Why Don't Democracies go to War?

Coleman, Charles (2004): Why Don't Democracies go to War? Published in: Festschrift for Gordon Tullock's 80th Birthday

Abstract

Cost-benefit analysis is applied to the choice of whether to go to war. The polar cases of autocracies and democracy are considered. Offensive and defensive wars are distinguished. Democracies are less likely to go to war.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: war, rent-seeking, democracy, autocracy
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

References

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