Sovereign Debt Restructuring After Argentina

Porzecanski, Arturo C. (2016): Sovereign Debt Restructuring After Argentina.

Abstract

Sovereign debt restructurings may experience marginal changes as a result of recent modifications in contractual terms being incorporated into new bond issues, but for the most part they will likely resemble what has generally worked so well in recent decades to the satisfaction of most governments and private creditors. The statutory reforms that have been proposed to date are highly unlikely to gain traction for a variety of reasons, including the prospect that they would have been stymied when confronted with a rogue sovereign debtor such as Argentina.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Argentina, default, debt, sovereign, restructuring, statutory; contractual; collective action; pari passu; finance
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions; F - International Economics > F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization > F65 - Finance; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior; N - Economic History > N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions > N26 - Latin America ; Caribbean

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