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Bottleneck congestion and residential location of heterogeneous commuters

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Abstract

This study examines the effects of bottleneck congestion and an optimal time-varying congestion toll on the spatial structure of cities. We develop a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city with a bottleneck located between a central downtown and an adjacent suburb. We then demonstrate that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of travel time and their flexibility. Furthermore, we reveal that introducing an optimal congestion toll alters the urban spatial structure, which contrasts with the previous literature. We further demonstrate through an example that congestion tolling can cause the city to physically expand outward, which helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters.

JEL classification: D62; R21; R41; R48

Keywords: bottleneck congestion; residential location; congestion toll; urban spatial structure

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1 Introduction

Traditional residential location models describe the spatial structures of cities and their evolution based on the trade-off between land rent and commuting costs (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969). Traditional and subsequent studies have successfully predicted the empirically observed patterns of residential location (e.g., the spatial distribution of rich and poor) and the effects of assorted urban policies. However, most previous studies describe traffic congestion using static flow congestion models. Their use renders these models inappropriate for dealing with peak-period traffic congestion and for examining the effects of measures intended to alleviate it (e.g., time-varying congestion tolls, flextime, staggered work hours).

The bottleneck model can adequately describe peak-period congestion and how commuters choose their departure times from home (Vickrey, 1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990b, 1993). Its simple, effective framework for studying the efficacy of various measures to alleviate peak-period congestion has inspired numerous extensions and modifications. The bottleneck model, however, cannot be easily applied in the context of the traditional residential location model, as stated by Ross and Yinger (2000). Therefore, few studies have developed a model to describe how commuters choose where they live and when they depart from home.

Arnott (1998) is the first and the most successful attempt to incorporate the bottleneck model into a residential location model. This study considered a (discrete space) monocentric city comprising two areas—a downtown and a suburb—connected by a single road with a bottleneck. He showed that imposing an optimal congestion toll without redistributing its revenues affects neither commuting costs nor commuters’ residential locations. This result fundamentally differs from the results given by traditional models with static flow congestion, which predict that cities become denser with congestion pricing (e.g., Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998). However, Arnott (1998) assumed that commuters are homogeneous although it has been established that optimal congestion tolling changes commuting costs in bottleneck models with heterogeneous commuters (e.g., Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011). That is, the effects of congestion tolling in the bottleneck model with heterogeneous commuters can fundamentally differ from those in the model with homogeneous commuters.

This study extends the model developed by Arnott (1998) to consider commuter heterogeneity and a continuous space monocentric city with a bottleneck located between a central downtown and an adjacent suburb. We systematically analyzed our model using the properties of complementarity problems that define the equilibrium. Our analysis shows that commuters sort themselves both temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of travel time and their flexibility.

In addition, this study investigates the effects of an optimal time-varying congestion toll (i.e., alleviating peak-period congestion) on the urban spatial structure. We show that introducing a congestion toll (with and without redistributing its revenues) changes commuters’ commuting costs, thereby altering their spatial distribution. To concretely demonstrate the effects of conges-

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2 As we show in Appendix A, the equilibrium defined by the complementarity problems coincides with that obtained by the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015).
tion tolling, we analyzed the model for a case in which commuters with a high value of travel
time (rich commuters) are highly inflexible.\textsuperscript{3} This analysis indicates that congestion tolling re-
duces the commuting costs of suburban commuters, thereby increasing the suburban population.
Furthermore, the population increase in the suburb causes the city to physically expand outward
and induces higher density and land rent at suburban locations and lower density and land rent
at downtown locations. This finding contrasts not only with the standard results of traditional
location models with static flow congestion (congestion tolling results in a denser urban spatial
structure), but also with those of Arnott (1998) (tolling has no effect on urban spatial structure).
This implies that interactions among heterogeneous commuters change the effects of congestion
tolling on urban spatial structure. We further demonstrate that, although the optimal congestion
toll (without toll-revenue redistribution) generates a Pareto improvement in this case if com-
muters do not relocate (Arnott et al., 1994; Hall, 2015), this is not true if we consider commuters’
relocation. Moreover, since rich commuters reside downtown and poor commuters reside in the
suburbs, congestion tolling leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits: rich commuters gain,
whereas poor commuters lose.

There are a few studies that considered both bottleneck congestion and commuters’ location
choice as in Arnott (1998).\textsuperscript{4} Gubins and Verhoef (2014) considered a (continuous space) monocen-
tric closed city with a bottleneck at the entrance to its central business district (CBD). Their model
introduced an incentive for commuters to spend time at home, which the standard bottleneck
model disregards,\textsuperscript{5} and assumed that a commuters’ house size affects their marginal utility of
spending time at home. They demonstrated that congestion tolling causes commuters to spend
more time at home and to have larger houses, leading to the physical expansion of the city.
Fosgerau et al. (2016) considered the same spatial structure as in Gubins and Verhoef (2014), but
assumed that the city is open.\textsuperscript{6} They defined the social optimum as the global maximizer of total
revenue from congestion tolling and land rents and showed that the optimal policy induces lower
density in the center and higher density farther out. In their models, however, commuters are
assumed to be homogeneous. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically
analyze the model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure time from home
and residential location.

This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which heterogeneous commuters
choose their departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city. Sections
3 and 4 characterize equilibrium in our model without and with tolling using the properties of
complementarity problems, respectively. Section 5 presents the effects of the optimal time-varying
congestion toll. Section 6 concludes the study.

\textsuperscript{3}Specifically, we assume that rich commuters have a higher time-based cost per unit schedule delay (marginal schedule
delay cost divided by marginal travel time cost). Note that this case includes situations analyzed in the literature employing
bottleneck models and commuter heterogeneity (e.g., Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall, 2015).

\textsuperscript{4}Recently, Osawa et al. (2017) extended the standard bottleneck model to consider a corridor network with multiple
bottlenecks and to allow each commuter to choose his/her job and residential location. They analytically derived
equilibrium job–location–departure-time choice patterns under a first-best transportation demand management scheme
and showed that the equilibrium pattern exhibits spatio-temporal sorting properties.

\textsuperscript{5}Vickrey (1973), Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Fosgerau and Engelson (2011), Fosgerau and de Palma (2012), Fosgerau
and Lindsey (2013), and Fosgerau and Small (2014) considered the utility of spending time at home. Note that this study
does not introduce the utility of spending time at home.

\textsuperscript{6}Unlike Gubins and Verhoef (2014), Fosgerau et al. (2016) did not introduce the assumption that the marginal utility
of spending time at home depends on house size.
2 The model

2.1 Assumptions

We consider a long narrow city with a spaceless CBD, where all job opportunities are located. The CBD is located at the edge of the city, and a residential location is indexed by distance \( x \) from the CBD (Figure 1). Land is uniformly distributed with unit density along a road. As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords. The road has a single bottleneck with capacity \( \mu \) at location \( d > 0 \). If arrival rates at the bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue develops.

To model queuing congestion, we employ first-in-first-out (FIFO) and a point queue, in which vehicles have no physical length as in standard bottleneck models (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993). Free-flow travel time per unit distance is assumed to be constant at \( \tau > 0 \) (i.e., free-flow speed is \( 1/\tau \)).

There are \( I \) types of commuters, each of whom must travel from home to the CBD and who have the same preferred arrival time \( t^* \) at work. They differ in their income, value of travel time, and schedule delay costs. The number of commuters of type \( i \in I \equiv \{1, 2, \ldots, I\} \), whom we call “commuters \( i \),” is fixed and denoted by \( N_i \). Since the bottleneck is located at \( d \), only commuters who reside at \( x > d \) pass through it, whereas those who reside at \( x \in [0, d] \) do not.

Following Arnott (1998), we denote locations \( X^x = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid x > d \} \) as “suburb” and locations \( X^d = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid x \in [0, d] \} \) as “downtown.” We denote the number of commuters \( i \) in the suburb and downtown by \( N^x_i \) and \( N^d_i (= N_i - N^x_i) \), respectively. If \( d \) is sufficiently large, all commuters reside downtown and no commuter traverses the bottleneck. Because we are uninterested in that case, \( d \) is assumed to be small, such that \( \sum_{i \in I} N^x_i > 0 \).

