

MPRA

Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Terrorism and Capital Flight from Africa

Uchenna, Efobi and Asongu, Simplice

January 2016

Online at <https://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/74651/>

MPRA Paper No. 74651, posted 19 Oct 2016 03:06 UTC

A G D I Working Paper

WP/16/022

Terrorism and Capital Flight from Africa

Forthcoming: International Economics

Uchenna Efobi

Covenant University, Km 10, Idiroko Road,
Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria.

E-mail: uche.efobi@covenantuniversity.edu.ng

Simplice A. Asongu

African Governance and Development Institute,
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon.

E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com /asongus@afridev.org

AGDI Working Paper

Research Department

Terrorism and Capital Flight from Africa

Uchenna Efobi & Simplicie A. Asongu

January 2016

Abstract

We assess the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel of 29 African countries for which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions (QR). The following findings are established. First, for GMM, domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight. Second, for QR, with the exception of transnational terrorism for which a positive effect on capital flight is apparent in the 0.90th quintile, terrorism dynamics affect capital flight in low quintiles of the capital flight distribution. In other words, terrorism increases capital flight for the most part when initial levels of capital flight are low. Policy implications are discussed.

JEL Classification: C50; D74 ; F23; N40 ; O55

Keywords: Africa; Capital flight; Foreign capital; Terrorism; Violence.

Acknowledgement


The authors are highly indebted to Bandyopadhyay Subhayu (Federal Reserve Bank, St. Louis; Sandler Todd (University of Texas, Dallas) and Javed Younas (American University of Sharjah) for their benevolence in sharing their dataset. Also the constructive comments from the editor and referees are highly appreciated.

1. Introduction

The November 2015 Radison Blu Hotel attack in Mali and Sinai Russian plane crash in Egypt clearly show that the threat of terrorism is posing a development challenge to Africa. Other notable examples include: (i) the 2015 Garissa University and 2013 Westgate shopping mall killings in Kenya by the Somali Al-Shabab; (ii) wave of attacks from Islamic fundamentalists targeting the Bardo National Museum and Sousse respectively in March and June 2015 and (iii) Boko Haram of Nigeria extending its sphere of terrorism to neighbouring countries like Chad, Cameroon and Niger.

Terrorism¹ is the new face of violence with economic consequences. In the context of a *paradoxical* African setting, where countries in this region are in need of scarce economic resources to foster their development process, and also record almost the highest volume of global capital flight among developing countries, we take interest in understanding its linkage to terrorism. As a foundational definition; capital flight is the outflow of economic resources from respective countries (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015; Asongu, 2014a). It includes the outflow of short-term capital as a response to some factors that are peculiar with the respective country, and which may affect the economic value of such capital. Precisely, there has been a rising trend in the volume of capital flight from African countries. Cumulatively, the volume of capital flight has remained higher than the foreign direct investment flow and the official development assistance (see Figure 1), which are the main sources of external financing for Africa's development trajectory.

Figure 1: Capital Flight in Comparison with other External Financial Flow




Note: The values are in Billion US\$

¹Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006).

Source: Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a)

In this paper, we considered the rising rate of terrorism in some African countries and to what extent this trend explains capital flight from Africa. The scatter plot in Figure 2 provides a non-technical hint on the possibility of the explanatory power of terrorism on capital movement from Africa. As a hint, an increase in terrorism activities perpetrated by indigenes of a country (domestic terrorism) and those by foreigners (transnational terrorism) will result in a positive slope of capital flight. Thus, implying that there will likely be a positive effect of terrorism on capital flight in Africa, *ceteris paribus*. However, these predictions will require empirical validation for credence.

Figure 2: Cross Country Correlation between Terrorism and Capital Flight, Average



Source: Authors' Computations

Concisely, we ask two important questions: first, how does the rising rate of terrorism in Africa affect capital flight? Second, how different is this magnitude when comparing terrorism initiated by the nationals of the respective countries (domestic terrorism) and those initiated across borders or by nationals of other countries (transnational terrorism)? The answer to the first question has important implications to provide relevant empirical evidence on the cost of the rising terrorism in *resource starved* Africa. Most importantly, by providing relevant statistics on the magnitude of influence of terrorism on capital flight, the reality of the cost of terrorism can be better seen and may spur policy actions. Most countries in Africa are taking steps towards attracting and retaining capital, although part of the effort is to improve security and reduce the risk of investment within the country, however, a new generation of policy may be motivated if the economic value (in terms of capital flight) of a

terrorist action is clearly known. The answer to the second question may suggest the relative impact of the two forms of terrorism, and afterwards the direction of policy efforts can be exploited towards tackling the one with higher economic impact. This is important considering that there is a rising campaign for development partners to increase aid flow to African countries (as well as other development countries) in order to augment the resources needed for counter-terrorism efforts (see Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014; Efobi et al, 2015; Asongu et al, 2015).

Empirical studies on the drivers of capital flight can be broadly categorised into two groups: the domestic and external determinants. The domestic drivers include those conditions that are prevalent within the country, which explains the reasons for capital flight. They include the structural features of the economy (in terms of the country being natural resource dependence or otherwise), macroeconomic environment (e.g. economic growth and inflation), risk and returns on investment (e.g. currency depreciation, financial instability, domestic tax rate), the governance structure of the country (such as corruption), and other forms of political factors. Focusing on the political factors, authors have identified the political environment of countries as having a significant influence on capital flight (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015). Political instability such as war or civil unrest raises the insurance premium on investment, as well as the risk of loss or damages to assets. This causes investment capitals to be taken out of the country to countries where the risks of losing such investment are lower. On the other hand, the external determinant of capital flight is the rising global integration among countries, which makes it easy for capital flight between (or among) countries. More so, it has been documented that foreign financial institutions encourage capital flight by having lax regulations with regards to movement of corrupt and embezzled fund and not having checks on fund lodged into their financial systems (Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015).

Terrorism involves the use of violence by individuals or groups against non-combatants in order to foster political or social objectives, and with the intimidation of a larger audience beyond the immediate victims (Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014). Unlike political instability, terrorists are involved in pressuring besieged government to concede to their demands by targeting civilians. Since the occurrences of terrorist actions are non-deterministic and may not be accurately predicted; hence, it raises the risk and cost of retaining capital in the venue country. In most cases, terrorist target central economic locations; with poor anti-terrorism efforts by the government, target countries will witness an

increasing outflow of capital due to heightened uncertainties/capital security. On this note, it is important to also consider the distinct impact of the two main forms of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational). This is because there are rising incidences of African countries experiencing spill-over from terrorist activities in neighbouring countries. The Somali's Al-Shabaab activities in Kenya and some other East African countries; and the Nigeria's Boko Haram group perpetrating violence in neighbouring country Cameroon, Niger and Chad, are cases in point.

