample of 68 non-OECD countries is the same as that used in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) including transitional economies with available data from 1995. The slope of the line shown in the graph is -0.25 and is significant at the 5 percent level.
3 Model - Small Open Economy

To make our results more transparent, but without loss of generality, we here use a simple small open economy neoclassical growth model, with inelastic labor supply and no capital adjustment costs. Since we are interested in long-run relationship, we focus on deterministic trend growth and abstract from the stochastic growth component characteristic of the business cycle literature.

The economy is populated by an infinite number of identical households who maximize their expected lifetime utility with respect to consumption,

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t c_t^{1-\gamma} - \frac{1}{1-\gamma}.$$  (1)

Population is held constant and normalized to 1, so that consumption corresponds also to per capita consumption. We use in eq. (1) a standard CRRA utility function in consumption only, where $\gamma$ is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution.

Households maximize utility with respect to consumption subject to the

authors calculations, data from PWT 8.1, (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer, 2013).
flow budget constraint given by

\[ d_t = (1 + r_{t-1})d_{t-1} + c_t + i_t - y_t, \] (2)

where \( d_t \) is the household’s end of period \( t \) debt position, \( r_{t-1} \) is the cost of international borrowing, \( c_t \) is per capita consumption, \( y_t \) is per capita income and \( i_t \) is investment per capita.

The law of motion for capital stock is

\[ k_t = i_t + (1 - \delta)k_{t-1}, \] (3)

where \( \delta \) is the depreciation rate of physical capital.

Output of a single good in the economy is produced using the following technology

\[ y_t = k_t^\alpha (\xi_t h_t)^{1-\alpha}, \] (4)

where \( h_t \) is inelastic labor supply, and \( \xi_t \) is a labor-augmenting technology parameter. We normalize inelastic labor supply to \( h_t = 1. \)\(^2\) We discuss the time path for productivity parameter as a combination of trend growth and productivity convergence in the following section.

We assume the domestic interest rate, \( r_t \) is

\[ r_t = R + \phi \left( \frac{d_t}{y_t} - \frac{\bar{d}}{\bar{y}} \right) - 1, \] (5)

The cost of borrowing is comprised of the world interest rate, reflecting the marginal product of capital minus depreciation of economies that are on the balanced growth path, and a spread. The spread is increasing in the level of average household debt over income, \( \frac{d_t}{y_t} \), relative to some long term average, \( \frac{\bar{d}}{\bar{y}} \), where \( \phi \) is a measure of the sensitivity of the interest rate with respect to debt to income ratio. Notice that while in equilibrium \( \bar{d}_t = d_t \), households will take \( \bar{d}_t \) as given in their utility maximization problem.

\(^2\)At a later stage, we may consider a model which accounts for demographics and difference in labor across countries. For now, we analyze the case where countries are allowed to differ only in their technological advancement.
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and now standard in the literature, we incorporate this assumption in order to find a balanced growth path that does not rely on initial conditions of debt in each country.\(^3\) This is a technical reason. However, as it becomes apparent in the quantitative results, the stationarity inducing assumption operates over the very long run, and impacts only marginally the dynamics we wish to analyze.\(^4\) Furthermore, while generally used for business cycle analysis, the fact that the country spread should be increasing in the debt to GDP ratio finds support in literature on the long run determinants of country spreads (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).\(^5\)

### 3.1 Productivity Growth

In the present paper, we analyze how the incorporation of learning to become rational along with the true model of the economy into a standard macro model impacts the predicted relationship between capital flows and long run convergence to a balanced growth path.

Growth in the economy is derived from exogenous growth of the productivity parameter, \(\xi_t\). We assume the technological frontier grows at gross exogenous rate, \(g^*\), which represents the long run, balanced growth factor of the most advanced economies. We highlight the case of convergence, or the economy catching up to the technological frontier. We formulate a catch-up parameter as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) as follows,

\[
\pi_t = \frac{\xi_t}{\xi_0 e^{g^* t}}.
\]

\(^3\)Without this closing assumption, the deterministic steady state depends on initial debt levels. This assumption is shown to be plausible over business cycle frequencies (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2003)

\(^4\)For example, one may be concerned that the relative strength of income and substitution effects with falling interest rates may impact the direction of our results. Our results are robust to different values of the IES.

\(^5\)It is important to note that the predictions of our model are not sensitive to the introduction of various closing methods used in the small open economy literature, including internal debt elastic interest rate and portfolio adjustment costs.
This catch-up parameter measures the growth in the economy over \( t \) periods relative to that of the frontier.\(^6\) With this formulation, we are able to describe technological convergence in a single parameter, where \( \pi_t > 1 \) for an economy that catches up to the technological frontier, \( \pi_t < 1 \) for an economy that is lagging behind, and \( \pi_t = 1 \) for countries growing at the rate of the frontier.

It is important to note, that our model does not rely on full convergence to the productivity frontier; in fact, the economy may converge to any balanced growth path.

Rewriting eq. (6) in terms of \( \xi_t \) and \( \xi_{t-1} \) and rearranging,

\[
\xi_t = e^{g^*} \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_{t-1}} \xi_{t-1},
\]

(7)

The gross growth rate in the economy is comprised of a balanced growth component and a productivity frontier convergence or catch-up component.

In order to examine the transition of the economy during convergence, we assume the time path for catch-up,

\[
\pi_t = (1 - \psi)\pi_{t-1} + \psi \bar{\pi},
\]

(8)

with \( 0 < \psi < 1 \). With this formulation, the economy catches up during a transition to a value of \( \bar{\pi} \), to which the productivity parameter converges. In this sense, one may consider \( \pi_t \) to be the cumulative growth in excess of the frontier.

