Coleman, Charles (2004): Why Don't Democracies go to War? Published in: Festschrift for Gordon Tullock's 80th Birthday
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Abstract
Cost-benefit analysis is applied to the choice of whether to go to war. The polar cases of autocracies and democracy are considered. Offensive and defensive wars are distinguished. Democracies are less likely to go to war.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | Why Don't Democracies go to War? |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | war, rent-seeking, democracy, autocracy |
| Subjects: | F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions |
| Item ID: | 74742 |
| Depositing User: | Dr. Charles Coleman |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Mar 2017 10:30 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 01:45 |
| References: | Booth, Ken and Steve Smith, International Relations Theory Today, University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Rummel, Rudolf J., Power Kills: Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997. Suganami, Hideo, "Bringing order to the causes of war debates," Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 19: 19-35, 1990. Tullock, Gordon, The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution, Blacksburg, Virginia: Center for Study of Public Choice, 1974. Tullock, Gordon, Autocracy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987. |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/74742 |
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