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# Ordinal multidimensional inequality: theory and application to the 2x2 case\*

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#### Abstract

This paper develops a method for ordinal comparison of multidimensional inequality. In our model, one distribution is more unequal than another when the distributions have common arithmetic median and the first can be obtained from second by one or more elementary shifts in population density that increase inequality. For the benchmark 2x2 case (i.e. the case of two binary outcome variables), we derive an empirical approach to making ordinal inequality comparisons. As an illustration, we apply the model to childhood poverty in Mozambique.

JEL classification: D63, I32, O15

Keywords: Qualitative data, multidimensional first order dominance, multidimensional inequality, ordinal comparison

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#### 1 Introduction

It is widely agreed in the literature that a multi-dimensional view of individual well-being along the lines suggested by Sen (1985, 1993) is needed when poverty, social welfare, and inequality comparisons are made. Alkire (2002), Alkire and Foster (2008), and Alkire and Santos (2010) pursue this point and helped form the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced in its 2010 "Human Development Report". These are welcome innovations in a challenging area of research and policy application.<sup>1</sup>

A persistent methodological challenge in the analysis of (multidimensional) inequality is that outcomes are often categorical and ordinal in nature. In recent years considerable progress has been made in the development of methods based on stochastic dominance theory for comparisons of multidimensional poverty, social welfare and inequality that are robust over broad classes of "utility" indices and aggregation rules across dimensions of well-being (e.g. Duclos et al. 2006, 2007, 2011; Gravel et al. 2009, Gravel and Mukhopadhyay 2010, among others). Decancq (2011) and Meyer and Strulovici (2011) study ordinal independence concepts for comparisons of discrete multidimensional distributions that have identical marginal distributions. However, ordinal inequality concepts for multidimensional distributions (not necessarily having the same marginals) are yet to be developed.

For the one-dimensional case, Allison and Foster (2004) put forward a simple but illuminating and intuitive model for comparisons of inequalities when outcomes are categorical and ordinally ranked. As empirical illustration, they provided both first order dominance comparisons and ordinal inequality comparisons of distributions of self-assessed health across states and regions of the United States. They also showed that the method was both meaningful and operational.<sup>2</sup> When data are ordinal in nature, use of a conventional one-dimensional income inequality measure, for example

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>For general discussion of the case for multidimensional understanding of inequality and poverty, see Grusky and Kanbur (2006) and Sen (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A number of recent contributions have further developed and tested the method, e.g. Apouey (2007), Naga and Yalcin (2008), Madden (2010).

the Gini index, is not meaningful. It requires that outcomes are measured on a cardinal scale that reflects the relative desirability of outcomes.<sup>3</sup> The Allison-Foster framework is a median-based approach in which distribution x is more unequal than distribution y whenever the two distributions have common median and x is more spread out relative to the median than y. As discussed in Allison and Foster (2004), the median, rather than for instance the mean, is chosen as the reference point since the median is the natural ordinally invariant center of distribution.

The primary aim of this paper is to develop a notion of inequality that can deal with ordinal multidimensional categorical data, with emphasis on the case of two binary outcome variables. Our concept can be used in situations where well-being is measured along several dimensions (attributes), and where only ordinal information about the desirability of outcomes is available. This means that along each dimension outcomes can be ranked according to their desirability, but nothing is known/assumed about the relative importance of attributes, complementarity/substitutability relationships, and the relative importance of levels within each attribute.<sup>4</sup> Our model extends the Allison-Foster framework for assessing inequality of onedimensional categorical distributions to a multidimensional one. Roughly speaking, in our model, distribution f is more unequal than distribution g, if the two distributions have a common arithmetic median (i.e. a common ordinally invariant reference point) and f can be obtained from g by certain "inequality increasing elementary transformations" in population mass relative to the reference point. Note that the arithmetic median is the vector of marginal medians (e.g. Hayford 1902, Haldane 1948, Barnett 1976). It has been described as the only reasonable multi-attribute generalization of the median concept when the attributes are different in kinds, e.g. Haldane (1948) and Barnett (1976).

A novel feature of our model is that it provides an operational yet purely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This means that outcomes are measured on a ratio-scale. We refer to Sen (1997) and Lambert (2001) for definitions and discussion of the Gini index.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>For explorations of multidimensional *poverty* measurement in similar frameworks, see for instance Duclos, Sahn, and Younger (2007) and Alkire and Foster (2008).

ordinal approach to making comparisons of inequality between categorical multidimensional distributions. In this respect our model differs from conventional models of multidimensional inequality comparisons. Take for example the well-known concentration index, which is a measure of association between two variables, and a variant of the Gini index.<sup>5</sup> Data on well-being along one dimension (say income) is used to rank individuals, so in this dimension only ordinal information is required. But in the second dimension (say individual health status) data on well-being has to be measured on a cardinal scale.<sup>6</sup> In the literature on multidimensional inequality comparisons, criteria for two-dimensional inequality have been proposed by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and Bourguignon (1989). Gravel and Moyes (2006, 2011) and Gravel, Moyes, and Tarroux (2009) characterize the elementary redistributive operations that correspond to these criteria in a model where one of the attributes is cardinally measurable.<sup>7</sup>