Commuting cost \( c_i(x, t) \) of commuters \( i \) who reside at \( x \) and arrive at work at time \( t \) is expressed as the sum of travel time cost \( m_i(x, t) \) and schedule delay cost \( s_i(t - t') \):

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_i(x, t) &= m_i(x, t) + s_i(t - t'), \\
  m_i(x, t) &= \begin{cases} 
    \alpha_i \tau x, & \text{if } x \in X^d, \\
    \alpha_i [q(t) + \tau x], & \text{if } x \in X^x,
  \end{cases} \\
  s_i(t - t') &= \begin{cases} 
    \beta_i(t' - t), & \text{if } t \leq t', \\
    \gamma_i(t - t'), & \text{if } t \geq t',
  \end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( q(t) \) denotes the queuing time of commuters arriving at work at time \( t \), \( \tau x \) represents free-speed.

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\(^7\) We can make the alternative assumption that land is publicly owned and that the aggregate land rent is equally redistributed to all commuters. The results under this assumption are essentially identical to those obtained with absentee landlords since we assume that the utility function \( u \) is quasi-linear (i.e., income elasticity of demand for land is zero).
under a quasi-linear utility function (2).

where \( f \) is the utility from land consumption. We assume 

\( H_0 \), assume commuters make long-run decisions about residential location and short-run decisions

Similar to models in Peer and Verhoef (2013), Gubins and Verhoef (2014), and Takayama (2015), we

where the prime denotes differentiation. Since the marginal utility of land consumption is infinity

at \( a_i(x) = 0 \), we must have \( a_i(x) > 0 \) and

\[ a_i(x) = g(r(x) + r_A), \tag{5} \]

where \( g(\cdot) \) is the inverse function of \( f'(\cdot) \). This implies that lot size \( a_i(x) \) is independent of

commuters’ type \( i \) as well as commuting cost (and congestion toll levels) \( c_i(x,t) \). Therefore, we
denote lot size at \( x \) by \( a(x) \).

From (2), (3), and (5), we obtain the indirect utility \( v_i(x,t) \) as follows:

\[ v_i(x,t) = w_i - c_i(x,t) + H(r(x) + r_A), \tag{6} \]

where \( H(r) = f(g(r)) - rg(r) \). Because \( H(r(x) + r_A) \) can be rewritten as \( f(a(x)) - [r(x) + r_A]a(x) \), this

represents net utility from land consumption at \( x \). Furthermore, since \( H'(r(x) + r_A) = -g(r(x) + r_A) < 0 \), \( H(\cdot) \) is a strictly decreasing function.

2.2 Equilibrium conditions

Similar to models in Peer and Verhoef (2013), Gubins and Verhoef (2014), and Takayama (2015), we

assume commuters make long-run decisions about residential location and short-run decisions

\footnote{As Arnott (1998) proved, if commuters are homogeneous, congestion tolling does not affect their spatial distribution under a quasi-linear utility function (2).}

\footnote{The same utility function has been introduced by, e.g., Blanchet et al. (2016) and Akamatsu et al. (2017).}
about day-specific trip timing. In the short run, commuters \( i \) minimize commuting cost \( c_i(x, t) \) by selecting their arrival time \( t \) at work taking their residential location \( x \) as given. In the long run, each commuter \( i \) chooses a residential location \( x \) so as to maximize his/her utility. We therefore formalize the short- and long-run equilibrium conditions.

### 2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium conditions

Commuters in the short run determine only their day-specific arrival time \( t \) at work, which implies that the number \( N_i(x) \) of commuters \( i \) residing at \( x \) (i.e., spatial distribution of commuters \( i \)) is assumed to be a given. Since commuting costs are given by (1), short-run equilibrium conditions differ according to commuters’ residential locations. We first consider commuters residing in the suburb (suburban commuters), who must traverse the bottleneck. The commuting cost \( c_i^s(x, t) \) of suburban commuters \( i \) consists of a cost \( a_i \tau x \) of free-flow travel time depending only on residential location \( x \) and a bottleneck cost \( c_i^b(t) \) owing to queuing congestion and a schedule delay depending only on arrival time \( t \):

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_i^s(x, t) &= a_i \tau x + c_i^b(t), \\
    c_i^b(t) &= a_i q(t) + s_i(t - t').
\end{align*}
\]

This implies that each suburban commuter chooses arrival time \( t \) so as to minimize bottleneck cost \( c_i^b(t) \). Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those in the standard bottleneck model, which are given by three conditions:

\[
\begin{align*}
    &n_i^s(t) \{ c_i^b(t) - c_i^{b*} \} = 0 \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}_+, \quad \forall i \in I, \tag{8a} \\
    &n_i^s(t) \geq 0, \quad c_i^b(t) - c_i^{b*} \geq 0 \\
    &q(t) \left( \mu - \sum_{k \in I} n_i^s(t) \right) = 0 \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}_+, \tag{8b} \\
    &q(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu - \sum_{k \in I} n_i^s(t) \geq 0 \\
    &\int n_i^s(t) dt = N_i^s \quad \forall i \in I, \tag{8c}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( n_i^s(t) \) denotes the number of suburban commuters \( i \) who arrive at work at time \( t \) (i.e., arrival rate of suburban commuters \( i \) at the CBD) and \( c_i^{b*} \) is the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost of suburban commuters \( i \).

Condition (8a) represents the no-arbitrage condition for the choice of arrival time. This condition means that, at the short-run equilibrium, no commuter can reduce the bottleneck cost by altering arrival time unilaterally. Condition (8b) is the capacity constraint of the bottleneck, which requires that the total departure rate \( \sum_{k \in I} n_i^s(t) \) at the bottleneck\(^{10} \) equals capacity \( \mu \) if there is a queue; otherwise, the total departure rate is (weakly) lower than \( \mu \). Condition (8c) is flow conservation for commuting demand. These conditions give \( n_i^s(t), q(t), \) and \( c_i^b \) at the short-run equilibrium as functions of the number \( N^s = \lfloor N_i^s \rfloor \) of suburban commuters \( i \in I \). This implies that, at the short-run equilibrium, the bottleneck cost of suburban commuters \( i \) depends on \( N^s \) but not on \( N_i(x) \).

We next consider commuters who reside downtown (downtown commuters). Since these

\(^{10}\)Note that the departure rate from the bottleneck coincides with the arrival rate of suburban commuters at the CBD.
commuters do not traverse the bottleneck, their commuting cost \( c^d_i(x, t) \) is expressed as

\[
c^d_i(x, t) = \alpha_i \tau x + s_i(t - t').
\] (9)

Thus, all downtown commuters will arrive at \( t = t' \), and their commuting cost at the short-run equilibrium is given by \( \alpha_i \tau x \).

### 2.2.2 Long-run equilibrium conditions

In the long run, each commuter \( i \) chooses a residential location \( x \) so as to maximize indirect utility \( v_i(x) \), which is expressed as

\[
v_i(x) = y_i(x) + H(r(x) + \alpha_i),
\] (10a)

\[
y_i(x) = \begin{cases} 
  w_i - \alpha_i \tau x - c_i^d(N^o) & \text{if } x \in X^o, \\
  w_i - \alpha_i \tau x & \text{if } x \in X^d,
\end{cases}
\] (10b)

where \( y_i(x) \) denotes the income net of commuting cost earned by commuters \( i \) residing at \( x \). Thus, long-run equilibrium conditions are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
N_i(x)\left[\sigma_i - v_i(x)\right] &= 0 & \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+, & \forall i \in I, \tag{11a} \\
N_i(x) &\geq 0, \quad \sigma_i - v_i(x) \geq 0 \\
r(x)\left[1 - \sum_{k \in T} a(x)N_k(x)\right] &= 0 & \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \tag{11b} \\
r(x) &\geq 0, \quad 1 - \sum_{k \in T} a(x)N_k(x) \geq 0 \\
\int_0^\infty N_i(x) \, dx &= N_i & \forall i \in I, \tag{11c}
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \sigma_i \) denotes the long-run equilibrium utility of commuters \( i \).

Condition (11a) is the equilibrium condition for commuters’ choice of residential location. This condition implies that, at the long-run equilibrium, no commuter has incentive to change residential location unilaterally. Condition (11b) is the land market clearing condition. This condition requires that, if total land demand \( \sum_{k \in T} a(x)N_k(x) \) for housing at \( x \) equals supply 1, land rent \( r(x) + r^A \) is (weakly) larger than agricultural rent \( r_A \). Condition (11c) expresses the population constraint.