Considering this formulation of the productivity catch up, \( \pi_t \) is a concave function of time: countries that begin to converge to the balanced growth path do so very quickly towards the beginning, and then experience slower long term convergence over time.

\(^6\)One may rewrite eq.(6) as the ratio of growth factors between the domestic economy and the frontier.
3.2 Equilibrium

Households choose optimal paths for $c_t$, $d_t$ and $k_{t+1}$ given initial conditions, $d_0 = \tilde{d}$, $k_0 > 0$, taking the path of $\tilde{d}_t$ as given, and subject to eq. (2) and the no Ponzi-game condition,

$$\lim_{j \to \infty} \frac{d_{t+j}}{\prod_{i=t-1}^{t+j-1}(1 + r_{t+i})} \leq 0. \tag{9}$$

The necessary conditions for the above optimization problem are,

$$c_t^{-\gamma} = \lambda_t \tag{10}$$

$$\lambda_t = \beta(1 + r_t) \hat{E}_t(\lambda_{t+1}) \tag{11}$$

$$\lambda_t = \beta[\hat{E}_t(\lambda_{t+1})][\alpha k_{t+1}^{\alpha-1} + (1 - \delta)] \tag{12}$$

where $\lambda_t$ is the shadow price of consumption and where the $\hat{E}_t$ may correspond to the true conditional expectation for the rational case, or the extrapolative conditional forecast with learning. Eqs. (11) and (12) are the consumption Euler and capital demand equations, respectively. Eq. (10) is the definition of marginal utility from the CRRA utility function.

The above first order conditions together with Equations (2), (3), (4), (5) and given $k_0 > 0$ and $d_0 = \tilde{d}$ describe the dynamical system completely.

3.3 Expectation Formation

The transitional dynamics during productivity convergence are largely determined by agents’ expectations of future marginal utility of consumption relative to expected future return on savings and investment. Given the key role for the forward looking behavior of agents in the model, the assumptions on the formation of expectations on future variables are central to the dynamic predictions of the model.

The standard rational expectations assumption imposes very strict requirements on the computational ability of agents in the model. While we follow this approach in the stable environment of advanced countries, we instead as-
sume that in countries experiencing a transitional path, consumers are unable to perform the rational expectations predictions perfectly and instead rely on their more recent experience. More generally, we find the experiential interpretation particularly plausible in the absence of the balanced growth path. Our departure from the rational expectation is minimal as it affects only the way the consumers imagine their future marginal utility in a country in transformation. Firms are assumed to always formulate their production and investment plans under fully rational expectations.

In fact, in our small open economy model the economy begins transition with a technological growth away from balanced growth. When labor-augmenting technological progress begins its convergence process, agents in the economy must learn to use the rational expectations forecast along the transitional path to balanced growth. In such a situation, we find it natural to assume that agents may not trust their predictions about their future will to consume and supplement forecasts based on the true model of the economy with purely extrapolative beliefs, forming a forecast of their future marginal utility that is a convex combination of forecasts based on the true model and one that extrapolates on past values.

Within this framework, we postulate that the representative household’s forecast at time $t$ for $\lambda_{t+1}$ is

$$\hat{E}_t \lambda_{t+1} = \mu_t \lambda_{t-1} + (1 - \mu_t) E_t \lambda_{t+1},$$

where, $\mu_t$ is the share of the household’s forecast that is purely extrapolative. As a first step, we assume that $\mu_t$ evolves according to the reduced form autoregressive process,

$$\mu_t = (1 - \psi) \mu_{t-1} + \psi \tilde{\mu},$$

where agents are becoming fully rational at the rate in which they are converging to the balanced growth path.\footnote{One could allow agents to form “nowcasts”, or assume agents may observe perfectly the current state of the economy. Agents using current period forecasts do not significantly}

\begin{equation}
\text{(14)}
\end{equation}
trapolation in the forecast converges from above to 0. Thus, this reduced form assumption for the evolution of \( \mu_t \) represents a gradual learning of agents to forecast true model of the economy, as they converge to the balanced growth path\(^8\).

We assume that the law of motion of \( \mu \) strictly reflects that of distance to the balanced growth path. In a robustness test, we also test it using a calibration, in order not to force our conclusion. Quite interestingly, the calibration returns a very similar result to the direct empirical counterpart of convergence.

With the incorporation of the forecast for \( \lambda_{t+1} \), the dynamical system is completely described by

\[
\begin{align*}
\lambda_t &= \beta(1 + r_t)[\mu_t \lambda_{t-1} + (1 - \mu_t) E_t \lambda_{t+1}] \\
\lambda_t &= \beta[\mu_t \lambda_{t-1} + (1 - \mu_t) E_t \lambda_{t+1}] [\alpha k_{t+1}^{\alpha - 1} + (1 - \delta)]
\end{align*}
\]

(15) (16)

together with eqs. (2), (3), (5), (4), (14).

In eq. (16), we assume that firm owners are rational in the sense that they know the true model of growth affecting the productivity of their firm’s capital.

4 Quantitative Exercise

In a deterministic setting, we simulate technological convergence of the economy to the frontier. We simulate this case both for the standard rational expectations model and for the case with learning. While, for exhibition purposes, we simulate the full convergence of the Chinese economy, as we will see later, our results do not rely on unconditional convergence, but hold for convergence to any balanced growth path.