As in the Allison-Foster model, where the (arithmetic) medians differ for two distributions they are incomparable inequality-wise. This tends to limit applicability in cases with many dimensions and levels where it happens less frequently that two given distributions have a shared median. Another obstacle for empirical implementation is that it is in general difficult to check if a given distribution is more unequal than another. Therefore, we focus in this paper on the 2x2 case (where common arithmetic medians tend to be the rule rather than the exception for many sub-populations) and where an easily implementable procedure for detecting inequality relations in practice can be derived.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we motivate, illustrate and provide intuition, while Section 3 contains general definitions and a comparison of our approach to that of Allison and Foster (2004). Sec-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>See for example Wagstaff et al. (1989, 1991) and Kakwani et al. (1997) for studies of socioeconomic health inequality using this method.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>For a critical discussion of the concentration index, see, e.g., Erreygers (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>For surveys of other (cardinal) multidimensional inequality measures, such as the various multidimensional generalizations of the Gini index and the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen approach, we refer to Maasoumi (1999) and Weymark (2006). See also Savaglio (2006) and Trannoy (2006) for broader discussions.

tion 4 addresses the 2x2 case (i.e., the case of two binary outcome variables), and we develop a procedure for detecting inequality relations in practice. In the 2x2 case, the test for inequality consists of comparisons of medians plus verification of a system of inequalities (depending on the location of the median). The test requires straightforward calculations and can be carried out in a spreadsheet. In Section 5 we apply our model to two-dimensional indicators of childhood poverty in Mozambique, and we rely on a bootstrapping method for statistical analysis of sample data. Section 6 concludes.

# 2 An ordinal approach to multidimensional inequality: illustration and intuition

Suppose a person's well-being can be measured using two 0-1 binary variables, so there are four possible outcomes. Let (0,0) denote the outcome where both variables take the value 0, (1,0) the outcome where the first variable takes the value 1 and the second the value 0, and so on. In the figure below arrows point to better outcomes.

$$(0,0) \rightarrow (1,0)$$

$$\downarrow \qquad \downarrow$$

$$(0,1) \rightarrow (1,1)$$

Outcome (0,0) is the worst and (1,1) is the best outcome. We assume it is unknown which of the two intermediate outcomes (0,1) and (1,0) is better. A population is characterized by how people are distributed among the four outcomes. This can be illustrated as follows:

$$f: \begin{array}{c|cc} & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & \frac{2}{16} & \frac{4}{16} \\ 1 & \frac{4}{16} & \frac{6}{16} \end{array}$$

where  $\frac{2}{16}$  of the population has (0,0),  $\frac{4}{16}$  has (0,1) and (1,0) respectively, and  $\frac{6}{16}$  has (1,1). Call this distribution f, and compare with distribution g:

$$g: \begin{array}{c|cccc} & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & \frac{4}{16} & \frac{2}{16} \\ 1 & \frac{2}{16} & \frac{8}{16} \end{array}$$

Here g can be obtained from f by moving mass amounting to  $\frac{1}{8}$  from outcome (0,1) to outcome (0,0) and by moving a similar amount from (1,0) to (1,1). In other words, g can be obtained from f by a correlation-increasing switch (Hamada 1974, Epstein and Tanny 1980, Tchen 1980, Boland and Proschan 1988). As argued by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), Tsui (1999), Atkinson (2003), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Decance (2011) and others, such a correlation-increasing switch intuitively increases inequality. It provides a balanced movement of mass from two intermediate outcomes to the two extremes that does not change the marginal distributions but increases interdependence. If a person experiences a bad outcome in one of the dimensions of g, the conditional probability that the other outcome is also bad is higher for g than for f, so indeed it seems reasonable to say that g is more unequal than f.

For one population distribution to be obtained from another by a correlation-increasing switch, it is required that the difference in mass between the two distributions for the outcome (0,0) is exactly equal to the corresponding difference for the outcome (1,1). Unless the populations (or number of observations) underlying the two distributions are very small this is only going to happen in exceptional cases.

However, let us consider a third distribution h:

$$h: \begin{array}{c|cc} & 0 & 1 \\ \hline 0 & \frac{4}{16} & \frac{2}{16} \\ 1 & \frac{3}{16} & \frac{7}{16} \end{array}$$

Obviously, h cannot be obtained from g or f by a correlation-increasing switch. But f, g and h all have the same arithmetic median in (1,1), i.e. a

median value of 1 in each of the two dimensions.<sup>8</sup> If we regard the arithmetic median as the natural midpoint for the distributions then intuitively h is more unequal than g. Indeed, distribution h can be obtained from g by moving population mass amounting to  $\frac{1}{16}$  from the median outcome (1,1) to (1,0): that is, h can be obtained from g by a median-preserving spread (Allison and Foster, 2004).

Accordingly, we will say that a distribution is ordinally more unequal than another if it is possible to obtain the distribution from the other through a sequence of median-preserving spreads and correlation-increasing switches. In our example, h is ordinally more unequal than f since there exists a distribution g, such that g can be obtained from f through a correlation-increasing switch and h can be obtained from g through a median-preserving spread.

# 3 General formulation

An outcome is a vector  $x = (x_1, ..., x_N)$  described by N attributes,  $x_j$ , j = 1, ..., N, where each attribute is defined on an attribute set  $X_j = \{1, ..., n_j\}$ . The set of outcomes to be considered is the product set  $X = X_1 \times \cdots \times X_N$  of the attribute sets  $X_j$ .

The statement  $x \leq y$  will mean that  $x_j \leq y_j$  for all j, and x < y will mean that  $x_j \leq y_j$  for all j and  $x \neq y$ .

A pseudo-distribution is a real-valued function f on X with  $\sum_{x \in X} f(x) = 1$ .

A pseudo-distribution f is a distribution if  $f(x) \geq 0$  for all  $x \in X$ . Let  $f_j$  denote the marginal distribution on  $X_j$ .

Let  $m_j(f_j)$  denote the median of  $f_j$  on  $X_j$ . The (arithmetic) median of f is the vector  $m(f) = (m_1(f_1), ..., m_N(f_N))$ , of N coordinate-wise medians.