Note that the traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso, 1964; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) is equivalent to our approach using complementarity problems, as shown in Appendix A. More precisely, long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach.\(^{11}\) Therefore, even if we used the traditional bid-rent approach, we would obtain the same results as those presented in this study.

Substituting (5) into (11b), we obtain \( r(x) \) as follows:

\[
r(x) + r_A = \begin{cases} 
  f'(\frac{1}{N_i(\cdot)}) & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i(\cdot)}) \geq r_A, \\
  r_A & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i(\cdot)}) \leq r_A,
\end{cases}
\] (12)

\(^{11}\)The equivalence between the bid-rent and our approaches has been shown in Fujita (1989, Chapter 2).
where \( N(x) = \sum_{i \in I} N_i(x) \) represents the total number of commuters residing at \( x \). It follows from (10a) and (12) that the equilibrium conditions in (11) are rewritten as (11a) and (11c) with (10a) and (10c) as follows:

\[
\begin{align}
\nu_i(x) &= \begin{cases} 
 y_i(x) + \frac{1}{\lambda} h(N(x)) & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N(x)}) \geq r_A, \\
 y_i(x) + H(r_A) & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N(x)}) \leq r_A,
\end{cases} \\
h(N(x)) &= f'(\frac{1}{N(x)}) - \frac{1}{N(x)} f''(\frac{1}{N(x)}),
\end{align}
\]

where \( h(N(x)) = H(r(x)+r_A) \). Since \( h'(N(x)) = \frac{1}{N(x)} f''(\frac{1}{N(x)}) < 0 \), \( h() \) is a strictly decreasing function; that is, the net utility from land consumption decreases as the number of residents increases.

To study the spatial distribution of commuters, it is useful to rewrite the equilibrium conditions (11a) and (11c) as follows:

\[
\begin{align}
N_i(x) \left[ v_i^r(N^r) - v_i^v(x) \right] &= 0 \quad \forall x \in X^r, \quad \forall i \in I, \\
N_i(x) &\geq 0, \quad v_i^r(N^r) - v_i^v(x) \geq 0 \\
\int_{0}^{\infty} N_i(x) \, dx &= N_i^r \quad \forall i \in I, \\
N_i(x) \left[ v_i^d(N^d) - v_i^d(x) \right] &= 0 \quad \forall x \in X^d, \quad \forall i \in I, \\
N_i(x) &\geq 0, \quad v_i^d(N^d) - v_i^d(x) \geq 0 \\
\int_{0}^{d} N_i(x) \, dx &= N_i^d \quad \forall i \in I, \\
\begin{cases} 
 v_i^d(N^d) \geq v_i^r(N^r) & \text{if } N_i^d \geq 0 \\
 v_i^d(N^d) \leq v_i^r(N^r) & \text{if } N_i^d \geq 0
\end{cases} \quad \forall i \in I,
\end{align}
\]

where \( v_i^r(N^r) \) and \( v_i^d(N^d) \) denote the utilities that commuters \( i \) receive from residing in the suburb and downtown, respectively.

Conditions (14a) and (14b) are equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters’ choice of residential location \( x \). Similarly, conditions (14c) and (14d) are those for downtown commuters’ choice of residential location \( x \). Conditions (14e) and (14f) are equilibrium conditions for commuters’ choice between residing in the suburb and downtown. We use these conditions to characterize the equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters in Section 3.

3 Equilibrium

3.1 Short-run equilibrium

The short-run equilibrium conditions (8) of suburban commuters coincide with those in the standard bottleneck model, as shown above. Therefore, we can invoke the results of studies utilizing the bottleneck model to characterize the short-run equilibrium ( Arnott et al., 1994; Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007; Liu et al., 2015). In particular, the following properties of the short-run equilibrium are useful for investigating the properties of our model.
Lemma 1 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007).

(i) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost $c^*_b(N^s)$ is uniquely determined.

(ii) The short-run equilibrium number $[n^*_i(t)]$ of suburban commuters arriving at time $t$ coincides with the solution of the following linear programming problem:

$$\min \left[ \sum_{i \in I} s_i(t-t^* \| \alpha_i) \right] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \mu - \sum_{k \in I} n^*_k(t) \geq 0, \quad \int n^*_i(t) dt = N^s_i. \quad (15)$$

Let us define (travel) time-based cost as the cost converted into equivalent travel time. Since that cost for commuters $i$ is given by dividing the cost by $\alpha_i$, we say that $s_i(t-t^* \| \alpha_i)$ represents the time-based schedule delay cost of commuters $i$. Therefore, Lemma 1 (ii) shows that, at the short-run equilibrium, the total time-based schedule delay cost is minimized, but the total schedule delay cost is not necessarily minimized.

We let $\text{supp}(n^*_i(t)) = [t \in \mathbb{R}_+ \mid n^*_i(t) > 0]$ be the support of the short-run equilibrium number $n^*_i(t)$ of suburban commuters $i$ who arrive at work at $t$. From Lemma 1 (ii), we then have

$$\text{supp}(\sum_{i \in I} n^*_i(t)) = [t^E, t^L], \quad (16)$$

where $t^E$ and $t^L$ denote the earliest and latest arrival times of commuters, which satisfy

$$t^L = t^E + \frac{\sum_{i \in I} N_i}{\mu}. \quad (17)$$

This indicates that, at the short-run equilibrium, a rush hour in which queuing congestion occurs must be a single time interval (Figure 2).

Furthermore, by using short-run equilibrium condition (8a), we obtain

$$c^*_i(t_i) + c^*_j(t_j) \leq c^*_i(t_j) + c^*_j(t_i) \quad \forall t_i \in \text{supp}(n^*_i), \ t_j \in \text{supp}(n^*_j). \quad (18)$$

Substituting (7) into this, we have the following conditions as given in Arnott et al. (1994) and Liu et al. (2015): for any $t_i \in \text{supp}(n^*_i), \ t_j \in \text{supp}(n^*_j)$, and $i, j \in I$,

$$\left( \frac{\beta_i}{\alpha_i} - \frac{\beta_j}{\alpha_j} \right) (t_i - t_j) \geq 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \max\{t_i, t_j\} \leq t^*, \quad (19a)$$
These conditions indicate that the short-run equilibrium has the following properties: if marginal time-based early delay cost of commuters $i$ is lower than that of commuters $j$ (i.e., $\beta_i/\alpha_i < \beta_j/\alpha_j$), early-arriving commuters $i$ (commuters $i$ arriving at the CBD before the preferred arrival time $t^*$) arrive at the CBD earlier than early-arriving commuters $j$; if the marginal time-based late delay cost of commuters $i$ is lower than that of commuters $j$ (i.e., $\gamma_i/\alpha_i < \gamma_j/\alpha_j$), late-arriving commuters $i$ (commuters $i$ arriving after $t^*$) arrive later than late-arriving commuters $j$.

This occurs because commuters with a lower time-based schedule delay cost avoid queuing time rather than a schedule delay. This result shows that, at the short-run equilibrium, commuters sort themselves temporally on the basis of their marginal time-based schedule delay cost.

In the following analysis, we make the following assumption about marginal early and late delay costs, which is common to the literature employing a bottleneck model with commuter heterogeneity (Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall, 2015).

**Assumption 1.** $\frac{\gamma_i}{\alpha_i} = \eta$ for all $i \in I$.

This assumption implies that commuters with a high early delay cost also have a higher late delay cost. Therefore, commuters are heterogeneous in two dimensions: the value of travel time $\alpha_i$ and marginal schedule delay cost $\beta_i$ ($\gamma_i$).

For convenience, we call commuters with a high (low) value of travel time “rich (poor) commuters.” We call commuters with a low (high) marginal schedule delay cost “flexible (inflexible) commuters.” We can then say from (19) that richer or more flexible commuters prefer to arrive further from their preferred arrival time $t^*$ to avoid queuing.

Under Assumption 1, we can explicitly obtain the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost as a function of the number $N_s = \lceil N_i^s \rceil$ of suburban commuters $i$. For the moment, we assume, without loss of generality, that commuters with small $i$ have a (weakly) higher time-based schedule delay cost:

**Assumption 2.** $\frac{\beta_i}{\alpha_i} \geq \frac{\beta_i}{\alpha_i}$ for any $i \in I \setminus \{1\}$.

Then, from (19), early-arriving (late-arriving) commuters with smaller $i$ arrive later (earlier) at the short-run equilibrium. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, therefore, the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost $c_i^*(N^s)$ of suburban commuters $i$ is derived by following the procedure employed in literature featuring bottleneck models with commuter heterogeneity (see, e.g., van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011):

$$c_i^*(N^s) = \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \left[ \frac{\beta_i}{\alpha_i} \sum_{k=1}^{i} N_k^s + \alpha_i \sum_{k=i+1}^{I} \frac{\beta_k}{\alpha_k} N_k^s \right] \forall i \in I.$$  

(20)

This clearly shows that richer or more inflexible commuters incur higher bottleneck costs at the short-run equilibrium.

