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Abstract

We study the response of stock prices to monetary policy, distinguishing the effects of exogenous policy actions from “Delphic” actions that reveal the Federal Reserve’s macroeconomic forecasts. To decompose composite monetary policy surprises into these separate components, we exploit differences in central bank and private sector forecasts to construct a measure of Federal Reserve private information. Contractionary monetary policy shocks of either type cause a fall in stock prices with exogenous shocks having a larger negative effect. However there is an important asymmetry; when FOMC meetings are unscheduled or when the fed funds rate reverses direction, stock prices actually rise in response to a contractionary Delphic shock.

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1 Introduction

From the early 1980s, the primary tool of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has been to target the federal funds rate. Since the early 1990s, the fed funds rate decision has been accompanied with the release of a corresponding FOMC statement which provides communication about the likely future course of monetary policy.\footnote{For early work on the importance of Federal Reserve communication see Gürlaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005). For a more recent study see Feroli, Greenlaw, Hooper, Mishkin, and Sufi (2016).} There is an ongoing debate regarding the exact nature of the content that is communicated through the FOMC statements. The conventional view is that the FOMC uses the statement to send signals about the current and future path of interest rates. Recent work (Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) among others) has suggested that there is an extra “Delphic” dimension, whereby FOMC communication about monetary policy decisions is tied to a signal about their forecast of economic activity. In this paper we aim to shed light on this Delphic component of monetary policy through the lens of the stock market. Specifically, we study how the stock market responds to monetary policy by explicitly separating Delphic policy actions related to revelation of information about economic activity from actions that represent exogenous shocks. We focus on the stock market reaction as it is an important component of the overall monetary policy transmission mechanism, which can drive economic activity by affecting wealth, cost of capital and overall expectations.

We build on the framework of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) (BK henceforth) and use an identification strategy based on high-frequency futures market data. Since stock prices should not react to policy changes that are already anticipated, changes in futures prices that occur in a narrow window around FOMC announcements are used to construct a measure of monetary policy surprise. Given the growing importance of Federal Reserve communication, we extend the federal funds rate based monetary policy surprise used by BK to also include any communication about unexpected future changes in monetary policy. This is done using an extended set of futures data, from the current month up to 4 quarters ahead.

This measure of monetary policy surprise consists of both the traditional notion of an ex-
ogenous monetary policy shock and any potential Delphic signal about economic activity. We take the view that FOMC signals about economic activity should surprise the market if they reveal any asymmetric information that the Federal Reserve possesses. This does not require taking a stand on whether the Federal Reserve actually has superior information relative to the market (à la Romer and Romer (2000)). To capture this asymmetric information we construct a measure of private information that combines market survey data with the Federal Reserve’s internal forecasts. Specifically, our measure is defined as the difference between the Greenbook forecasts produced by the Federal Reserve Board’s staff and the consensus forecast from the market based Blue Chip survey. Our estimation methodology proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we regress the monetary policy surprise on our measure of private information. The estimates suggest that when the Greenbook forecast is more optimistic relative to the market’s forecast, it is related to a positive monetary policy surprise (i.e. a contractionary surprise). The fitted value from this regression is the Delphic component of the policy surprise while the residual is a clean measure of an exogenous monetary policy shock. In the second step we regress the stock return in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement on the Delphic shock and the exogenous shock.

We layout a simple conceptual framework to understand how exogenous and Delphic shocks can affect stock prices differently. Under some simple conditions, the stock response to an exogenous shock is expected to be negative, while that of the Delphic shock can be either positive or negative. Our baseline results using data from 1991 to 2010 find a stock response to the exogenous shock that is similar to BK. A hypothetical surprise increase of 25 basis points in the expected 1 year ahead fed funds rate results in about a 1.45% fall in the S&P 500 index. On the other hand, a contractionary Delphic shock of the same size reduces stock prices by about 0.50%; a statistically significant difference relative to the exogenous shock response. Thus, on average stock prices fall in response to surprise contractionary shocks, whether they are exogenous or Delphic in nature. But we find that there is an important asymmetry in the stock response on certain specific FOMC meetings, especially concerning Delphic shocks. These episodes occur
when FOMC policy actions were enacted at unscheduled dates (also called inter-meeting moves) or when there is a reversal in the direction of the change in the fed funds rate target (also called turning points). On these particular FOMC meetings, the stock market falls more in response to a contractionary exogenous shock but actually *rises* in response to a contractionary Delphic shock.

To complement our high-frequency analysis, we use a monthly vector autoregression based decomposition of stock prices using the framework of Campbell and Ammer (1993). This methodology breaks down current excess stock returns into revision of the expectation of discounted future dividends, the real interest rate, and future excess returns. We find that on average the response of excess returns to exogenous shocks is mostly due to changes in expected future excess returns and dividends, while the excess return response to a Delphic shock is primarily attributed to changes in expected dividends. These vector autoregression results confirm the asymmetric effects of monetary policy actions (especially the Delphic shocks) on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. The stock response to Delphic shocks on these meetings appears to be driven mostly by movements in the expected future excess returns.

This paper lies at the intersection of two distinct strands of the literature. First, there is a long line of work that studies the effect of monetary policy on stock prices, building on the seminal work of BK. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and more recently Kurov (2012) expand on this work by separately estimating the stock response to surprises to the federal funds rate and surprises in forward guidance. There has also been work exploring the cross-sectional firm level stock price reactions to monetary policy. See Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), Ippolito, Ozdagli, and Perez-Orive (2013) among others. Finally, while our analysis focuses exclusively on a narrow window around FOMC meetings, there is intriguing new evidence that discusses other occasions on which the Federal Reserve communicates to the public (for example in speeches made by FOMC members). These are explored in more detail by Cieslak, Morse, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2015), Lucca and Moench (2015) and Neuhierl and Weber (2016). However, all these papers use the composite monetary policy surprise measure, while the
focus of our paper is to separate the effect of Delphic monetary shocks from the exogenous shocks. Second, this paper is also related to the growing literature on how central bank signals about fundamentals can affect economic activity. Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) empirically highlight the role of Delphic signals and their effect on survey expectations. Melosi (2015) and Tang (2015) provide a more structural perspective on the signaling channel of monetary policy. Based on the work of Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) among others, unscheduled FOMC meetings are thought to be more likely to reflect new information about the economy. The stock market response results in this paper are consistent with this interpretation. In light of the growing evidence of the signaling channel of monetary policy, we advocate accounting for the asymmetric effects on these meetings to get the full picture of the monetary transmission mechanism.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we layout a conceptual framework to understand how monetary policy actions can affect the stock market, with a focus on the role of private information. In section 3 we detail the construction of the monetary policy surprise and our measure of Federal Reserve private information. Section 4 provides the main results and some concluding remarks are presented in section 5.

2 Stock Prices and Monetary Policy

To identify the effect of monetary policy on stock prices, one cannot directly regress stock prices on the central bank’s policy instrument (for example the short-term interest rate). The endogenous reaction of both stock prices and the central bank’s policy instrument to common economic conditions leads to the classic simultaneous equation bias. Thus the literature has tried to isolate exogenous variation in the policy instrument to overcome this problem. Following the work of BK, an important strategy involves high-frequency identification using federal funds futures contracts. In this section we first outline a simple framework to understand futures based identification, with a special emphasis on why central bank private information can matter. This treatment is closely related to the framework laid out in Miranda-Agrippino (2016). Next we
extend the framework and discuss how stock prices may respond differently to an interest rate change by the central bank depending on if the change reflects an exogenous monetary policy shock or if it reflects a signal about the central bank’s private information.