We say that g can be derived from f by a bilateral transfer of mass (from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>As mentioned in the Introduction, the arithmetic median is the vector of marginal medians and the natural multi-attribute generalization of the median concept when the attributes are different in kind (e.g. Haldane, 1948; Barnett 1976). For geometric problems, like that of defining the geographical median for a population distributed on a plane (or a sphere), a number of other median concepts exists, see Small (1990).

x to y of the amount  $\varepsilon$ ), if there are outcomes x,y such that  $g(x)=f(x)-\varepsilon$ ,  $g(y)=f(y)+\varepsilon$  and g(z)=f(z) otherwise. If y< x the bilateral transfer is diminishing, if  $y< x \le z$  or  $z \le x < y$  it is z-directed (i.e. directed away from the outcome z), and if m(f)=m(g) it is median-preserving. A median-preserving and median-directed bilateral transfer is a median-preserving spread.

Distribution g first order dominates distribution f if g can be derived from f by a finite sequence of diminishing bilateral transfers, i.e., if there are distributions  $f = f^1, f^2, ..., f^k = g$ , where  $f^{i+1}$  is obtained from  $f^i$  by a diminishing bilateral transfer i = 1, ..., k - 1.

For a pair of outcomes x, y, let  $\max(x, y)$  denote the outcome where the ith attribute is  $\max\{x_i, y_i\}$  and let  $\min(x, y)$  be the outcome where the ith attribute is  $\min\{x_i, y_i\}$ . We say that g is derived from f by a correlation-increasing switch if we can choose x, y, v, w such that  $v = \min(x, y)$  and  $w = \max(x, y), f(x) - g(x) = f(y) - g(y) > 0, f(v) - g(v) = f(w) - g(w) < 0,$  and g(z) = f(z) otherwise.<sup>10</sup>

In the following, we define an *inequality-increasing elementary transfor*mation to be a correlation-increasing switch or a medial-preserving spread.

If g can be derived from f by a finite sequence of inequality-increasing elementary transformations, we say that g is ordinally more unequal than f, or, as an equivalent statement, f is ordinally more equal than g. Formally, g is ordinally more unequal than f if there are distributions  $f = f^1, f^2, ..., f^k = g$ , where  $f^{i+1}$  is obtained from  $f^i$  by an inequality-increasing elementary transformation, i = 1, ..., k - 1.

Before proceeding, compare these definitions and concepts with the onedimensional case put forward by Allison and Foster (2004). For N=1,  $X=X_1=\{1,...,n_1\}$ ,  $f=f_1$  and  $g=g_1$ , define  $F(k)=\sum_{j=1,...,k}f(j)$ and G in a similar way. Allison and Foster (2004) say that g has a greater spread than f whenever m(g)=m(f) and  $G(k)\geq F(k)$  for all k< m(f)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> First order dominance is also known as the usual (stochastic) order. For general references on stochastic dominance theory, see Müller and Stoyan (2002) and Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>For discussions of this concept, see the literature referenced in Section 2.

and  $G(k) \leq F(k)$  for all  $k \geq m(f)$ . For N = 1, g has greater spread than f precisely if g is ordinally more unequal than f (as defined here). Thus, the present model is a generalization of Allison and Foster's one-dimensional case.

A central question is how to test if one distribution is ordinally more unequal than another (i.e. has greater spread in an ordinally meaningful sense). For two *one-dimensional* distributions f and g, such testing is a straightforward matter of checking whether  $n_1$  inequalities hold.<sup>11</sup> For the multidimensional case, checking if one distribution is more unequal than another is more complicated. We focus in our empirical implementation on the 2x2 case which can be dealt with in a tractable manner.

# 4 Implementation of the 2x2 case

In this section, we assume that an outcome is a vector  $x = (x_1, x_2)$  described by two attributes, where each attribute  $x_j$  is defined on an attribute set  $X_j = \{0, 1\}, j = 1, 2$ . Thus, the outcome set is  $X = \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\}$ . For an outcome  $x = (x_1, x_2)$  we use the notation  $f(x_1, x_2)$  for f(x).

#### 4.1 Finding first order dominance relations

In empirical work, the analyst would often be interested in complementing comparisons of *inequality* with comparisons of *social welfare*. Roughly speaking, f first order dominates g whenever g can be obtained from f by iteratively moving population mass from better to worse outcomes, and is a natural concept for making social welfare comparisons in an ordinal framework.<sup>12</sup>

Let f and g denote distributions on X. It follows by application of a general equivalence result<sup>13</sup> that f first order dominates g if and only if the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>See Allison and Foster (2004) for a detailed discussion of how this test can be nicely visualized.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Recently, Arndt et al. (2011) provide an implementation of the multidimensional first order dominance approach with an application to comparisons of child poverty in Vietnam and Mozambique between groups and over time.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>General characterizations of first order dominance, also known as the usual (stochastic)

following four inequalities are satisfied:  $g(0,0) \ge f(0,0), g(0,0) + g(0,1) \ge f(0,0) + f(0,1), g(0,0) + g(1,0) \ge f(0,0) + f(1,0), \text{ and } g(0,0) + g(1,0) + g(0,1) \ge f(0,0) + f(1,0) + f(0,1).$ 

Alternatively, define  $D(f,g) = \min\{g(0,0) - f(0,0), g(0,0) + g(0,1) - f(0,0) - f(0,1), g(0,0) + g(1,0) - f(0,0) - f(1,0), g(0,0) + g(1,0) + g(0,1) - f(0,0) - f(1,0) - f(0,1)\}$ . Then,  $D(f,g) \ge 0$  if and only if f first order dominates g. The function D is useful for testing statistical significance of first order dominance relations.

