Hard peg and monetary unions.Main lessons from the Argentine experience

Carrera, Jorge Eduardo (2004): Hard peg and monetary unions.Main lessons from the Argentine experience.

Abstract

Currency board (CB) was a corner solution for Argentine hyperinflation, however its balance is controversial. How does a CB work as a long run regime? After evaluating the result of ten years CB regime, we obtain important lessons for a monetary union and for dollarization proposals. We discuss: 1) the capacity of such a regime to deal with real and nominal volatility, 2) fiscal problems and debt dynamics, 3) financial problems under currency substitution, 4) CB regime compared with dollarization and 5) the feasibility of a single–peg CB in a flexible exchange rate world.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Currency board, Dollarization, Monetary union, Fiscal policy and Monetary policy
• Subjects: F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems; F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements; F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics

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