Aquila non captat muscas :Homo Economicus between exploration and exploitation

Friedrich, Thomas (2016): Aquila non captat muscas :Homo Economicus between exploration and exploitation.

Abstract

Three different strategic types of ensembles are compared on basis of their calculated superadditive net profit. The superadditive and peaceful ensemble of two Homo Economicus serves us with the starting value. From there two ensemble types emerge rearranging substrate within the ensemble through exploitation with force and deception of source and/or sink. An increasing transfer of substrate will, after an initial increase of rational superadditivity, finally lead to a dominating amount of irrational subadditivity. They are a conditional and an unconditional violent and deceptive ensemble. A third type, not rearranging substrate within the ensemble, is able to increase superadditivity by exploration and transfer from the outside of the ensemble. Dependent ensembles with a master and independent ensembles are considered. A low (realistic) finding probability for new substrate is assumed in all examples. The unconditional violent and deceptive ensemble is in most of the cases superior according to the maximal possible superadditivity. This is altered after consideration of the investments necessary. Besides the three pure types also mixed types are investigated. Mixed strategic types are constructed assuming a mosaic structure of pure behaviour. The result is the topography of superadditivity or subadditivity. With this topography it becomes possible to assess the maximal investment for force and deception and compare the strategies. Extreme subadditivity can be avoided by a revolution of the transfer direction or by a recreation of the starting conditions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: utility function, source, sink, ensemble, supply, demand, violence, deception, framing effect, exploration, exploitation, superadditivity, subadditivity, Homo Economicus
• Subjects: Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General

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