Properties of the short-run equilibrium obtained above can be summarized as follows.

**Proposition 1.** The short-run equilibrium has the following properties.

(i) Total time-based schedule delay cost is minimized.

\(10\)
Proof. See Appendix B.

Lemma 2. The long-run equilibrium number \( N^*(x) \) of commuters residing at \( x \) has the following properties:

(i) the support of \( N^*(x) \) is given by

\[
\text{supp} (N^*) = [0, X^B],
\]

where \( X^B \) denotes the residential location for commuters farthest from the CBD (city boundary).

(ii) \( N^*(x) \) satisfies

\[
\begin{align*}
 f'(\frac{\gamma_i}{\alpha_i}) > r^A & \quad \forall x \in \text{supp} (N^*) \setminus \{X^B\}, \quad (22a) \\
 f'(\frac{\gamma_i}{\alpha_i}) = r^A & \quad. \quad (22b)
\end{align*}
\]

Proof. See Appendix B.

Let \( N^*_s(x) \) and \( N^*_d(x) \) be the respective long-run equilibrium number of suburban and downtown commuters \( i \) residing at \( x \). Then, it follows from Lemma 2 that, for any \( x^*_i \in \text{supp} (N^*_s) \) and \( x^*_d \in \text{supp} (N^*_d) \), indirect utilities \( v^*_s(x^*_i) \) and \( v^*_d(x^*_d) \) are expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
 v^*_s(x^*_i) &= w - \frac{\gamma_i}{\alpha_i} (N^s) - \alpha_i x^*_i + h(N(x^*_i)), \\
 v^*_d(x^*_d) &= w - \alpha_i x^*_d + h(N(x^*_d)).
\end{align*}
\]

In addition, equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c) give the following conditions for \( N^*_s(x) \) and \( N^*_d(x) \):

\[
\begin{align*}
 v^*_s(x^*_i) + v^*_i(x^*_j) \geq v^*_i(x^*_i) + v^*_i(x^*_j) & \quad \forall x^*_i \in \text{supp} (N^*_s), \forall x^*_j \in \text{supp} (N^*_s), \forall i, j \in I, \quad (24a) \\
 v^*_d(x^*_i) + v^*_d(x^*_j) \geq v^*_d(x^*_i) + v^*_d(x^*_j) & \quad \forall x^*_d \in \text{supp} (N^*_d), \forall x^*_j \in \text{supp} (N^*_d), \forall i, j \in I. \quad (24b)
\end{align*}
\]
Substituting (23) into (24) yields the following conditions: for any \( x_i \in \text{supp} (N_i^{sr}) \), \( x_j \in \text{supp} (N_j^{dr}) \), and \( i, j \in I \),

\[
(a_i - a_j)(x_i - x_j) \leq 0.
\]  
(25)

This condition also holds for any \( x_i \in \text{supp} (N_i^{dr}) \), \( x_j \in \text{supp} (N_j^{dr}) \), and \( i, j \in I \).

This condition states that richer suburban commuters reside closer to the CBD to reduce their free-flow travel time cost. This property also holds for downtown commuters. This implies that suburban and downtown commuters sort themselves spatially on the basis of their value of travel time. Furthermore, spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown commuters are unaffected by the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost \( v_i^{br}(N_i) \).

In our model, the free-flow travel time cost is more income elastic than the demand for land since we assume that the income elasticity of demand for land is zero. Therefore, this result is in accordance with the well-known result of traditional location models considering different groups with heterogeneous income levels (Fujita, 1989), which show that rich commuters reside closer to the CBD if the income elasticity of commuting costs is larger than the income elasticity of demand for land.\(^{12}\)

By using condition (25), we can obtain the spatial distribution of commuters \( N(x) \), land rent \( r(x) \), and lot size \( a(x) \). For this, we introduce the following assumption.\(^{13}\)

**Assumption 3.** \( a_{i-1} > a_i \) for all \( i \in I \setminus \{1\} \).

This means that commuters with small \( i \) are richer than those with large \( i \).

Let \( X_i^s \) and \( X_i^d \) denote the respective locations for suburban and downtown commuters \( i \) residing nearest the CBD. It follows from (25) and Assumption 3 that suburban and downtown commuters \( i \) reside in \( [X_i^s, X_i^{s*}] \) and \( [X_i^d, X_i^{d*}] \), respectively (i.e., \( \text{supp} (N_i^{sr}) = [X_i^s, X_i^{s*}] \) and \( \text{supp} (N_i^{dr}) = [X_i^d, X_i^{d*}] \) for all \( i \in I \)). Therefore, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
v_i^s(x) &= v_i^s(X_i^s) \quad \forall x \in [X_i^s, X_i^{s*}], \\
v_i^d(x) &= v_i^d(X_i^d) \quad \forall x \in [X_i^d, X_i^{d*}].
\end{align*}
\]  
(26a)  
(26b)

These, together with the population constraints (14b) and (14d), lead to the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.** Suppose Assumption 3. Then the long-run equilibrium land rents at locations \( X_i^s \) and \( X_i^d \) are given by

\[
r(X_i^s) + r_A = r_A + \sum_{k=i}^{k=I} \alpha_k \tau N_k^{sr}, \quad r(X_i^d) + r_A = r(d) + r_A + \sum_{k=i}^{k=I} \alpha_k \tau N_k^{dr},
\]  
(27)

where \( r(d) + r_A \) is the land rent at location \( d \).

**Proof.** See Appendix C. \( \square \)

---

\(^{12}\)As discussed in Duranton and Puga (2015), with only one dimension of household heterogeneity, this (extreme) ordered sorting is expected in equilibrium, but some mixing will occur when households are heterogeneous in two or more dimensions (see, e.g., Behrens et al., 2014).

\(^{13}\)This assumption ensures that “no pair of bit rent functions intersects more than once” in the suburb and downtown when we use the bid-rent approach. As discussed in Fujita (1989, Chapter 4), this is a necessary condition for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in the traditional residential location model.
Substituting (27) into (26), we obtain $X^s_j$ and $X^d_j$ as follows.

\begin{align}
X^s_j &= d + \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \frac{1}{\alpha_j} \left( H(r_A + \sum_{k=j+1}^{i} a_k N^s_k) - H(r_A + \sum_{k=j}^{i} a_k N^s_k) \right), \\
X^d_j &= \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \frac{1}{\alpha_j} \left( H(r(d) + r_A + \sum_{k=j+1}^{i} a_k N^d_k) - H(r(d) + r_A + \sum_{k=j}^{i} a_k N^d_k) \right).
\end{align}

(28a)

(28b)

Recall that $H(r) = f(g(r)) - r g(r)$, and thus $h(N(X^s_j)) = H(r(X^s_j) + r_A)$. Land rent $r(d) + r_A$ at location $d$ is obtained from the following condition:

\begin{align}
\begin{cases}
r(d) \left( d - X^d_{i+1} \right) = 0, \\
r(d) \geq 0, \quad d - X^d_{i+1} \geq 0.
\end{cases}
\end{align}

(29)

This condition means that, if $X^d_{i+1} < d$ for any $r(d) \in \mathbb{R}_+$, land rent at $d$ equals the agricultural rent $r_A$ (i.e., $r(d) = 0$); otherwise, $r(d)$ is determined such that $X^d_{i+1} = d$. $r(d)$ is uniquely determined by condition (29), because the following conditions hold:

\begin{align}
\frac{dX^d_{i+1}}{dr(d)} &= \sum_{k \in I} \left( g(r(X^d_k) + r(d) + r_A) - g(r(X^d_{k+1}) + r(d) + r_A) \right) < 0 \quad \text{if} \quad \sum_{k \in I} N^d_k > 0, \\
\lim_{r(d) \to \infty} X^d_{i+1} &= 0, \\
\sum_{k \in I} a_k (N^d_k + N^s_k) &= 0.
\end{align}

(30a)

(30b)

where the second condition follows from $H'(\cdot) = -g(\cdot)$ and $\lim_{r \to \infty} g(r) = 0$ ($\lim_{a \to 0+} f'(a) = \infty$).