Along the balanced growth path, at the frontier, the technology parameter, \( \xi_t \), grows at a gross exogenous rate, \( g^* \). Therefore, we explain productivity convergence to the frontier using our catch-up parameter, \( \pi_t \), that reaches a

\(^{8}\)The reduced form process for \( \mu_t \) is easily microfounded with adaptive learning.
steady state level once convergence is attained.

We calculate total factor productivity using an approach common in growth and development account literature. Namely, from our production function \( \xi_t = \left( \frac{y_t}{k_t} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} \), where \( y_t \) and \( k_t \) are real GDP and capital stock per employed labor from PWT 8.1. Our measure for TFP is then the trend component of \( \xi_t \), using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter of 100.

A significant portion of cross-country differences in capital labor ratios are explained with difference in complementary inputs to TFP such as human capital (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007). We account for this important fact by incorporating human capital in our calculation of TFP as follows,

\[
\xi_t = \left( \frac{y_t}{k_t^\alpha} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)} / h_{ct},
\]

where \( h_{ct} \) is the human capital measure taking from PWT 8.1.\(^9\) The real GDP measure corrects for changing reference prices and PPP exchange rates over time and, as such, is comparable across countries and over time.\(^10\)

The growth rate of the frontier is proxied by the long run, growth rate of trend total factor productivity in the United States of 1.013 from 1995 to 2011,

\[
g^* = \ln \left( \frac{\xi_{2011}}{\xi_{1995}} \right) / (2011 - 1995).
\]

For sake of example, the simulation mimics the convergence of the People’s Republic of China relative to the United States. While China is clearly not a small open economy, it has, with little doubt, been at the forefront of intrigue regarding the savings glut hypothesis and studies of excess saving during pe-

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\(^9\)This measure is derived from Barro-Lee average years of schooling and return based measures. In general, the measure follows standard approaches in the development accounting literature. Please see Feenstra et al. (2013) for an exposition of how this measure is derived.

\(^10\)We use the real GDP measure based on output side, the variable \( r_{gdp} \), which takes into account the relative prices in exports and imports in additional to final goods in the calculation of PPPs over time. This will give a better measure of productivity changes over time, as it accounts for the affects of changing terms of trade on real GDP measure. We find this of particular importance in a sample, which includes emerging economies.
riods of high economic growth. Our choice of small open economy is for ease of exposition of our results. We perform an identical exercise (with essentially identical results) for a two region case in Section 7.

To calibrate the terminal catch-up parameter, \( \bar{\pi} \), TFP is assumed to grow at the frontier by a constant rate, \( g^* \),

\[ \xi_t^* = e^{g^* t} \xi_0. \]  

(19)

China is catching up over the simulation and TFP grows according to,

\[ \xi_t = e^{g^* t} \frac{\pi_t}{\pi_0} \xi_0. \]  

(20)

By definition, after full convergence the Chinese TFP growth should equal that of the US or frontier and therefore,

\[ \frac{\bar{\pi}}{\pi_0} = \frac{\xi_t^*}{\xi_0}. \]  

(21)

Normalizing \( \pi_0 \) to 1 and taking the ratio of our measure of US TFP to Chinese TFP, we calibrate \( \bar{\pi} \approx 7.95 \). This parameter measures the initial distance to the productivity frontier. That is, in 1995 the Chinese level of TFP was roughly one eighth that of the US.

The model is calibrated to annual data. The number of years that it takes the economy to converge to the frontier is governed by eq. (8) and specifically, parameter \( \psi \). From 1995 to 2011, Chinese trend TFP grows from 1,400.02 to 1,993.75, a factor of 1.42. From eq. (8), we have after 17 years, the value of the catchup parameter \( \bar{\pi}_{16} = 1.15 \). Plugging this into eq. (8) for \( t = 17 \) we can solve for \( \psi = 0.0013 \).

Despite the high annual growth in trend TFP in China from 1995 to 2011 in excess of 2.2 percent, absent further differences in demographic patterns, capital to labor ratios (aside from complementary inputs), capital shares, the halfway point to convergence is attained after around 500 years! The length of catch-up would be naturally reduced should we examine the case of conditional convergence.
The world interest rate, $\bar{r}$, is taken as the interest rate along a balanced growth path. Combining eqs. (10) and (11) and assuming that all variables grow at exogenous rate, $g^*$, along the balanced growth path, we have that $\bar{r} = (e^{g^*})^{\gamma}/\beta - 1$. Considering the frontier growth of 0.013, and assuming a subjective discount factor in the utility function of $\beta = 0.96$, this gives us a world interest rate of 5.53 percent, which is slightly lower than the value taken in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) and the long-run average return on capital markets as measured for developing countries of 6.9 percent (Caselli and Feyrer, 2007).

The remaining parameters are taken from standard values in the literature. We assume a positive rate of depreciation of 6 percent, a capital share is assumed to be $\alpha = 0.3$ and an inverse elasticity of substitution parameter, $\gamma$ of 1.\(^{11}\) The parameter governing the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to average debt to GDP ratio, $\phi$, is set to 0.035. This is in line with estimates of the sensitivity of country interest rates to debt to GDP ratios found in the literature (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).\(^{12}\)

The initial share of extrapolation in the forecast is latent. We estimate $\mu_0$ using a simulated method of moments approach, that minimizes the sum of squared distance between our model’s predictions for current account balance over GDP to the empirical counterpart in China taken as trend current account over GDP from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) from 1995 to 2011. This estimation exercise results in an estimated $\hat{\mu}_0 = 0.4865$. The transitional path of $\mu_t$ is displayed in Figure 4.