The contrasting effects of domestic and transnational terrorism have spurred research interest that is targeted at understanding its impact on capital movement. The earliest work to carry on this enquiry, especially for developing countries, are Bandyopadhyay and Younas (2014), and Bandyopadhyay et al, (2014, 2015). The authors studied the effect of both domestic and transnational terrorism on movement of foreign investments; they found similar negative impact but at different magnitudes. In the spirit of the debate, we provide empirical work on the linkage between terrorism (and its components) and capital flight using an isolated sample of 29 African countries. This sample is unique because of the controversial regimes of capital outflow it records. Interested readers can see Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2015) for a more detailed statistics of the trend of capital flight from Africa. However, we make attempt to highlight some: as at the period 1970-90, capital flight from Africa was about 40 percent of the entire private wealth, which was about four times that of Latin America despite the higher private capital per worker of the later (collier et al, 2001). Also, in 2010, unrecorded capital flight from Africa represents 39.5 percent of GDP, compared to 12 percent in the East and South Asia (Henry, 2012). The implication of this statistics are: first, the region faces a lot of capital constraint compared to other regions and a capital flight of this magnitude will imply that the available resources required for development will be further depleted. No wonder the huge resource gap recorded in the region (see Asiedu, 2006). Second, as a result of this impoverishment, the damaging effect on human development structures will be further visible as funds needed for social services such as education and health care, among others, will be lacking (see Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011a). As a result of these, urgent attention is needed to understand other possible and emerging causes of capital flight as a further step towards resolving it.

This paper is connected to the literature on the determinants of capital flight on one hand, and the economic consequences of the rising rate of global terrorism, on the other hand. The first strand of literature have not considered the dynamic influence of terrorism on capital

flight. The second strand of literature is becoming popular following the rising trend of terrorist attacks around the world. More importantly, attention is being drawn to understand the consequences as this will help to shape global policy on acts of terrorism. The contributors to this literature, and their focus has been: terrorism and its consequences on foreign investment (Bandyopadhyay and Younas, 2014; Bandyopadhyay et al, 2014, 2015; Asongu et al, 2015; Efobi et al, 2015); terrorism and the labour force (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014a); terrorism and economic development (Piazza, 2006); terrorism and the productivity of certain sectors in the country (Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Berrebi and Ostwald, 2013); terrorism and fertility rate (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2014b).

This study is the first to relate these two strands of literature by using a sample from the African region for the period 1987 to 2008 as well as a variety of macroeconomic controls. While there is a substantial bulk of the empirical literature on the nexus between capital flight and violence (Nyatepe-Coo, 1994; Hermes and Lensink, 2001; Lensink et al., 2000; Fielding, 2004; Le and Zak, 2006), the dimension of terrorism has hitherto not been investigated. Terrorism is likely to affect capital flight because it creates an uncertain economic outlook and investors have been documented to prefer investing in less ambiguous economic environments (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). In essence, the phenomenon of terrorism is of significant economic consequence, such that investors could be concerned about the valuation of their assets and may lose confidence in the positive economic outlook. Hence, money and assets may rapidly flow out of a country as a result of terrorism.

We implement a robust panel analysis to understand the effects of terrorism on capital flight as well as observe the dynamic implications across the different origins of terrorism (i.e. transnational, domestic). We find that terrorism as a whole causes an increase in capital flight in Africa. However, when considering the disaggregated terrorism data, domestic terrorism significantly causes capital flight unlike transnational terrorism. Even unclear terrorism was also found to have a significant impact on capital flight. The effect of the different forms of terrorism on capital flight (considering varying quantiles) was further computed. This is such that the effect is considered at different intensities of terrorism. The result suggest that at 75 percent quantile, both domestic and transnational significantly explains the extent of capital flight from African countries. As for the unclear terrorism and total terrorism, the impact on capital flight was significant across the levels of percentiles apart from 25 and 90 percent quantiles (unclear terrorism), and 10 percent quantile for total terrorism.

The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. A literature review is covered in the second section. The third section lays out the empirical model, describes the variables and discusses the data. The estimation results are presented and discussed in the fourth section, while the fifth section concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review

In this section, we present the reasoning from the literature that shows how the rising wave of terrorism will further impact on the incidences of capital flights. Using civil war as a measure of violence, Collier (1999) predicts that the capital stock of countries tend to reduce as a result of incidences of civil war. Conflict increases the rate of uncertainty with respect to the future returns on assets held within the country. As a result of this, domestic investors relocate their capital abroad. Some studies that support this proposition include Le and Zak (2001), Ndikumana and Boyce (2002), and Davies (2010).

It is important to discuss how terrorism differs from other forms of violence like war, domestic conflicts and instabilities. Terrorism and other forms of violence are similar in terms of their resultant effects. Which are mostly loss of life and property. However, a clear distinction between them can be seen in their targets. For terrorism, the targets are often non-combatant individuals (see Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2014), who may be unaware of the ideologies or the objectives of the terrorists. Terrorists aim at non-combatants in order to raise their anxiety levels so that they pressure their government to grant the terrorist's demands (Gaibullov and Sandler, 2010). This explains the reasons for a unified global effort targeted against terrorist activities: its effect adversely impacts innocent non-combatants. On the other-hand, the targets of other forms of violence are mostly combatants or government forces, and to a large extent, the violence is spurred by one party being disgruntled or having a deep feeling of being cheated (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sharma, 2006; Sandler and Emders, 2008; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2011).

Terrorism can be categorised into two main groups: domestic and transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is home grown and home directed and the perpetrators, victims, and audience are from the venue country. This is unlike transnational terrorism with perpetrators, supporters, victims, and audience involving two or more countries (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas, 2011; Napps and Enders, 2015). There are varying impact of these two forms of terrorism on the domestic capital stocks of countries. Gaibullov and Sandler (2011) examines this effect on the income per capita of African

countries for the period 1970-2007. For the entire sample, they found transnational terrorism as having a significant impact on income per capita: the absence of domestic terrorism impact was also observed. One identified reason for the differences in the impact of the two forms of terrorism is that transnational terrorism creates graver impact as it creates fear in foreigners, foreign businesses (including personnel and assets), as well as international institutions. This will have a significant effect on capital retention in the country (Sandler and Enders, 2008).

Banyopadhyay, Sandler and Younas (2014) is another closely related study, but with emphasis on a broader sample of 72 developing countries, and focusing on counterterrorism effect of foreign aid. The authors found the both types of terrorism having a depressing effect on foreign investment. Their intuition is: terrorist activities tend to increase the premium on retaining investment in the venue country, and heightens the risk capital and output losses, and other overhead cost like security. As a result of this, investment capital tends to be repatriated from countries that are prone to terrorist activities. As a comment on the issue of violence and capital repatriation, Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye (2015) supports this finding but with a focus on other violent activities apart from terrorism.

We expect a positive relationship between terrorism and capital flight, however when considering the components of terrorism (i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism), we will rely on some theoretical explanations. For instance, transnational terrorism targets foreign citizens, foreign businesses and international institutions that are operational within the country, therefore it is expected that its impact will stimulate more capital repatriation from the affected country compared to domestic terrorism. The studies (i.e. Sandler and Enders, 2008; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2011) that reached this conclusion was focusing on a different form of capital – foreign investment – unlike the interest of this study. The mechanism is that: since terrorism affect the economic value of capital, capital owners will tend to substitute the location of their capital from the respective country to another location abroad (see Collier, 1999).

