Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders

Matsumura, Toshihiro and Yamagishi, Atsushi (2016): Lobbying for Regulation Reform by Industry Leaders.

Abstract

We investigate a free-entry market in which incumbents engage in lobbying for changing regulations, which affect the cost of all firms equally. We find that incumbents have incentive to weaken or strengthen regulations, depending on the demand condition.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: lobbying, common costs, free entry market, Stackelberg, regulation costs
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation

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