All parameter values used in the simulation exercise are shown in Table 1.

The simulation begins at time, $t = 0$, for the of productivity catch-up by

\(^{11}\)Our assumption of log utility is not essential for our results. With $\gamma > 1$, the substitution effect is dominated by a negative income effect resulting from falling interest rates, which exacerbates our results. With log utility, we are able to isolate the effects from our expectational channel and a positive wealth effect.

\(^{12}\)A value of $\phi = 0.035$ means for a 1 percentage point increase in the debt to GDP ratio for China, interest rates increase around 3.5 basis points. This is consistent with estimates in the literature of the elasticity of country interest rates with respect to debt to GDP ratios, that long run country interest rates increase 2 to 7 basis points with an increase of one percentage point in debt to GDP ratio (Kinoshita, 2006; Kumar and Baldacci, 2010).
Calibrated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frontier TFP growth rate</td>
<td>$g^*$</td>
<td>1.013, eq. (18), eq. (17) &amp; PWT 8.1 data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial convergence parameter</td>
<td>$\pi_0$</td>
<td>1.00, normalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Final convergence parameter</td>
<td>$\bar{\pi}$</td>
<td>7.95, eq. (21), eq. (17) &amp; PWT 8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speed of tech. convergence</td>
<td>$\psi$</td>
<td>0.0013, from eq. (8) &amp; PWT 8.1</td>
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Parameters from literature

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Parameter</th>
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<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.06, Caselli and Feyrer (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital share of income</td>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.30, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.96, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRA parameter</td>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>1.00, log utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steady state debt/GDP ratio</td>
<td>$\bar{d}$</td>
<td>0, full repayment of debt in long run</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rate sensitivity</td>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.035, Kinoshita (2006); Kumar and Baldacci (2010)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Estimated parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initial share of extrapolation</td>
<td>$\mu_0$</td>
<td>0.4865, estimated via simulated method of moments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final extrapolation share</td>
<td>$\bar{\mu}$</td>
<td>0, rational agents along balanced growth path</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Parameters used for simulation

assuming an initial balanced growth path at a low initial productivity level relative to the frontier. At $t = 1$, convergence begins and total growth in the economy rises from 1.013 to in excess of 1.022. Figure 4 shows the transition of productivity growth and productivity catch-up.

The predictions of the neoclassical open economy–and rational expectations model–are well known. From an intertemporal perspective, forward looking agents in a country experiencing rapid technological convergence should borrow from abroad to increase current consumption in excess of current output. Therefore, absent any capital market frictions, we would expect there to be an immediate deterioration in the trade balance to GDP ratio, which recovers over time as output catches up to consumption.

The model’s predictions for NFA position over GDP, current account and trade balance over GDP, capital stock over GDP and the interest rate are shown in Figure 5. The figure also shows Chinese data for the empirical counterparts to the model.\footnote{The trade balance to GDP ratio is taken from the World Bank’s external balance of goods and services as a percentage of GDP and the NFA over GDP and current account over GDP series calculated from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) EWN Mark II database.} The rational expectations (RE) model’s transition is
shown in the red dotted line and the adaptive learning version in solid blue line. In the RE case, we observe a transition in the trade balance as expected: there is an initial deterioration in the trade balance, which is corrected over time, as the output growth catches up to the optimal consumption path.

Our model with learning during convergence, with the presence of extrapolation in the expectation formation, conveys a very different prediction. Quickly after the start of convergence, large trade surpluses emerge, rising to a maximum of around 5.5 percent of GDP after about 7 years, then falling thereafter, but remaining positive until 14 years after the start of convergence. Thereafter, trade deficits emerge that are persistent and more reflective of the RE predictions.

The RE prediction for external borrowing is also clear in the case of long run excess productivity growth. A growing country should increase international debt levels, borrowing from abroad in order to finance consumption in excess of output. In the learning case, we observe large net foreign asset positions relative to GDP emerging in this economy that reach 50 percent of GDP about

---

Figure 4: Share of Extrapolation, Simulation of Productivity Convergence

Capital stock is taken from the real capital stock from PWT 8.1 and the interest rate is taken as the Chinese deposit rate from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. All series are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter 100. The NFA over GDP is absent valuation effects and taken as the cumulative sum of current account surpluses plus initial NFA position in 1980.
15 years after transition begins.

The predictions of our model are very consistent with the data for China. The simple small open economy model, with parameters estimated directly from observables, is able to replicate the magnitude of observed trade balance over GDP of 4 percent almost exactly. Furthermore, the shape and magnitude NFA over GDP in our model is highly reflective of the emergence of large NFA position that has grown to 30 percent of GDP in China since the mid 1990s.

![Graphs showing NFA over GDP, Current Account over GDP, Trade Balance over GDP, Capital Stock over GDP, and Interest Rate from 1995 to 2015.](image.png)

Figure 5: Quantitative Results, Chinese Data

It is worth noting that the interest rate falls after convergence begins. While this is mechanically due to the formulation of the interest rate being debt elastic, this is consistent with evidence of falling rates of return to capital in China during the 1990s that increase thereafter (Bai, Hsieh, and Qian, 2006).