2.1 Monetary Policy Surprise from Futures Data  Let $p_t^{(h)}$ be the price of a futures contract at time $t$ that matures in $t + h$. The underlying asset for this futures contract is the federal funds rate. Thus we can write

$$p_t^{(h)} = i_{t+h|t} + \zeta_t^{(h)}$$

(2.1)

where $i_{t+h|t} = E_t i_{t+h}$ is the expected fed funds rate at $t + h$ and $\zeta_t^{(h)}$ is the risk-premium. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the relevance of risk-premia in fed funds futures markets, but they are not crucial to our analysis and we will set them to zero in the illustrative model.\(^2\)

The next step is to consider a general monetary policy rule where the central bank changes the short-term interest rate $i_t$ in response to current, lagged and forecasts of certain indicators of economic activity.

$$i_t = g \left( \hat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{CB} \right) + e_t$$

(2.2)

where $e_t$ represents a monetary policy shock and $g(.)$ is the central bank’s reaction function. $\hat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{CB}$ contains the central bank information set available at time $t$, including any current information that is used to form forecasts. The hat denotes that not all economic data is available contemporaneously and must be estimated.

An important convention in the monetary policy literature is that $e_t$ is assumed to be an exogenous shock, i.e. it is unrelated to economic activity. Thus if we can estimate $e_t$, then we can regress stock prices on $e_t$ to identify the effects of monetary policy. One strategy for identification is to study changes in fed funds futures data around FOMC announcements, following BK.

\(^2\)Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) find that fed funds futures risk-premia are slow-moving and do not change much around FOMC announcements. On the other hand, Miranda-Agrippino (2016) finds a bigger role for risk-premia.
Consider the futures contract maturing at the end of the current month (i.e. $h = 0$). Specifically, consider the futures prices of this contract measured just before the FOMC announcement

$$p_{t-\varepsilon} = i_{t|t-\varepsilon} = g\left(\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{M}\right)$$

(2.3)

The $M$ superscript denotes the fact that the futures price will reflect expectations based on the market’s information set, $\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{M}$. The key assumption in the futures based identification is that no other macro news announcements are released in the window between $t - \varepsilon$ and $t$. Thus we have that $\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t-\varepsilon} = \widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}$. Now consider the futures price after the FOMC announcement.

$$p_{t}^{(0)} = i_{t|t} = g\left(\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{CB}\right) + e_{t}$$

(2.4)

Note that the information set that is relevant to the short rate set by the central bank is its own information set. The monetary policy surprise is measured as the change in the futures contract

$$mps_{t} = p_{t}^{(0)} - p_{t-\varepsilon}^{(0)} = g\left(\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{CB}\right) - g\left(\widehat{\Omega}_{t|t}^{M}\right) + e_{t}$$

(2.5)

where the last equality holds if we assume a linear reaction function $g(.)$ for the central bank. More generally, we can show that the analysis used to derive the last equation also applies to futures contracts that expire not in the current month, but in the future. These surprises likewise capture an exogenous component, which is a signal about shocks to the interest rate that are expected to occur in the future. But the surprises also capture a signal about future shocks to the interest rate that are related to central bank private information about macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e the Delphic shocks).

Equation 2.5 makes it clear that in the special case that the information set of the central bank

\(^3\text{For simplicity, let us assume that the market has full knowledge of the central bank’s reaction function.}\)
and the market coincide, the monetary policy surprise recovers the exogenous monetary policy shock. However the assumption of no asymmetric information may not be tenable. There is a growing body of literature suggesting a role for central bank signals about macro fundamentals. Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) find a “Fed information effect” where Fed communication affects agents’ expectation of future economic activity. Melosi (2015) sets up a DSGE model with an explicit signalling channel of monetary policy and finds that it has empirically relevant effects. Finally, Tang (2015) also finds that the empirical patterns in the U.S. inflation data are consistent with the existence of a signalling channel. While this a nascent literature, it does seem to suggest that the “signalling/information” channel is important. In this paper we add to this literature by studying the response of the stock market and testing whether it responds differently to Delphic shocks when compared to traditional exogenous monetary policy shocks.

In the first step of the estimation procedure we separate the monetary policy surprises into i) exogenous component and ii) private information component. Equation 2.5 suggests that a simple linear regression will suffice as long as we can construct a variable that measures the difference in the information set of the central bank relative to the market. Essentially we need a private information variable that captures \( \hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{M}^{t|t} \). In section 3.2 below we discuss in detail how we create this variable using forecast data. With this variable in hand, we run the following regression.

\[
mps_t = c + \gamma (\hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{M}^{t|t}) + e_t
\]

Using this equation we construct the residual \( \hat{e}_t \) and the fitted value \( \hat{\gamma} (\hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{M}^{t|t}) \). In the next step of the estimation procedure we regress the change in the stock price on the residual and fitted value.

\[
\Delta S_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \hat{e}_t + \beta_2 \hat{\gamma} (\hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{M}^{t|t}) + u_t
\]

where \( S_t \) is the stock price and \( \Delta \) represents the change in a narrow window around the FOMC announcement. What should we expect for the sign of the two coefficients \( \beta_1 \) and \( \beta_2 \)? Next we layout a simple “model-free” theoretical framework that can help us understand the related
2.2 Stock Price Response to Exogenous and Delphic Shocks: A Conceptual Framework

The key intuition can be obtained by thinking broadly about stock prices depending on discount rates and cash-flow news. Consider a surprise increase in the interest rate by the central bank that is solely due to an exogenous monetary policy shock. In conventional models where monetary policy has real effects this translates to bad news about future cash flows and higher discount rates. Thus both discount rates and cash flow news work to create a fall in stock prices. This is the traditional channel of how monetary policy affects the stock market. But monetary policy can have an additional effect if the change in the interest rate is related to revelation of central bank private information. A surprise increase in the interest rate in this case can have an ambiguous effect on stock prices, because there are distinct and potentially opposing effects. First, consider the effect of a contractionary shock on expectations of future cash flows. If the rise in interest rates has a contractionary effect on the economy, it will mean bad news about future cash flows. However this decision to increase interest rates could be driven by the central bank’s forecast being more optimistic relative to the market. This Delphic signal could lead the market to revise their expectations of economic activity upwards in response. This upward revision of expectations will mean good news about future cash flows. Regarding discount rates, the conventional wisdom is that these rates should rise with a contractionary policy shock. But if the Delphic shock affects the risk premium then this effect could be counteracted. Overall there is not much theoretical work that analyzes the effect of Delphic shocks. Thus we are not confident in assessing the sign of the impact of this shock on discount rates as well.