#### 4.2 Finding ordinal inequality relations

We proceed next to present necessary and sufficient conditions for f being ordinally more equal than g, as defined in Section 2.

Correlation-increasing switches are median-preserving, so a necessary condition for the statement 'g is ordinally more unequal than f' to be true is that the two distributions have common median. We can therefore rely on considering in turn each of four possible cases of common median, and proceed as described below.

**Proposition 1** (Ordinal inequality check for the 2x2 case) Let  $X = \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}$  and let f and g be two distributions on X. Then g is ordinally more unequal than f if and only if one of the following six cases holds:

- A1. f and g have common median (1,1), and f first order dominates g.
- A2. f and g have common median (0,0), and g first order dominates f.
- B1. f and g have common median (1,1), and  $f(1,0) \ge g(1,0)$ ,  $f(0,1) \ge g(0,1)$ ,  $g(1,1) f(1,1) \le \min\{f(1,0) g(1,0), f(0,1) g(0,1)\}.$
- B2. f and g have common median (0,0), and  $f(1,0) \ge g(1,0)$ ,  $f(0,1) \ge g(0,1)$ ,  $g(0,0) f(0,0) \le \min\{f(1,0) g(1,0), f(0,1) g(0,1)\}.$

order, are due to Lehmann (1955), Strassen (1965), see also Theorem 1 in Kamae, Krenge and O'Brien (1977). For a direct derivation and discussion of the equivalence result, see also Østerdal (2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Suppose that g is derived from f by some correlation-increasing switch. The correlation-increasing switch is non-trivial if  $f \neq g$ . For the case  $X = \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}$ , any non-trivial correlation-increasing switch can be conducted by means of two bilateral transfers (of the same amount of mass) from (0,1) and (1,0) to the extreme outcomes (0,0) and (1,1).

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C1. f and g have common median (1,0), and g(1,0) \le f(1,0), g(0,1) \le f(0,1), g(1,1) \ge f(1,1), g(0,0) \ge f(0,0), f(1,0) - g(1,0) \ge f(0,1) - g(0,1).

C2. f and g have common median (0,1), and g(0,1) \le f(0,1), g(1,0) \le f(1,0), g(1,1) \ge f(1,1), g(0,0) \ge f(0,0), f(0,1) - g(0,1) \ge f(1,0) - g(1,0).
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The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A. Ordinal inequalities of type A1 and A2 are simple and intuitive. They just involve a check of the medians and first order dominance (cf. Section 4.1). The intuitive meaning and derivation of the other four sets of inequalities is more involved and also discussed in the Appendix. The cases B1 and B2 are symmetric and cover situations where the common median is (1,1) or (0,0) respectively but without first order dominance. The cases C1 and C2 are also symmetric and cover situations where the common median is (1,0) or (0,1) respectively.

The following illustrates how a concrete data set can be analyzed in the present framework. For illustrative purposes, we highlight numerical examples of all the basic types of ordinal inequality relations that can occur in the 2x2 case (see Section 5.3).

# 5 Empirical illustration

In Mozambique, investment in schooling, health, and sanitation has increased the level of human capital and indices of human development. While this development has influenced living standards of both adults and children, its impact on children is of particular interest. The acquisition of human capital in early childhood is imperative for future learning, earnings and health status (UNICEF 2006). Large gaps in basic welfare goods during childhood tend to persist, if not widen, the variation in human capital, productivity and living standards throughout adulthood, see Strauss and Thomas (1995), and Orazem and King (2007).

To address the above challenges voucher or cash transfer programmes targeted at disadvantaged children have in recent year become more common.<sup>15</sup> A general problem with such government transfer programmes is to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>The most famous of these initiatives is probably Mexico's PRO-

make sure that transfers are directed at the most disadvantaged children. Efficient targeting of government resources require that administrators can detect the most vulnerable groups. We illustrate how our model can be used for examining inequalities within and between groups of Mozambican children, concentrating on three key characteristics, rural-urban area of residence, gender of head of household, and gender of the child. This results in a total of eight categories of children that we compare with each other.

#### 5.1 Data and summary statistics

We apply the model to the Mozambican Demographics and Health Survey from 2003 (DHS 2003). This is a nationally representative data set that includes detailed information on childhood poverty. From it, we generate three UNICEF indicators (a subset of the so-called Bristol indicators, which indicate severe deprivations in relation to nutrition, water, sanitation, health care, shelter, education, and information). In particular, we illustrate the 2x2 case with indicators of sanitation, health, and education. Sanitation deprivation indicates lack of access to a toilet of any kind, including communal toilets or latrines. Health deprivation is an indicator for pre-school-aged children (under five years) who have never been immunized or who have recently been ill with diarrhea but did not receive medical attention. Education deprivation is an indicator for school-aged children (between seven

GRESA/Oportunidades programme, which aims at increasing children's school attendance among poor families, by awarding grants to mothers conditional on school enrolment. See Parker, Rubalcava and Teruel (2007) for further discussion and examples.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Urban-rural area of residence is likely to have a significant impact on living standards mainly due to the low population density of rural areas, which makes supply of high quality public services more costly. Children living in female headed households are more likely than other children to fall below the poverty line primarily because women's wages and education tend to be lower than men's. Buvinić and Gupta (1997) review literature relating female headship and poverty. However, as Handa (1996) observes, female headed households are also likely to spend a larger share of their income on improving children's human capital. Finally, households may discriminate based on gender of the child. For example in Mozambique, it is not uncommon for especially rural families to invest more in the education of boys as compared to girls (UNICEF, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>For more details and overview from considerations of alternative poverty indicators, we refer to our working paper, Sonne-Schmidt et al. (2008), on which this paper is based.

