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What Shapes Europeans' Attitudes toward Xeno-philia(/phobia)? ☆

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Abstract

Migration has strongly manifested itself to historic highs, creating divisive views among politicians, policy makers and individuals. The present paper studies the Europeans' attitudes toward immigration and the contextual factors that shape these attitudes. Based on 267,282 respondents from 22 countries and over the period 2002-2014, we find that despite the eventful past years, Europeans, on average, are still positive toward immigrants with the North European countries to be the most xenophile to immigrants of all backgrounds. High educational level and political orientation (right-wing) are among the most important individual characteristics that associate with xenophile and xenophobic sentiments, respectively. Macroeconomic conditions and ethnic diverse environments play a very important role in shaping public attitudes. A salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the impact of other contextual factors, individuals (and countries) with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes toward immigration than the rest of the population (countries). Social capital further moderates the negative effects of any "perceived threat" on people's opinions about immigrants.

Keywords: immigration, social capital, public attitude, survey, Europe

JEL: C25, F22, J61, O52

1. Introduction

Migration has strongly manifested itself to historic highs.¹ Spurred by civil war, political instability and the global financial crisis, constantly growing immigration flows to European countries and between European countries posed certain challenges for host countries and rose concerns about the potential costs of welcoming more immigrants on employment, welfare benefits, security and social cohesion.

Two concurring factors have arguably contributed to bringing migration to the centre of public attention. First, the aftermath of dramatic economic recession, from which some European countries are still struggling to recover, left European countries fragile with weaker economic prospects and generalised cuts to public spending, led voters to question the legitimacy of foreign nationals' presence in their countries. When opportunities shrink fears of potential competition for access to the labour market and to the welfare state intensify. Second, the Syrian exodus and the number of people that have arrived in Europe in the

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¹Migration Policy Institute (MPI) data show that the total annual asylum applications in the EU Member States and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries from 2008 to 2015 have increased by 444% - from 256,155 to 1,393,285 applications. Only in 2015 there were 3.8 millions of new immigrants in the EU; half of them originating from non-member countries. In 2008, most of asylum applications came from immigrants from Iraq (12.58%), Russia (8.71%), Somalia (7.57%); in 2015, 27.54% of applicants were from Syria; India, China, Morocco, Pakistan and Ukraine are top origin countries of newly arrived non-EU citizens during the period of 2010-2013.

last few years to seek asylum having fled conflicts and oppression in Asia and Africa has reached historical highs. The absence of EU-level coordinated mechanisms to respond to the emergency (for instance, to effectively allocate refugees across member countries and spread the economic burden of hosting them), led many member countries to autonomous and uncoordinated responses, with national political concerns and hostile feelings to be on the rise among the general public.

Immigration is also highly politicised. It has been a divisive issue in many countries as the right-wing parties brought the issue to front lines in their election campaigns, which usually drew attention on the economic burden of immigration and also on cultural distinctiveness of the immigrant groups to argue for more exclusionist immigration policies. Immigration took, for instance, centre stage in the campaign that led to the vote for the 'Brexit' of the UK from the European Union in June 2016. It has also been debated in many other European countries (Austria, Hungary, Netherlands). In addition, terrorist attacks in France and Belgium perpetuated by second-generation immigrants triggered a harsh debate that questioned the idea of integration of foreign nationals in hosting societies. Immigration -undocumented migration, in particular- has also been a divisive issue in the US political debate. The constant presence of immigration in the media, however, does not necessarily mean that the discussion and the public understanding of the subject matter have become progressively deeper and better documented.

Yet, while the economic recession -along with the absence of a supranational, EU-level coordinated approach to immigration- seemed to have provided a justification for political pandering to a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment, it is far from clear how much public opinion has really shifted in that direction.

This paper studies what shapes Europeans' sentiments toward immigration. We carefully combine individual survey data and aggregate data to analyse the factors and conditions that contribute to cross-country attitude variation toward immigration, and explore the relevance of theories in explaining the formation of these attitudes.

Our work relates to an insightful body of research on public sentiments on immigration that has developed in recent years since Quillian's (?) seminal cross-national work.² Researchers have explored whether opposition to immigrants is due primarily to perceived economic threat, cultural threat, or to some combination of the two. Economic arguments test predictions of models of labour market competition and immigrants' use of public services (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Studies, emphasising cultural elements, focus on threats to national identity and racist (Jolly and DiGiusto, 2014; Kaufmann and Harris, 2015), religion (Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), values and beliefs (Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), ethnic differences, (Brader et al., 2008), language difference (Hopkins, 2011), conservative social attitudes (Ford, 2011), personal traits and predisposition (Dinesen et al., 2016). Other studies highlight the effect of security fears (Fitzgerald et al., 2012) and concerns about crime (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Last but not least, studies have examined whether direct or representative democracy favours fair treatment of immigrant minorities (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2015).³

Our paper adds to the literature in two distinct ways: First, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the micro level characteristics that shape immigration sentiments. The vast majority of research on public attitudes to immigration has followed a piecemeal approach, as it focused on few characteristics of the individual, mainly socio-demographic (i.e., gender, age, income, employment status, among others). We use the recent edition of the European Social Survey (ESS) database to estimate models at the individual level which include the commonly used individual characteristics along with other, less explored, characteristics such as trust, networks, norms and sanctions -the so-called social capital. The latter is considered to be the "glue" for more cooperative communities (Bowles and Gintis, 2002) and economic growth (Putnam, 2000). In the increasingly multicultural societies if sound social capital generates more integrated societies, it should be relevant for the issue of immigration. The evidence, however, in the empirical literature on public attitude and social capital is scant. To our knowledge, there is a single study by Herreros and Criado (2009) that employs only one dimension of social capital, "trust in people" drawing only on the 2002-2003 ESS data and for sixteen European countries. The authors find that regardless

²The pioneering empirical study of Quillian examined the impact of macroeconomic circumstances on attitudes to immigrants in Europe and regressed a measure on prejudice against immigrants on the inverse of GDP per capita across twelve European countries that were observed in 1988.

³For a review of theories proposed to explain immigration sentiments, see the work of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014).

of the impact of other individual-level variables and contextual variables such as levels of unemployment or percentage of foreign population, individuals with high trust exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration than the rest of the population. We, additionally, explore more aspects of social capital, along with other contextual factors, and for many ESS waves and countries.

Second, we enrich the micro data with macro level data to capture the economic conditions and multicultural environments. We consider a range of macroeconomic variables to proxy the economic performance of a country as well as its ethnic diversity. The inclusion of the economic and multicultural profile of a country allows us to obtain more insights and discuss competing theories. Specifically, the literature on public opinion on immigration has analysed various versions of two main hypotheses: the "threat hypothesis" and the "contact hypothesis". The threat hypothesis considers that racial prejudices toward immigrants are a response to a perceived threat to the economic and political privileges of the dominant ethnic group in a society. These perceived threats can result from, among others, the relative size of the subordinate group (Blalock, 1967), country's economic circumstances (?) or personal economic circumstances (?).⁴ The "contact hypothesis", in contrast, considers that the presence of large populations of out-groups provides members of the dominant group with first-hand experience of different people, which, under certain conditions, can diminish racial prejudices (?). Unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances and strong presence of foreign population in a country can create concerns of potential competition for access to the labour market and to the welfare state and lead to more prejudice and racism toward immigrants. Therefore, it is interesting to explore whether the presence of social capital can mitigate these typical "threat" conditions and lead to more positive sentiments toward immigration.

Our empirical analysis covers 22 countries for a total of 267,282 individuals over the period 2002-2014 and develops around two main questions: (i) What explains Europeans' xeno-phile(/phobic) attitudes toward immigration? and (ii) Do Europeans' attitudes vary across different immigrant profiles?

Despite the economic upheavals, we find Europeans, on average, to be rather positive toward immigrants with the North European countries to exhibit less xenophobic attitudes. Among the personal characteristics of the individual, the level of education shapes xenophile sentiments, while right-wing political orientation forms more xenophobic stances. Macroeconomic conditions as well as ethnic diversity play an important role in shaping attitudes. However, a salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the impact of other contextual factors, individuals (and countries) with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes toward all immigrants -independently of their background- than the rest of the population (countries). Furthermore, social capital moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people's opinions about immigrants.

This could be important for the increasingly multicultural societies we live in. Improving the efficiency of the institutions (legal, health and education systems) increases the trust to the government and society in general and associates with positive sentiments to immigration. Instead of cultivating differentiation, fragmentation and exclusion, successful public policies should aim at investing in social capital. Policies that foster the bonding, bridging and linking of different communities and between communities and public agents, increase country's social cohesion and prosperity.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework for modelling individuals' attitudes to immigration and the estimation technique. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes.

⁴For a long time, prejudice was only explained through individual characteristics or social psychological theories based on inter-group relations (Jackson, 1993; ?). Blumer (1958) extended the existing framework by recognising the importance of the group perspective. While originally developed in the context of US race relations, group threat theory is general in its formulations of in-versus out-groups and it has been applied as the theoretical motivation of empirical investigations of European natives' attitudes towards immigrants or immigration.