Next we flesh out this intuition in a little more detail. Consider the stock price $S_t$ that depends on the discount rate $r_t$ (composed of a risk-free rate and an equity premium) and news about future cash flows $X_t$ (adopting the convention that an increase in $X_t$ represents positive news about cash flows). Both these terms in turn depend on (among other things) the exogenous monetary policy shock ($e_t$) and the interest rate surprise related to revelation of private information by the central bank ($\gamma g(\tilde{\Omega}^{CB}_{t|t} - \tilde{\Omega}^{M}_{t|t})$), what we have labeled the Delphic

component. Using the shorthand notation $\tilde{g}_t \equiv \tilde{\gamma}g(\hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{CM}^{t|t})$ we have

$$S_t(r_t(e_t, \tilde{g}_t), X_t(e_t, \tilde{g}_t))$$

Consider the derivative of stock price to the exogenous monetary policy shock

$$\frac{dS_t}{de_t} = \frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t} dr_t + \frac{\partial S_t}{\partial X_t} dX_t$$

The first term $\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t}$ is the partial derivative of stock prices to discount rates. This derivative is negative based on the idea that a higher discount rate should lower the present value of associated payoff stream and thus lower stock prices. Recall that we define an increase in $e_t$ as representing a contractionary shock to the interest rate in equation 2.2. In conventional models this would imply that the sign of the term $\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t}$ is also positive. The sign of the product of the first two terms is negative, $(\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t} dr_t) < 0$. The sign of the third term $\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial X_t}$ is positive by construction based on the convention adopted above that an increase in $X_t$ represents positive news about cash flows. The last term $\frac{dX_t}{de_t}$ captures how an exogenous monetary policy shock affects cash flow news. We expect a contractionary shock to reduce future output and thus imply bad news about future cash flow, i.e. this last term should be negative. Thus the sign of the product of the third and fourth terms is also negative, $(\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial X_t} dX_t) < 0$. The total response of the stock market to an exogenous shock is the sum of two negative components and thus we should expect $\beta_1$ in our regression from equation 4.2 to be negative.

Next consider the response of stock prices to a Delphic shock.

$$\frac{dS_t}{d\tilde{g}_t} = \frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t} dr_t + \frac{\partial S_t}{\partial X_t} dX_t$$

As discussed above, $\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial r_t} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial S_t}{\partial X_t} > 0$. For the private information variables, we will adopt the convention that a positive value for $(\hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}_{CM}^{t|t})$ implies that the Fed’s forecast of economic activity is more optimistic than the market’s. Based on this convention we would expect that, if
the Fed reveals a more optimistic outlook for the economy (e.g. higher inflation forecast) then it is more likely to raise interest rates as a result. In section 4.2 we show from the first step of our empirical estimation that this is indeed the case. Thus a more rosy outlook for the Fed implies an increase in $\tilde{g}_t$. How does this rise in the Fed’s policy tool translate into discount rates? In the conventional model this derivative $\frac{dr_t}{d\tilde{g}_t}$ should be positive. However, there is not much to fall back on in the literature in terms of the effects of Delphic shocks on discount rates. Thus it would be prudent to be uncertain about the sign of $\frac{dr_t}{d\tilde{g}_t}$.

Finally, what is the sign of $\frac{\partial X_t}{\partial \tilde{g}_t}$? In conventional models of monetary policy, the typical assumption is that there is no asymmetric information and thus $\tilde{g}_t$ is always zero. In a setting with asymmetric information a positive value for $\tilde{g}_t$ can have two effects. It does reflect an increase in the Fed’s policy instrument and could thus translate into a contractionary effect on the economy, i.e. bad news about expected future cash flows. However, there is some recent empirical work suggesting that central bank signals can directly affect private sector beliefs about future economic activity. Melosi (2015) builds a model with an explicit signaling channel of monetary policy. The model incorporates a mechanism that could lead agents to expect higher inflation in response to a signal tied to an increase in the interest rate. In a similar vein, Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) sketch a model where the central bank can affect the market’s expectations about the natural rate of interest. In their model an increase in interest rate can cause the market to revise upwards their expectation of the natural rate, leading to a rise in economic activity. Finally, in a recent paper Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) use similarly constructed private information variables and show that the component of the monetary policy surprises that is related to optimistic Fed private information predicts upward revisions of economy activity by forecasters. All these studies suggest that $\frac{\partial X_t}{\partial \tilde{g}_t}$ could be positive. Thus both components of the overall derivative $\frac{dS_t}{d\tilde{g}_t}$ can reasonably be expected to be either negative or positive. The overall sign of the derivative will depend on the relative strength of the two potentially competing effects.

To summarize, the conceptual framework suggests that we should have a strong prior for $\beta_1$
to be negative but there is more uncertainty about the sign of $\beta_2$ as it can reasonably be expected to be either positive or negative.

3 Data

We use the S&P 500 index to measure the response of the stock market. The prices are measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements, starting at 10 minutes before the announcement and ending 20 minutes after the announcement. For our baseline results, we use the sample period 1991-2010. There are 180 total FOMC policy decisions over this time frame. We drop a total of four data points. We exclude 8/17/2007 and 11/25/2008 due to stock market data unavailability for those dates. We also drop 9/17/2001 and 3/18/2009 following Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016). This leaves 176 observations in our sample. In the next subsection we detail the construction of the monetary policy surprise and conclude this section by discussing the private information variables constructed from Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts.

3.1 Monetary policy surprise

Our measure of the surprise change in monetary policy is constructed from interest rate futures contracts, as in Kuttner (2001). Federal funds rate and Eurodollar futures contracts capture the market’s expectations about future Federal Reserve actions. Changes in these futures contracts around FOMC announcements therefore serve as a measure of the change in policy that is unanticipated by the market. Since any expected change in policy will already be priced into financial assets, the reaction of asset prices to monetary policy should be entirely due to this surprise component.

We want the monetary policy surprise measure to capture surprises to expectations about future fed funds rate changes, in addition to any surprise to the current month’s fed funds rate target. Thus to construct our measure of the monetary policy surprise, we follow Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) and use five futures contracts: the current month’s fed funds futures, the 3-month ahead fed funds futures, and the 2-quarter, 3-quarter, and 4-quarter ahead Eurodol-
lar futures. For the baseline results, the surprise in each contract is measured as the change in the futures rate in a 30 minute window (10 minutes before to 20 minutes after) around FOMC policy decisions as in Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005). But we also discuss results obtained using a broader daily window. Taken together, the five contracts contain rich information about the short and medium term path of expected interest rates.

To summarize this information in a parsimonious way we perform a principal components analysis. Let $X$ denote a $T \times 5$ matrix of the change in the price of the 5 futures contracts, where $T$ is the number of FOMC meetings. We can then perform a principal components analysis of the futures price changes

$$X = F\Lambda + \tilde{\eta}$$

where $F$ are factors, $\Lambda$ are factor loadings, and $\tilde{\eta}$ is an error term. The first principal component of $F$ explains more than 80% of the total variation across all the contracts. We therefore use this first principal component as our baseline measure of monetary policy surprises. Figure 1 plots this monetary policy surprise measure using both the 30 minute and daily window. The two series display a high degree of correlation with some minor discrepancies around the financial crisis in 2008 and in the early 1990s. To facilitate interpretation of our results below, we normalize the policy surprise such that its effect on the four quarter ahead Eurodollar futures contract is equal to unity. Thus the coefficient from a regression of stocks on the monetary policy surprise will measure the effect on the stock market of a 1% surprise rise in the fed funds rate that is expected 4 quarters from now.

3.2 Federal Reserve Private Information Our measure of Federal Reserve private information is constructed using the FOMC Greenbook forecasts and the private sector Blue Chip forecasts, and is similar to the approach used in Barakchian and Crowe (2013) and Campbell,

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4 For comparison, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use only the current month fed funds futures contract in their baseline results.