and eighteen years) who have never been to school.<sup>18</sup> We combine these into two 2x2 indicators of childhood poverty for school-aged and pre-school-aged children respectively. A detailed description of the survey is given in UNICEF (2006).<sup>19</sup>

Table 1 summarizes the 2x2 indicators of childhood poverty. The top panel lists the distribution of sanitation and education (for school-aged children), and the lower panel lists the distribution of sanitation and health (for pre-school-aged children), each by area of residence, gender of head of household, and gender of the child. For example, the first row of the lower panel shows that among pre-school-aged girls in rural, male-headed households 18.8% live with poor sanitation and under poor health conditions, 44.4% have poor sanitation but adequate health, 4.8% have good sanitation but poor health, and the rest, 32%, have both good sanitation and good health conditions.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Exact definitions are given in the working-paper version of this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Lindelow (2006) studies socioeconomic health inequalities in Mozambique using the concentration index. His study is based on income and health data from the 1996-1997 household survey.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>We have weighted these shares by survey sample weights.

Area,												
Gender of household head,	(0,0)	(0,1)	(1,0)	(1,1)	Median	# of obs.						
Gender of child		, , ,	, , ,									
(Sanitation deprivation, Education deprivation)												
Rural, Male, Girl	27.7	34.5	10.3	27.6	(0,1)	3716						
Rural, Male, Boy	16.3	41.3	9.4	33.0	(0,1)	4010						
Rural, Female, Girl	21.6	38.4	8.7	31.2	(0,1)	1223						
Rural, Female, Boy	19.2	41.0	8.1	31.7	(0,1)	1348						
Urban, Male, Girl	6.0	9.9	7.2	76.9	(1,1)	2858						
Urban, Male, Boy	5.0	13.1	5.3	76.6	(1,1)	2912						
Urban, Female, Girl	8.2	9.0	5.3	77.5	(1,1)	1140						
Urban, Female, Boy	7.2	11.2	4.2	77.4	(1,1)	1025						
(Sanitation deprivation, Health deprivation)												
Rural, Male, Girl	18.8	44.4	4.8	32.0	(0,1)	2262						
Rural, Male, Boy	19.2	44.8	4.7	31.3	(0,1)	2288						
Rural, Female, Girl	13.9	47.9	4.7	33.6	(0,1)	580						
Rural, Female, Boy	15.7	44.9	3.7	35.6	(0,1)	598						
Urban, Male, Girl	2.6	18.8	7.6	71.0	(1,1)	1215						
Urban, Male, Boy	2.9	18.2	8.1	70.9	(1,1)	1156						
Urban, Female, Girl	2.0	19.5	3.2	75.3	(1,1)	382						
Urban, Female, Boy	3.7	16.7	8.5	71.1	(1,1)	341						

*Note:* The first element, i, in vector (i,j) indicates sanitation deprivation. The second element, j, indicates education deprivation in the top panel and health deprivation in the bottom panel. i,j=0 is deprivation, i,j=1 is no deprivation.

Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.

Table 1: Percentages of children's two-dimensional living standards.

#### 5.2 Results from pairwise comparisons

Table 2 summarizes first order dominance and ordinal inequality relations between all distributions (within each panel) in Table 1. The number 1 in an entry indicates that the row distribution first order dominates the column distribution (while 0 indicates no first order dominance). Capital letters indicate ordinal inequality relations of the type specified in Proposition 1. Note that first order dominance might be compatible with ordinal inequality relations (of the type A), yet these cases do not occur in the data shown, while ordinal inequality relations of type B and C are present. We highlight these cases below.

An illustration of ordinal inequality of type B can be seen from the upper panel of Table 1. Type B inequalities are those with extreme common medians, in (0,0) or (1,1), but where none of the distributions first order dominates the other. For example, compare the distribution for urban boys in female-headed households (last row) with the distribution for urban boys in male-headed households (third to last row). None is first order dominating the other, but the latter is more equal. Alternatively, starting with the distribution for urban boys in male-headed households (third to last row), use a correlation-increasing switch of 1.1 and then a median-preserving spread of 0.3 and 0.8 from (1,1) and (0,1) to (0,0). This results in the distribution for urban boys in female-headed households (last row).<sup>21</sup>

An illustration of type C ordinal inequality can be seen from the lower panel of Table 1. Type C inequalities are those where the median is non-extreme and where there is no first order dominance. Compare the distribution for girls in rural female-headed households (third row) to the distribution of boys in similar households (fourth row). Here, the girls are more equally distributed than the boys. To see this, starting with the distribution for the girls (third row), apply first a correlation-increasing transfer of 0.9 and then a median-preserving spread of 0.9 and 1.1 from (0,1) to (0,0) and (1,1), which gives the distribution for boys (fourth row).<sup>22</sup> Note that because of rounding errors the numbers do not match exactly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Alternatively, we can check the three inequalities in B1 of Proposition 1, which here gives  $13.1 \ge 11.2$ ,  $5.3 \ge 4.2$  and  $77.4 - 76.6 \le \min\{13.1 - 11.2; 5.3 - 4.2\}$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Checking the five inequalities in C2 of Proposition 1 we get:  $44.9 \le 47.9$ ,  $3.7 \le 4.7$ ,  $35.6 \ge 33.6$ ,  $15.7 \ge 13.9$ , and  $4.7 - 3.7 \le \min\{35.6 - 33.6; 15.7 - 13.9\}$ .