2. A Framework of Analysis

2.1. Modelling Individual's Attitudes towards Immigration

Suppose that stated immigration concerns depend on latent continuous concerns about immigration. If y^* denotes latent concerns and y the stated concerns, then holds,

$$y_{it}^* = x^T \beta + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where i and t denote country and time; x is a vector of covariates; and β is the vector of regression coefficients to be estimated.

Further, suppose that while we cannot observe y^* , we can instead observe the categories of response:

$$y = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } y^* \leq c_1, \\ 1, & \text{if } c_1 < y^* \leq c_2, \\ 2, & \text{if } c_2 < y^* \leq c_3, \\ \vdots & \\ \vdots & \\ N, & \text{if } c_N < y^* \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

To capture the complex and multifaceted nature of sentiments towards immigration, we consider interviewees' responses (y^*) in six different statements: (i) "immigration is bad or good for country's economy", (ii) "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants", (iii) "immigrants make country worse or better place to live", (iv) "allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority", (v) "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority", and (vi) "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe". While the first three statements capture the effects of immigration on economic, cultural and welfare prospects of the host country, the last three explore individual attitudes towards different immigrant profiles.

The vector x is a set of covariates that includes *Sociodemographic*, *Social Capital*, *Macroeconomic* and *Foreign* variables. More analytically, the set of *Sociodemographic* contains characteristics of the individual, namely gender, age, education, marital status, health status, net income, domicile, employment status, religiousness, political orientation, and the origin (family roots) of the interviewee. The literature in sociology has identified some of these characteristics as import ones in shaping attitudes (Billiet, 1995; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Arguably, one would expect that older, low-income, low-educated, unemployed and extreme right in political orientation individuals, for example, would express more xenophobic opinions about immigration. This set of variables has been commonly used in all micro level analyses with evidence, on their statistical importance, to vary across studies.

Next set of variables, is what the literature calls social capital, i.e., the stock of social relations, based on norms and networks of cooperation and trust in intra- and inter-groups that spillover to the market and state to enhance collective action between formal actors and achieve social efficiency and growth. The *Social Capital* set includes three dimensions, as proposed by Coleman (1988): (i) trust in people and institutions -interpersonal trust creates bonds between people, influences individual outcomes as well as social group interactions, facilitates cooperation, efficiency and trust in the quality of the political, legal and institutional environment (?), thus increasing society overall effectiveness (??); (ii) interpersonal networks such as meeting colleagues, friends or family lead to a greater social embeddedness of the individual and to a strong feeling of belonging in society and thus enhance trust and cooperation;⁵ and (iii) norms and effective sanctions -solid norms and transparent and effective sanctions reduce the incentives for criminal

⁵Networks can be further subdivided into informal, Putnam-type social activities, yielding positive externalities (informally meeting with friends, relatives, colleagues, but also participating in associations such as churches, voluntary work), and formal, Olson-type special interest group engagement such as work for political parties, professional organisations or trade unions, which may yield negative externalities in a society.

action; individuals who do not feel afraid but feel safe in the surroundings they live in, develop stronger ties within their community. One would expect that in societies where trust in people and institutions is high, networks work to society's benefit and solid norms and effect sanctions are present, then these societies show more receptive attitudes to multiculturalism and ethnic diversity and to new comers (new immigrants). Even in a "threat context", for instance, when some individuals are in a "risky" situation (being unemployed or close to job loss) or in times of economic upheavals, where usually people feel threaten of losing their economic or political privileges, the presence of rich capital stock in a society mitigates such threats. A society characterised by high levels of social capital could achieve the integration of immigrants more easily than a society with lower levels of social trust. Empirical evidence by Herreros and Criado (2009) corroborates to the important role of trust in shaping positive attitudes toward immigration. As Herreros and Criado (2009) have shown, social trust may have a direct effect, social trusters have positive sentiments toward immigrants and an indirect, even in difficult situations (threat context) social trusters are more receptive to immigrants than social distrusters.

The set *Macroeconomic* includes variables that characterise the economic environment of a country that could also affect public assessments. Arguably, public attitudes toward immigrants become more positive in good economic times and more negative in economic downturns. For example, when the aggregate production shrinks, so do the opportunities; fears of potential job loss and competition for access to the labour market and to the welfare state intensify. The fiscal cost of immigration becomes more of an issue of concern at economic downturns and raises concerns among individuals, which are either at the bottom of the income distribution and thus are threatened of immigrant competition for a fixed supply of welfare benefits or further up of the income distribution and therefore worry about the potential tax implications of immigration-induced expansion of the welfare budget. According to the threat theory, an economic downturn should imply more negative attitudes towards minority groups and also among majority group members who do not personally feel threatened. We consider a number of variables that relate to macroeconomic environment, namely gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment, central government dept, social benefits, Gini coefficient that are good proxies of economic welfare, fiscal burden and (in)equality, respectively, of the host country. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed, mainly weak and sometimes with perverse results (?????). We also consider the share of elderly people in a country, as rising old-age dependency ratios pose a challenge to the viability of public pension and health systems. The loosening of immigration policies is often seen as one policy option to counter this challenge.⁶ The share of elderly people in a country enters in our model as a dummy that gets the value one if a country has high elder citizens share and zero otherwise, to test whether sentiments toward immigration differ across countries with different age distributions. Empirical evidence (Calahorrano, 2013) supports that over the life cycle stated immigration concerns are predicted to increase well into retirement and decrease afterwards.

The set *Foreign* contains a number of variables relevant to the multicultural and ethnic diversity of the host country. The presence of foreigners in a country, such as stock of foreign (i.e., foreign-born, first and second generation of immigrants) population, asylum seekers, number of nationality acquisitions and country's colonial tradition may shape attitudes as well.⁷ According to a simplified version of contact theory (Allport, 1954), increased contact with immigrants should undermine xenophobic sentiment. For example, people who live next to well-integrated neighbours tend to have positive immigration sentiments (Ha, 2010). In contrast, threat theory argues that inter-group contact intensifies conflict due to competition over scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967). From this perspective, in countries with larger immigrant populations, there is more of a perceived group threat, leading to more antipathy toward the out-group (Hjerm, 2009). Empirical evidence is also mixed as to the effect of the presence of foreigners to individuals' perceptions toward immigration depending on the theory/mechanism at work. For example, ?

⁶Studies have shown that even modest increases in immigration can have positive fiscal impacts, especially if immigrants are selected according to age and skill (Bonin et al., 2000).

⁷Colonial tradition influences migration patterns between former imperial powers and their colonies of the past. Clear examples are the cases of old colonial countries such as the UK and France and immigrant nations like the US, where many earlier immigrants have now become citizens or are second or third generation "immigrants"; nevertheless, they are often still perceived as a minority out-group. Failure of policies intended to aid in the integration of new comers into the host society frustrates local people, exacerbating anti-immigrant attitudes among the public.

find that between regions, a larger size of the immigrant population increases negative reactions but within regions, more immigrants increase inter-group contact and reduce immigrant derogation. In similar vein, ? find regions with a higher percentage of immigrants born outside the EU and a higher unemployment rate among the immigrant population to show a higher probability natives to express negative attitudes to immigration. However, ? finds that the size of the immigrant population has no impact on attitudes at all. Colonial tradition enters in our model as a dummy that gets the value one if country has colonial history and zero otherwise and intends to capture whether sentiments to immigration differ between countries with colonial history (and potentially richer and more accustomed to ethnic diversities) and countries with no such history (Gallaher et al., 2009).

Our aim is to assess the impact of each one of the aforementioned variables on shaping Europeans' sentiments toward immigration. Of particularly special interest are the variables in the set *Social Capital*, as there is scant empirical evidence on how they influence public attitudes toward immigration. One way to examine their impact is to include them directly into the model. To also test competing theories, for instance, "contact" versus "threat", we interact social capital variables with some of the traditionally "threat" variables, such as employment status (unemployed) and various multiculturalism variables (from the set *Foreign*). Our main hypothesis is that social capital has a positive direct effect on attitudes, and an indirect effect via mitigating the influence of the impact of the "threat" factors on attitude formation.

2.2. Estimation Strategy

Our dependent variable, attitude of the individuals toward immigration, is ordinal; that is, we can rank the values, but the real distance between categories is unknown. Respondents state that immigration is "bad for a country's economy" if their latent concern exceeds a higher threshold c_1 , "good for a country's economy" if their latent concern exceeds a much higher threshold, c_2 and "very good for a country's economy" if their latent concern exceeds an even higher threshold, c_3 .⁸ The vector parameter β and $c = (c_1, c_2, c_3)'$ can then be chosen such as to maximize the likelihood of observing the sample on hand. This requires an assumption on the distribution of ϵ . Assuming a standard normal distribution function, results in the ordered probit model, whereas assuming a standard logistic distribution function, results in the ordered logit model. Testing the distribution of the error term, we employ ordered logistic regression model, as described in the section above, in which the estimated set of regression coefficients (β), predict the probability of the outcome of interest (for example, immigration is very good). We estimate our ordered logit using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques.