5 This detailed principal component analysis is presented in the online appendix.

6 This is essentially identical to the measure used in Nakamura and Steinsson (2015) which they call the “policy news shock”
Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016). The Fed’s Greenbook forecasts represent the information set of the central bank $\hat{\Omega}^{CB}_{t|t}$ from equation 2.6, while the Blue Chip forecasts proxy for the market’s information set $\hat{\Omega}^{M}_{t|t}$. Greenbook forecasts are constructed by the Federal Reserve Board’s staff a week prior to every scheduled FOMC policy meeting and are released to the public following a roughly five year lag. Blue Chip forecasts are compiled from market professionals on a monthly basis and released on the 10th of every month. For each FOMC policy decision (t) the corresponding measure of Fed private information is calculated as the most recent Greenbook forecast minus the last Blue Chip forecast prior to the policy decision that is of the same forecast horizon as the relevant Greenbook forecast. In table 1, for each FOMC meeting we list the corresponding Greenbook and Blue Chip forecast dates.

Each set of forecasts predicts the values of macroeconomic variables on a quarterly basis. For the 1991-2010 sample we use the following four variables: real GDP, CPI, industrial production, and the civilian unemployment rate. For each variable, both set of forecasts contain at least five different forecast horizons: the current quarter forecast, the quarter ahead forecast, two quarter ahead forecast, three quarter ahead forecast, and four quarter ahead forecast. Our measure of private information for variable i at forecast horizon j is:

$$\hat{\Omega}^{CB}_{i,t+j|t} - \hat{\Omega}^{M}_{i,t+j|t}$$

These variables are plotted in figure 2. A few interesting points stand out. These variables are persistent and for each variable as the forecast horizon increases, the persistence rises. This suggests that the Federal Reserve’s internal forecasts are not completely inferred by the market based on FOMC meeting actions and announcements. This is especially true for the longer-horizon forecasts. For a given variable, in addition to the autocorrelation for each individual forecast horizon, the forecasts for different horizons are also correlated with one another. Forecast horizons that are “closer” to each other are more highly correlated. For example, the 4 quarter ahead forecast is quite highly correlated with the 3 quarter ahead forecast but not with the
These patterns guide us in choosing the private information measures that will be used in the regression analysis below. First, given the high cross-correlation among forecasts of different horizons (for a given variable) we use only the nowcast and the 4 quarter ahead forecast. Next, given the high persistence of the private information variables, we include the first lag in our regression. Thus our baseline specification will have the contemporaneous and first lag of the nowcast (0 quarter ahead forecast) and 4 quarter ahead forecast for four macro variables: GDP, CPI, Industrial Production and Unemployment. Thus we have a total of 16 private information variables that capture the relevant information. A potential alternative is to follow the approach of Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano, and Melosi (2016) and construct a short and long factor for each variable using principal component analysis. We found that the short factor and long factors correlate very highly with the nowcast and the 4 quarter ahead forecasts.

4 Results

4.1 Stock prices and monetary policy surprise We start by exploring the relationship between changes in the S&P 500 index ($\Delta S_t$) and our measure of monetary policy surprise ($mps_t$) detailed in the previous section. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these two measures using both a tight window and broad window around FOMC announcements. The tight window measures the change from 10 minute before to 20 minutes after the announcement. The broad window is just the daily change. The correlation between the tight and broad measures of the monetary policy surprise is high (0.81), while the correlation is lower for stock returns (0.53). For the policy surprise, moving to a broader window increases the standard deviation slightly, but it does so considerably more for the stock return. Thus stock returns in the broad window appear to have more noise relative to the tight window. The table also provides information separated by unscheduled FOMC meetings and meetings that correspond to “turning points” (which are instances when the federal funds rate target is changed in the direction opposite to
previous changes). The specific dates for the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings are listed in table 1. There has been some discussion in the literature that FOMC meetings of these two types are “unusual” relative to the other meetings. BK document that stock price reactions are much larger on turning point FOMC meetings. Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004) find that monetary policy surprises on unscheduled FOMC meetings are more likely to reveal information about the state of the economy, i.e. suggesting a role for Delphic shocks (using our terminology). We will discuss the importance of these particular episodes for stock prices in more detail below and in section 4.3. For now, we want to point out that both these papers use data up to the early 2000s (2002 for BK and 2003 for Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004)). Extending the data up to 2010, we notice that both monetary policy surprises and stock returns are substantially more volatile on unscheduled and turning point days, consistent with the idea that these meetings are somewhat different.

Table 3 presents the results from the regression of $\Delta S_t$ on $mps_t$ using the 30 minute window with robust standard errors in parentheses. $R^2 > 0.3$ provides support for the assumption that monetary policy surprises are major drivers of stock prices in this narrow window. Consistent with BK, the specification in column (1) reports a significant decline in the S&P 500 following a positive monetary policy surprise (i.e. an unexpected tightening of monetary policy). A 1% surprise rise in the fed funds rate that is expected 4 quarters from now, results in a 5.2% fall in stock prices.\footnote{Notice from table 2 that the standard deviation of the policy surprise is 7 basis basis points. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the policy surprise leads to a 0.36% fall in stock prices.} This coefficient is precisely estimated with statistical significance at the 1% level. Column 2 presents regression results where the monetary policy surprise is interacted with a dummy variable that jointly represents FOMC meetings that are unscheduled and those associated with turning points. Column 3 and 4 presents the interaction results where the dummy variable is separated into unscheduled meetings and turning point meetings. The stock response to a monetary policy surprise is slightly lower in columns 2-4. The interaction coefficients are all negative but none of them are statistically significant. These negative point estimates suggest that if there is any evidence of asymmetry in the response of stock prices, it points to a larger
negative response on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. Since the standard errors are relatively large, it is reasonable to conclude that the response of stock prices to monetary policy surprises is stable across these different types of FOMC meetings.

Table 4 shows the regression results using the wider daily window. Column 1 shows that the response of stock prices is now statistically insignificant and much lower in magnitude relative to the tight window \((-2.2\% \text{ vs } -5.2\%)\). The \(R^2\) is also substantially lower at .035. The daily stock response in table 4 is also lower relative to the findings in BK. There are two main reasons why our daily results are different from BK’s daily results. First, we use a broader measure of monetary policy surprise that captures forward guidance shocks, while BK just used federal funds rate surprises. And second, we extend the sample end date from 2002 to 2010. Similar to table 3, columns 2-4 show the regression results with dummy interactions for unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. The coefficients on the interactions are negative and two out of the three are not significant. Thus the daily data regressions confirm that the stock market response to monetary policy surprises is stable across the different FOMC meetings and if anything more likely to be negative in these episodes.

