Saglam, Ismail
(2016):
*An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise.*

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## Abstract

In this paper, we offer for two-person games an alternative characterization of Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise (IKSNC), which was introduced and first characterized by Saglam (2016) for $n$-person games. We present an axiom called Gamma-Decomposability, satisfied by any solution that is decomposable with respect to a given reference solution Gamma. We then show that the IKSNC solution is uniquely characterized by Gamma-Decomposability whenever Gamma satisfies the standard axioms of Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations and Symmetry, along with three additional axioms, namely Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions, Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise |

English Title: | An Alternative Characterization for Iterated Kalai-Smorodinsky-Nash Compromise |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Cooperative bargaining; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; Nash solution |

Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory |

Item ID: | 73564 |

Depositing User: | Ismail Saglam |

Date Deposited: | 07 Sep 2016 14:43 |

Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 12:53 |

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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/73564 |