Analysing together micro (survey) and macro level data could raise some issues, as the latter vary mainly across countries and not necessarily within a country especially in short spans. The common practice in the public opinion literature is to regress a measure of attitude on some macro variables, for instance GDP per capita or unemployment rates along with other contextual micro level data in a cross section of countries. The results reported in this literature include statistically significant coefficients with the expected as well as with the unexpected signs. Instead, in this study, we transform all macroeconomic (*Macroeconomic*) and multiculturalism related (*Foreign*) variables into dummies (high versus low) and "cut-off" our data using sample medians. In this way, we focus mainly on the impact of micro level variables on attitudes, meanwhile controlling for the influence of the macroeconomic and multicultural environment.

Before embarking to empirically estimating the role of various factors in shaping individual's stance on immigration, one may encounter some issues to properly comparing opinions expressed across different survey rounds (strata) within same country as well as across different countries. In principal, cross-stratum/country analysis should be conducted using weights. The European Study Survey (ESS) provides three types of weights: design (*DWEIGHT*), post-stratification (*PSPWGHT*), and population size (*PWEIGHT*) weights.⁹ The main purpose of the design weights is to correct for possible sample selection

⁸Immigration is considered "very bad for a country's economy" if individuals' latent concern is below threshold c_1 .

⁹A detailed discussion on weights is available at https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf.

bias as in some countries respondents have different probabilities to be part of the sample due to the sampling design used. Post-stratification weights are a more sophisticated weighting strategy that uses auxiliary information (on age-group, gender, education, and region) to reduce the sampling error and potential non-response bias. Population size weights correct for the different population sizes of the countries participating in the survey so that each country is represented in proportion to its population size; otherwise, as country samples are similar in size, cross-country estimates may be biased, over-representing smaller countries at the expense of larger ones.

We take these weighting schemes into account and adjust our data using post-stratification (*PSPWGHT*) and population size (*PWEIGHT*) weights to control for qualitative characteristics of the interviewees in each wave within a country and for different country sizes, respectively.

3. Data Description and Analysis

Our empirical analysis covers 22 countries for the period 2002 to 2014 and a total of 267,282 individuals. The main source of our data is the European Social Survey (ESS), a large-scale biennial study of attitudes and values, consisting of seven rounds/waves that date back to 2002.¹⁰ Regarding data availability, some countries in the dataset are represented with observations from all ESS waves, while others only for some waves. Table ?? in the Appendix presents the participating countries (as well as their 3-letter abbreviation code) and the number of observations per country in each wave.

The dependent variable (y) is a vector and contains individuals' responses on six statements about immigration: (i) "immigration is bad or good for country's economy" (*Economy*), (ii) "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants" (*Culture*), (iii) "immigrants make country worse or better place to live" (*Place to Live*), (iv) "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (*Same Race*), (v) "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority" (*Different Race*), and (vi) "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" (*Poorer/NonEU*). The answers are ordinal and limited. For the first three statements, the respondents were shown a card with a 10-point scale, where only the two most distant points were articulated (i.e., 0-bad for the economy and 10-good for the economy; 0-Cultural life undermined and 10-Cultural life enriched; 0-Worse place to live and 10-Better place to live, respectively), while for the last three statements the interviewees had to choose among four points (1-Allow many, 2-Allow some, 3-Allow a few, 4-Allow none). We reduced the 10-point scale of the three first variables (*Economy*, *Culture*, and *Place to Live*) to a 4-point scale based on the quantile distribution of the answers provided. In this way, we have less classes and all six dependent variables are expressed to a 4-point scale. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the correspondence between ESS coding and ours.

Figure 1, below, maps Europe according to the responses of the Europeans on the statements: "immigration is bad or good for country's economy" (left map), "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants" (middle map), and "immigrants make country worse or better place to live" (right map), over our whole period, 2002-2014. Bold blue indicates positive individuals' sentiments toward immigration, while light blue indicates the opposite.

¹⁰The data were gathered in face-to-face interviews conducted in the native language of the interviewee. All rounds together contain micro data for almost 336,964 individuals. Data are available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org>.




Figure 1: European Attitudes toward Immigration

Figure 2 maps the attitude of the Europeans toward immigration policy statements: "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (left map), "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority" (middle map), and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" (right map).




Figure 2: European Attitudes toward Immigration Policy

Two things are worth noting: First, a consistent finding that emerges is that there is no significant variability in the answers of the interviewees across the different statements about immigration. Throughout the sample period, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway consistently show more xenophile attitude toward immigration and to all immigrant profiles, while Greece, Czech Republic and Hungary appear to be more xenophobic. The composition of individuals' sentiments per country and over our sample period is portrayed in Figure ?? and Figure ?? in the Appendix.

It is interesting to explore whether Europeans' attitudes change over time. As the economic effects of immigration have been an issue of utmost importance that have been strongly debated in the media, Table 1, below, depicts the evolution of the attitudes toward "immigration is bad or good for country's economy"

across countries and for three waves, wave 2002-2004 (beginning of the survey), wave 2006-2008 (beginning of financial crisis) and wave 2012-2014 (large inflows of immigrants - Syrian Exodus).

Table 1: Country Trends toward Immigration
("Immigration is Bad/Good for a Country's Economy")

	Wave 2002-2004	Wave 2006-2008	Wave 2012-2014
Austria	2.89	—	2.61
Belgium	2.47	2.55	2.42
Czech Republic	2.44	2.31	2.13
Denmark	2.54	2.72	2.56
Estonia	—	2.47	2.64
Finland	2.73	2.80	2.71
France	2.72	2.57	2.45
Germany	2.70	2.70	2.89
Greece	2.14	2.04	—
Hungary	2.33	2.08	2.12
Ireland	2.63	2.60	2.64
Italy	2.79	—	—
Netherlands	2.61	2.76	2.56
Norway	2.79	2.84	2.84
Poland	2.49	2.83	2.61
Portugal	2.55	2.66	2.67
Slovak Republic	—	2.41	—
Slovenia	2.41	2.39	2.31
Spain	2.79	2.73	2.65
Sweden	2.84	2.84	2.89
Switzerland	2.97	3.06	3.05
United Kingdom	2.44	2.53	2.59
<i>sample mean</i>	2.63	2.63	2.63

"Immigration is bad or good for country's economy". Respondents choose among points: 1=Very bad, 2=Bad, 3=Good, 4=Very good.

Based on Table 1, three things are worth noting: First, Europeans are reasonably in favour of immigrants with an average score of 2.63 out of 4 possible points. About half of the European countries in each wave have rather positive (above sample mean) score implying that both the financial crisis and the large influx of immigrants -especially observed after 2013- did not dramatically alter the attitude of the Europeans.


Second, a consistent finding that also emerges is that countries that were rather positive to immigration at the beginning of the ESS survey have remained positive throughout, while others with rather negative (below sample mean) stance to immigration have remained negative across rounds and over time. Among them, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries (except Denmark) appear to be more welcoming to immigration inflows and this attitude is consistent and even growing over time/waves. In contrast, countries such as Greece, Hungary and Czech Republic show a more "xenophobic" attitude with an even increasing trend over time/waves.

Third, countries that traditionally have been receptive to immigrants such as Germany, the Scandinavian countries, the UK and France show completely different attitude trends over time. Germany and the Scandinavian countries have remained pretty stable over time (with increase of positive sentiments in Germany), while France and the UK show a declining trend with the UK to rank below sample mean. Southern countries, which were all hit hard by the financial crisis, exhibit a mixed picture: Spain and Portugal show a rather positive but declining view over immigration, while Greece remains steadily negative. It would be interesting to follow the development of Greece's and Italy's scores for the wave 2012-2014, as both countries have been "gates" to Europe for thousands of immigrants - mainly refugees from Syria.

Unfortunately, we lack information for Greece for the last wave (wave 2012-2014). Greece's score, however, on the earlier round, wave 2010-2012, is 2.08; our guess is that this negative attitude will continue in the next survey round and get even worse due to the closed border policy. Similarly, there is no information about Italy for the wave 2006-2008 and wave 2012-2014; there is, however, for the wave 2010-2012, which is 2.72 -rather positive (above the sample mean) and quite stable over time. Finally, similar rankings emerge when interviewees comment on the rest of the depended variables, i.e., "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants", "immigrants make country worse or better place to live", "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority", "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority", and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe".

Figure 3, below, visualises the trends of sentiments toward immigration's effects on a country's economy. We plot attitude scores of various groups of countries: with the most positive attitude (Switzerland and Sweden), with the most negative attitude (Greece and Hungary), and for large receptive countries (Germany, France, and the UK).

Figure 3: Trends of European Attitudes toward Immigration



From Figure 3 one can clearly see that despite the challenges Europe has been through, "friendly" to immigration countries and large receptive countries have not altered their immigration attitude over time. In contrast, the attitude of the least xenophile countries exhibits big fluctuation with a strong declining tendency for Greece. For the latter, there is a sharp pick around the year 2004 -as Greece hosted the Olympic Games that year- and a sharp decline thereafter, as the economic conditions deteriorated ("Greek crisis"). Unfortunately, the ESS survey does not provide information for Greece for the period 2012-2014.