By using (26), (27), and (28), we obtain Lemma 4.

**Lemma 4.** Suppose Assumption 3. Then at the long-run equilibrium,

(i) the city boundary $X^B$ is given by

\begin{equation}
X^B = d + \frac{1}{\tau} \left[ H(r_A) - \sum_{k \in [1]} \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \left( H^s_k - \frac{1}{\alpha_1} H^s_{i+1} \right) \right],
\end{equation}

(31)

where $H^s_k = H(r_A + \sum_{k=2}^{i} a_k N^s_k)$;

(ii) the number $N(x)$ of commuters, lot size $a(x)$, and land rent $r(x) + r_A$ are given by

\begin{align}
N(x) &= \begin{cases} 
H^{-1} \left( a_i \tau (x - d) + \alpha_i \sum_{k=2}^{i} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_k} - \frac{1}{\alpha_{k-1}} \right) H^s_k + \frac{a_i}{\alpha_1} H^s_{i+1} \right) & \text{if} \quad x \in [X^d_j, X^d_{i+1}], \\
H^{-1} \left( a_i \tau x + \alpha_i \sum_{k=2}^{i} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha_k} - \frac{1}{\alpha_{k-1}} \right) H^d_k + \frac{a_i}{\alpha_1} H^d_{i+1} \right) & \text{if} \quad x \in [X^s_j, X^s_{i+1}],
\end{cases} \\
a(x) &= \frac{1}{N(x)} \quad \forall x \in [0, X^B], \\
r(x) + r_A &= f'(a(x)) \quad \forall x \in [0, X^B],
\end{align}

(32a)

(32b)

(32c)

where $H^{-1}(\cdot)$ is the inverse function of $h(\cdot)$ and $H^d_k = H(r(d) + r_A + \sum_{k=1}^{i} a_k N^d_k)$.

**Proof.** Since $X^B = X^s_{i+1}$ and $H^s_i = H(r(X^s_i) + r_A)$, we have (31). (32) is obtained from the straightforward calculation of (4), (12), and (26). \qed
It follows from this lemma that, for any \( i, j \in I \),
\[
\frac{\partial X^B}{\partial N^B_i} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial N(x)}{\partial N^B_i} \begin{cases} > 0 & \text{if } x \in (X^B_j, X^B_{j+1}), \\ < 0 & \text{if } x \in (X^B_{j+1}, X^B_{j+1+1}). \end{cases}
\] (33)

This shows that the city boundary moves outward as the suburban population increases. That is, a population increase in the suburb leads to the physical expansion of the city. Furthermore, it induces higher density and land rent at any populated suburban location and lower density and land rent at any populated downtown location.

We see from this lemma that the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown commuters are uniquely determined if \( X^s_i \) and \( X^d_i \) are finite. Therefore, we make the following assumption to ensure the uniqueness of the long-run equilibrium in the suburb and downtown.

**Assumption 4.** \( H(r) < \infty \) for any \( r \geq r_A \).

Indeed, since \( X^s_i \) and \( X^d_i \) are given by (28), they are finite under Assumption 4.

In addition, the long-run equilibrium conditions (14a), (14b), (14c), and (14d) are equivalent to Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the following optimization problem:

**Lemma 5.** The spatial distribution \( [N^s_i(x)] \) (\( x \in X^s \)) of suburban commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:

\[
\max_{[N^s_i(x) \in X^s]} \int_d \left\{ \sum_{k \in I} \left[ w_k - a_k \tau x - c_k^*(N^s) + f(\frac{1}{N^s(x)}) \right] N_i(x) - r_A \right\} dx \tag{34a}
\]

\[
s.t. \quad \int_d N_i(x) dx = N^s_i \quad \forall i \in I, \quad N_i(x) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in I, \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+. \tag{34b}
\]

Furthermore, the spatial distribution \( [N^d_i(x)] \) (\( x \in X^d \)) of downtown commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it is a KKT point of the following optimization problem:

\[
\max_{[N^d_i(x) \in X^d]} \int_0^{d} \left\{ \sum_{k \in I} \left[ w_k - a_k \tau x + f(\frac{1}{N^d(x)}) \right] N_i(x) - r_A \right\} dx \tag{35a}
\]

\[
s.t. \quad \int_0^{d} N_i(x) dx = N^d_i \quad \forall i \in I, \quad N_i(x) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in I, \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+. \tag{35b}
\]

Since \( \frac{1}{N^s(x)} \) equals the lot size \( a(x) \) and \( f'(\frac{1}{N^s(x)}) \) equals the market land rent at location \( x \), the objective functions of (34) and (35) represent the total surplus \( \int \sum_{k \in I} \varphi_k(x) N_k(x) dx + \int r(x) a(x) N(x) dx \) of the suburb and the downtown, respectively. Hence, this lemma demonstrates that the land market is efficient in both the suburb and downtown, as in the traditional residential location model (Fujita, 1989). Note that since the number \( N^s \) of suburban commuters is taken as given, Lemma 5 does not indicate that the long-run equilibrium is efficient but instead shows that market failures in our model are caused only by traffic (bottleneck) congestion.

The results obtained above can be summarized as Proposition 2.

**Proposition 2.** Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4. Then, given the number \( N^s \) of suburban commuters, the long-run equilibrium suburban and downtown spatial structures have the following properties.
(i) The long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of suburban commuters and that of downtown commuters are uniquely determined.

(ii) Among commuters residing in the suburb, those with a high value of travel time reside closer to the CBD. Among commuters residing downtown, those with a high value of travel time reside closer to the CBD.

(iii) Population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward. Furthermore, it induces higher density and land rents at any populated suburban location, and lower density and land rents at any populated downtown location.

(iv) The total surplus of the suburb and that of the downtown are maximized.

3.2.2 Population of suburban and downtown commuters

We next characterize the long-run equilibrium number \( N^s = [N^s_i] \) and \( N^d = [N^d_i] \) of suburban and downtown commuters \( i \) under Assumptions 3 and 4 by using equilibrium conditions (14e) and (14f). From (28) and Lemma 4, utilities that commuters receive from residing in the suburb and downtown are given by

\[
v^s_i(N^s) = y_i - c^s_i(N^s) - \alpha_i \tau X^s_i + H(r_A) - \sum_{k=1}^l \alpha_k \tau (X^s_{k+1} - X^s_k), \tag{36a}
\]

\[
v^d_i(N^d) = y_i - \alpha_i \tau X^d_i + H(r(d) + r_A) - \sum_{k=1}^l \alpha_k \tau (X^d_{k+1} - X^d_k), \tag{36b}
\]

where \( X^s_i \) and \( X^d_i \) are represented as (28). The utility difference \( v^d_i(N^d) - v^s_i(N^s) \) is thus given by

\[
v^d_i(N^d) - v^s_i(N^s) = c^s_i(N^s) + \sum_{k=1}^l (\alpha_{k-1} - \alpha_k) \tau (X^s_k - X^d_k) + \alpha_i \tau (X^d - d) + H(r(d) + r_A) - H(r_A). \tag{37}
\]

The difference in utility of commuters with high bottleneck cost \( c^s_i(N^s) \) or small \( i \) grows. More specifically, because the utility difference satisfies

\[
\left\{ v^d_i(N^d) - v^s_i(N^s) \right\} - \left\{ v^d_{i-1}(N^d) - v^s_{i-1}(N^s) \right\} = \left\{ c^s_i(N^s) + \alpha_i \tau (X^s_i - X^d_i) \right\} - \left\{ c^s_{i-1}(N^s) + \alpha_{i-1} \tau (X^s_{i-1} - X^d_{i-1}) \right\}, \tag{38}
\]

where \( c^s_i(N^s) + \alpha_i \tau (X^s_i - X^d_i) \) denotes the commuting cost difference between suburban and downtown commuters \( i \), commuters with a large commuting cost difference have a greater utility difference. Since the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost \( c^s_i(N^s) \) is given by (20), this implies that richer or more inflexible commuters prefer to reside downtown under Assumptions 1, 3, and 4. Indeed, if rich commuters are inflexible, they reside downtown. To see this, we consider the case in which Assumption 3 and the following assumption hold.