3. Data and Methodology

3.1 Data

The terrorism data are from Efobi et al. (2015) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014). The motivation for using this dataset for the measure of terrorism is its ability to separate terrorism data across the two main classifications (i.e. domestic and transnational terrorism). More so, the dataset contains data for unclear (those forms of terrorism which are neither

domestic nor transnational) and total terrorism. Hence, the study uses four distinct but related independent variables

Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives (Enders & Sandler, 2006). Terrorism is measured as the number of terrorist incidents registered by a given country yearly. In order to limit issues related to positive skew and log transformation of zeros, the data is improved by adding one to the base before taking natural logarithms of the terrorism incidents. Cho and Salehyan (2013) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) have recently adopted the same transformation procedure.

Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism “includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”. Unclear terrorism is that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and unclear terrorisms.

As earlier stated, these classifications will enhance policy recommendations stemming from our analysis. The capital flight data is from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a). The matching process yields a panel of 29 African countries for the period 1987-2008², consisting of three year non-overlapping intervals. The dependent variable is capital flight, whereas the independent variables are dynamics of terrorisms, namely: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms, with the last measurement being the sum of the first-three. The interest of using a plethora of terrorism indicators is to avail more room for policy implications.

Following the empirical literature on capital flight, we apply the direct definition of capital flight as defined by Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a, b) as those capital flows between a country and the rest of the world, whose measurement begins from the inflows of foreign

² The adopted countries include: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

exchange that are recorded in the country's Balance of Payments (BoP), in which 'missing money' – the difference between total capital inflows and recorded foreign exchange outflows – is reported as 'net errors and omissions. This measure has gained credence in capital flight literature (e.g.Ndiaye and Siri, 2015; Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015; Weeks, 2015)

It is important to devote some space to discuss the different dimensions of capital flight as contained in the empirical literature. It includes the direct 'hot money' measure of capital flight and the indirect 'residual' measure. The direct measure involves the computation of capital flight from the official balance of payment (BOP) data. It is the outflow of short-term capital from respective countries to abroad in response to the prevailing determinants as identified in the literature. It is measured as the summation of the net errors and omissions in the BOP and other short term capitals (see Ndikumana, Boyce and Ndiaye, 2015). The indirect approach computes capital flight as the difference between the recorded inflows and the recorded uses of the foreign exchange. However, for consistency and comparison with other authors that have studied capital flight issue in relation to African countries (which is our context) we have defined capital flight according to the construction by Ndikumana and Boyce (2012). As far as we know, this is the latest data that takes into consideration peculiarities regarding the capital flight situation for African countries.

The control variables include: the lagged variable of capital flight, interest rate, external debt, economic growth, Polity IV, corruption-control, trade openness and exchange rate. These have been substantially documented in the African capital flight literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2013a, 2014a, 2015; Weeks, 2012). First, past capital flight is expected to increase capital flight. This is known as the capital flight trap. Second, from intuition capital flight is expected to be more apparent in countries with negative and low real interest rate compared to countries that offer a higher real interest rate. A higher interest rate logically implies a higher lending rate by financial institutions. Third, external debt fuels capital flight (the revolving door phenomenon). Fourth, economic growth may either increase or decrease capital flight depending on whether the growth is broad-based or concentrated only in specific sectors of the economy like heavy extractive industries. Where growth is broad-based, economic growth may reduce capital flight because of a positive outlook on investment opportunities. Conversely, economic growth that is concentrated on extractive industries is very likely to be associated with higher levels of capital flight (Asongu, 2015). Fifth, constraints in the executive power are very

likely to increase capital flight. Sixth, capital flight has been documented to increase with poor institutional quality, notably: the absence of corruption-control (Weeks, 2012). The expected sign of this governance indicator depends on whether the distribution of corruption-control is positively or negatively skewed. This is consistent with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) who have based their study on bad governance because the governance indicators employed were negatively skewed for the most part. Seventh, in accordance with Asongu (2013a), trade globalization is a natural determinant of capital flight, especially with practices like transfer pricing (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011ab; Asongu, 2015). Eighth, very high deterioration of exchange rate increases capital flight (Asongu, 2014a; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003) because it betrays a negative economic outlook. Accordingly, investors prefer investment strategies that are less economically ambiguous (Le Roux & Kelsey, 2015ab). The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Definition and source of variables

Variables	Signs	Definitions	Sources
Interest rate	Interest	Lending interest rate (%)	
External debt	logextdebt	External debt stocks, total (DOD, US\$)	
Growth	GDPg	GDP growth rate (annual %)	WDI (World Bank)
Institutions	Polity IV	The extent of institutional constraints on the decision-making powers of the chief executive, whether an individual or a collective executive.	
Capital Flight	capf	Logarithm of real capital flight (million, constant USD)	Boyce & Ndikumana (2012a)
Corruption-control	CC	<i>“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.</i>	WGI (World Bank)
Exchange rate	logxrate	Logarithm Exchange rate (local currency per USD)	
Trade Openness	tradeg	Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP)	Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014)
Domestic terrorism	incd	Logarithm of Number of Domestic terrorism incidents	
Transnational terrorism	inct	Logarithm of Number of Transnational terrorism incidents	
Unclear terrorism	incu	Logarithm of Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear	
Total terrorism	incdtu	Logarithm of Total number of terrorism incidents (inct + incu + incu)	

GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WGI: World Governance Indicators. WDI: World Development Indicators.

The summary statistics of the variables is presented in Table 2. Some of the indicators are presented in logarithms to enable comparisons in terms of means. We also notice that there is a substantial degree variation in the variables, implying that we can be confident that significant estimated relationships would emerge. The use of non-overlapping intervals is to mitigate instrument proliferation that render Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimates invalid.

Table 2: Summary statistics

	Mean	S.D	Minimum	Maximum	Obs
Interest rate	19.194	41.254	0.000	537.70	232
External debt (log)	22.398	1.119	19.785	24.932	228
Growth	3.529	3.808	-10.933	17.339	230
Institutions	5.087	1.485	1.000	7.000	232
Capital Flight (log)	2.843	0.696	-0.221	4.473	171
Corruption-Control	-0.394	0.544	-2.061	1.128	232
Exchange rate (log)	1.341	2.066	-9.607	9.349	232
Trade Openness	62.979	26.764	12.420	155.957	230
Domestic terrorism	5.344	19.135	0.000	153	232
Transnational terrorism	0.892	2.223	0.000	23.333	232
Unclear terrorism	1.022	5.571	0.000	67.666	232
Total terrorism	7.260	24.578	0.000	180.333	232

S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations.

Table 3 below presents the summary statistics of the variables. Its purpose is to mitigate potential issues of multicollinearity. We observe that such issues are apparent among terrorism variables which display relatively higher degrees of substitution. We address these issues by using distinct specifications for each terrorism variable.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size=166)

Control Variables							Terrorism Dynamics				Dep. Vble	
Interest	Debt	GDPg	Polity	CC	logxrate	tradeg	incd	inct	incu	incdtu	capf	
1.000	-0.095	0.122	-0.044	-0.222	0.127	0.286	-0.054	0.002	-0.007	-0.042	-0.114	Interest
	1.000	0.017	0.248	-0.149	-0.150	0.038	0.249	0.240	0.189	0.254	0.631	Debt
		1.000	-0.175	-0.094	0.166	0.123	-0.132	-0.054	-0.023	-0.112	0.104	GDPg
			1.000	-0.162	-0.171	-0.076	0.142	0.123	0.026	0.129	0.152	Polity
				1.000	-0.312	-0.213	-0.051	-0.071	-0.041	-0.055	0.046	CC
					1.000	0.062	-0.086	-0.070	0.002	-0.075	-0.151	logxrate
						1.000	-0.035	-0.036	-0.074	-0.044	0.098	tradeg
							1.000	0.670	0.813	0.992	0.223	incd
								1.000	0.448	0.719	0.213	inct
									1.000	0.853	0.140	incu
										1.000	0.223	incdtu
											1.000	capf

Dep. Vble: Dependent Variable. Interest: lending interest rate. Debt: External debts. GDPg: Gross Domestic Product growth rate. Polity: Policy IV. CC: Corruption-Control. Logxrate: Exchange rate. tradeg: trade openness. incd: domestic terrorism. inct: transnational terrorism. incu: unclear terrorism. Incdtu: total terrorism. capf: capital flight.