Next, a number of regressors are included in the vector set, x . Information on the socio-demographic variables, i.e., gender (*Gender*), age (*Age*), education level (*Education level*), marital status (*Marital status*), health status (*Health status*), net income level (*Income level*), domicile (*Domicile*), employment status (*Employment status*), religiousness (*Religiousness*), political orientation (*Political orientation*), and whether one of the parents was immigrant (*Immigrant parents*) is also derived from the ESS database. In almost all aforementioned variables, we "merged" the range of a respondent's categories just to reduce the number of classes. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the correspondence between ESS coding and ours.


Data on different dimensions of social capital, trust in people (*Trust People*) and in institutions (*Trust Legal System, State of health services, State of Education system*), networks (*Social interaction, Church attendance, Worked in political / action group, Contacted politician / government, Worn campaign badge / sticker, Take part in demonstrations*, and *Member of trade union*) and norms and effective sanctions (*Feel safe, Feel fair treated* and *Victim of burglary / assault*) are retrieved from the ESS as well. In similar vein, as with the sociodemographic variables, we modified the ESS range of interviewees' responses. Table A.2 in the Appendix provides the correspondence between ESS coding and ours.

Data on macroeconomic variables, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (constant 2011 thousand dollars, PPP) (*GDPcap*) and central government debt ratio to GDP (*Debt / GDP*) come from the World Bank, *World Development Indicators* database.¹¹ Elderly people share to country's population (*D_{HighElderlyPop}*) comes from the CIA Factbook database and is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country's elderly population share is above sample's median, and zero otherwise.

The set *Foreign*, includes variables relevant to the multicultural profile of a country, namely percentage of foreigners (foreign-born, first and second generation) to country's population, percentage of asylum seekers to country's population and percentage of nationality acquisitions to country's population -all derived from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). All these variables enter in our model as dummies that take the value of one, if percentage of foreigners to country's population (*D_{HighForeignStock}*), percentage of asylum seekers to country's population (*D_{HighAsylumSeekers}*), percentage of nationality acquisitions to country's population (*D_{HighNationalityAcq}*) are above sample's median, and zero otherwise. Information on the colonial tradition of a country is extracted from Gallaher et al. (2009) and is a dummy (*D_{Colonial tradition}*) that takes the value of one if a country has been a coloniser -even once in its history, and zero otherwise.

Figure 4 associates standards of living -proxied by GDP per capita (y-axis), sentiments toward immigration's effects on a country's economy (x-axis) and size of foreigners to population in the host country (bubble's size equals to the size of foreigners to population):

Figure 4: Sentiments toward Immigration, Standards of Living and Size of Foreigners (%)




¹¹We aimed to include more macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rate, social benefits (%GDP) and the Gini coefficient for income inequality, but collinearity among variables was significant.

Countries with high standards of living, also tend to have more positive attitude toward immigration. Among these countries, Switzerland singles out as it has the largest share of foreign population (size of bubble), the largest GDP per capita and the least opposition to immigration. Germany, Ireland Austria and Spain are also countries which host large number of foreigners and tend to be positive, while Belgium, France, and the UK although they have significant number of foreigners in their population are rather conservatively positive. On the other side of the spectrum, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, and Czech Republic are countries with lower GDP per capita and higher anti-immigration sentiments compared to the rest. Within this group, Greece is more multicultural as 5.7% of its population are foreigners (period average), while Czech Republic and especially Hungary are more homogenous with 3.6% and 1.5% of the their population, respectively, to be foreigners. These two conditions, being less wealthy and with ethnically diverse background, can generate negative sentiments to immigrants. As recourses are few and competition (for jobs and benefits) is intense, immigrants just add more pressure to the system, which eventually translates into more xenophobic reactions towards new comers.

Differences in economic standards of living and presence of foreigners can explain some of the attitude variation across countries. For example, Sweden and Greece have similar presence of foreigners in their population (6.2% and 5.7%, respectively), but Sweden's GDP per capita is 1.5 times bigger than that of Greece. What is striking, however, is that Swedish people show about two times more trustworthiness to each other and to their institutions than the Greeks. Greece also has the lowest score in trust, among the least immigrant-friendly countries, and also the lowest in the entire sample.

Figure 5, below, associates social capital -proxied by trust in people (y-axis), sentiments toward immigration's effects on a country's economy (x-axis) and size of foreigners to population in the host country (bubble's size equals to the size of foreigners over population):

Figure 5: Sentiments toward Immigration, Social Trust and Size of Foreigners (%)



Summary statistics for all variables across all countries in our sample and for the period 2002-2014 are reported in Table ?? in the Appendix. On average, Europeans have a rather positive stance to immigration and different immigrant profiles, as the scores of the six depend variables indicate. They tend to welcome more immigrants of the same/race and less immigrants from poorer non-European countries. Cultural cohesion seems to be more of a concern than economic or life quality impacts of immigration. Commending on some of the characteristics of the individuals in our sample, we can say that on average Europeans are

more social trusters than distrusters in others and their institutions, socialise often, are not much of church-goers, the majority have not worked in political or action groups, or contacted politicians and government officers, or displayed campaign budge, or participated in public demonstrations, or have been member of trade unions, but feel rather safe, fairly treated, and have not often fallen victims of burglary/assault over the last 5 years. Finally, on average, 10% of the population of a European country applied for asylum, 19% have acquired the nationality of the country, about 6.6% are foreigners (immigrants) and almost half of the countries have been colonisers some period in their history with at least one colony.

4. Empirical Results

This section presents our results. First, we examine what factors shape Europeans' sentiments toward immigrants, and second, whether these sentiments vary across different immigrant profiles.

4.1. What Explains Europeans' Xeno-phile(/phobic) Attitudes toward Immigrants?

Table 2 shows the results. Columns (i) to (iii) report odd estimates of equation (1) on the interviewees' attitudes toward "immigration is bad or good for country's economy" (*Economy*), "country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants" (*Culture*), and "immigrants make country worse or better place to live" (*Place to Live*), respectively. Heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses.¹²

Table 2: Estimates of Europeans' Attitude toward Immigrants (odd ratios)

	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Place to Live</i>
Gender	0.828*** (0.0230)	1.061 (0.0453)	1.022 (0.0381)
Age	1.005 (0.0188)	0.936*** (0.0129)	0.926*** (0.0140)
Education level	1.757*** (0.0722)	1.810*** (0.0784)	1.715*** (0.0702)
Marital status	0.981 (0.0768)	0.963 (0.0280)	0.926* (0.0374)
Health status	1.102*** (0.0251)	1.115*** (0.0246)	1.131*** (0.0159)
Income level	1.160*** (0.0300)	1.097*** (0.0259)	1.088*** (0.0196)
Domicile	1.196*** (0.0422)	1.213*** (0.0654)	1.215*** (0.0434)
Employment status	0.833** (0.0713)	0.921* (0.0448)	0.802*** (0.0588)
Religiousness	1.062*** (0.0177)	1.090*** (0.0299)	1.088*** (0.0245)
Political orientation	0.760*** (0.0362)	0.675*** (0.0394)	0.696*** (0.0385)
Immigrant parents	1.628*** (0.136)	1.533*** (0.0764)	1.719*** (0.119)
Trust people	1.303***	1.222*	1.119

Continued on next page

¹²To economise on space, we only report here final specifications. We set out by estimating null models, without independent variables, for all specifications. The null models showed that the variation between countries in attitudes towards immigration was significant. Then, we proceeded by estimating models without and with interaction terms, and finally what is reported here are the final (multi-level) models to account for this variation.