Taken together, it is an indication that stock returns in the broad window have a lot more noise relative to the tight window. The underlying identifying assumption in this paper is that the relevant window around FOMC announcements does not contain any other important macroeconomic news event. In light of the above results, this identifying assumption is more credible with the tight window and motivates us to use the tight window for our benchmark results below in section 4.3. This is also consistent with the recommendation of Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) among others. To conclude this section, figure 3 shows a scatter plot of the stock return and the monetary policy surprise in the tight 30 minute window (which is our preferred measure that is used in the results below). There is a clear negative relationship. The black triangles mark the Unscheduled FOMC meetings while the red squares represent turning points, highlighting that the bigger monetary policy surprises occur at these two types of meetings.
4.2 Monetary Policy Surprise and Private Information

In section 3.2 we discussed the properties of the private information variables constructed from forecast data. An important implication was that the Federal Reserve does not seem to completely reveal all of its private information through the FOMC announcement. Thus we would like to use only the component of private information that is inferred by the market from the FOMC announcements. As discussed above, we proceed by first regressing the monetary policy surprise measure on the private information variables. The estimating equation is reproduced below

\[ mps_t = c + \gamma_{i,j} \left( \hat{\Omega}^{CB}_{i,t+j|t} - \hat{\Omega}^M_{i,t+j|t} \right) + e_t \]  

(4.1)

Table 5 shows the results from this regression using the nowcast and 4 quarter ahead forecasts for the GDP, CPI, Unemployment and Industrial Production private information variables. Given the persistent nature of the private information variables, we also include the first lag. The p-value jointly tests the null hypothesis that the private information variables have no explanatory power. This is rejected at the 1% level. The \( R^2 \) from the regression is 0.17, which is substantial but also highlights the fact that a major part of the monetary policy surprise is exogenous with respect to the Fed’s private information.

In the theoretical motivation sketched out in section 2.2, we emphasized that the response of stock prices to private information depends on how forecast differences are related to interest rate changes. The regression coefficients from table 5 can inform us about the sign. Note that a positive value for the private information variable for GDP, CPI and IP means that the Fed has a relatively optimistic forecast for the economy. For unemployment a positive sign implies the opposite. The first step regression is reported in table 5, where 0Q refers to the nowcast and 4Q refers to the four quarter ahead forecast. The sign of all the coefficients on the private information nowcast variables suggest that an optimistic forecast results in a positive value for \( \bar{\gamma}_t \equiv \gamma g(\hat{\Omega}^{CB}_{t|t} - \hat{\Omega}^M_{t|t}) \), i.e. a contractionary policy surprise. But not all the signs on the lagged variables have the signs consistent with this interpretation. For example, the coefficient on the
lagged 4 quarter ahead forecast of IP implies that if the Fed has a more positive outlook for IP, that is related to an expansionary policy surprise. This is most likely a combination of some noise and the fact that there is a high amount of correlation in the content of the different private information variables. We have run the first step regression with different combinations of private information variables (including using principal component analysis) and find that most of the coefficients are consistent with \( \tilde{g}_t \) being positive. Another reassuring aspect is that the resulting fitted values and residuals are quite similar regardless of the exact combination of private information variables used.

Figure 4 displays the exogenous shock (residual) and Delphic shock (fitted value) over time, with summary statistics reported in table 6. The Delphic shock is typically of a smaller magnitude with a standard deviation roughly half that of the exogenous shock. The standard deviation of the Delphic shock is roughly stable even when we narrow down to unscheduled or turning point FOMC meetings. On the other hand, the standard deviation of the exogenous shocks is much larger in these particular episodes. The Delphic shock displays a few notable episodes, with relatively large contractionary shocks in the late 90s and expansionary ones in the early 2000s and 2008-2009. The overall pattern of the exogenous shock is similar to the monetary policy surprise, which is unsurprising given that the exogenous shock explains around 80% of the variation of the monetary policy surprise.

4.3 Stock Price Response to Exogenous and Delphic Shocks

Now we are ready to run our second step regression. We regress the change in the S&P 500 index in the 30 minute window on the exogenous and Delphic shocks obtained from the first step discussed above. The estimating equation is

\[
\Delta S_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \hat{\epsilon}_t + \beta_2 \hat{\gamma}_{i,j} \left( \hat{\Omega}_{i,t+j|t}^{CB} - \hat{\Omega}_{i,t+j|t}^M \right) + u_t
\]

(4.2)

Since the regressors in this second step are generated in the first step, we have to account for the added sampling uncertainty. This is done by bootstrapping the standard errors. The key idea
is to conduct the resampling at the beginning and thus to perform both steps of the two-step regression procedure for every bootstrap sample. We use 10,000 replications in the bootstrap procedure.

The results are presented in table 7 with the bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 shows that the exogenous shock has a negative and significant effect on stock returns with a slightly larger magnitude than the monetary policy surprise. Specifically, a 1% surprise rise in the fed funds rate that is expected 4 quarters from now, results in a precisely estimated 5.8% fall in stock prices (relative to the 5.2% fall for the monetary policy surprise). The effect of the Delphic shock is also negative but much lower at -1.9%. While this coefficient by itself is not statistically significant, it is significantly different from the coefficient on the exogenous shock (with a p-value for the difference of 0.043). As shown in table 6, exogenous shocks are more volatile than Delphic shocks and we reinterpret the coefficients to get a better gauge of the size of the effects. Specifically, stock prices fall 0.35% and .05% in response to a one standard deviation exogenous and Delphic shock respectively. An important implication is that on average surprise Federal Reserve decisions and announcements that are related to revelation of their private information have a lower effect (in terms of both economic and statistical significance) on the stock market as compared to actions that are exogenous shocks.

However, there is important asymmetry in the effect of these shocks. The second column shows the results where the exogenous and Delphic shocks are interacted with a dummy variable that jointly represents FOMC meetings that are unscheduled and those associated with turning points. The overall stock response is lower in magnitude for the exogenous shock and higher in magnitude for the Delphic shock by about a percentage point. The interaction coefficient on the exogenous component is $-3.7$ (with a p-value of 0.11) implying a total response of stock prices to exogenous shocks on these particular FOMC meetings is substantially larger in magnitude at $-8.4$. With a higher variance of exogenous shocks on these particular meetings, stock prices fall

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8The standard deviation of the exogenous shock is slightly lower relative to the monetary policy surprise. Thus the stock response to a one standard deviation exogenous shock is essentially identical to the monetary policy surprise response.
by 0.9% in response to a one standard deviation exogenous shock. The interaction coefficient on the Delphic component is also large but positive at 15.5 (with a p-value of 0.04). The total response of stock prices to a Delphic shock on these particular FOMC meetings is 12.5 (with a p-value of 0.055). Even with a lower variance of Delphic shocks on these FOMC meetings, it implies a 0.38% rise in stock prices in response to a one standard deviation Delphic shock. Thus there appears to be a clear distinction in how the stock market interprets exogenous vs. Delphic monetary policy actions on these particular FOMC meetings.

The third and fourth columns show the results where the interaction for unscheduled FOMC meetings and turning point FOMC meetings is done separately. The same pattern is obtained with the interaction coefficients. Clearly, the standard errors are larger as there are a total of 17 observations for the unscheduled dates and only 8 for the turning point dates. Nevertheless the sign of the interaction coefficients on these particular dates continue to show a larger negative response to the exogenous shock and a positive response to the Delphic shock.

Next we check the robustness of the results to sample selection. First, we consider the zero lower bound episode. Since late 2008, the fed funds rate has been stuck around zero and all the variation in our monetary policy surprise measure is driven by forward guidance surprises rather than any target rate change surprise. To check whether our results are driven by this, we rerun our estimation excluding the zero lower bound episode. The first two columns of table 8 present these results. Column 1a shows that the overall response to exogenous shocks and Delphic shocks is similar to the baseline case reported in table 7, with similar standard errors as well. The interaction terms with the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings also paint a similar picture. Relative to the baseline results, on these particular FOMC meetings, the stock response to exogenous shocks is slightly more negative and the response to Delphic shocks is slightly less positive. Both the interaction terms are significant with p-values of 0.045 and 0.049 respectively.