(Sanitation deprivation, Education deprivation)											
Area,		Rural,	Rural,	Rural,	Rural,	Urban,	Urban,	Urban,	Urban,		
Gender of household head,		Male,	Male,	Female,	Female,	Male,	Male,	Female,	Female,		
Gender of child	Median	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy		
Rural, Male, Girl	(0,1)		0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Male, Boy	(0,1)	1*		1*	1*	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Female, Girl	(0,1)	1*	0		0	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Female, Boy	(0,1)	1*	0	0		0	0	0	0		
Urban, Male, Girl	(1,1)	1*	1*	1*	1*		0	0B*	0		
Urban, Male, Boy	(1,1)	1*	1*	1*	1*	0		0	0B*		
Urban, Female, Girl	(1,1)	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0		0		
Urban, Female, Boy	(1,1)	1*	1*	1*	1*	0	0	0			
(Sanitation deprivation, Health deprivation)											
Rural, Male, Girl	(0,1)		1	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Male, Boy	(0,1)	0		0	0	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Female, Girl	(0,1)	1	1*		0C*	0	0	0	0		
Rural, Female, Boy	(0,1)	1*	1*	0		0	0	0	0		

Note: The number 1 indicates that the row distribution first order dominates the column distribution. The letters B and C indicate that the row distribution is ordinally more equal of type B or C respectively cf. Proposition 1. We conducted tests of significance for first order dominance and ordinal inequality by using the permutation bootstrap method. \* indicates a significant test statistic at the 5% level.

0

0

0

0

0

Source: Authors' calculations from DHS 2003.

Urban, Male, Girl

Urban, Male, Boy

Urban, Female, Girl

Urban, Female, Boy

Table 2: First order dominance and ordinal inequality relations among groups of children

First order dominance appears relatively frequent and systematic. For example, urban households tend to first order dominate rural households. For the poverty indicators analyzed here, two distributions frequently have shared median, but they are much less frequently in an ordinal inequality relation. Moreover, as noted above, inequality relations of type A do not appear in the data with the poverty indicators analyzed here.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Inequality relations of type A occured however relatively frequently when doing a similar analysis with other poverty indicators cf. Sonne-Schmidt et al. (2008).

#### 5.3 Bootstrapping

Data is a sample of a larger population, so testing whether two sample groups are genuinely distinct, accounting for sample uncertainty, is of key interest. We test a null-hypothesis of equality of two distributions with a bootstrap procedure. In the case of first order dominance, the test statistic is the minimum function D defined in Section 4.1. Following common convention, the null-distribution is generated by merging the observations from the two groups. From the null-distribution, two new samples are generated (drawing randomly with replacement) corresponding in size to the original two samples, and the test statistic D is calculated. Repeating this procedure 1000 times, we obtain a distribution over the test statistic consistent with the null-hypothesis, which we then compare with the test statistic of the original sample.<sup>24</sup> Asterisks in Table 2 indicate significance at the five percent level, meaning that the observed value of D is larger than the 95th percentile of its bootstrapped distribution (indicating that the two groups are genuinely distinct).<sup>25</sup> In the case of ordinal inequality (without the presence of first order dominance) the bootstrapped test statistic is the minimum function over the appropriate differences induced by the inequalities as specified in type A, B, or C in Proposition 1.

An alternative null-hypothesis, discussed by Howes (1993), Kaur et al. (1994) and Dardanoni and Forcina (1999) and more recently by Davidson and Duclos (2006) in the context of one-dimensional dominance of first and higher order, is non-dominance (including exact equality of distributions) against the alternative of strict dominance. This means that first order dominance is rejected unless there is strong evidence in its favor. A similar kind of test could be envisioned for the ordinal inequality relations. In order to perform such tests in a multidimensional framework, we would have to

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$ We refer to Efron and Tibshirani (1993, ch. 16) for a general discussion of the bootstrap approach to hypothesis testing.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Robertson, Wright and Dykstra (1988) and Bhattacharya and Dykstra (1994) develop a test for equality of multivariate distributions against an alternative of first order dominance. We do not discuss this approach here. For continuous-variable models, methods for testing multidimensional first and higher order dominance have been developed by Crawford (2005), Duclos et al. (2006), McCaig and Yatchew (2007) and Anderson (2008).

determine a 'least favorable case'; that is, a null-distribution consistent with the null-hypothesis that makes the observed distributions as plausible as possible. We conjecture that the 'least favorable case' in this situation is, in fact, a case of equal distributions, and that it is valid to interpret our bootstrap procedure along this line of reasoning. A detailed exploration of these subtle econometric issues is beyond the scope of the present paper.

### 6 Conclusion

In this paper we have developed an ordinal concept of multi-dimensional inequality, building on the Allison and Foster (2004) framework for comparing inequalities with one-dimensional categorical data. To illustrate how our model can be applied in the 2x2 case we compared poverty distributions of school- and pre-school-aged children from the DHS data in Mozambique. Such data is available for a large number of countries across the developing world, meaning that potentially interesting comparisons are possible.

For these indicators, we find that first order dominance occur relatively frequently while ordinal multidimensional inequality relations are less frequent (see Table 2 for examples). Whether this is because ordinal inequality relations generally are "rare" empirically or whether it is due to the chosen indicators of child poverty cannot be established with the data in hand. However, the example shows that while instances of ordinal multidimensional inequality relations may be relatively uncommon, they do exist empirically. Moreover, our indicators of sanition, health and education by area of residence, gender of the household health, and gender of the child provide insights into how targeting of for example cash transfer programmes presently under consideration by the Mozambiqian government should be pursued.

In sum, we have shown that it is possible to develop a meaningful and intuitive concept of ordinal multidimensional inequality. We have also demonstrated how it can be applied in the 2x2 case. Future research will be required to explore how to deal with variations of the concept and more general cases.