More generally, the simple learning during convergence model appears largely consistent with the data, particularly compared with the predictions in the case of rational expectations. The simulation results for the main variables of our small open economy model are shown in Figure 15 in Appendix A.
 Evidence Across Countries

China has taken center stage in the discourse of global imbalances and savings glut until now. We are interested in what our model would predict for capital flows and allocation for different countries, with varying degrees of convergence. Furthermore, in order for the expectation channel to explain the allocation puzzle, our model must predict an increase in saving in excess of investment for higher growth in total factor productivity during convergence.

Our results are not isolated to the miraculous growth experience in China used in our simulation, but accommodate the diverse convergence experiences of developing economies. Figure 6 shows the model’s predictions for average current account over GDP for the first 20 years of convergence for varying TFP growth values. Clearly, as the extent of convergence increases, countries with extrapolation in their expectation formation experience greater capital outflows.

Figure 6: Average Current Account over GDP for Varying TFP Growth

Small open developing economies will also have diverse initial extrapolation forecasts. In our quantitative exercise of productivity convergence, initial forecasts are comprised of about one half extrapolative and one half based on the rational expectations forecast, reflected by an initial \( \mu \) share of 0.4865. The
emergence of current account surpluses during do not rely on a high value of this parameter specific to the Chinese case. Therefore, a lower initial $\mu_0$ share can also accommodate countries starting out closer to the balanced growth path and, therefore, that are better able to forecast rationally.

Figure 7: Average Current Account over GDP with Varying Initial Share of Extrapolation

Figure 7 shows the model’s predictions for the average current account to GDP ratio over the first 20 years of convergence. The expectation mechanism in our model does not rely on agents being purely extrapolative, but predicts that current account surpluses may emerge with an initial weight of extrapolation in excess of 0.20, given a high convergence parameter of 7.95. Interestingly, the threshold $\mu_0$ for which surpluses emerge is increasing in the convergence parameter. Given the fast TFP growth in China, this fact allows other developing economies with lower TFP growth to exhibit current account surpluses for much lower shares of extrapolation. Any extent of extrapolation increases the current account surplus predicted by our model relative to the rational expectations benchmark.

How do these model-simulated results reconcile with real development experiences of other countries over the same time period? We conduct our estimation exercise for $\mu_0$ across countries. That is, for a sample of 29 converging,
non-OECD economies with data available from 1995 to 2011, we calculate directly, from our measure of TFP discussed above, $\tilde{\pi}$ and convergence parameter, $\psi$. Using these country-specific convergence parameters, we estimate $\hat{\mu}_0$ using the same simulated method of moments estimation as the baseline simulation introduced above.\footnote{We choose the sample period 1995-2011 for consistency with the Chinese experience, however, the results of this exercise also hold for the sample period 1990-2011.} A detailed discussion of this exercise is presented in Appendix B. The cross-country parameters used in the simulation as well as the estimated initial share of extrapolation for countries in our sample are shown in Table 3 in Appendix B.

Figure 8: Cross Country Evidence, 29 Converging Economies

Figure 8, shows the results of the cross-country simulation exercise. First, panel (a) shows a strong, positive relationship between the initial extrapolation shares and average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011. Countries that are growing faster during convergence, and therefore initially further away from balanced growth, tend to initially rely more on past experience when forming their expectations.

Panel (b) shows the empirical counterpart to Figure 7. Not only are higher initial extrapolation shares associated with higher TFP growth factors, but also greater capital outflows during convergence. Thus our mechanism appears to be able to explain, at least partially, the cross-sectional allocation of capital
across converging economies.

Finally, panel (c) shows the empirical counterpart to Figure 6. Consistent with our extended evidence of the negative relationship between capital inflows and productivity growth from our stylized facts, there is a positive relationship between average current account surpluses over GDP and average TFP growth from 1995 to 2011.

5 Welfare Effects

How important is the excess saving that results during convergence for welfare? We compare the consumption equivalent changes in welfare during productivity convergence with rational expectations versus our model with learning.

The agent’s productivity adjusted utility function is,

$$
\bar{U}_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \left[ \ln(\bar{c}_{t+j}) + \ln(\xi_{t+j}) \right],
$$

where $\bar{c}$ is productivity adjusted consumption.

We define productivity adjusted welfare, $\bar{W}_t$, as

$$
\bar{W}_t = \bar{U}_t - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \ln(\xi_{t+j}) = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j \ln(\bar{c}_{t+j}).
$$

We may write the flow productivity welfare as,

$$
\bar{W}_t = \ln c_t + \beta \bar{W}_{t+1}.
$$

With our assumption of exogenous productivity growth, there is a steady state in levels for productivity adjusted consumption, $\bar{c}$, which, solving eq. (23) for the steady state $\bar{c}$, is

$$
\bar{c} = \exp((1 - \beta)\bar{W}).
$$
After the start of convergence, the value of $W_t$ represents the present discounted utility of productivity adjusted consumption during the whole transition. Therefore, by comparing the productivity adjusted consumption levels for the value of welfare in the rational expectations case and the learning case, we are able to evaluate the impact of varying expectation formation on the welfare of convergence.

With log preferences and same parameters taken in the quantitative exercise in the previous section, the presence of extrapolation in the forecast for the marginal utility of consumption reduces welfare to the equivalent of reducing consumption by about 1.4 percent—reducing consumption per effective unit of labor from 1.19 to 1.17.

6 Two Country World - Global Imbalances

In order to explore global imbalances in the context of our model, we recast the basic economy in terms of a two large economy model.

In the large open economy model, we assume two countries, Country A, a large industrialized country, and Country B, a large developing economy and analyze the interactions of these two economies during convergence to a balanced growth path. Country A is assumed to be at the frontier and Country B converges to the balanced growth path of the frontier. As such, the industrial economy grows at the long run rate of growth of the frontier, $g^*$. The developing economy catches up to the frontier and grows at a rate, $g_t > g^*$, during convergence.