3.2 Methodology

3.2.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)

The GMM technique is used for three main reasons. First, data is already in non-overlapping intervals. Hence, given that $N(29) > T(8)$, a GMM technique is a better fit. Second, the GMM specification which is dynamic enables us to control for past capital flight (capital flight trap) in the specification. Third, there are other traditional advantages associated with the use of GMM, namely: (i) the incorporation of both time-series and cross-sectional variations; (ii) time-invariant omitted variables are controlled for some bite on endogeneity and (iii) the System GMM approach eliminates small sample biases in the Difference estimator.

In accordance with recent terrorism (Efobi et al., 2015) and capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) literature, we adopt a *two-step* GMM with forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing as an empirical strategy. This technique is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009ab) and has the advantage of accounting for cross-sectional dependence and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008).

The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarizes the estimation procedure.

$$CF_{i,t} = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 CF_{i,t-\tau} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \sigma_j T_{j,i,t-\tau} + \sum_{h=1}^4 \delta_h W_{h,i,t-\tau} + \eta_i + \xi_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

$$CF_{i,t} - CF_{i,t-\tau} = \sigma_0 + \sigma_1 (CF_{i,t-\tau} - CF_{i,t-2\tau}) + \sum_{j=1}^4 \sigma_j (T_{j,i,t-\tau} - T_{j,i,t-2\tau}) + \sum_{h=1}^4 \delta_h (W_{h,i,t-\tau} - W_{h,i,t-2\tau}) + (\xi_t - \xi_{t-\tau}) + \varepsilon_{i,t-\tau} \quad (2)$$

Where: $CF_{i,t}$ is capital flight in country i at period t ; α is a constant; τ represents tau ; T , entails terrorism dynamics (domestic, transitional, unclear and total) ; W is the vector of control variables (*corruption-control, trade openness, exchange rate and fuel exports*), η_i is the country-specific effect, ξ_t is the time-specific constant and $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ the error term. In the specification, we prefer the *two-step* to the *one-step* procedure because it is heteroscedasticity-consistent.

3.2.2 Quantile Regressions

Consistent with the literature on conditional effects (Asongu et al., 2015), in order to investigate if existing levels of capital flight affect the impact of terrorism on capital flight, we employ a quintile regression (QR) approach. It consists of assessing the impact of terrorism throughout the conditional distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 2001).

Contrary to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that is based on the assumption of normally distributed error terms, the QR technique is not based on the hypothesis that capital flight and error terms are normally distributed. Accordingly, the QR approach enables us to investigate the effect of terrorism with particular emphasis on low- medium- and high- ‘capital flight’ countries. The interest of the technique is based on the intuition that blanket policies from the terrorism-‘capital flight’ nexus may not be efficient, unless they are contingent on initial capital flight levels and tailored differently across low- medium- and high-‘capital flight’ countries. In essence, with QR, parameters are estimated at multiple points of the conditional distributions of capital flight (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). This technique is increasingly being employed in development literature, notably in: finance (Asongu, 2014b), corruption (Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b; Efobi et al., 2014) and health (Asongu, 2014c) studies.

The θ^{th} quintile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (3) for ease of presentation.

$$\min_{\beta \in R^k} \left[\sum_{i \in \{i: y_i \geq x_i' \beta\}} \theta |y_i - x_i' \beta| + \sum_{i \in \{i: y_i < x_i' \beta\}} (1 - \theta) |y_i - x_i' \beta| \right] \quad (3)$$

Where $\theta \in (0,1)$. Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with QR, we minimise the weighted sum of absolute deviations. For instance the 10th or 90th quintiles (with $\theta=0.10$ or 0.90 respectively) by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of capital flight or y_i given x_i is:

$$Q_y(\theta / x_i) = x_i' \beta_\theta \quad (4)$$

Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each θ^{th} specific quintile. This formulation is analogous to $E(y / x) = x_i' \beta$ in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of capital flight. For the model in

Eq. (4), the dependent variable y_i is the capital flight indicator, while x_i contains a constant term, *corruption-control*, *trade openness*, *exchange rate* and *fuel exports*. The specifications in Eq. (3) are tailored to avoid the multicollinearity issues between terrorism variables identified in Table 3.

4. Empirical results

4.1 Presentation of results

Table 4 and Table 5 present results corresponding to GMM and QR estimations. We engage them chronologically. In the GMM specifications, not all control variables are included because of the interest of minimising instrument proliferation. Table 4 is presented in four main sets of specifications, notably for: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. Each set of specification entails three main regressions with incremental control variables. From Efobi et al. (2015), five main information criteria or post-estimation diagnostics are employed to assess the validity of models. First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (*AR2*) in difference should not be rejected because its null hypothesis is the position for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Second, the null hypothesis of the Sargan and Hansen tests for over-identification should also not be rejected because their null hypotheses are the positions that the instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. It should be noted that while the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (*OIR*) test is not robust and not weakened by instruments, the Hansen *OIR* test is robust and weakened by instruments. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (*DHT*) for the exogeneity of instruments is further employed to confirm the validity of the Hansen *OIR* results. Fourth, the Fisher test for joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided. Its null hypothesis is the position that the joint estimated coefficients are not valid; hence should be rejected. Based on highlighted the information criteria: (i) all models are valid at the 1% 5% and 10% significance levels; (ii) five of the twelve models are valid if the 5% significance level is incorporated and (iii) two of the twelve models are valid if the 10% significance level is considered. Our concern is also about statistical significance, no matter how small the magnitude might be.

We consider all significant levels in establishing the following findings. First, domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight. Second, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs, notably: (i) corruption-control that is negatively skewed increases capital flight; (ii) trade globalisation is

positive related with capital flight; (iii) external debt increases capital flight and (iv) the capital flight trap is confirmed because of the consistent positive significant estimates from lagged capital flight.