# A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1

We will make use of the following lemma.

**Lemma A** Suppose that g is obtained from f by a sequence of m(f)-directed bilateral transfers and m(f) = m(g). Then each of these bilateral transfers is median-preserving (i.e. is a median-preserving spread).

Proof of Lemma A: Define the sets  $L(m(f)) = \{x \in X | x \leq m(f)\}$  and  $U(m(f)) = \{x \in X | m(f) \leq x\}$ . Then g is obtained from f by a sequence of bilateral transfers of the following four kinds: from m(f) to outcomes in the sets  $L(m(f)) \setminus \{m(f)\}$  and  $U(m(f)) \setminus \{m(f)\}$  respectively, and m(f)-directed bilateral transfers within the sets  $L(m(f)) \setminus \{m(f)\}$  and  $U(m(f)) \setminus \{m(f)\}$  respectively.

Order the bilateral transfers in the sequence with the numbers 1, 2, ... etc., such that we first have all the m(f)-directed bilateral transfers within L(m(f)) and second all the m(f)-directed bilateral transfers within U(m(f)).

Suppose that the bilateral transfers 1, 2, ..., h-1 are median-preserving, but bilateral transfer h fails to be median-preserving. Let  $\overline{m}$  denote the new median following bilateral transfer h.

If bilateral transfer h is within L(m(f)) we have  $\overline{m} < m(f)$ , since each bilateral transfers in L(m(f)) is diminishing. In particular, for the median  $\widetilde{m}$  resulting after the last bilateral transfer within L(m(f)) we have  $\widetilde{m} \leq \overline{m} < m(f)$ . However, the remaining bilateral transfers cannot move the median back to m(f) since they are all within U(m(f)), contradicting m(f) = m(g).

If bilateral transfer h is within U(m(f)), for the new median  $\overline{m}$  we have  $m(f) < \overline{m}$ , since each bilateral transfer in U(m(f)) is the reverse of a diminishing transfer (i.e. moving mass from worse to better outcomes). Hence, for the median  $\widetilde{m}$  resulting after the last bilateral transfer within U(m(f)) we have  $m(f) < \overline{m} \le \widetilde{m}$ , contradicting m(f) = m(g).

We are now ready to prove Proposition 1. As mentioned prior to the statement of Proposition 1, a shared median is a necessary condition for one distribution to be ordinally more unequal than another. We proceed by showing that for each case of common median, the relevant sets of inequalities stated in Proposition 1 are indeed necessary and sufficient for an ordinal inequality relation to hold. We focus on the case m(f) = m(g) = (1,1) (Case 1) and the case m(f) = m(g) = (1,0) (Case 2). The case m(f) = m(g) = (0,0) is symmetric to Case 1 and the case m(f) = m(g) = (0,1) is symmetric to Case 2.

Case 1: 
$$m(f) = m(g) = (1, 1)$$
.

For the inequalities in case A in Proposition 1 recall that f first order dominates g if and only if it is possible to go from f to g by a finite sequence of diminishing bilateral transfers. By Lemma A, each such bilateral transfer is a median-preserving spread and thereby an inequality-increasing elementary transfer. Thus, case A implies that g is ordinally more unequal than f, and, conversely, if g is ordinally more unequal than f and we can go from f to g by a finite sequence of diminishing bilateral transfers (using no correlation-increasing switches) case A is satisfied.

To provide some intuition for the inequalities in case B1, suppose in the following that f does not first order dominate g, and g does not first order dominate f. Then, it is impossible to go from f to g (or vice versa) via a finite sequence of inequality-increasing elementary transformations without making use of at least one correlation-increasing switch. This implies that, if g is ordinally more unequal than f, we have f(1,0) > g(1,0) and f(0,1) > g(0,1), since if either  $f(1,0) - g(1,0) \le 0$  or  $f(1,0) - g(1,0) \le 0$  it would be possible to go from f to g without any correlation-increasing switches. However, these two conditions are not sufficient for g being ordinally more unequal than f. Roughly speaking, we need a condition ensuring that all mass transferred to (1,1) in the process of moving from f to g can be transferred from the intermediate outcomes (0,1) or (1,0) in connection with a correlation-increasing switch.

Now, we claim that if g is ordinally more unequal than f and if g is not first order dominated by f then it is possible to obtain g from f from a sequence of inequality-increasing elementary transformations that involves only a single correlation-increasing switch and no bilateral transfers from

the outcome (1,1) to other outcomes.

We first verify the last part of the claim, i.e. we show that no bilateral transfers from (1,1) to other outcomes are required. For this, consider a given sequence of inequality-increasing switches (leading from f to g) that contains a bilateral transfer of the amount  $\beta$  from (1,1) to another outcome z. We assume, without loss of generality, that z = (0,1). (If z = (0,0) then we can split the bilateral transfer up into two nested bilateral transfers, one from (1,1) to (0,1) and one from (0,1) to (0,0); the case z = (1,0) is symmetric to the one treated here and hence can be omitted).

As noted earlier, we know that the sequence contains at least one correlation-increasing switch (since if otherwise f would first order dominate g). Now, pick an arbitrary correlation-increasing switch from the sequence, and let  $\alpha$  denote the amount of mass moved from each of the outcomes (0,1) and (1,0) to (0,0) and (1,1) respectively. We can then decompose this correlation-increasing switch into two bilateral transfers: a bilateral transfer of the amount  $\alpha$  from (0,1) to (1,1) and a bilateral transfer of the amount  $\alpha$  from (1,0) to (0,0). We consider two cases: (a)  $\alpha \geq \beta$ , and (b)  $\alpha < \beta$ .