Table 2 – Continued from previous page

	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Place to Live</i>
	(0.119)	(0.144)	(0.105)
Trust legal system	1.540***	1.484***	1.559***
	(0.0404)	(0.0644)	(0.0653)
State of health services	1.350***	1.105	1.257***
	(0.0574)	(0.0701)	(0.0650)
State of education system	1.064**	1.074*	1.116***
	(0.0311)	(0.0408)	(0.0327)
Social interaction	1.010	1.054***	1.001
	(0.0179)	(0.0194)	(0.0166)
Church attendance	1.168***	1.088	1.253***
	(0.0558)	(0.0772)	(0.0860)
Worked in political/action group	1.434***	1.296***	1.343***
	(0.0918)	(0.126)	(0.0883)
Contacted politician/government	1.093**	1.077**	1.071
	(0.0441)	(0.0340)	(0.0465)
Worn campaign badge/sticker	1.151***	1.274***	1.215***
	(0.0254)	(0.0406)	(0.0415)
Taken part in demonstrations	1.255***	1.262***	1.214***
	(0.0705)	(0.0680)	(0.0579)
Member of trade union	0.943	0.946	0.988
	(0.0510)	(0.0421)	(0.0364)
Feel safe	1.473***	1.483***	1.609***
	(0.0613)	(0.0802)	(0.0682)
Feel fair treated	1.251***	1.350***	1.300***
	(0.0178)	(0.0362)	(0.0400)
Victim of burglary/assault	0.921	0.875	0.730
	(0.0198)	(0.0402)	(0.0310)
$D_{HighGDPcap}$	1.350***	1.427	1.303
	(0.264)	(0.409)	(0.374)
$D_{HighDebt}$	0.553*	0.753	0.639
	(0.171)	(0.192)	(0.208)
$D_{HighElderlyPop}$	0.790	1.121	1.100
	(0.132)	(0.390)	(0.381)
$D_{HighAsylumSeekers}$	0.431***	0.556	0.484*
	(0.0976)	(0.222)	(0.191)
$D_{HighForeignStock}$	0.534***	0.916	0.774
	(0.102)	(0.328)	(0.261)
$D_{HighNationalityAcq}$	0.803	0.944	1.150
	(0.174)	(0.298)	(0.341)
$D_{Colonial\ tradition}$	1.197	0.816	0.654
	(0.264)	(0.203)	(0.225)
$D_{HighGDPcap\&\ HighForeignStock}$	2.991***	0.807	0.931
	(0.743)	(0.319)	(0.364)
$D_{HighTrust\&\ HighAsylumSeekers}$	1.124	1.153	1.284*
	(0.0868)	(0.161)	(0.178)
$D_{HighTrust\&\ HighForeignStock}$	1.094	1.090	1.381***
	(0.0952)	(0.139)	(0.151)
$D_{HighTrust\&\ HighNationalityAcq}$	1.036	1.077	0.996

Continued on next page

Table 2 – Continued from previous page

	<i>Economy</i>	<i>Culture</i>	<i>Place to Live</i>
	(0.0718)	(0.139)	(0.116)
$D_{HighTrust\&Unemployment}$	1.029	1.132**	1.175**
	(0.0576)	(0.0585)	(0.0869)
$D_{HighTrust\&LowIncome}$	1.065**	1.007	1.066*
	(0.0303)	(0.0400)	(0.0362)
Observations	165,173	165,772	165,331

The estimates above are odd ratios. One can read the odd ratios as follows: if the odd ratio, a , is bigger than one ($a > 1$), then the probability of an individual to express very positive sentiments toward immigration ($y_{it}=4$, i.e., maximum level), increases by $(a-1)*100\%$, whereas the probability decreases by $(1-a)*100\%$, if the odd ratio is smaller than one ($a < 1$).

In terms of individual characteristics, the educational level of the individual matters the most. Higher levels of formal education tend to be associated with positive attitude toward immigration's effects on economy (75.7%), culture (81%) and making a country a better place to live (71.5%). Evidence has shown that more educated individuals are less likely to express prejudice, negative stereotypes and racism towards minorities (Herrerros and Criado, 2009). For at least two reasons. First, according to the labour market competition theory, as immigrants mostly work in low-skilled manual jobs, they are more likely to be complement rather than substitute to highly educated natives (Bogard and Sherrod, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Second, the link between education and attitudes is deeply rooted in the fact that educational systems tend to promote acceptance of different cultural values and beliefs (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007).

The origin of the respondent's parents (i.e., whether the parents are immigrants, one or both of them) is also an important contributor to positive sentiments toward immigrants. Respondents who are immigrant's children themselves tend to have a positive stance on immigration's effect on economy (62.8%), cultural enrichment (53.3%) and better living (71.9%). It is rather evident that individuals who are raised by immigrant parent(s) are exposed to different cultures, develop better understanding of these cultures and, therefore, express less fear toward immigrants (Finney and Peach, 2004; ?; Goldstein and Peters, 2014).

The following set of characteristics: domicile (live in city/town), high income level, good health status and religiousness of the individual are also positively associated with a friendlier stance toward immigration. More specifically, residing in a big city/town (compared to living in the countryside), higher income level, good health status and being religious make an individual about 19.6%, 16%, 10.2% and 6.2% more prone to be in favour of immigration effects on economy (effects are similar for culture and quality of life). Individuals who live in a city/town have more job options, exposure to cultural events, enjoy more police attendance compared to an individual who lives in the countryside; therefore, they can develop less anti-immigrant sentiments compared to individuals who live away from cities and towns -a finding also documented in Butkus et al. (2016). Further, high levels of income provide financial security; good health status makes one feel psychologically better and not being in competition for social security benefits; and religiousness cultivates positive feelings toward the mankind and promotes treating people equally.

In contrast, gender (being a woman), age (getting older), marital status (being married), employment status (unemployed) and political (right-wing) orientation of the individual appear to be associated with anti-immigration attitudes. In particular, women tend to be about 17.2% less favourable to immigration than men, which lines up with evidence from the literature that women feel more economic threaten from immigration than men (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), while men seem to be more prone to feelings of cultural threat (?).

Age appears to have a positive but small and statistically insignificant effect on sentiments toward immigration's impact on economy, when all other causes are accounted; a finding consistent with the literature (Hempstead and Espenshade, 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Theoretical research suggests

that on economic grounds old individuals should be more open to immigration than younger ones. Assuming that immigration is predominantly labor migration, immigrants can be considered to be substitutes to workers and complements to (older) capital owners (Benhabib, 1996; ?). When age exerts significant influence, it is usually positively correlated to prejudices and anti-immigration attitudes (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; ?). Altogether, older individuals are more likely to support exclusion of out-groups (Gorodzeisky, 2011), which is true for the case of culture and quality of living. Further, to explore whether immigration concerns increase till retirement and decrease afterward, we include the dummy $D_{HighElderlyPop}$. In contrast to some evidence in favour (Calahorrano, 2013), our results do not support this conjecture.

Marital status (being married versus all other alternatives) of the individual plays little role in affecting attitude as the coefficients are statistically insignificant in all specifications except for the case of quality of living, where married individuals tend to be less immigrant friendly. Perhaps safety issues, especially if the family has children, could be part of the explanation.

Consistent with rational competition theories, employment status has always been crucial predictor of attitudes to minorities. Unemployed people and blue collar workers are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiments and support the restriction of immigration (Herrerros and Criado, 2009; ?). Compared to people in paid jobs, jobless individuals are about 16.7% more probable to have a negative stance on immigration as they feel threatened from increased job competition (Gorodzeisky, 2011). Unemployed people may also feel a general threat from new comers, due to their situation, which is at "risk", and express this negativity toward immigrants and their impact on culture and quality of living.

Political ideology, as expected, also associates with stances toward immigration. The literature has found that left-wing people score higher than conservative people on the index on attitudes toward immigration (?). This also holds in our study. All other things equal, right-wing political oriented individuals are 24% less likely to consider immigration beneficial for a country's economy, 32.5% less likely to see how it adds to culture and 30.4% less prone to accept that immigrants can make a country better (Davis and Deole, 2015).

Summing up, among the socio-demographic characteristics of the Europeans, it is the high education level that contributes the most to positive sentiments toward immigrants, whereas political orientation (right-wing) relates the most to anti-immigrant sentiments. Other characteristics such as domicile (living in a city/town), good health status, high income level, and being religious appear to show a positive and statistically significant association with immigration sentiments, while employment status (jobless) associates with negative attitude.

Next set of estimates analyse the role of social capital. Among its three dimensions (i.e., trust, networks, and norms & sanctions), it is the trust in people and institutions (legal, health and education), that has the largest influence in shaping positive sentiments toward immigrants. It has been argued that social trusters have altruistic preferences (?). Social trust implies an expectation that strangers are trustworthy and this expectation is extended to all people, including immigrants from different cultural backgrounds. The "mechanism" that links social trust and positive attitudes toward immigrants is that trusters exclude heuristics and cues based on racial or cultural stereotypes when forming their beliefs about other people's trustworthiness. As our results show, the coefficient related to trust in people is significant and in the expected direction. Social trust is associated with more positive attitude toward immigrants and their impact on economy (30.3%), culture (22.2%) and quality of living (11.9%) than social distrust. This result is also confirmed by the study of Herreros and Criado (2009), which assigns a very important role to social trust in shaping individuals' attitude toward immigration. Likewise, institutional trust, especially trust in legal system, shapes positive attitudes to immigration. Trust in legal system associates with 54% higher probability of positive attitude to immigrants' effect on economy (48.4% and 55.9%, respectively, on culture and quality of living). Satisfaction from the health and education systems also associate with 35% and 6.4%, respectively, more positive sentiments to immigrants' effect on economy. Institutional trust increases society's overall effectiveness (??), make people more confident for the society they live in and the way the society copes with stressful situations. If immigration is such, then trusters in country's institutions, all other variables considered, tend to express more welcoming attitude toward immigrants compared to institutional distrusters.