Table 4: Capital Flight and Terrorism (GMM)

	Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (Log)											
	Domestic Terrorism			Transnational Terrorism			Unclear Terrorism			Total Terrorism		
Capital Flight (log)(-1)	0.376** (0.031)	0.241*** (0.004)	0.206** (0.049)	0.015 (0.943)	0.158*** (0.005)	0.046 (0.636)	0.350** (0.035)	0.403*** (0.000)	0.224* (0.053)	0.398** (0.039)	0.371*** (0.000)	0.205** (0.047)
Constant	1.905*** (0.001)	1.874*** (0.000)	-7.20*** (0.001)	3.154*** (0.000)	2.194*** (0.000)	-7.45*** (0.006)	1.736*** (0.001)	1.208*** (0.000)	-6.034** (0.026)	1.639*** (0.004)	1.528*** (0.000)	-6.033** (0.018)
Domestic Terrorism	0.002** (0.035)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.002 (0.115)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Transnational Terrorism	---	---	---	-0.013 (0.356)	0.006 (0.506)	0.011** (0.049)	---	---	---	---	---	---
Unclear Terrorism	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.012*** (0.000)	0.016*** (0.000)	0.010*** (0.000)	---	---	---
Total Terrorism	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.002* (0.051)	0.371*** (0.000)	0.002** (0.025)
Corruption-Control	0.405*** (0.000)	0.467*** (0.000)	0.405*** (0.001)	0.298* (0.053)	0.376*** (0.000)	0.271** (0.012)	0.490*** (0.000)	0.634*** (0.000)	0.435*** (0.000)	0.435*** (0.000)	0.537*** (0.000)	0.393*** (0.001)
Trade Openness	---	0.002* (0.085)	---	---	0.001 (0.475)	---	---	0.006*** (0.008)	---	---	0.001 (0.246)	---
Exchange rate(log)	---	-0.007 (0.115)	---	---	-0.003 (0.352)	---	---	- (0.003)	---	---	-0.008** (0.029)	---
Interest rate	---	0.001** (0.044)	---	---	0.0006 (0.471)	---	---	0.001 (0.145)	---	---	0.002*** (0.007)	---
External Debt (log)	---	---	0.408*** (0.000)	---	---	0.450*** (0.000)	---	---	0.396*** (0.004)	---	---	0.357*** (0.004)
GDP growth rate	---	---	-0.0006 (0.938)	---	---	-0.002 (0.648)	---	---	-0.005 (0.606)	---	---	0.002 (0.667)
Polity IV	---	---	0.027 (0.460)	---	---	-0.014 (0.711)	---	---	-0.032 (0.313)	---	---	0.022 (0.537)
AR(1)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.055)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.002)
AR(2)	(0.068)	(0.121)	(0.049)	(0.168)	(0.151)	(0.185)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.115)	(0.073)	(0.089)	(0.044)
Sargan OIR	(0.035)	(0.135)	(0.004)	(0.208)	(0.382)	(0.004)	(0.546)	(0.427)	(0.008)	(0.052)	(0.137)	(0.003)
Hansen OIR	(0.417)	(0.302)	(0.812)	(0.908)	(0.444)	(0.613)	(0.556)	(0.576)	(0.818)	(0.502)	(0.331)	(0.818)
DHT for instruments												
(a) Instruments in levels												
H excluding group	(0.309)	(0.830)	(0.526)	(0.339)	(0.849)	(0.519)	(0.533)	(0.819)	(0.524)	(0.291)	(0.789)	(0.493)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.445)	(0.132)	(0.815)	(0.989)	(0.226)	(0.567)	(0.466)	(0.357)	(0.825)	(0.571)	(0.162)	(0.841)
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))												
H excluding group	(0.205)	(0.243)	(0.771)	(0.921)	(0.258)	(0.370)	(0.254)	(0.302)	(0.625)	(0.220)	(0.296)	(0.774)
Dif(null, H=exogenous)	(0.481)	(0.456)	(0.616)	(0.841)	(0.716)	(0.813)	(0.601)	(0.863)	(0.831)	(0.567)	(0.419)	(0.624)
Fisher	20.16***	199.7***	69.19***	4.40***	68.82***	19753.68***	19.28***	506.2***	1926.54*	6.05***	320.7***	63.21***
Instruments	17	29	29	17	29	29	17	29	29	17	29	29
Countries	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28	28
Observations	118	118	116	118	118	116	118	118	116	118	118	116

***, **, *: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments' Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR (1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.

Table 5: Capital Flight and Terrorism (Quantile regression)

Dependent Variable: Capital Flight (log)												
Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism												
	Domestic Terrorism						Transnational Terrorism					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	-	-5.273**	-	-	-	-3.914**	-	-4.725**	-	-	-6.086***	-4.140**
	6.135***	(0.040)	6.029***	7.006***	6.063***	(0.015)	6.171***	(0.029)	6.287***	7.003***	(0.000)	(0.016)
Domestic Terrorism	0.004**	0.007*	0.003	0.002*	0.001	0.002	---	---	---	---	---	---
	(0.019)	(0.093)	(0.114)	(0.083)	(0.501)	(0.292)						
Transnational Terrorism	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.022	-0.095**	0.009	0.011	0.011	0.055***
							(0.228)	(0.010)	(0.662)	(0.230)	(0.521)	(0.000)
Corruption-Control	0.214**	0.372	0.256*	0.154***	0.041	0.133	0.215**	0.349	0.239	0.157**	0.070	0.195
	(0.010)	(0.245)	(0.097)	(0.004)	(0.594)	(0.396)	(0.010)	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.017)	(0.396)	(0.203)
Trade Openness	0.003*	0.001	0.0002	0.002**	0.001	0.001	0.003*	0.004	0.0004	0.002**	0.001	0.003*
	(0.084)	(0.858)	(0.932)	(0.011)	(0.232)	(0.526)	(0.084)	(0.504)	(0.891)	(0.039)	(0.226)	(0.080)
Exchange rate(log)	-0.001	-0.004	-0.005	0.005	-0.009	-0.007	-0.001	0.001	-0.008	0.005	-0.008	-0.001
	(0.824)	(0.867)	(0.714)	(0.313)	(0.241)	(0.720)	(0.831)	(0.936)	(0.612)	(0.435)	(0.320)	(0.928)
Interest rate	-0.001	-0.005	-0.0001	0.0004	-0.0009	-0.001	-0.002	-0.009*	-0.001	0.0004	-0.0009	-0.002
	(0.422)	(0.440)	(0.953)	(0.651)	(0.520)	(0.669)	(0.391)	(0.093)	(0.743)	(0.721)	(0.529)	(0.219)
External Debt (log)	0.387***	0.350***	0.387***	0.419***	0.394***	0.333***	0.388***	0.303***	0.401***	0.419***	0.396***	0.331***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth rate	0.021*	0.014	0.015	0.017***	0.016	0.029*	0.020	0.027	0.011	0.016**	0.018	0.023*
	(0.088)	(0.757)	(0.383)	(0.009)	(0.145)	(0.074)	(0.107)	(0.439)	(0.517)	(0.045)	(0.119)	(0.070)
Polity IV	0.021	-0.066	-0.014	0.060***	0.039	-0.055	0.021	0.020	-0.015	0.058**	0.037	-0.014
	(0.503)	(0.594)	(0.777)	(0.003)	(0.171)	(0.249)	(0.493)	(0.821)	(0.784)	(0.018)	(0.226)	(0.813)
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.452	0.188	0.265	0.349	0.359	0.330	0.451	0.181	0.259	0.349	0.358	0.349
Fisher	27.62***						25.58***					
Observations	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism												
	Unclear Terrorism						Total Terrorism					
	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90	OLS	Q.10	Q.25	Q.50	Q.75	Q.90
Constant	-	-5.033**	-	-	-	-	-	-5.689**	-	-	-6.209***	-3.724**
	6.311***	(0.041)	5.827***	7.016***	6.599***	4.307***	6.136***	(0.023)	6.072***	7.017***	(0.000)	(0.031)
Unclear Terrorism	0.008	0.027*	0.012*	-0.0004	0.004	0.002	---	---	---	---	---	---
	(0.121)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.922)	(0.496)	(0.793)						
Total Terrorism	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.003**	0.005*	0.002*	0.002	0.0007	0.003
							(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.097)	(0.119)	(0.525)	(0.114)
Corruption-Control	0.211**	0.360	0.236	0.158**	0.092	0.125	0.214**	0.409	0.256*	0.156***	0.051	0.172
	(0.012)	(0.255)	(0.113)	(0.014)	(0.177)	(0.297)	(0.010)	(0.190)	(0.072)	(0.006)	(0.449)	(0.285)
Trade Openness	0.003*	0.001	0.0003	0.002*	0.001	0.003**	0.003*	0.001	0.0002	0.002**	0.001	0.001
	(0.083)	(0.843)	(0.902)	(0.060)	(0.152)	(0.029)	(0.082)	(0.874)	(0.930)	(0.017)	(0.165)	(0.451)
Exchange rate(log)	-0.002	-0.005	-0.009	0.005	-0.007	-0.015	-0.001	-0.002	-0.007	0.005	-0.009	-0.001
	(0.772)	(0.847)	(0.531)	(0.397)	(0.302)	(0.355)	(0.815)	(0.921)	(0.621)	(0.350)	(0.186)	(0.938)
Interest rate	-0.001	-0.006	-0.0001	0.00006	-0.0009	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004	-0.0001	0.0004	-0.0009	-0.001
	(0.405)	(0.356)	(0.960)	(0.568)	(0.470)	(0.254)	(0.413)	(0.536)	(0.941)	(0.664)	(0.458)	(0.700)
External Debt (log)	0.395***	0.338***	0.377***	0.421***	0.417***	0.347***	0.387***	0.372***	0.389***	0.420***	0.401***	0.317***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
GDP growth rate	0.020	0.017	0.012	0.016**	0.017*	0.021	0.021*	0.006	0.015	0.017**	0.015	0.029*
	(0.109)	(0.697)	(0.430)	(0.046)	(0.070)	(0.116)	(0.092)	(0.882)	(0.347)	(0.017)	(0.113)	(0.078)
Polity IV	0.023	-0.060	-0.004	0.057**	0.048*	-0.045	0.021	-0.074	-0.013	0.059***	0.042*	-0.029
	(0.448)	(0.622)	(0.925)	(0.019)	(0.058)	(0.243)	(0.491)	(0.537)	(0.774)	(0.005)	(0.093)	(0.644)
Pseudo R ² /R ²	0.446	0.177	0.261	0.347	0.356	0.326	0.452	0.185	0.264	0.349	0.358	0.331
Fisher	27.79***						27.21***					
Observations	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166	166