- (a) Replace the bilateral transfer from (1,1) to (0,1) of the amount  $\beta$  with a bilateral transfer of the amount  $\beta$  from (1,0) to (0,0), and reduce the amount of mass transferred between each pair of outcomes from  $\alpha$  to  $\alpha \beta$ . Note that the amount of mass eventually allocated to each outcome remains the same.
- (b) Replace the correlation-increasing switch (which moves the amount  $\alpha$  between each pair of outcomes) with a bilateral transfer of the amount  $\alpha$  from (1,0) to (0,0), and reduce the size of the bilateral transfer from (1,1) to (0,1) to  $\beta \alpha$ . Again, note that the amount of mass eventually allocated to each outcome remains the same.

Proceeding in this way until no bilateral transfers from (1,1) to other outcomes remain, we can eliminate all bilateral transfers from (1,1) to other outcomes. Note that we have not shown (and it is not needed for our argument) that after each elimination of some bilateral transfer from (1,1) to another outcome, the resulting sequence of pseudo-distributions consists entirely of distributions. It is sufficient to observe that when all bilateral

transfers from (1,1) to other outcomes have been eliminated, what remains is a sequence of correlation-increasing switches and/or bilateral transfers from (0,1) and/or (1,0) to (0,0). For this sequence, it is clear that each intermediate pseudo-distribution is a distribution. Moreover, the transformations (i.e. correlation-increasing switches and/or bilateral transfers from (0,1) to (0,0) and from (1,0) to (0,0)) can be arranged in an arbitrary order and we can obtain g from f by a single operation of each type. This proves our claim.

From these observations we get the following: Suppose that f does not first order dominate g. Then g is ordinally more unequal than f if and only if the following 3 inequalities are satisfied:  $f(1,0) - g(1,0) \ge 0, f(0,1) - g(1,0) \ge 0$  $g(0,1) \ge 0$  and  $g(1,1) - f(1,1) \le \min\{f(1,0) - g(1,0), f(0,1) - g(0,1)\}.$ Note that in conjunction with the assumption that f does not first order dominate q, the 3 inequalities imply that g(0,0) > f(0,0) (i.e. with strict inequality). From this observation it follows that the 3 inequalities are both necessary and sufficient: The three inequalities are necessary, since if one of them were violated, clearly we could not get g from f by a single correlationincreasing switch and/or bilateral transfers from (0,1) and/or (1,0) to (0,0). To verify that the conditions are sufficient, we give the following constructive argument: Suppose that the conditions are satisfied. Let  $\alpha = g(1,1)$  – f(1,1). Given f, let  $\hat{f}$  be the distribution obtained from a correlationincreasing switch of the amount  $\alpha$  (where  $\alpha$  is transferred from (0,1) to (0,0) and  $\alpha$  is transferred from (1,0) to (1,1)). Thus,  $\widehat{f}(1,1)=g(1,1)$ ,  $\widehat{f}(0,1) \geq g(0,1), \widehat{f}(1,0) \geq g(1,0)$ . This means that g can be obtained from  $\widehat{f}$  by diminishing bilateral transfers from (0,1) and/or (0,1) to (0,0), and we are done.

Case 2: m(f) = m(g) = (1,0).

Note that if m(f) = m(g) = (1,0) and if g is ordinally more unequal than f, then g can be obtained from f by a finite number of correlation-increasing switches (from (1,0) and (0,1) to (1,1) and (0,0)) and bilateral transfers from (1,0) to the extreme outcomes (1,1) and (0,0). Regardless of how these correlation-increasing switches and bilateral transfers are or-

dered, each intermediate pseudo-distribution is a distribution. Thus, a single correlation-increasing switch is enough (since all correlation-increasing switches can be amalgamated into a single correlation-increasing switch and still each intermediate pseudo-distribution is a distribution). In particular, we can obtain g from f in three steps, ordered as follows: (1) A correlation-increasing switch, (2) A bilateral transfer from (1,0) to (0,0), and (3) A bilateral transfer from (1,0) to (1,1).

From these observations, we can show that g is ordinally more unequal than f if and only if the 5 inequalities of case C1 hold:  $g(1,0) \leq f(1,0)$ ,  $g(0,1) \leq f(0,1)$ ,  $g(1,1) \geq f(1,1)$ ,  $g(0,0) \geq f(0,0)$ , and  $f(1,0) - g(1,0) \geq f(0,1) - g(0,1)$ .

Necessity of the first four inequalities is straightforward. The fifth inequality  $f(1,0)-g(1,0)\geq f(0,1)-g(0,1)$  must hold since the only way that mass can be transferred away from (0,1) is by means of a correlation-increasing switch and thus at least the same amount is going to be transferred away from (1,0). For sufficiency, we give the following constructive argument: Suppose that the 5 inequalities hold. Let  $\lambda=f(0,1)-g(0,1)$ . Define the distribution  $\hat{f}$  by  $\hat{f}(0,1)=f(0,1)-\lambda$ ,  $\hat{f}(1,0)=f(1,0)-\lambda$ ,  $\hat{f}(0,0)=f(0,0)+\lambda$ , and  $\hat{f}(1,1)=f(1,1)+\lambda$ . Thus,  $\hat{f}$  is obtained from f by a correlation-increasing switch. Then  $\hat{f}(0,1)=g(0,1)$ ,  $\hat{f}(0,0)\geq g(0,0)$ , and  $\hat{f}(1,0)\geq g(1,0)$ . Thus, g can be obtained from  $\hat{f}$  by bilateral transfers from (1,0) to (0,0) and/or (1,1) and we are done.

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