Next we focus on the FOMC meetings in the early 1990s. Starting with February 1994, the

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9 We also tried truncating the sample in late 2007 to coincide with the beginning of turmoil in the financial markets. The results are very similar to the ones presented here.
FOMC started releasing a statement to accompany its monetary policy decision. To check if our results are driven by the 1991-1993 sample, we rerun the second step regressions using data starting with the February 1994 FOMC meeting. Columns 2a and 2b report these results. The overall response to both exogenous and Delphic shocks is slightly larger for the post-1994 sample. For the interaction coefficients we find that the sign of the responses is similar to the baseline case. The magnitude of the effects is a little larger for the exogenous shock and a little smaller for the Delphic shock on these particular FOMC meetings. However, the standard errors are somewhat larger in this case.

Finally, we control for the employment report when running our regressions. Recall that the underlying identifying assumption is that no other important macroeconomic event or announcement is occurring in the relevant window around the FOMC announcement. However, as pointed out by Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) there are a handful of FOMC meetings that coincide with macro news releases. Specifically, in the early 1990s there are 7 FOMC meetings that occur on the same day as the release of the employment report. Of special concern are 5 of these meetings that are unscheduled because if the Federal Reserve and the stock market are both responding to the employment report then our estimates will be mistakenly picking up that relationship. As discussed above, in constructing the the stock price change and monetary policy surprises the narrow 30 minute window was preferred precisely to avoid this particular issue. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) show that using the narrow 30 minute window does indeed help in circumventing this identification issue. Here we confirm that our main results are not affected by excluding the 7 FOMC meetings that coincide with the employment report. Column 3a of table 8 shows that the coefficients on the exogenous and Delphic shocks are very similar to the baseline results in table 7. Column 3b shows that on the unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings, the stock price response is in the same direction as the baseline results with the p-value on the interaction term for the exogenous shock and the Delphic shock being 0.043 and 0.02 respectively. Excluding the employment report in fact makes the magnitude of these effects a little larger.
Overall, we conclude that our results are robust to sample selection. Next we use a VAR based decomposition to further understand the stock price response.

4.4 VAR Based Decomposition  In section 2.2 we discussed a broad but abstract theoretical framework where stock price movements can be broadly attributed to two main components: i) news about discount rates and ii) news about dividends (or cash flow news). In this section we use a more concrete decomposition of stock prices based on the work of Campbell and Shiller (1988). The main goal is to understand the importance of these two components in driving the stock market responses to monetary policy. The exact methodology used here follows the work of Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Campbell and Ammer (1993).

The key idea is to decompose the current period’s unexpected excess returns ($e_{t+1}^y$) into revisions of expectations of discounted future dividends ($\tilde{e}_{t+1}^d$), future excess returns ($\tilde{e}_{t+1}^y$) and the real interest rate ($\tilde{e}_{t+1}^r$)$^{10}$

$$e_{t+1}^y = \tilde{e}_{t+1}^d - \tilde{e}_{t+1}^r - \tilde{e}_{t+1}^y$$

where

$$\tilde{e}_{t+1}^d = (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta d_{t+1+j}$$

$$\tilde{e}_{t+1}^r = (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta r_{t+1+j}$$

$$\tilde{e}_{t+1}^y = (E_{t+1} - E_t) \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \rho^j \Delta y_{t+1+j}$$

$\rho$ is the steady state level of the price to dividend ratio and is set to .9962 following BK. The expectations terms in 4.4 need to be estimated to evaluate the decomposition in equation 4.3. A vector autoregression is used to construct these expectations. Campbell and Ammer (1993) show how this relationship can be modeled using the variables of interest and any other variables that might be helpful in forecasting excess returns. The resulting model is a six variable VAR

$^{10}$The details of the derivation can be found in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Campbell and Ammer (1993).
with one lag.

\[ z_t = A z_{t-1} + w_t \]

The endogenous variables \((z_t)\) include the excess stock return, real interest rate, relative 3-month T-bill rate, change in the 3-month T-bill rate, the dividend-price ratio, and the spread between the 10-year and 1-month Treasury yields. From this VAR we can estimate the variables of interest in equation 4.3 using the following equations

\[
\begin{align*}
    e_y^{t+1} &= s_y w_{t+1} \\
    \tilde{e}_y^{t+1} &= s_y \rho A (I - \rho A)^{-1} w_{t+1} \\
    \tilde{e}_r^{t+1} &= s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} w_{t+1} \\
    \tilde{e}_d^{t+1} &= e^{t+1} + \tilde{e}_r^{t+1} + \tilde{e}_y^{t+1}
\end{align*}
\]

where \(s_y\) and \(s_r\) are vectors with zeros and ones to pick out the relevant variables. The variance of the current excess equity return can be decomposed into the sum of the three variances and covariances.

\[
\begin{align*}
    Var(e^{t+1}) &= Var(\tilde{e}_d^{t+1}) + Var(\tilde{e}_r^{t+1}) + Var(\tilde{e}_y^{t+1}) \\
    &\quad -2Cov(\tilde{e}_d^{t+1}, \tilde{e}_r^{t+1}) - 2Cov(\tilde{e}_d^{t+1}, \tilde{e}_y^{t+1}) + 2Cov(\tilde{e}_y^{t+1}, \tilde{e}_r^{t+1})
\end{align*}
\]

Using monthly data from 1991 to 2010 (to match our baseline estimation sample), we report the variance decomposition of excess equity returns in table 9. For ease of comparison, the first two columns present the results from BK where they use data from 1989 to 2002. The left column shows the total contribution to the variance while the second column shows the shares (divided by \(Var(e^{t+1})\)). The majority of variation in excess returns is accounted for by the variance in expected dividends and expected future excess returns. Relative to the BK results, our data suggest a slightly bigger role for dividends (42% vs. 32%) and a smaller role for future excess returns (29% vs. 38%). At this stage, we should mention that there is recent work that points
out some potential issues with this framework. These concerns are primarily related to the residual based nature of the decomposition, see for example the work of Chen and Zhao (2009). Thus we do not want to place too much emphasis on how our results compare to BK because of the differences in the sample dates and how the monetary policy surprises are constructed. Rather, the main purpose of the analysis in this section is to compare how the decomposition varies between the exogenous and Delphic shocks. We can more reasonably expect that the shortcomings of this residual based decomposition are not systematically related to the manner in which we construct the exogenous and Delphic shocks. Thus our emphasis will be on the difference in the decomposition between the exogenous shock and Delphic shock rather than on the level of the effects themselves.

