Plaidoyer pour une autre approche des politiques climatiques : De la poursuite de l’intérêt propre à l’introduction du principe de responsabilité

Billette de Villemeur, Etienne and Leroux, Justin (2016): Plaidoyer pour une autre approche des politiques climatiques : De la poursuite de l’intérêt propre à l’introduction du principe de responsabilité. Forthcoming in: Revue Française d'Economie

Abstract

We explore an alternative to existing economic instruments to tackle climate change: carbon liabilities. Such liabilities would hold countries responsible for future climate damage to the tune of their emissions over time. The prospect of having to repay this carbon debt over time is enough to discipline emitters, leading to the efficient emissions level. Contrary to existing instruments, our scheme does not rest on a consensus regarding the discount factor nor about climate forecasts; this, together with its reliance on observed damage, allows for better international participation as well as to a fairer division of costs and risks.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: For another approach to climate policy: From the pursuit of self interest to holding emitters responsible
• Language: French
• Keywords: Carbon liabilities, climate policy, market instruments, Pigou tax
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q54 - Climate ; Natural Disasters and Their Management ; Global Warming

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