Batabyal, Amitrajeet (2016): Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis. Forthcoming in: Theoretical Economics Letters (2016)
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_71199.pdf Download (32kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In this note we analyze a simple game model of effort and time investment in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment is to create a better marital relationship. We first specify the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve for the Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we delineate an interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the corresponding best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis |
English Title: | Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Arranged Marriage, Effort, Nash Equilibrium, Static Game, Strategic Complements |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage ; Marital Dissolution ; Family Structure ; Domestic Abuse |
Item ID: | 71199 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Amitrajeet Batabyal |
Date Deposited: | 14 May 2016 09:32 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 09:53 |
References: | References Becker, G.S. 1973. A theory of marriage: Part I, Journal of Political Economy, 81, 813-846. Manser, M., and Brown, M. 1980. Marriage and household decision-making: A bargaining analysis, International Economic Review, 21, 31-44. Peters, H.E. 1986. Marriage and divorce: Informational constraints and private contracting, American Economic Review, 76, 437-454. Cornelius, T.J. 2003. A search model of marriage and divorce, Review of Economic Dynamics, 6, 135-155. Greenberg, J., Luo, X., Oladi, R., and Shitovitz, B. 2002. (Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies, Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 54-70. Levine, R., Sato, S., Hashimoto, T., and Verma, J. 1995. Love and marriage in eleven cultures, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 26, 554-571. Kumar, P., and Dhyani, J. 1996. Marital adjustment: A study of some related factors, Indian Journal of Clinical Psychology, 23, 112-116. Batabyal, A.A. 1998. Aspects of arranged marriages and the theory of Markov decision processes, Theory and Decision, 45, 241-253. Batabyal, A.A. 2003. On decision making in arranged marriages with a stochastic reservation quality level, Applied Mathematics Letters, 16, 933-937. Batabyal, A.A. 2004. Meetings and exposure before an arranged marriage: A probabilistic analysis, Applied Economics Letters, 11, 473-476. Batabyal, A.A., and Beladi, H. 2002. Arranged or love marriage? That is the question, Applied Economics Letters, 9, 893-897. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/71199 |