Productivity evolves in Country A,

$$\xi_t^A = e^{g^*} \xi_{t-1}^A$$  \hspace{1cm} (26)

and in Country B,

$$\xi_t^B = e^{g^*} \frac{\pi_t^B}{\pi_{t-1}} \xi_{t-1}^B.$$  \hspace{1cm} (27)

The structure of the model is the same in each countries apart from the fol-
lowing additional assumptions. As before, in the learning case, we assume that agents form their expectations based on a convex combination of extrapolative expectation and rational expectation of the marginal utility of consumption. Learning takes place during catch-up as agents learn to trust the true model of the economy. Therefore, we assume that the expectation formation for Country A at the frontier is purely derived from the true model of the economy and the learning case is present only in Country B.

The treatment of the interest rate is also different in the two-country case. We assume that risk premium applies only to the case of Country B so that the interest rate at which Country A may borrow is $r^A$, whereas Country B’s cost of borrowing is determined by a risk premium related to the level of debt over GDP relative to some average, $\bar{d}$,

$$r^B_t = r^A_t + \phi(e^{\frac{d^B_t - \bar{d}}{\bar{d} - \bar{d}}}) - 1. \quad (28)$$

Our choice of which country pays (receives) and positive (negative) premium does not affect the quantitatively in all calibrations. In addition, each country, $i = A, B$ has the production function,

$$y^i_t = k^i_t (\xi^i_t h^i_t)^{1 - \alpha}. \quad (29)$$

Capital evolves in each economy according to,

$$k^i_{t+1} = i^i_t + (1 - \delta)k^i_t \quad (30)$$

We assume that households maximize the same expected lifetime utility function as eq. (1) subject to a budget constraint,

$$d^i_t = (1 + r^i_{t-1})d^i_{t-1} + c^i_t + i^i_t - y_t. \quad (31)$$

Households in each country $i$ choose $c^i_t, d^i_t, k^i_{t+1}$ subject to eq. (31), taking

\[15\] We have also tested whether rebating the premium back to Chinese households impacts our results. The impact is negligible.
as given the path for $\bar{d}_t^B$ and given initial conditions, $k_0^A > 0$, $k_0^B > 0$ and $d_0^A, d_0^B$. The first order conditions for each country in the adaptive learning case are

\begin{align*}
    c_t^{A-k} &= \lambda_t^A \quad (32) \\
    c_t^{B-k} &= \lambda_t^B \quad (33) \\
    \lambda_t^A &= \beta(1 + r_t^A)E_t(\lambda_{t+1}) \\
    \lambda_t^B &= \beta(1 + r_t^B)[\mu_t \lambda_{t-1}^B + (1 - \mu_t)E_t\lambda_{t+1}^B] \quad (36) \\
    \lambda_t^B &= \beta[\mu_t \lambda_{t-1}^B + (1 - \mu_t)E_t\lambda_{t+1}^B][\alpha k_{t+1}^B - (1 - \delta)]. \quad (37)
\end{align*}

To close the model, we impose a market clearing condition for international debt,

\[ d_t^A = -d_t^B \quad (38) \]

since Country B can only borrow from abroad, the net foreign assets of country B must be equal to the net foreign liabilities of Country A.

As a consequence of the previous equation, the goods world market clearing condition holds:

\[ c_t^A + c_t^B + \iota_t^A + \iota_t^B = y_t^A + y_t^B. \quad (39) \]

Eqs. (32)-(37) together with eqs. (29), (30), (31), (28), (39), (38), (26) and (27) together with $k_0^A, k_0^B > 0$ and $d_0^A, d_0^B = \bar{d}$ describes our two-country world.

7 Global Imbalances

In our two country world, we simulate again a transition for the Chinese economy converging towards the productivity frontier. We perform an identical exercise to that in Section 4. The parameters used in the simulation exercise are listed in Table 2.
The US interest rate is taken from the balanced growth path equation for
the interest rate in US, \( r^{US} = (e^{g^*})^\gamma / \beta - 1 \). With frontier growth of 1.013, and
assuming a subjective discount factor in the utility function, \( \beta = 0.96 \). This
gives us a US interest rate of 5.53 percent, which is consistent with slightly
higher interest rates in the US around the start of our productivity convergence
in 1995, which decrease (along with world interest rates) over time (Caballero
et al., 2008a).

The main results for the US and China for this exercise are shown in Figures
16-17 in Appendix A. Figure 9 shows the main results for the simulation using
Chinese data. The rational expectation model (the dashed red line) predicts
an initial trade deficit over GDP as initially as China transitions to higher
technology, consumption will increase above current output produced with
the given capital stock. As the result of this debt-financed consumption in
excess of output, China would be accumulating debt, generating a negative
net foreign asset position.

If agents are tempted to rely more on their more recent experience in form-
ing expectations of future marginal utility of consumption, a very different
prediction materializes. A trade surplus emerges in the initial stages of con-
vergence. Consumers tend not to trust the ability for future economic growth to
enable them a sustained higher level of consumption and thus under-consume
relative to output. This trade surplus persists for about 15 years before re-

\begin{table}
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Parameters both Countries & \\
\hline
Depreciation Rate & \( \delta \) & 0.06 \\
Capital share of income & \( \alpha \) & 0.30 \\
Frontier growth rate & \( g^* \) & 1.013 \\
Discount factor & \( \beta \) & 0.96 \\
CRRA parameter & \( \gamma \) & 1.00 \\
Steady state debt/GDP ratio & \( \bar{d} \) & 0 \\
\hline
Parameters for China & \\
\hline
Final convergence parameter & \( \bar{\pi} \) & 7.95 \\
Speed of tech. convergence & \( \psi \) & 0.0013 \\
Initial share of extrapolation & \( \mu_0 \) & 0.595 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Parameter Values for two-country simulation}
\end{table}
turning to a deficit, more consistent with rational expectation model.

