Reito, Francesco (2016): Is it better to be mixed in group lending?
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This paper shows that, in a group-lending environment characterized by positive assortative matching, a microfinance institution can achieve a Pareto improvement by promoting negative matching among borrowers. Some new implications are: i) borrowers may be better off under mixed groups; ii) a heterogeneous group lending equilibrium is possible even when individual or homogeneous group equilibria do not exist.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Is it better to be mixed in group lending?|
|Keywords:||joint liability lending; assortative matching; screening|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
|Depositing User:||Francesco Reito|
|Date Deposited:||11 Jan 2017 14:28|
|Last Modified:||11 Jan 2017 14:28|
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When Opposites Attract: Is the Assortative Matching Always Positive? (deposited 22 Feb 2011 20:59)
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