In this framework, a natural way to evaluate the effect of monetary policy is to include the exogenous and Delphic shock directly in the VAR. Denoting the estimated exogenous shock by $\hat{e}_t$ and the estimated Delpic shock $\hat{\gamma}_{i,j} \left( \hat{\Omega}_{CB}^{i,t} + \hat{\Omega}_{M}^{i,t} \right)$ by $\tilde{g}_t$ we get

$$z_t = Az_{t-1} + \phi_1 \hat{e}_t + \phi_2 \tilde{g}_t + \tilde{w}_t \tag{4.7}$$

The VAR is estimated at a monthly frequency which requires aggregating the monetary policy shocks from the FOMC meeting frequency to a monthly frequency. We follow a simple rule of summing up any monetary policy shocks in a given month to get the monthly number. Having estimated the VAR, we want to calculate the effect of the two monetary policy shocks on the discounted sums in equation 4.4. We can use the relationship outlined above in equation 4.5 together with the orthogonality of the monetary policy shocks. For example, consider the equation for the real interest rate

$$\tilde{e}_{r_{t+1}} = s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} w_{t+1} = s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} (\phi_1 \hat{e}_t + \phi_2 \tilde{g}_t + \tilde{w}_t) \tag{4.8}$$

From this equation the effect of the exogenous shock on the present value of current and expected
future real rates is given by
\[ s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} \phi_1 \]  
(4.9)

and the effect of the Delphic shock on the present value of current and expected future real rates is given by
\[ s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} \phi_2 \]  
(4.10)

The response of the present value of current and expected future excess returns and dividends is calculated in a similar way. To account for the parameter uncertainty of the VAR coefficients in \( A \), standard errors are calculated using the delta method following Campbell and Ammer (1993) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Table 10 shows the response of the discounted sums to i) the composite monetary policy surprise, ii) the exogenous shock and iii) the Delphic shock. For ease of comparison we reproduce the results from BK in the first column where the sample runs from 1989 to 2002. In the next 3 columns we present the results where both the VAR and the monetary policy shocks are estimated using the 1991 to 2010 sample. For the second column we replace the exogenous and Delphic shocks with the composite monetary policy surprise in the VAR (equation 4.7). Relative to BK, the monetary policy surprise has a larger effect on current excess equity return. Note this is not surprising as our monetary policy surprise measure contains forward guidance surprises in addition to the federal funds rate surprises used in BK. However as found in BK, the current excess return is explained mostly by discounted sums of dividends and future excess returns.

Relative to the composite monetary policy surprise, the exogenous shock (shown in the third column) has a very similar effect on current excess returns. The size of the impact is slightly larger (-17.6 vs. -16.0), which is consistent with the regressions from section 4.3. This larger negative response is driven mostly by a larger positive response of future excess returns (4.6 vs 3.5). The response to the Delphic shock are quite different, although the standard errors are substantially larger. The overall effect on current excess returns is smaller at -7.7 The most interesting aspect is the composition of this response. The share of the dividend response is
much bigger at -9.02, accounting for 117% of the total effect on current excess returns (relative to 66% for the exogenous shock). This large response of dividends is counteracted by a negative response of future excess returns. This response is in contrast to that of BK’s federal funds rate surprise, the composite monetary policy surprise and the exogenous monetary policy shock. For each of these three expected future excess returns rise.

Next we extend the above analysis to account for the differential effects on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. This can be done in a straightforward manner using the framework of equation 4.7. Denote the unscheduled and turning point dummy by $D_t$.

$$z_t = A z_{t-1} + \phi_1 \tilde{e}_t + \phi_2 \tilde{g}_t + \phi_3 D_t + \phi_4 \tilde{e}_t D_t + \phi_5 \tilde{g}_t D_t + \tilde{w}_t \quad (4.11)$$

Using this equation the effect on the various components can be calculated as above. For example, on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings the effect of the exogenous shock on the present value of current and expected future real rates is given by

$$s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} \left( \phi_1 + \phi_4 \right) \quad (4.12)$$

and the effect of the Delphic shock is given by

$$s_r (I - \rho A)^{-1} \left( \phi_2 + \phi_5 \right) \quad (4.13)$$

Table 11 shows these estimates. The response of current excess returns and its components to the exogenous shock ($\tilde{\phi}_1$) is similar to that reported in table 10. The interaction effects of exogenous shocks ($\tilde{\phi}_4$) are small as well. The overall response of current excess returns to a Delphic shock is more negative once we allow for the interaction (-16.62 vs. -7.73). This larger negative response on regular FOMC days is counteracted by a large positive response on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings. Specifically the total effect on these meetings ($\tilde{\phi}_2 + \tilde{\phi}_5 = 17.04$) is roughly the same size as the baseline effect but with the opposite sign.
positive response is mainly driven by a large fall in the future excess return and to a lesser extent by a rise in dividends in response to contractionary Delphic shocks. The VAR decomposition exercise confirms that the stock market responds very differently to Delphic shocks that occur on unscheduled or turning point FOMC meetings. Moreover, the results point to a change in the risk premium as a major driver of this asymmetric response. In recent work Hanson and Stein (2015) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) find that monetary policy shocks have substantial effects on bond interest rate term premia. Our results show that, at least on certain FOMC dates, the stock risk premium also seems to respond to monetary policy shocks. We view our results as providing complementary evidence to this active area of research.

5 Conclusion

What are the effects of FOMC announcements on the economy? In this paper we aim to shed light on this question by studying the response of stock prices. By exploiting differences in central bank and private sector forecasts we construct a measure of Federal Reserve private information. We use this measure to separate monetary policy surprises into exogenous and Delphic shocks. Exogenous shocks are surprise changes in monetary policy which are unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals whereas Delphic shocks are surprise changes in policy attributable to the Fed’s asymmetric information about the state of the economy.

We find that, on average, stock prices fall more in response to exogenous shocks relative to Delphic shocks. However, on unscheduled and turning point FOMC meetings, contractionary Delphic shocks result in an increase in stock prices. These results highlight the unconventional Delphic channel of monetary transmission where contractionary policy actions can stimulate the economy. An additional important implication of our results is that an FOMC that is concerned with financial market reaction should pay extra attention to its statements on turning point and unscheduled meetings.

11While the response of future excess returns is precisely estimated with significance at the 1% level, standard errors in general are somewhat large and thus these results should be interpreted with some caution.
A promising possibility for future work includes analyzing firm and industry level responses to the exogenous and Delphic shocks. Heterogeneous firm-level responses may be informative about which kind of firms or industries are particularly sensitive to the revelation of Federal Reserve private information.
References


Table 1: This table reports all FOMC dates from 1991-2010 and the corresponding Greenbook and Blue Chip forecast dates used to construct private information variables. Unscheduled (intermeeting) FOMC decisions are denoted with an X and turning point (policy reversal) FOMC decisions are denoted with TP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOMC Date</th>
<th>Greenbook Date</th>
<th>Blue Chip Date</th>
<th>Unsched/TP</th>
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<tr>
<td>4-Feb-94</td>
<td>31-Jan-94</td>
<td>10-Jan-94</td>
<td>18-Aug-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-Apr-94</td>
<td>16-Mar-94</td>
<td>10-Mar-94</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-May-94</td>
<td>13-May-94</td>
<td>10-May-94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Jul-94</td>
<td>30-Jun-94</td>
<td>10-Jun-94</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-Aug-94</td>
<td>12-Aug-94</td>
<td>10-Aug-94</td>
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<tr>
<td>27-Sep-94</td>
<td>21-Sep-94</td>
<td>10-Sep-94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Dec-94</td>
<td>14-Dec-94</td>
<td>10-Dec-94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: This table reports all FOMC dates from 1991-2010 and the corresponding Greenbook and Blue Chip forecast dates used to construct private information variables. Unscheduled (intermeeting) FOMC decisions are denoted with an X and turning point (policy reversal) FOMC decisions are denoted with TP.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All FOMC days</th>
<th>Turning points</th>
<th>Unscheduled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 Minute</td>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>30 Minute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monetary Policy Surprise</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S&amp;P 500 Return</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
<td>-2.53</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: This table reports the summary statistics calculated using a tight 30 minute window and a broad daily window. The monetary policy surprise measure reported in percentage points is constructed using a principal component analysis of futures data, see section 3.1 for details. The S&P 500 return is also reported in percentage points.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500 (30 Minute Window)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise</td>
<td>-5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled/Turning Point Dummy</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
<td>-1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled FOMC Dummy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Unscheduled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point Dummy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Turning Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the monetary policy surprise, both measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>S&amp;P 500 (Daily Window)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise</td>
<td>-2.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled/Turning Point Dummy</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unschedued FOMC Dummy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Unscheduled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turning Point Dummy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP Surprise x Turning Point</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the monetary policy surprise, both measured using a daily window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>MP Surprise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPI0Q</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U0Q</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP0Q</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP0Q</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI4Q</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U4Q</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP4Q</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP4Q</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI0Q Lag</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U0Q Lag</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP0Q Lag</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP0Q Lag</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI4Q Lag</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U4Q Lag</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP4Q Lag</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP4Q Lag</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 175
R-squared 0.17
Adjusted R-squared 0.08
P-Value 0.01