***, **, *: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile regression. Lower quintiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Capital flight is least.

Table 5 on QR is presented in two main panels, notably Panel A on domestic and transnational terrorisms and Panel B on unclear and total terrorisms. We notice that the OLS findings are consistently different from the QR estimations, which justifies the choice of the estimation technique. It is interesting to note that the findings of Table 4 are based on mean

effects of the dependent variable while those of Table 5 are based on conditional quantiles of the dependent variables. The following can be established for Table 5 with 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. First, with the exception of transnational terrorism for which a positive effect on capital flight is apparent in the 0.90th quintile, terrorism dynamics affect capital flight in low quintiles of the capital flight distribution. In other words, terrorism increases capital flight for the most part when initial levels of capital flight are low. Second, most of the significant control variables display expected signs.

4.2. Further discussion and policy implications

We have broadly established that terrorism increases capital flight. This finding is consistent with the intuition from the empirical literature in the motivation of this line of inquiry. Whereas the effect from terrorism dynamics is consistently significant in GMM specifications for the most part, we have found it to be overwhelmingly significant in bottom quintiles of the QR specifications. The direct implication is that the effects based on mean distributions of capital flight are unlikely to provide complete picture of the relationship between terrorism and capital flight.

In the light of the above, while it is well known that existing levels of capital flight affect future levels of capital flight, there is yet no evidence in the literature that the effect of terrorism on capital flight depends on existing levels of capital flight. We have found that terrorism would increase capital flight more significantly in countries where existing levels of capital flight are low. A possible explanation as to why the effect is not very significant in countries where existing capital flight levels are high is that when levels of capital flight are already very substantial, the signal of terrorism is no longer significant as a determinant to low valuation of investors' assets and loss of confidence in a positive economic outlook. Under this scenario, investors may not evaluate the corresponding terrorists' attacks as significant in increasing the existing level of economic uncertainty. Hence, investors despite the high levels of capital flight may still decide not to engage in asset and money outflows as a result of terrorism. Some investors could also be motivated by the risk premium to their investments resulting from the discussed uncertainty.

The positive effect of terrorism on capital flight has substantial implications for African business and sustainable development, notably: in the need for investment and importance of inclusive development in the post-2015 development agenda. Accordingly, there is a growing stream of African business literature supporting the need for investment

(Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012). According to Asiedu et al. (2012), a fundamental factor behind Africa's underdevelopment is the lack of long term investment capital that is essential for sustainable growth. Unfortunately, according to the same authors, the continent is characterised by substantial capital flight levels despite being capital starved. The April 2015 World Bank publication on Millennium Development Goals has recently shown that poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015). In line with recent capital flight literature (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012b), concerns about immiserizing growth and capital flight are most acute in rich countries of the sub-region; a position that is consistent with recent quality of growth (QG) literature from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Mlachila et al., 2014, p.27). For example the Republic of Congo and Gabon are among Africa's wealthiest countries with the 15th and 5th ranks and corresponding per capita incomes of \$1,253 and \$4,176. The QG shows deterioration in the positions of these countries (partly due to capital flight) between 1990 and 2011. Accordingly, from a comparative assessment of 93 developing countries in the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2011, the rankings of these countries has deteriorated: the Congo Republic (59th, 70th, 74th and 84th) and Gabon (58th, 61st, 67th and 69th).

While we have also established evidence of a capital flight trap, what is interesting to note in relation to the advantage of our dynamic estimation technique is the consistent evidence of convergence. Consistent with the capital flight catch-up literature (Asongu, 2014a), the criterion for evidence of conditional catch-up is when the absolute value of the lagged capital flight variable is between zero and one. Evidence of catch-up implies that common policies among sampled countries in the fight against capital flight is possible while the presence of full catch-up means that the underlying common policies can be implemented without distinction of nationality or locality within sampled countries. The harmonization of common policies against capital flight can be enhanced by reducing terrorism-related cross-country differences that are inhibiting the convergence process. Some documented mechanisms to fighting terrorism have included, inter alia: education (Brockhoff et al., 2014), especially in the promotion of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008); transparency (internal and external) (Bell et al., 2014); press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013); military mechanisms (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010); the assessment of behaviours towards terrorism (Gardner, 2007) and respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010).

In the light of the above on the need for policy harmonization, we suggest some measures that can be used to improve efforts towards country-county policy initiatives: harmonization of capabilities in regions that are visa-free for citizens of member countries; creation of a legal framework and environment for cooperation and financing member states of the African Union (AU) in the areas of transnational and internal security against terrorism as well as better coordination between practitioners and front line actors.