**Assumption 5.** \( \beta_{i-1} > \beta_i \) for all \( i \in I \setminus \{1\} \).
Under Assumptions 1 and 3–5, \( c_i^{b}(N^*) < c_{i-1}^{b}(N^*) \) for any \( N^* \) and \( i \in I \backslash \{1\} \); that is, the income elasticity of commuting cost differences is positive. Thus, we have

\[
\nu_i^{b}(N^d) - \nu_i^{*}(N^*) < \nu_{i-1}^{b}(N^d) - \nu_{i-1}^{*}(N^*)
\]

for any \( N^* \) and \( i \in I \backslash \{1\} \). This implies that there exists \( i^* \in I \) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
\nu_i^{b}(N - N^*) & > \nu_i^{*}(N^*) \quad \text{for any } i < i^*, \\
\nu_i^{b}(N - N^*) & \leq \nu_i^{*}(N^*) \quad \text{if } i = i^*, \\
\nu_i^{b}(N - N^*) & < \nu_i^{*}(N^*) \quad \text{for any } i > i^*,
\end{align*}
\]

where \( N = [N_i] \) denotes the total number of commuters \( i \). Because \( \nu_i^{b}(N - N^*) - \nu_i^{*}(N^*) \) increases with an increase in \( N_i \), this condition indicates that a long-run equilibrium number \( N_i^{**} \) of suburban commuters exists uniquely and is given by

\[
N_i^{**} = 0 \quad \text{if } i < i^*,
\]

\[
N_i^{**} = N_i \quad \text{if } i > i^*,
\]

\[
N_i^{**} = \begin{cases} 
N_i & \text{if } \nu_i^{b}([N_1, \ldots, N_{i-1}, 0, 0, \ldots, 0]) < \nu_i^{*}([0, \ldots, 0, N_i, N_{i+1}, \ldots, N_I]), \\
\phi N_i & \text{otherwise},
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \phi \in [0, 1] \) is uniquely determined from

\[
\nu_i^{b}([N_1, \ldots, N_{i-1}, (1 - \phi)N_i, 0, \ldots, 0]) = \nu_i^{*}([0, \ldots, 0, \phi N_i, N_{i+1}, \ldots, N_I]).
\]

Therefore, we have the following proposition.

**Proposition 3.** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3–5. Then the long-run equilibrium number of suburban and downtown commuters is uniquely determined. Furthermore, at the long-run equilibrium, commuters with a high value of travel time reside downtown and commuters with a low value of travel time reside in the suburb.

Propositions 2 and 3 show that, under Assumptions 1 and 3–5, rich and inflexible commuters reside closer to the CBD since rich commuters have a higher commuting cost. Note that introducing Assumptions 3 and 5 implies that the income elasticity of commuting costs is positive and larger than the income elasticity of demand for land. Therefore, this result is consistent with the well-known result given by the traditional location model (Fujita, 1989).

Although we mainly focus on this type of heterogeneity to clearly demonstrate the properties of our model, in other cases, we can have different equilibrium spatial distributions of commuters. As an example, we consider the opposite case: poor commuters are highly inflexible and rich commuters are highly flexible. In this case, the bottleneck cost of poor commuters can be much higher than that of rich commuters, such that \( c_i^{b}(N^*) + \alpha_i \tau_i (X_i^e - X_i^d) > c_{i-1}^{b}(N^*) + \alpha_{i-1} \tau_i (X_i^e - X_i^d) \) for some \( N^* \) and \( i \in I \) under Assumption 3 (i.e., income elasticity of commuting cost differences is negative). This, together with (38), implies that poor commuters can reside downtown at the long-run equilibrium. This result occurs because commuters who are relatively rich but highly flexible are able to traverse the bottleneck early or late to avoid queuing congestion at a low cost. This will save them a significant amount on their lot size, with a fairly small bottleneck cost. Thus, they
prefer to do so. Likewise, commuters who are relatively poor but highly inflexible can avoid their incredibly costly traversing of the bottleneck by paying to reside downtown. Therefore, we can say that, in our model, commuters sort into residing in the suburb or downtown based on their value of travel time and their flexibility.

4 Optimal congestion toll

Studies utilizing the standard bottleneck model show that queuing time is a pure deadweight loss. Hence, in our model, there is no queue at the social optimum, and the social optimum can be achieved by imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll that eliminates queuing congestion, as shown later. This section considers the introduction of an optimal congestion toll \( p(t) \) and characterizes equilibrium under this pricing policy.

4.1 Short-run equilibrium

Congestion toll \( p(t) \) eliminates queuing congestion.\(^{14}\) Thus, the commuting cost \( c_i^t(x, t) \) of commuters \( i \) is given by

\[
c_i^t(x, t) = \begin{cases} 
  s_i(t - t^*) + a_i t x & \text{if } x \in X^d_i, \\
  c_i^{bt}(t) + a_i t x & \text{if } x \in X^b_i, \\
  c_i^{bt}(t) = p(t) + s_i(t - t^*). 
\end{cases}
\]

(43a)

Superscript \( t \) describes variables under the congestion toll. Since we consider heterogeneous commuters, congestion toll \( p(t) \) does not equal queuing time cost \( \alpha_i q(t) \) at the no-toll equilibrium and is set so that travel demand \( \sum_{i \in I} n_i^{st}(t) \) at the bottleneck equals supply (i.e., capacity) \( \mu \). Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions for suburban commuters are expressed as

\[
\begin{align*}
  c_i^{bt}(t) &= c_i^{bt*} \quad \text{if } n_i^{st}(t) > 0 \quad \forall i \in I, \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \\
  c_i^{bt}(t) &\geq c_i^{bt*} \quad \text{if } n_i^{st}(t) = 0 \\
  \sum_{i \in I} n_i^{st}(t) &= \mu \quad \text{if } p(t) > 0 \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \\
  \sum_{i \in I} n_i^{st}(t) &\leq \mu \quad \text{if } p(t) = 0 \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \\
  \int n_i^{st}(t) \, dt &= N_i^{st} \quad \forall i \in I.
\end{align*}
\]

(44a)

Condition (44a) is the no-arbitrage condition for suburban commuters’ arrival time choices. Condition (44b) denotes the bottleneck’s capacity constraints, which assure that queuing congestion is eliminated at the equilibrium. Condition (44c) provides the flow conservation for commuting demand. From these conditions, we have \( n_i^{st}(t), p(t), \) and \( c_i^{bt*} \) at the short-run equilibrium as functions of the number \( N_i^{st} \) of suburban commuters \( i \in I \).

As in the case without the congestion toll, by invoking the results of studies employing the bottleneck model, we have Lemma 6

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\(^{14}\)The tradable network permit scheme proposed by Akamatsu and Wada (2017) and Wada and Akamatsu (2013) has the same effect as the optimal congestion toll. Similar schemes have been proposed by, e.g., Verhoef et al. (1997), Yang and Wang (2011), Nie (2012), He et al. (2013), and Nie and Yin (2013).
Lemma 6 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007).

(i) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost \( c_i^{bt}(N^{at}) \) under the congestion toll is uniquely determined.

(ii) The short-run equilibrium number \([n_i^{at}(t)]\) of suburban commuters arriving at time \( t \) under the congestion toll coincides with the solution of the following linear programming problem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{\{n_i(t)\}} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \int s_i(t - t') n_i^{st}(t) \, dt \\
\text{s.t.} & \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} n_i^{st}(t) \leq \mu \quad \forall t \in \mathbb{R}, \\
& \int n_i^{st}(t) \, dt = N_i^{st} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, \quad n_i^{st}(t) \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, \; \forall t \in \mathbb{R}. \tag{45a}
\end{align*}
\]

Lemma 6 (ii) suggests that total schedule delay cost is minimized at the short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll. Note that total schedule delay cost equals total commuting cost minus total toll revenue. Hence, Lemma 6 (ii) indicates that, in the short run, the optimal congestion toll minimizes the social cost of commuting.