Social networks of informal type, such as meeting with friends, relatives, colleagues, participating in associations (including churches) and voluntary work (so-called Putnam-type social activities) or formal type, such as work for political parties, professional organisations or trade unions among others (so-called Olson-type social activities) are also found to have positive impact on immigration attitude index. Individuals who are socially and, especially, politically active tend to express more positive immigration sentiments compared to individuals who are not. Among these activities, being member or working for political parties/action groups, participating in campaigns (wear campaign badge/sticker) and lawful public demonstrations significantly increases the probability of having a more positive attitude toward immigrants. The only exception is the association with trade union. Being a member of a trade union decreases the probability of having positive attitude to immigrants. In times of ample national supply of labour, trade unions are likely to oppose recruitment of immigrant workers; while in times of labour shortages, unions will probably be more willing to cooperate. Furthermore, in times of widespread unemployment, competition (actual or presumed) between indigenous and immigrant workers might increase, making inclusive union policies difficult to maintain (?). However, trade union estimates are statistically insignificant.

Conditionally that the engagement in these groups does entail rent seeking or protecting of in-group interests, such activities increase the "embeddedness" of the individual and develop a strong feeling of belonging in society and thus enhance trust and cooperation among individuals.

Solid norms and transparent and effective sanctions reduce the incentives for criminal action; individuals who feel safe, fair treated, and not being victimised, develop stronger ties within their community and feel less threaten. Consequently, absence of criminality is highly associated with positive stance toward immigrants. This conjecture is confirmed by our estimates of feeling safe and fair treated which carry the expected sign and are statistically significant.

In sum, all dimensions of social capital, and particularly, trustworthiness, greatly contribute to friendly and welcoming attitude toward immigrants across all specifications.

Macroeconomic conditions do matter as well for public assessments regarding the impact of immigration. Countries with higher GDP per capita ($D_{HighGDPcap}$) are 35% more probable to associate with positive attitude toward immigrants' effect on economy than countries with lower GDP per capita. The fiscal cost of immigration also appears to be an important aspect of attitude. Countries with high debt ($D_{HighDebt}$) are about 45% more prone to associate with anti-immigration sentiments compared to countries with low debt. For example, immigrants who do not find employment are a fiscal burden on the welfare state and thus for natives of all ages. In this case, the design of the welfare system determines whether individuals with high or low incomes are most affected, as Facchini and Mayda (2009) state. Empirical evidence on the macroeconomic conditions, however, is mixed, mainly weak and sometimes with perverse results. For instance, ? find that higher GDP per capita implies significantly more negative attitudes, while ? and ? support the opposite relation. Other studies (?) find no impact on attitudes. A recent study by Hatton (2016) documents strong positive and negative effect of GDP per capita and public dept, respectively, on individuals' attitude toward immigrants.

The stock of foreigners, i.e., foreign-born people, first and second generation of foreigners/immigrants in a country, contributes to the multiculturalism profile of a country. Multiculturalism, as the acknowledgment and appreciation of racial and ethnic differences, may stir up both positive and negative reactions: it can encourage the decrease of prejudice or can increase the perception of threat to national identity (?). Studies that have tried to reconcile this contradiction found that multiculturalism increases perceptions of threat mostly among individuals with a strong national identity (??). Our results show that citizens in countries with many foreigners ($D_{HighForeignStock}$) and refugees/asylum seekers ($D_{HighAsylumSeekers}$) are about 46.6% and 56.9%, respectively, to show anti-immigrant feelings compared to citizens who live in countries with more ethnically homogenous population and less refugees (?). For some people, perhaps, there can be a threshold beyond which they do not think favourably towards new immigrants. This negative effect of the size of immigrant (foreign) population is also documented in the literature (??), with some studies to find no link at all (Rustenbach, 2010). Further refugees presence is associated with negative sentiments of citizens when it comes to refugees' impact on the quality of living. The number of nationality acquisitions ($D_{HighNationalityAcq}$), although it appears to negatively associate with attitude, in countries that have more nationality acquisitions, it has no statistical significance at all. The colonial tradition of the

country has also no statistical significance.

Nevertheless, the negative impact of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity on immigration attitude may alter when we consider the level of economic development of the country. The coefficient of the dummy, $D_{HighGDPcap\&HighForeignStock}$ captures exactly this. What we observe is that in countries with high percentage of foreign population *and* high GDP per capita sentiments toward immigrants are more positive, especially when it comes to the economic impact, than in countries with high percentage of foreign population and low GDP per capita. Wealthier countries have better economic and institutional mechanisms to provide for and integrate different ethnicities/races. Independent of economic conditions, however, individual's prejudice may remain against foreigners, and this is indeed the case as the coefficient of $D_{HighGDPcap\&HighForeignStock}$ turns negative in the other two specifications, losing however, its statistical significance.

Independent of the economic performance of a country, when we consider country's trust level, the picture that emerges sharply contradicts with the xenophobic one presented above. In countries that host big numbers of foreigners or asylum seekers *and* are rich in social trust, the sentiments toward immigrants tend to be more xenophile than in countries with low social trust. The coefficient of $D_{HighTrust\&HighForeignStock}$ captures exactly this positive effect -bigger than one in all specifications and statistically significant in the last one. This is because rich in social capital countries are more cooperative and egalitarian (Hayashi et al., 1999; ?; Bowles and Gintis, 2002) and therefore able to cope effectively with accommodating new comers. Social trusters are also 28.4% ($D_{HighTrust\&HighAsylumSeekers}$) more prone to have a positive stance on the impact of asylum seekers on culture.

Finally, we revisit the individual characteristics, and particular the ones that relate to the "threat effect", i.e., when an individual is at a "risky" situation and therefore feels threat from new comers. This time, however, we consider how different is a social truster individual who is unemployed ($D_{HighTrust\&Unemployment}$) or a social truster individual who has very low income level ($D_{HighTrust\&LowIncome}$) from equal peers who are social distrusters. Again, in this case results alter dramatically. Unemployed trusters are not negative at all to immigrants than unemployed distrusters. In fact, they are 13.2% and 17.5% more probable to have positive attitude on the immigrants' impact on culture and quality of living, respectively. Likewise, low income social trusters are about 6.5% more positive to immigrants than low income distrusters.

Overall, our empirical analysis has shown that social capital has a positive impact on attitudes toward immigration via two effects, a direct effect: rich in social capital countries have more positive attitude toward immigration than countries which are not, and an indirect effect: social capital and particularly social trust moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people's opinions about immigrants. Individuals with low income, or unemployed people or citizens in multicultural and ethnically diverse environments, where the risk of inter-group conflicts is high, will nonetheless exhibit generally positive attitudes toward immigration if they are social trusters.

4.2. Do Europeans' Sentiments Vary Across Different Immigrant Profiles?

In this section, we turn our attention into examining whether sentiments toward immigrants differ depending on immigrant's profile, i.e., race/ethnicity and country of origin. Different attitude toward different types of immigrants reveals the concerns of the Europeans toward certain cultures, and it is an indication of individuals perception toward the immigration policy (stricter or looser toward certain immigrant profiles) their country should apply.

Table 3 shows the results. Columns (i) to (iii) report the odd ratios of equation (1) on the respondent's attitudes toward "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (*Same Race*), "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority" (*Different Race*), and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer non-European countries" (*Poorer/NonEU*), respectively. Heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 3: Estimates of Europeans' Attitude toward Different Immigrant Types (odd ratios)

	<i>Same Race</i>	<i>Different Race</i>	<i>Poorer/NonEU</i>
Gender	0.970* (0.0156)	1.000 (0.0274)	1.047 (0.0251)
Age	0.947* (0.0266)	0.895*** (0.0214)	0.877*** (0.0172)
Education level	1.690*** (0.0655)	1.771*** (0.0643)	1.596*** (0.0463)
Marital status	0.831*** (0.0574)	0.850** (0.0547)	0.934 (0.0642)
Health status	1.135*** (0.0186)	1.125*** (0.0149)	1.087*** (0.0175)
Income level	1.177*** (0.0268)	1.133*** (0.0225)	1.105*** (0.0215)
Domicile	1.153*** (0.0435)	1.143*** (0.0398)	1.114*** (0.0377)
Employment status	0.868* (0.0685)	0.823** (0.0637)	0.883 (0.103)
Religiousness	1.055 (0.0371)	1.029 (0.0344)	1.073** (0.0373)
Political orientation	0.751*** (0.0279)	0.669*** (0.0328)	0.666*** (0.0323)
Immigrant parents	1.338*** (0.0574)	1.326*** (0.0739)	1.284*** (0.0644)
Trust people	1.105* (0.147)	1.101* (0.141)	1.076 (0.151)
Trust legal system	1.257*** (0.0531)	1.317*** (0.0579)	1.262*** (0.0531)
State of health services	1.107* (0.0648)	1.094 (0.0611)	1.079* (0.0471)
State of education system	0.982 (0.0366)	0.973 (0.0351)	0.954 (0.0379)
Social interaction	1.022 (0.0243)	1.005 (0.0300)	1.034 (0.0334)
Church attendance	1.180*** (0.0690)	1.263*** (0.0889)	1.337*** (0.0965)
Worked in political/action group	1.244*** (0.0545)	1.283*** (0.0977)	1.299*** (0.0783)
Contacted politician/government	1.116*** (0.0423)	1.123** (0.0515)	1.071* (0.0401)
Worn campaign badge/sticker	1.237*** (0.0252)	1.277*** (0.0478)	1.256*** (0.0365)
Taken part in demonstrations	1.187*** (0.0465)	1.131*** (0.0858)	1.126*** (0.0811)
Member of trade union	0.979 (0.0364)	0.992 (0.0385)	0.991 (0.0417)
Feel safe	1.298*** (0.0538)	1.391*** (0.0437)	1.336*** (0.0299)
Feel fair treated	1.224*** (0.0330)	1.193*** (0.0294)	1.157*** (0.0215)

