Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints

Goto, Masahiro and Kojima, Fuhito and Kurata, Ryoji and Tamura, Akihisa and Yokoo, Makoto (2015): Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints. Published in: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , Vol. 2, No. 9 (May 2017): pp. 226-262.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_64000.pdf

Download (213kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this paper, we consider two-sided, many-to-one matching problems where agents in one side of the market (schools) impose some distributional constraints (e.g., a maximum quota for a set of schools), and develop a strategyproof mechanism that can handle a very general class of distributional constraints. We assume distributional constraints are imposed on a vector, where each element is the number of contracts accepted for each school. The only requirement we impose on distributional constraints is that the family of vectors that satisfy distributional constraints must be hereditary, which means if a vector satisfies the constraints, any vector that is smaller than it also satisfies them. When distributional constraints are imposed, a stable matching may not exist. We develop a strategyproof mechanism called Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), which is nonwasteful and ``more fair'' than a simple nonwasteful mechanism called the Serial Dictatorship mechanism (SD) and ``less wasteful'' than another simple fair mechanism called the Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ACDA). We show that we can apply this mechanism even if the distributional constraints do not satisfy the hereditary condition by applying a simple trick, assuming we can find a vector that satisfy the distributional constraints efficiently. Furthermore, we demonstrate the applicability of our model in actual application domains.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.