From equilibrium condition (44a), we have

\[ c_i^{bt}(t_i) + c_j^{bt}(t_j) \leq c_i^{bt}(t_j) + c_j^{bt}(t_i) \quad \forall t_i \in \text{supp} (n_i^{at}), \; \forall t_j \in \text{supp} (n_j^{at}), \; \forall i, j \in \mathcal{I}. \tag{46} \]

Thus, the following condition is obtained by substituting (43b) into (46): for any \( t_i \in \text{supp} (n_i^{at}), \; t_j \in \text{supp} (n_j^{at}) \), and \( i, j \in \mathcal{I} \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\left( \beta_i - \beta_j \right)(t_i - t_j) & \geq 0 \quad \text{if } \max\{t_i, t_j\} \leq t', \\
\left( \gamma_i - \gamma_j \right)(t_i - t_j) & \leq 0 \quad \text{if } \min\{t_i, t_j\} \geq t'. \tag{47a}
\end{align*}
\]

This condition indicates that early-arriving commuters arrive at the CBD in order of increasing \( \beta \) and that late-arriving commuters arrive in order of decreasing \( \gamma \) under the congestion toll. Since commuters with a high marginal time-based schedule delay cost arrive closer to their preferred arrival time at the no-toll equilibrium, imposing the congestion toll alters the arrival order of commuters.

This result and Lemmas 1 and 6 reveal that the equilibrium bottleneck cost under the congestion toll \( c_i^{bt}(N^{at}) \) generally differs from the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost \( c_i^{bt}(N^{at}) \) when we consider commuter heterogeneity in the value of travel time. Indeed, we can see that the bottleneck cost at equilibrium with tolling differs from that at the no-toll equilibrium. For this, we suppose Assumptions 1 and 5. Then equilibrium bottleneck cost \( c_i^{bt}(N^{at}) \) under the toll is obtained in the same manner as in (20).

\[ c_i^{bt}(N^{at}) = \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \left( \beta_i \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{i} N_k^{st}}{\mu} + \sum_{k=i+1}^{\tilde{I}} \beta_k \frac{N_k^{st}}{\mu} \right) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}. \tag{48} \]

This shows that inflexible commuters have higher bottleneck costs at the equilibrium under the congestion toll, which is fundamentally different from the properties of the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost.

We summarize the properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 4.

Proposition 4. The short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the following properties.
(i) **Total schedule delay cost is minimized.**

(ii) Early-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of increasing marginal early delay cost ($\beta_i$). Late-arriving commuters arrive at work in order of decreasing marginal late delay cost ($\gamma_i$).

(iii) **Equilibrium bottleneck cost** $c_{bt}^i(N^{st})$ of commuters $i$ is uniquely determined. Furthermore, under Assumptions 1 and 5, $c_{bt}^i(N^{st})$ is given by (48).

As in the case without tolling, downtown commuters arrive at $t = t^*$, as they need not traverse the bottleneck. That is, the commuting cost of downtown commuters $i$ at the short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll is given by $\alpha_i \tau x$.

### 4.2 Long-run equilibrium

We characterize the long-run equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters by using the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost. In the long-run, the difference between cases with and without tolling appears only in the indirect utility of suburban commuters. Specifically, under the congestion toll, the indirect utility $v_i^d(x)$ of suburban commuters $i$ is expressed as

$$v_i^d(x) = w_i - \alpha_i \tau x - c_{bt}^i(N^{st}) + H(r'(x) + r_A),$$

where $r'(x) + r_A$ denotes the land rent at $x$ under the congestion toll. The long-run equilibrium conditions are thus represented as (11) with the use of (49).

Following the same procedure as in Section 3.2 reveals that the urban spatial structure at the long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the same properties as those without tolling (Propositions 2 and 3).

**Proposition 5.** Suppose Assumptions 1 and 3–5. Then under the congestion toll, the long-run equilibrium has the following properties.

(i) **Spatial distributions of commuters are uniquely determined.**

(ii) **Commuters with a high value of travel time reside closer to the CBD.**

(iii) **The city boundary $X^{Bi}$, spatial distribution $N_l(x)$ of commuters, lot size $a^l(x)$, and land rent $r'(x)$ in the suburb and downtown have the same functional form as in the no-toll equilibrium (i.e., (31) and (32)).**

Note that this proposition does not suggest that the urban structure at the long-run equilibrium with tolling coincides with that at the no-toll long-run equilibrium. Indeed, imposing a congestion toll can change the number of suburban and downtown commuters since it changes the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost. Therefore, this proposition demonstrates that **differences between the long-run equilibria with and without tolling arise only when the long-run equilibrium number ($N^{st}$ and $N^{st*}$) of suburban commuters changes by tolling.** In the next section, we will show the effects of tolling on the urban spatial structure by examining differences between $N^{st}$ and $N^{st*}$.

Before studying the effects of tolling, we show that the social optimum is achieved by imposing the congestion toll. We define the social optimum as the global maximizer of commuters’ total utility subject to budget, land, bottleneck capacity, and population constraints:

$$\max_{\{n(x,t), z(x,t), a(x,t)\}} \int \int u(z(x,t), a(x,t)) n(x,t) \, dt \, dx,$$  (50a)
Proposition 6. Then we have Proposition 6.

Proof. See Appendix D

This proposition shows that the social optimum is a long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll, which indicates that market failures are caused only by bottleneck congestion in our model.

5 Effects of congestion toll on urban spatial structure

5.1 Long-run equilibria with and without tolling

This section demonstrates that imposing the congestion toll alters urban spatial structure. As discussed in the previous section, the difference between the long-run equilibria with and without tolling arises when the number of suburban and downtown commuters ($N^s$ and $N^d$) changes by imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, to examine effects of the congestion toll, we compare the number of suburban commuters at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling.

We denote the utilities of commuters $i$ residing in the suburb and downtown under the congestion toll by $v_i^s(N^s)$ and $v_i^d(N^d)$, respectively, which are derived from (14a)–(14d), with the use of (49). Then under Assumptions 3 and 4, $v_i^s(N^s)$ and $v_i^d(N^d)$ are obtained in the manner of (36):

\[
v_i^s(N^s) = y_i - c_i^s(N^s) - \alpha_i \tau X_i^s + H(r_A) - \sum_{k=i}^{L} \alpha_k \tau(X_k^s - X_k^c),
\]

\[
v_i^d(N^d) = y_i - \alpha_i \tau X_i^d + H(r^d(d) + r_A) - \sum_{k=i}^{L} \alpha_k \tau(X_k^d - X_k^c),
\]

where $X_i^s$ and $X_i^d$ are, respectively, residential locations for suburban and downtown commuters $i$ closest to the CBD, which are given by the same functional form as in the no-toll equilibrium (i.e., (28)). Thus, $v_i^s(N^s) - v_i^d(N^d)$ is represented as

\[
v_i^s(N^s) - v_i^d(N^d) = c_i^s(N^s) + \sum_{k=i+1}^{L} (\alpha_{k-1} - \alpha_k) \tau(X_k^s - X_k^c) + \alpha_i \tau(X_i^s - d) + H(r^d(d) + r_A) - H(r_A).
\]
It follows from this and (37) that
\[
\left(\nu_{\delta i}^{d*}(N^d) - \nu_{\delta i}^{s*}(N^s)\right) - \left(\nu_i^{d*}(N^d) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s)\right) = c_i^{\delta*}(N^s) - c_i^{*}(N^s) \quad \forall i \in I. \tag{53}
\]
This leads to Proposition 7.

**Proposition 7.** Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4. Then for any \(N^s\) and \(i \in I\setminus\{1\},
\[
\left(\nu_i^{\delta*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s)\right) - \left(\nu_i^{d*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s)\right)
= \left(\nu_i^{d*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s)\right) - \left(\nu_i^{d*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s)\right), \tag{54}
\]
if and only if there exists \(\delta\) such that \(c_i^{\delta*}(N^s) = c_i^{*}(N^s) + \delta\) for all \(i \in I\).

This proposition implies that the urban spatial structure does not change by imposing the congestion toll if \(c_i^{\delta*}(N^s) = c_i^{*}(N^s) + \delta\) for all \(i \in I\setminus\{1\}\). However, in general, this condition does not hold when commuters are heterogeneous in their value of travel time, as discussed in Section 4.1. This means that imposing the optimal congestion toll changes the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost and creates incentives for commuters to relocate. Unlike Arnott (1998), therefore, congestion tolling does alter the urban spatial structure in our model. It is, however, difficult to examine how the urban spatial structure changes by imposing the congestion toll. Therefore, the following subsection analyzes our model in a simple setting to elucidate the effects of tolling.