Table 5: The table reports the regression of the monetary policy surprise on the private information variables (constructed as the difference between the Greenbook forecasts and Blue Chip forecasts). “0Q” and “4Q” refer to the nowcast and 4 quarter ahead forecast, see the main text for more details. The and p-value tests the joint significance of all the private info variables included in the regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6: This table reports the summary statistics calculated using a tight 30 minute window. Both shocks, reported in percentage points, are retrieved from the regression of monetary policy surprises on Fed private information. The exogenous shock is the residual and the Delphic shock is the fitted value, see section 4.2 for details. The first column includes all FOMC dates in our sample, the second includes only unscheduled and turning point dates, the third includes all dates prior to the fed funds rate hitting the zero lower bound, the fourth column includes all dates following 1994, and the fifth includes all dates that did not coincide with the release of an unemployment report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Unscheduled/TP</th>
<th>Pre-ZLB</th>
<th>Post-1994</th>
<th>No Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exogenous Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation with MP surprise</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Delphic Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation with MP surprise</td>
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<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARIABLES</td>
<td>S&amp;P 500 (30 minute window)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous Shock</td>
<td>-5.81</td>
<td>-4.73</td>
<td>-5.29</td>
<td>-4.82</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.83)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-2.94</td>
<td>-2.48</td>
<td>-2.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
<td>(2.01)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unscheduled/Turning Point Dummy</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delphic x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.82)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled FOMC Dummy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous x Unscheduled</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.94)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphic x Unscheduled</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(14.66)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turning Point Dummy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous x Turning Point</td>
<td>-8.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphic x Turning Point</td>
<td>9.42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37.47)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the residual and fitted value of the policy surprise from the first step, both measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parentheses.
### Table 8

The table reports the regression of the change in the S&P 500 index on the residual and fitted value of the policy surprise from the first step, both measured in a 30 minute window around FOMC announcements. The Unscheduled dummy is set to 1 for FOMC meetings occurring outside the regularly scheduled dates. The Turning Point dummy is set to 1 if the policy decision changed the fed funds rate in the opposite direction of the previous change. The Unscheduled/Turning Point dummy is set to 1 for either occurrence. Bootstrapped standard errors are in the parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Pre-ZLB</th>
<th>Post-1994</th>
<th>No Employment Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1a)</td>
<td>(1b)</td>
<td>(2a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous Shock</td>
<td>-5.88</td>
<td>-4.11</td>
<td>-6.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphic Shock</td>
<td>-1.27</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
<td>-2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
<td>(1.97)</td>
<td>(1.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unscheduled/Turning Point Dummy</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exogenous x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
<td>-4.70</td>
<td>-4.58</td>
<td>-5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(4.09)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delphic x Unscheduled/Turning Point</td>
<td>11.83</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>20.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.00)</td>
<td>(10.85)</td>
<td>(8.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Share (%)</td>
<td>Total Share (%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Excess Return)</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>19.43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Dividends)</td>
<td>6.10 31.90</td>
<td>8.13 41.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Real Rate)</td>
<td>0.10 0.60</td>
<td>0.25 1.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Var(Future Returns)</td>
<td>7.20 38.00</td>
<td>5.53 28.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2*Cov(Dividends, Real Rate)</td>
<td>-0.60 -3.20</td>
<td>0.42 2.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2*Cov(Dividends, Future Excess Returns)</td>
<td>7.20 37.70</td>
<td>5.04 25.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2*Cov(Future Excess Returns, Real Rate)</td>
<td>1.00 5.10</td>
<td>0.07 0.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: The table reports the variance decomposition of current excess equity returns into the variances of revisions in expectations of dividends, real interest rates, future excess returns, and the covariances between them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Excess Return</td>
<td>-11.01</td>
<td>-16.04</td>
<td>-17.55</td>
<td>-7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.72)</td>
<td>(5.11)</td>
<td>(5.51)</td>
<td>(12.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Excess Return</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>-2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>(3.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Interest Rate</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividends</td>
<td>-6.96</td>
<td>-11.17</td>
<td>-11.56</td>
<td>-9.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(4.94)</td>
<td>(5.40)</td>
<td>(11.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: This table reports the response of current excess equity returns and its components to monetary policy shocks. The first column reproduces the BK results estimated on the sample 5/1989 to 12/2002. The remaining three columns use the baseline data sample of 2/1991 to 12/2010. Delta method standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 11: This table reports the response of current excess equity returns and its components to monetary policy shocks interacted with the unscheduled/turning point dummy. The dummy equals 1 on dates for which the FOMC decision was unscheduled or reversed the previous direction of policy. Delta method standard errors are in parentheses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exogenous</th>
<th>Delphic</th>
<th>Unsch/TP Dum</th>
<th>Exog x Unsch/TP</th>
<th>Delphic x Unsch/TP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\tilde{\phi}_1$</td>
<td>$\tilde{\phi}_2$</td>
<td>$\tilde{\phi}_3$</td>
<td>$\tilde{\phi}_4$</td>
<td>$\tilde{\phi}_5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Excess Return</td>
<td>-18.74</td>
<td>-16.62</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>33.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.17)</td>
<td>(14.07)</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(14.16)</td>
<td>(27.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Excess Return</td>
<td>5.87</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-2.28</td>
<td>-27.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
<td>(4.20)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(4.04)</td>
<td>(7.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Interest Rate</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dividends</td>
<td>-12.05</td>
<td>-10.87</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.96)</td>
<td>(12.71)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(13.10)</td>
<td>(24.84)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: This figure plots the monetary policy surprise constructed from the futures data around FOMC announcements. The top panel uses a tight 30 minute window, whereas the bottom panel uses a broad daily window, see section 3.1 for more details.
Figure 2: Private information variables for GDP, CPI, IP and unemployment, representing the difference between the Greenbook and Blue Chip forecasts. See the main text for more details.
Figure 3: Stock Returns vs Monetary Policy Surprises
Figure 4: This figure shows the decomposition of the futures based monetary policy surprise into an exogenous component and a Delphic component which is related to the Federal Reserve’s private information, see 4.2 for more details.