Continued on next page

Table 3 – Continued from previous page

	<i>Same Race</i>	<i>Different Race</i>	<i>Poorer / NonEU</i>
Victim of burglary/assault	0.950 (0.0374)	0.897 (0.0398)	0.789 (0.0333)
$D_{HighGDPcap}$	1.365* (0.455)	1.264 (0.465)	1.301 (0.523)
$D_{HighDebt}$	0.759* (0.214)	0.568 (0.234)	0.619 (0.288)
$D_{HighAsylumSeekers}$	0.757 (0.323)	0.442* (0.195)	0.430* (0.209)
$D_{HighForeignStock}$	0.674 (0.315)	0.683 (0.246)	0.678 (0.271)
$D_{HighNationalityAcq}$	1.041 (0.212)	1.050 (0.403)	1.061 (0.419)
$D_{Colonial\ tradition}$	0.999 (0.466)	1.517 (0.753)	1.456 (0.784)
$D_{High\ ElderlyPop}$	1.168 (0.342)	1.169 (0.503)	1.049 (0.499)
$D_{HighGDPcap\&\ HighForeignPop}$	1.167* (0.516)	2.049 (1.014)	2.312 (1.300)
$D_{High\ Trust\&\ HighAsylumSeekers}$	1.239* (0.148)	1.303** (0.137)	1.257** (0.147)
$D_{High\ Trust\&\ HighForeignPop}$	1.278* (0.169)	1.270* (0.160)	1.221 (0.169)
$D_{High\ Trust\&\ HighNationalityAcq}$	0.933 (0.102)	0.969 (0.0953)	1.019 (0.110)
$D_{High\ Trust\&\ unemployment}$	1.000 (0.0649)	1.099** (0.0485)	1.070 (0.0773)
$D_{High\ Trust\&\ Low\ Income}$	1.092* (0.0544)	1.076** (0.0376)	1.062*** (0.0247)
Observations	165,779	165,772	165,573

All variables that were important in the previous analysis remain important in the present analysis as well, carrying the expected sign; however, in some cases, their impact changes across different immigrant profiles.

Among the sociodemographic characteristics of the Europeans, high level of education, having immigrant parents, domicile (living in a city/town), good health status, high income level, and being religious, still pertain their statistical significance and contribute to a positive stance toward immigrants; however, the xenophile attitude slightly decreases, in some cases, across different immigrant profiles: starts with very positive stance to immigrants of the same race/ethnicity, becomes less positive to immigrants of different race/ethnicity and decreases even further to immigrants from poorer non-European countries. There are two notable exceptions, though. First, higher educated individuals do welcome all immigrants, but they are even more receptive to immigrants from different racial/ethnic background. This finding further validates the conjecture that educational systems promote and celebrate acceptance of different cultural values and beliefs (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Second, religious individuals are prone to be more positive to all immigrant profiles, especially to the poor non-European immigrants. We assume that it is the humanitarian attitude that makes citizens, who can afford to help and citizens who believe in helping others, to have a more sympathetic attitude. Women, married, unemployed, right-wing politically oriented and

older individuals appear to express more exclusionary reactions to all immigrants; these reactions become even more negative to immigrants from different race/ethnicity and especially to those from poorer non-European countries.

Further, all three dimensions of social capital continue to greatly contribute to the xenophile attitude of the individuals. Our results show that countries rich in social capital do not actually differentiate across different types of individuals; this is indeed the essence of social capital: the enhancement of solidarity and effective cooperation among members of a society embracing everybody, native or immigrant.

Macroeconomic conditions affect individuals' sentiments toward immigrants, as discussed before, but we find no statistical difference between high and low GDP per capita (or Debt) countries when it comes to their attitude toward different immigrant profiles. Societies with more elder citizens tend to be more in favour of immigrants of the same race/ethnicity compared to the rest, but results have no statistical significance.

In multicultural countries -identified by large stock of foreign people, asylum seekers, nationality acquisitions and colonial tradition- there is more of a perceived group threat, leading to more antipathy toward the out-group -especially in the case of asylum seekers ($D_{HighAsylumSeekers}$), which is the only statistical significant coefficient. In wealthier countries, however, multiculturalism does not pose necessarily a threat as the coefficient of the dummy $D_{HighGDPcap\&HighForeigners}$ indicates. As inter-group resource competition is less fierce, citizens' attitudes are friendlier to all types of immigrants than in a less wealthy multicultural country.

The picture alters entirely when we consider social trust and intersect it with multiculturalism (for instance, $D_{HighTrust\&HighForeignPop}$): In societies with high social trust and strong multicultural background, immigrants of all types are welcome; slightly more are those from the same race/ethnicity. Perhaps, the integration of these immigrants poses less strain to the economy and culture of the host country.

Finally, unemployed trusters do not actually differentiate among immigrants. Same holds for low income social trusters.

Overall, a consistent finding that emerges is that public attitude toward immigrants appears to vary across different immigrant profiles. Europeans are slightly more xenophile to immigrants of the same race/ethnicity. Strong presence of social capital only improves xenophobic attitudes and differentiation across immigrant profiles.

Robustness

We have performed several checks to sharpen the robustness of our results. We split our sample in two sub-periods and estimate attitudes for the periods, 2002-2008 and 2010-2014, in order to examine whether attitudes have changed over time, and especially after the financial crisis (2008) and the Syrian Exodus (2013). Results did not alter significantly.

Further, in all interaction terms we replaced social trust with trust in institutions.¹³ Results mildly varied without, however, showing any significant change.

We also examined whether the geographic location of the respondents matters. We classified our countries into various groups, for instance, North and South and estimated equation (1) for each group. Results remained unaltered.

Finally, we also included various (mainly macroeconomic) control variables in the Z set. Results barely modified.

Overall, results do not change in any significant way across different specifications, sub-samples and alternative definitions.¹⁴

5. Conclusion

Substantially increasing international migration flows over the past several decades have fundamentally changed the composition of the European countries' populations and brought immigration to the

¹³Using principal component analysis, we constructed an index of institutional satisfaction/trust.

¹⁴All sensitivity analysis results are available upon request.

front of the research and policy agenda. The question of how public opinion toward immigration is formed has become as relevant as ever with implications for both present and potential immigrants as well as for policymakers to meet the challenges associated with increased immigration.

Using the most recent version of the European Study Survey, a large cross-national European population survey, this paper studies the attitudes toward immigrants and the contextual factors that shape these attitudes in Europe. Based on detailed information on 267,282 respondents over the period 2002-2014, we find that despite the eventful past years, Europeans, on average, are still positive toward immigrants, with the North European countries to exhibit the least xenophobic attitudes. Among personal characteristics of the individual, the level of education shapes xenophile sentiments, while right-wing political orientation leads to xenophobic stance. Macroeconomic conditions as well as ethnic diversity do play an important role in shaping attitudes. A salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the impact of other contextual factors, individuals (and countries) with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes toward all immigrants -independently of their background- than the rest of the population (countries). Furthermore, social capital moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people's opinions about immigrants.

Our findings corroborate with the important role the literature has assigned to social capital in increasing efficiency and growth by facilitating collaboration between individual conflicting interests towards the achievement of increased output and equitable distribution (Hall, 1999).

The implication of our results is straightforward. In increasingly multicultural societies, social capital makes people more receptive to immigration. A successful public policy, therefore, can reduce inter-group social tensions and increase social cohesion by investing more in social capital.