![Figure 9: Quantitative Results, Chinese Data](image)

During initial convergence, excess savings is channeled abroad to US debt and Chinese net foreign assets over GDP expands quite significantly in excess of 60 percent of GDP after around 15 years of catch-up. Interestingly, the positive NFA position takes quite some time to unwind and Chinese net foreign assets remain positive well into transition.

The two-country model replicates well the size and evolution of NFA positions over GDP observed in the data—both the Chinese and US cases shown in Figures 9 and 10, respectively. Our model offers an important prediction for global imbalances should China continue its transition: as consumers in China learn to trust the true model of technological convergence, the imbalances that have been at center stage of policy and academic debate since their emergence, will tend to disappear. China’s consumers will learn to trust economic growth in the economy and imbalances will tend to diminish as they catch-up to rational expectations and the balanced growth path of frontier economies.

With the exception of capital stock over GDP in the US, our model repli-
cates not only the current account to GDP ratio in China for which $\mu_0$ is estimated, but also other variables. Particularly noteworthy is the ability of the expectational channel to capture both the magnitude and time path of variables describing the Chinese economy during transition.

8 Discussion

In addition to the stylized facts that we aim to explain with our simple model, there are several larger implications from our findings. These are discussed in turn below.

Habit Formation

One might wonder if our results may be replicated using a more standard model feature of habit formation. Until our exercise, this point remained an open research question. In what follows, we include habit formation in the model and show the simulation results. As will become apparent, the inclusion
of habit formation is not powerful enough to explain our stylized facts. In a next step, we include both in the model and allow the data to calibrate both the initial share of extrapolation in the forecast of marginal utility as well as the parameter governing the strength of habits.

We keep the standard model introduced in Section 3, but include habit formation in a non-separable form into the preferences of households.

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t (c_t - \mu_2 c_{t-1})^{1-\gamma} - 1,$$

(40)

where $\mu_2$ governs the strength of habits and will ultimately slow the growth rate of consumption. We can see this from the consumption Euler equation,

$$(c_t - \mu_2 c_{t-1})^{-\gamma} = \beta (1 + r_t) (c_{t+1} - \mu_2 c_t)^{-\gamma}.$$  

(41)

An unconstrained household cares about the marginal utility derived from consumption levels and consumption growth. In a converging economy consumption growth will remain sticky due to the lower marginal utility that households derive from large shifts in consumption.

We test the suitability of the habit formation model to our data using the same estimation exercise as before, only with rational expectations assumption and habit formation. Our estimation exercise results in an intensity of habit parameter of $\hat{\mu}_2 = 0.99$. The results of the quantitative exercise for carrying over the parameters from the initial exercise are shown for the small open economy and two large economy cases in Figures 11 and 18 in Appendix A, respectively.

Figure 11 shows the data for China in the dashed black line and the model’s prediction with habit formation in solid green. What becomes immediately clear is that, despite the high intensity of habits, the model is unable to replicate our stylized facts. While habit formation is important and very successful in inducing persistence at business cycle frequencies, it does not allow model predictions to match systematic imbalances at lower frequencies, in which households rationally anticipate the effects of their consumption habits dur-
Figure 11: Quantitative Results Small Open Economy, Habit formation

ing the growth process. This suggests that learning plays a crucial role in understanding persistent imbalances in the growth and development process. Similar results hold for the two country model with habit formation. These results are shown in Figures 18 in Appendix A.

We also conduct our quantitative analysis including the habit formation with the expectation formation simultaneously, allowing the data to estimate the parameters of initial share of extrapolation and the intensity of habits. The consumption Euler equation in this case looks like,

\[
(\frac{ct - \mu_2 c_{t-1}}{ct} - \gamma) = \beta(1 + r_t)(\mu_t(\frac{ct-1 - \mu_2 c_{t-2}}{ct}) - \gamma) + (1 - \mu_t)(\frac{ct+1 - \mu_2 c_t}{ct}) - \gamma). \tag{42}
\]

We follow the same procedure as before in estimating the parameters $\mu_0$ and $\mu_2$. The results of the joint estimation is $\mu_0 = 0.47$ and $\mu_2 = 0.66$. The results of this exercise are shown below.

Figure 12 shows the results for the simulation with learning and habit formation in green. Data for China is reflected in the dashed black line.

Clearly, the model with both habit formation and our learning channel fits
Figure 12: Quantitative Results Small Open Economy, Learning with habit formation

the data for the Chinese case and is able to replicate our stylized facts quite well.

Factor Income Distribution

Upon receiving news of convergence with rational expectations, even in an economy closed to world capital markets, households should rely on future economic growth to allow them to smooth consumption and therefore save less. Firms will increase investment, anticipating higher future marginal productivity. Therefore, the capital to labor ratio will determine the impact of convergence on the real wage.