Speeches of hate can be fought by means of adopting common legislation in the battle against xenophobia and racisms. This should be tailored in conjunction with audiovisual media services. Radicalisation can be reduced through networks which sensitise citizens on the dangerous consequences of terrorism on capital flight, notably, on the potential negative consequences on employment, production, macroeconomic stability and economic development. Terrorism Financing Tracking Systems (TFTS) can also be introduced to control the financing of terrorism.

Multinational institutions like the African Union (AU) and other regional bodies can also play a role. They would need strong commitment from member states. In essence, while the management of crises related to terrorism is of national competence, multilateral development institutions can also help in the prevention and resolution of crises by coordinating common measures in member states. The latest AU Peace and Security Council resolution for a joint task force in the fight against the Boko Haram is an eloquent testimony of how multinational policy coordination with the support of concerned countries (Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Nigeria) can contribute in the fight against terrorism and hence, reduce potential capital flight negative externalities associated with the terrorism-induced negative economic outlook in the sub-region (Asongu et al., 2016).

5. Conclusion and future research directions

Building on previous literature, we set-out to tackle two main issues notably: (i) the effect of terrorism on capital flight and (ii) how this effect varies from one terrorism dynamic to another. We have investigated the effects of terrorism on capital flight in a panel 29 African countries for which data is available for the period 1987-2008. The terrorism dynamics entail domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations and Quantile regressions (QR). The latter methodology is based on the intuition that blanket policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial capital flight levels and

tailored differently across high- and low-‘capital flight’ countries. The following findings have been established. First, for GMM, domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorisms consistently increase capital flight. Second, for QR, with the exception of transnational terrorism for which a positive effect on capital flight is apparent in the 0.90th quintile, terrorism dynamics affect capital flight in low quintiles of the capital flight distribution. In other words, terrorism increases capital flight for the most part when initial levels of capital flight are low. Second, most of the significant control variables display expected signs. Policy implications have been discussed. Further research inquiries devoted to extending the line of inquiry can focus on country-specific studies and can consider comparable datasets that considers the portfolio component of capital flight. This will be an important addition to the literature.

References

- Anyanwu, J., (2012). Why Does Foreign Direct Investment Go Where It Goes? New Evidence from African Countries, *Annals of Economics and Finance*, 13(2):425-462.
- Arellano, M., and Bover, O., (1995), Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error Component Model. *Journal of Econometrics*, 68(1): 29-52.
- Asiedu, E., (2006), Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The role of natural resources, marketSize, government policy, institutions and political stability. *World Economy*, 29(1):63-72.
- Asiedu, E., and Lien, D. (2011). Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources. *Journal of International Economics*, 84: 9-111.
- Asiedu, E., Nana, F., and Nti-Addae, A., (2012). “The Paradox of Capital Flight from a CapitalStarved Continent”, Department of Economics, University of Kansas, Association of Concerned African Scholars, Bulletin No. 87, fall, 2012. <http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss04-asiedu-14th.pdf> (Accessed: 10/08/2015).
- Asongu, S. A., (2013a, October), Fighting African capital flight: timelines for the adoption of common policies’, *The Empirical Economics Letters*, <http://www.eel.my100megs.com/volume-12-number-10.htm> (accessed: 09/08/2015).
- Asongu, S. A., (2013b), Fighting corruption in Africa: do existing corruption-control levels matter? *International Journal of Development Issues*, 12(1): 36-52.
- Asongu, S. A., (2014b), Financial development dynamic thresholds of financial globalization: Evidence from Africa, *Journal of Economic Studies*, 42(2): 166-195.
- Asongu, S., (2014a), Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy Harmonization, *The European Journal of Comparative Economics*, 11 (1): 93-122.
- Asongu, S. A., (2014c), The impact of health worker migration on development dynamics: evidence of wealth effects from Africa, *The European Journal of Health Economics*, 15(2):187-201.
- Asongu, S. A., (2015), Rational Asymmetric Development, Piketty and the Spirit of Poverty in Africa”. African Governance and Development Institute *Working Paper* No. 15/006, Yaoundé.
- Asongu, S. A., and Nwachukwu, J. C., (2015), Revolution empirics: predicting the Arab Spring, *Empirical Economics*: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-015-1013-0>
- Asongu, S., Efobi, U., and Beecroft, I., (2015), FDI, Aid and Terrorism: Conditional Threshold Evidence from Developing Countries, African Governance and Development Institute *Working Paper Series* WP/15/019, Yaoundé.
- Asongu, S. A., Tchamyu, V. S ., and Tchamyu, N. P., (2016). ‘Fighting Terrorism in Africa: Benchmarking Policy Harmonization’. In *The Comparative African Economics of Fighting Terrorism*; CODESRIA, Dakar
- Baltagi, B. H., (2008). Forecasting with panel data, *Journal of Forecasting*, 27(2):153-173.
- Bandyopadhyay, S., and Younas, J., (2014), Terrorism: A Threat to Foreign Direct Investment, *Doing Business Abroad Policy Report*
- Bandyopadhyay, S., Lahiri, S., and Younas, J., (2015), Financing Growth through ForeignAid and Private Foreign Loans: Nonlinearities and Complementarities, *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 56, 75-96. doi: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.04.005.

- Bandyopadhyay, S., Sandler, T., and Younas, J., (2014), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid, and Terrorism, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 66 (1): 25-50.
- Bartels, F. L., Alladina, S.N., and Lederer, S., (2009). Foreign Direct Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Motivating Factors and Policy Issues, *Journal of African Business*, 10(2): 141-162.
- Bell, S. R., Clay, K. C., Murdie, A., and Piazza, J., (2014). "Opening Yourself Up: The Role of External and Internal Transparency in Terrorism Attacks", *Political Research Quarterly*: doi:10.1177/1065912914527798.
- Bellows, J., and Miguel, E., (2009), War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone, *Journal of Public Economics*, 93: 1144-1157.
- Berrebi, C. and Ostwald, J. (2013), Exploiting the Chaos: Terrorist Target Choice Following Natural Disasters, *Southern Economic Journal*, 79: 793-811.
- Berrebi, C., and Klor, E.F., (2010), The Impact of Terrorism on the Defence Industry, *Economica*, 77(307): 518-543.
- Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014a), Terrorism and the Labour Force: Evidence of an Effect on Female Labour Force Participation and the Labour Gender Gap, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1-29. doi: 10.1177/0022002714535251
- Berrebi, C., and Ostwald, J., (2014b), Terrorism and Fertility: Evidence for a Causal Influence of Terrorism on Fertility, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 1-21. doi: 10.1093/oepegpu042.
- Billger, S. M., and Goel, R. K., (2009), Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption? Cross-country quantile regression estimates, *Journal of Development Economics*, 90: 299-305.
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2011), 'Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages with external borrowing and policy options', *International Review of Applied Economics*, 25(2): 149-170.
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012b), Rich Presidents of Poor Nations: Capital Flight from Resource-Rich Countries in Africa', *Political Economy Research Institute University of Massachusetts*. <http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss01-ndiku-14th.pdf> (accessed: 09/08/2015).
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2003), 'Public Debt and Private Assets: Explaining Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries', *World Development*, 31(1): 107-130.
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012a), 'Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Updated Estimate, 1970-2010', *Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts*. http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ADP/SSAfrica_capitalflight_Oct23_2012.pdf (accessed: 09/08/2015).
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (1998), Congo's odious debt: External borrowing and capital flight in Zaire', *Development and Change*, 29: 195-217.
- Boyce, J. K., and Ndikumana, L. (2001), Is Africa a Net Creditor? New Estimate of Capital Flight from Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-1996', *Journal of Development*, 38(2): 27-56.
- Brockhoff, S., Kieger, T., and Meierrieks, D., (2014). "Great Expectations and Hard Times - The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: doi: 10.1177/0022002713520589.
- Cho., S-W., (2010). Fighting Terrorism through the Rule of Law?, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 54(6): 940-966.