An issue for further exploration that has largely been overlooked is how survey respondents understand the term "immigrant". The public perceptions of immigration may largely diverge from the set of individuals identified as immigrants in government statistics; Blinder (2013) has shown that this was exactly the case in the UK. Such perceptions, however, could mistakenly lead to negative stances toward immigration and politicians and policy makers, taking into considerations such attitudes, can form restrictive immigration policies that would impede the knowledge (for instance, international students/academicians/researchers) mobility and cultural exchange across countries having negative implications for an economy's innovation and growth prospects.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Number of Observations (obs) by Country and Wave

Country	Country Code	<i>European Study Survey (ESS) Waves</i>						
		2002 (obs)	2004 (obs)	2006 (obs)	2008 (obs)	2010 (obs)	2012 (obs)	2014 (obs)
Austria	AUT	2,257	2,256	2,405	-	-	-	1,795
Belgium	BEL	1,899	1,778	1,798	1,760	1,704	1,869	1,769
Switzerland	CHE	2,040	2,141	1,804	1,819	1,506	1,493	1,532
Czech Republic	CZE	1,360	3,026	-	2,018	2,386	2,009	2,148
Germany	DEU	2,919	2,870	2,916	2,751	3,031	2,958	3,045
Denmark	DNK	1,506	1,487	1,505	1,610	1,576	1,650	1,502
Estonia	EST	-	1,989	1,517	1,661	1,793	2,380	2,051
Spain	ESP	1,729	1,663	1,876	2,576	1,885	1,889	1,925
Finland	FIN	2,000	2,022	1,896	2,195	1,878	2,197	2,087
France	FRA	1,503	1,806	1,986	2,073	1,728	1,968	1,917
United Kingdom	GBR	2,052	1,897	2,394	2,352	2,422	2,286	2,264
Greece	GRC	2,566	2,406	-	2,072	2,715	-	-
Hungary	HUN	1,685	1,498	1,518	1,544	1,561	2,014	1,698
Ireland	IRL	2,046	2,286	1,800	1,764	2,576	2,628	2,390
Italy	ITA	1,207	-	-	-	-	960	-
Netherlands	NLD	2,364	1,881	1,889	1,778	1,829	1,845	1,919
Norway	NOR	2,036	1,760	1,750	1,549	1,548	1,624	1,436
Poland	POL	2,110	1,716	1,721	1,619	1,751	1,898	1,615
Portugal	PRT	1,511	2,052	2,222	2,367	2,150	2,151	1,265
Sweden	SWE	1,999	1,948	1,927	1,830	1,497	1,847	1,791
Slovenia	SVN	1,519	1,442	1,476	1,286	1,403	1,257	1,224
Slovakia	SVK	-	1,512	1,766	1,810	1,856	1,847	-
Total		38,308	41,436	36,166	38,434	38,795	38,770	35,373

Table A.2: Variables and Sources

Variable	Description
Dependent (y)	
<i>Economy</i>	Immigration is bad or good for country's economy
<i>Culture</i>	Country's cultural life undermined/enriched by immigrants
<i>Place to Live</i>	Immigrants make country worse/better place to live
<i>Same Race</i>	Allow immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
<i>Different Race</i>	Allow immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
<i>Poorer/NonEU</i>	Allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
Socio-demographic	
Gender	Gender of the respondent
Age	Age of the respondent, calculated
Education level	Highest level of respondent's education
Marital status	Legal marital status of respondent
Health status	Subjective general health
Income level	Household's total net income
Domicile	Domicile, respondent's description
Employment status	Main activity, last 7 days
Religiousness	How religious are you
Political orientation	Placement on left right scale
Immigrant parents	mother/father are immigrants
Social Capital	
Trust people	Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful
Trust legal system	Trust in the legal system
State of health services	State of health services in country
State of education system	State of education in country
Social interaction	How often meet friends/relatives/colleagues
Church attendance	How often attend religious services
Worked in political/action group	Worked in political party or action group
Contacted politician/government	Contacted politician/government official
Worn campaign badge/sticker	Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker
Take part in demonstrations	Taken part in lawful public demonstration
Member of trade union	Member of trade union/organisation
Feel safe	Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area
Feel fair treated	People take advantage of you/Treat you fair
Victim of burglary/assault	Victim of burglary/assault last 5 years

Continued on next page

Table A.2 – Continued from previous page

	Variable	ESS code	Our code
27	Dependent (y)		
	<i>Economy</i>	0=Bad for economy,..., 10=Good for economy	1=Very bad,..., 4=Very good
	<i>Culture</i>	0=Cultural life undermined,..., 10=Cultural life enriched	1=Very undermined,..., 4=Very enriched
	<i>Place to Live</i>	0=Worse place to live,...,10=Better place to live	1=Much worse,..., 4=Much better
	<i>Same Race</i>	Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None	1=None,..., 4=Many
	<i>Different Race</i>	Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None	1=None,..., 4=Many
	<i>Poorer/NonEU</i>	Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None	1=None,..., 4=Many
	Socio-demographic		
	<i>Gender</i>	1=Male, 2=Female	0=Male, 1=Female
	<i>Age</i>	13-123 years old	1=<24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44,..., 6=>65
<i>Education level</i>	0=Unclassified into 5-level,..., 5=Tertiary	1=< Primary, 2=Primary/Secondary, 3=Tertiary	
<i>Marital status</i>	1=Married,..., 6=Never married	0=Non-married, 1=Married	
<i>Health status</i>	1=Very good, 2=Good, 3=Fair, 4=Bad, 5=Very bad	1=Bad, 2=Fair, 3=Good	
<i>Income level</i>	J=1st decile,..., H=10th decile	1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High	
<i>Domicile</i>	1=A big city,..., 5=Countryside	1=Countryside, 2=City/Town	
<i>Employment status</i>	1=Paid work,..., 8=Housework	0=Unemployed, 1=Employed	
<i>Religiousness</i>	0=Not at all religious,..., 10=Very religious	1=Not at all, 2=Moderate, 3=Very	
<i>Political orientation</i>	0=Left,..., 10=Right	1=Left, 2=Middle, 3=Right	
<i>Immigrant parents</i>		(Constructed) 0=No, 1=Yes	
Social Capital			
<i>Trust people</i>	0=Not trusted,..., 10=Most people trusted	0=No trust, 1=Trust	
<i>Trust legal system</i>	0=No trust at all,..., 10=Complete trust	0=No trust, 1=Trust	
<i>State of health services</i>	0=Extremely bad,..., 10=Extremely good	0=Unsatisfied, 1=Satisfied	
<i>State of education system</i>	0=Extremely bad,..., 10=Extremely good	0=Unsatisfied, 1=Satisfied	
<i>Social interaction</i>	1=Never,..., 7=Every day	0=Not very often, 1=Very often	
<i>Church attendance</i>	1=Every day,..., 7=Never	0=Rarely, 1=Often	
<i>Worked in political/action group</i>	1=Yes, 2=No	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Contacted politician/government</i>	1=Yes, 2=No	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Worn campaign badge/sticker</i>	1=Yes, 2=No	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Take part in demonstrations</i>	1=Yes, 2=No	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Member of trade union</i>	1=Yes, currently, 2=Yes, previously, 3=No	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Feel safe</i>	1=Very safe,..., 4=Very unsafe	0=No, 1=Yes	
<i>Feel fair treated</i>	0=People take advantage of you,..., 10=People treat you fair	0=Unfair, 1=Fair	
<i>Victim of burglary/assault</i>	1=Yes, 2=No	0=No, 1=Yes	

Note: All variables are extracted from the European Study Survey (ESS)




Figure A.1: Sentiments toward Immigration's Impact on (a) Economy (b) Culture, and (c) Place to Live.




Figure A.2: Sentiments toward Immigration Policy for (a) Same Race/Ethnicity, (b) Different Race/Ethnicity, and (c) Poorer non-European Immigrants.

Table A.3: Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
(y variables)					
Economy	256,331	2.591	0.935	1	4
Culture	256,850	2.561	1.071	1	4
Place to live	256,441	2.614	0.892	1	4
Same Race	259,601	2.778	0.849	1	4
Different Race	259,392	2.507	0.872	1	4
Poorer/Non EU	258,859	2.437	0.890	1	4
(x variables)					
-Sociodemographic					
Gender	267,005	0.532	0.499	0	1
Age	267,282	3.754	1.694	1	6
Education level	265,758	2.279	0.466	1	3
Marital status	267,282	0.298	0.457	0	1
Health status	266,995	2.584	0.635	1	3
Income level	199,430	1.845	0.736	1	3
Domicile	266,503	1.625	0.484	1	2
Employment status	267,282	0.055	0.227	0	1
Religiousness	265,197	1.945	0.819	1	3
Political orientation	235,269	1.924	0.750	1	3
Immigrant parents	266,854	0.144	0.352	0	1
-Social Capital					
Trust people	266,438	0.644	0.479	0	1
Trust legal system	260,985	0.640	0.480	0	1
State of health services	263,854	0.649	0.477	0	1
State of education system	254,428	0.552	0.497	0	1
Social interaction	266,668	0.623	0.485	0	1
Church attendance	266,088	0.256	0.436	0	1
Worked in political/action group	266,492	0.040	0.196	0	1
Contacted politician/government	266,424	0.147	0.354	0	1
Worn campaign badge/sticker	266,294	0.077	0.267	0	1
Take part in demonstrations	266,388	0.066	0.248	0	1
Member of trade union	263,952	0.424	0.494	0	1
Feel safe	264,863	0.776	0.417	0	1
Feel fair treated	265,389	0.537	0.499	0	1
Victim of burglary/assault	266,551	0.188	0.390	0	1
-Macroeconomic					
GDP per capita (constant 2011, PPP)	267,282	38,801	18,877	8,815	90,807
Debt (%GDP)	267,282	57.67	28.51	4.400	146.2
Elderly population (% population)	267,282	18.47	2.071	12.84	21.76
-Foreign					
Asylum seekers (% population)	267,282	0.101	0.120	0.0005	0.774
Stock of foreigners (% population)	267,282	6.623	4.784	0.0164	23.78
Nationality acquisition (% population)	267,282	0.189	0.148	0.0026	0.624
Colonial tradition	267,282	0.39	0.488	0	1