In our baseline model we highlight the savings channel of learning. In other words, while investment reflects decision based on the true path for productivity in the economy, and thus gets investment decisions right, households save too much. The capital to labor ratio is higher in an economy converging to the frontier because of the excess savings of households. The implications
for factor incomes should be clear at this point. Real wages under rational expectations would have risen less in China since the 1990’s than our model predicts. Therefore, the way expectations and learning takes place in converging countries has major implications for the distribution of factor income worldwide.

Figure 13 makes this point plain. It shows labor income per efficiency unit and the marginal product of capital for the US and China during the first 50 years after Chinese convergence. Given a common productivity scenario within each country for both model types, in the learning during convergence case, real labor income is larger with learning than with rational expectations. This has implications for the distribution of factor incomes in China during its transition experience.

What is also interesting is that in the converging economy, the differential effect of learning on real labor income seems to be quite large. Figure 14 depicts the real labor income in China and the US for first 50 years of convergence of the Chinese economy. In the Chinese case, real labor income is up to 10 percent higher with learning than under rational expectations. The differences
are instead negligible in the frontier economy.

9 Conclusion

Technological catch-up entails a huge transformation in the converging countries’ standards of living, often long before the country will have converged to a balanced growth path. During this sometimes dramatic transition, it is likely that consumers fail to perfectly predict their and their offspring’s future desire for consumption independently from their recent past experience. We therefore claim that a past of starvation or hardship will make a developing country’s average household wish to save more for the future, simply because they may be incapable of imagining how close to satisfaction they and their children will be. This relative lack of self awareness—certainly conflicting with a textbook view of developing countries borrowing against an optimistic future—may also be justified by the higher complexity of rational expectations on an economy’s transition towards a more stationary environment. As they get closer to a more balanced growth path, they will learn to trust the rational
expectations view of the economy, and they will realize that so much saving is not necessary to guarantee an acceptable future.

This paper offers two simple theoretical and numerical examples of how the excess savings of a country catching up—both to the balanced growth path and to rational expectations modeling—could help to solve the allocation puzzle which characterizes many developing countries, and to contribute to explain important global imbalances, such as China’s massive net foreign asset accumulation.

Quite remarkably in our two country world analysis, despite the US being assumed fully rational, the Chinese gradual catching up to fully rational expectations may even explain the US debt over accumulation. In this sense, our model gives an additional theoretical underpinning to the “savings glut hypothesis” formulated by Bernanke (2005).

It is important to remark that in order to make our point clear, we have operated under highly simplistic assumptions, most notably neglecting the important investment and saving frictions that plague developing countries (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013), as well as the process of financial development and exchange rate liberalization gradually taking place in a country such as China, highlighted by Caballero et al. (2008a,b) and Song et al. (2011, 2014). Hence we view our contribution as complementary to the analyses of these important issues.

References


Caballero, R. J., E. Farhi, and P.-O. Gourinchas (2008a). An equilibrium


Appendix A

Figure 15: SOE Simulation of Productivity Convergence

Appendix B

In Section 8 we test the generalizability of our results to the convergence experience of other economies. Therefore, we conduct a model simulation
Figure 16: United States: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Convergence
Figure 17: China: Two Country Simulation of Productivity Convergence
exercises on a sample of converging economies.

From a total sample of 108 countries from PWT 8.1 with data available from 1995 to 2011, we calculate per employment output and capital stock, using \( \text{emp} \), real GDP \( \text{rgdpo} \) and capital stock \( \text{rkna} \). Human capital is the variable, \( h_c \). All variables are HP filtered with smoothing parameter \( \lambda = 100 \).

With these variables, TFP is calculated using eq. (17). For each country, we calculate Average productivity growth from 1995 to 2011 using eq. (18) and the convergence parameter, \( \pi^i \) from eq.(21). Finally, the speed of technological convergence (and learning) parameter, \( \psi^i \) is found using the solution to eq. (8).

We exclude OECD countries, adding back in Mexico, Turkey and Korea as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). We also include transitional economies of eastern Europe, with data available during our sample period.

We are interested in explaining convergence to a balance growth path from below. That is, we are interested in explaining capital flows for countries beginning from a level below that of the productivity frontier. As such, we exclude countries that are not converging during the period 1995 to 2011: that is with \( \psi < 0 \) or \( \pi < 1 \). This leaves us with a sample of 36 economies.

Finally, we observe several countries that are very distant from the productivity frontier. As our model assumes perfectly functioning capital markets and no official role for government aid, we exclude economies exhibiting convergence parameters that exceed the 90th percentile. These countries are likely not to have access to international capital markets and receive a large portion of GDP in the form of official aid flows. This leaves us with a sample of 29 converging economies for which we carry out our simulation exercise.

We calculate the average capital inflows over the period 1995 to 2011 using data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Capital inflows are taken to be the negative of the current account measure in current US Dollars and GDP in current US Dollars. Both series are smoothed using an HP filter with smoothing parameter, \( \lambda = 100 \).

The resulting data as well as the estimation results for initial extrapolation shares are listed below in Table 3.
Figure 18: Quantitative Results China and the US, model with habit formation

China

United States

Habit Formation, $\mu_2 = 0.96$

Data, China

Habit Formation, $\mu_2 = 0.96$

Data, US
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(\pi)</th>
<th>(\psi)</th>
<th>g (TFP)</th>
<th>Avg. (CA/Y)</th>
<th>(\hat{\mu}_0)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>10.04</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, People’s Republic</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, Hong Kong</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
<td>0.672</td>
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<td>China, Macao</td>
<td>3.82</td>
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<td>0.075</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
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Table 3: Variables for Cross Country Simulation