- Choi, S-W., and Salehyan, I., (2013). 'No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian Aid, and Terrorism', *Conflict Management and Peace Sciences*, 30(1): 53-75.
- Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2002). Greed and grievance incivil war. Working paper series 2002-01. Centre for the Study of African Economics. Oxford: Oxford University.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Pattillo, C. (2001). Flight capital as a portfolio choice. *World Bank Economic Review*, 15, 55-80.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. and Pattillo, C. (2004), Africa's Exodus: Capital Flight and the Brain Drain as Portfolio Decisions. *Journal of African Economies*, 13 (2): 15-54.
- Costa., A., Hernandez, M., and Sebastian-Gallés, N., (2008). "Bilingualism aids conflict resolution: Evidence from the ANT task", *Cognition*, 106 (1): 59-86.
- Davies, V. (2008), Post-war Capital Flight and Inflation. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45 (4), 519-537.
- Davies, V.A.B., (2010), Capital Flight and Violent Conflict: A Review of the Literature, World Development Report 2011 *Background Note*.
- Enders, W., and Sandler, T., (2006). *The Political Economy of Terrorism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Efobi, U., Asongu, S., and Becroft, I., (2015), Foreign Direct Investment, Aid and Terrorism: Empirical Insight Conditioned on Corruption Control, African Governance and Development Institute *Working Paper* No. 15/007, Yaoundé.
- Efobi, U., Becroft, I., and Asongu, S., (2014), Foreign Aid and Corruption: Clarifying Murky Empirical Conclusions, African Governance and Development Institute *Working Paper* No. 14/025, Yaoundé.
- Fearon, J.D., and Laitin, D.D., (2011), Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War, *World Development*, 39(2): 199-211.
- Feridun, M., and Shahbaz, M., (2010). Fighting Terrorism: Are Military Measures Effective? Empirical Evidence from Turkey, *Defence & Peace Economics*, 21(2): 193-205.
- Fielding, D., (2004). 'How does violent conflict affect investment location decisions? Evidence from Israel during the intifada'. *Journal of Peace Research*, (41)4: 465-484.
- Gaibulloev, K., and Sandler, T., (2011), The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic Terrorism on Growth in Africa, *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(3): 355-371
- Gardner, K. L., (2007). Fighting terrorism the FATF way. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organisation*, 13(3): 325-345.
- Henry, J. S. (2012). *The Price of Offshore Revisited*. London: Tax Justice Network.
- Hermes, N. and Lensink. R., (2001). 'Capital flight and the uncertainty of government policies'. *Economics Letters*, 71(3): 377-81.
- Hoffman, A. M., Shelton, C., and Cleven, E., (2013). "Press freedom, publicity, and the cross-national incidence of transnational terrorism", *Political Research Quarterly*, 66 (4): 896-909.
- Koenker, R., and Hallock, F.K., (2001), Quantile regression, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 15:143-156.
- Le, Q.V. and Zak. P. J., (2006). 'Political risk and capital flight'. *Journal of International Money and Finance*. (25)2: 308-29.
- Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015a), Dragon slaying with ambiguity: theory and experiments", Sara le Roux, Department of Economics, Oxford Brookes University.
- Le Roux, S., and Kelsey, D., (2015b), Strategic substitutes, complements and ambiguity: An experimental study, department of economics, Oxford Brookes University.

- Lensink, R., Hermes, N., and V. Murinde. V., (2000). 'Capital flight and political risk'. *Journal of International Money and Finance*, 19(1), 73-92.
- Love, I., and Zicchino, L., (2006), Financial development and dynamic investment behaviour: Evidence from Panel VAR. *The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance*, 46(2): 190-210.
- Mlachila, M., Tapsoba, R., and Tapsoba, S. J. A., (2014). A quality of growth index for developing countries: A proposal, *IMF Working Paper* No. 14/172.
- Napps, C., and Enders, W., (2015), A regional investigation of the interrelationships between domestic and transnational terrorism: A time series analysis, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 26 (2): 133-151.
- Ndiaye, A.S., and Siri, A., (2015), *Impact of Capital Flight on Domestic Resource Mobilization in Burkina Faso*, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) Collaborative Workshop Project on Capital Flight and Tax Havens, Final Reports Review Workshop, Tanzania, May 29-30, 2015.
- Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (2011a), *Africa's odious debts: How foreign loans and capital flight bled a continent*. London: Zed Books.
- Ndikumana, L. and Boyce, J. K. (2011b) 'New estimates of capital flight from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options'. *International Review of Applied Economics*, 25(2): 149-170.
- Ndikumana, L., Boyce, J. and Ndiaye,A.S. (2015) "Capital Flight: Measurement and Drivers", in Ajayi, S. I. and L. Ndikumana (Eds), *Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects, and Policy Issues*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 15-54.
- Nyatepe-Coo, A.A. (1994). 'Capital flight in low-income sub-Saharan Africa: The effects of political climate and macroeconomic policies'. *Scandinavian Journal of Development Alternatives*, 13(4): 59-69.
- Okada, K., and Samreth, S., (2012), The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach, *Economic Letters*, 115(2): 240-243.
- Piazza, J. A., (2006), Rooted in poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development, and Social Cleavages, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 18(1): 159-177.
- Rolfe, R. J., and Woodward, D. P., (2004). Attracting foreign investment through privatization: the Zambian experience, *Journal of African Business*, 5(1): 5-27.
- Roodman, D., (2009a), A note on the theme of too many instruments, *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 71(1):135-158.
- Roodman, D., (2009b), How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in Stata, *Stata Journal*, 9(1): 86-136.
- Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2008) Economic consequences of terrorism in developed and developing countries: an overview, in P. Keefer and N. Loayza (Eds.) *Terrorism, Economic Development and Political Openness*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Sharma, K., (2006), The political economy of civil war in Nepal, *World Development*, 34(7): 1237-1253.
- Weeks, J., (2012), Macroeconomic impact of capital flows in Sub-Saharan African countries, 1980-2008, *Association of Concerned Africa Scholar Bulletin*, 87, 1-7.
- Weeks, J., (2015), Macroeconomic impact of capital flows in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Ajayi, S.I., and Ndikumana, L., (Eds.), *Capital Flight from Africa: Causes, Effects and Policy Issues*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- World Bank (2015), World Development Indicators, World Bank Publications <http://www.gopa.de/fr/news/world-bank-release-world-development-indicators-2015> (Accessed: 25/04/2015).