Note that the results presented thus far were obtained under the assumption that toll revenues are not redistributed. Since the optimal congestion toll minimizes the short-run social cost of traversing the bottleneck, bottleneck costs for all suburban commuters can be reduced. More specifically, if policymakers can observe the type of commuters, they can redistribute toll revenue to suburban commuters such that
\[
c_i^{\delta*}(N^s) - \rho_i(N^s) < c_i^{*}(N^s), \tag{55}
\]
where \(\rho_i(N^s)\) denotes the toll-revenue redistribution for each suburban commuter \(i\) (type-specific lump-sum rebate). Thus, under this toll-revenue redistribution \(\rho_i(N^s)\), the following condition is satisfied for any \(N^s\) and \(i \in I\):
\[
\nu_i^{d*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s) - \rho_i(N^s) < \nu_i^{d*}(N - N^s) - \nu_i^{s*}(N^s). \tag{56}
\]
This indicates that if every commuter does not relocate (i.e., in the short-run), imposing congestion toll with this toll-revenue redistribution helps all suburban commuters and hence makes residing in the suburb more desirable. Furthermore, this and (40) indicates that this toll-revenue redistribution leads to the physical expansion of the city under Assumptions 1 and 3–5.

### 5.2 A simple example

#### 5.2.1 Theoretical analysis

We consider a simple setting to show concretely the effects of the congestion toll on urban spatial structure. Specifically, we suppose that Assumptions 1–4 hold.\(^{15}\) That is, rich commuters

\(^{15}\)Note that if Assumptions 1–4 hold, the condition in Assumption 5 is also satisfied.
are assumed to have a higher marginal time-based schedule delay cost. This implies that rich commuters tend to avoid a schedule delay rather than queuing time and paying the toll.

As Hall (2015) shows, this is a situation wherein congestion tolling does not alter the arrival order of commuters and generates a Pareto improvement if every commuter does not relocate. Indeed, it follows from (20) and (48) that the difference between short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs with and without tolling is non-positive for any $N$:

$$c_i^{st}(N^s) - c_i^{st}(N^s) = \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left[ \frac{1}{\alpha_k} - \frac{1}{\alpha_k} \right] \beta_k \mu \begin{cases} = 0 & \forall i \geq \max \{\text{supp}(N^s)\}, \\ < 0 & \forall i < \max \{\text{supp}(N^s)\}. \end{cases}$$

This shows that the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost incurred by the poorest commuters does not change. This reflects the fact that the poorest commuters are the most inflexible and have the highest time-based marginal schedule delay cost. That is, commuters who face no queuing cost at the equilibrium without tolling and face no toll at the equilibrium with tolling are the poorest ones.

We see from (57) that congestion tolling weakly decreases short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs of all commuters. However, as we see later, congestion tolling cannot lead to a Pareto improvement if we consider commuters’ relocation. Moreover, rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from imposing the congestion toll.  

We first examine the effects of tolling on urban spatial structure. It follows from (53) and (57) that, for any $N^s$ and $i \in I$,

$$\begin{align*}
v_i^{st}(N - N^s) - v_i^{st}(N^s) &= v_i^{st}(N - N^s) - v_i^{st}(N) \quad \forall i \geq \max \{\text{supp}(N^s)\}, \\
v_i^{st}(N - N^s) - v_i^{st}(N^s) &< v_i^{st}(N - N^s) - v_i^{st}(N) \quad \forall i < \max \{\text{supp}(N^s)\}. 
\end{align*}$$

This clearly indicates that imposing the congestion toll can create incentives for commuters to reside in the suburb. Since the long-run equilibria with and without tolling are uniquely determined, this result leads to

$$N_i^{st*} \geq N_i^{st} \quad \forall i \in I.$$  

This implies that imposing the congestion toll can increase the suburban population. Furthermore, it follows from Propositions 2 and 4 that if there exists $i \in I$ such that $N_i^{st*} > N_i^{st}$,

$$X_i^{Bi*} < X_i^{Bi*},$$

$$N_i(x) \begin{cases} > N_i^{st}(x) & \text{if } x \in X_i^d, \\
< N_i^{st}(x) & \text{if } x \in X_i^s \cap \text{supp}(N_i^{st}), \end{cases}$$

$$r_i(x) \begin{cases} > r_i^{st}(x) & \text{if } x \in X_i^d, \\
< r_i^{st}(x) & \text{if } x \in X_i^s \cap \text{supp}(N_i^{st}), \end{cases}$$

where superscripts * and t* describe variables at the long-run equilibria without and with tolling, respectively. This indicates that the population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward

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16 As Takayama and Kuwahara (2016) shows, essentially the same conclusion is obtained if we introduce the assumption “$\beta_i/\alpha_i \leq \beta_i/\alpha_i$ for any $i \in I \setminus \{1\}”$ instead of Assumption 2.
and induces higher (lower) density and land rents at any populated suburban (downtown) location.

This finding is in contrast to the standard results (cities become denser with congestion pricing) of traditional location models, which consider static flow congestion (Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998). It also differs from the results (the urban spatial structure does not change by tolling) obtained by Arnott (1998), who considers homogeneous commuters. This thereby demonstrates that interactions among heterogeneous commuters may cause the physical expansion of the city resulting from imposition of the optimal congestion toll.

We next examine changes in commuters’ utility due to the population increase in the suburb. There exist commuters \( i \in I^R \equiv \{ i \in I | N^d i > 0 \ \text{and} \ N^s i > 0 \} \) who reside downtown at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling, and their utility changes by tolling from \( v^d_i(N - N^s) \) to \( v^d_i(N - N^s) \). Their difference is obtained from (28), (36), and (51) as

\[
v^d_i(N - N^s) - v^d_i(N - N^s) = \left[ H(r^*(0) + r_A) - H(r^*(0) + r_A) \right] + \sum_{k=2}^{N^f} (a_k - a_k) \tau \left( X^d_t^k - X^d_t^k \right).
\]  

(61)

Because \( X^d_t^k \geq X^d_t^k \) for all \( i \in I^R \) and \( r^*(0) < r^*(0) \) hold if there exists \( i \in I \) such that \( N^d_{i^*} > N^s_{i^*} \), we have \( v^d_i(N - N^s) > v^d_i(N - N^s) \) for all \( i \in I^R \). This shows that rich commuters \( i \in I^R \) gain from the population increase in the suburb.

The poorest commuters \( I \) reside farthest from the CBD at the long-run equilibria with and without tolling. Therefore, their utility difference is equal to the commuting cost difference:

\[
v^d_i(N^s) - v^d_i(N^s) = \left[ c^d_i(N^s) + \alpha_i \tau X^d_t \right] - \left[ c^d_i(N^s) + \alpha_i \tau X^d_t \right].
\]  

(62)

Furthermore, (20) and (48) yield

\[
c^d_i(N^s) - c^d_i(N^s) = \frac{\eta}{1 + \eta} \left( \sum_{k \in j} N^s_{k^*} - \sum_{k \in I} N^s_{k^*} \right).
\]  

(63)

Thus, we obtain \( v^d_i(N^s) < v^d_i(N^s) \) if there exists \( i \in I \) such that \( N^s_{i^*} > N^s_{i^*} \); that is, the population increase in the suburb harms the poorest commuters.

These results establish the following proposition.

**Proposition 8.** Suppose Assumptions 1–4. Then

(i) congestion tolling weakly decreases bottleneck costs of all commuters in the short-run and can increase the suburban population in the long-run;

(ii) the population increase in the suburb expands the city boundary outward and induces higher (lower) density and land rents at any populated suburban (downtown) location;

(iii) rich commuters \( i \in I^R \) gain and the poorest commuters \( I \) lose from the population increase in the suburb.

The results obtained in this subsection can be summarized as follows. In the short-run, congestion tolling reduces bottleneck costs of all commuters except those incurred by the poorest commuters, creating incentives for downtown commuters to reside in the suburb. Furthermore, commuters’ relocation from downtown to the suburb causes downtown rents to fall and utilities to
rise. Since rich commuters reside downtown in this case, they are made better off by congestion tolling if it leads to relocation. Since the poorest commuters reside farthest from the CBD, downtown commuters’ relocation pushes them farther out from the CBD. This, together with increased demand for traversing the bottleneck, exacerbates commuting costs (free-flow travel time cost and schedule delay cost) of the poorest commuters.

5.2.2 Numerical analysis

We numerically analyze our model and show effects of the optimal congestion toll. In this analysis, we assume \( f(a) = \kappa \ln[a] \) and use the following parameter values:

\[
I = 4, \quad d = 10 \text{ (km)}, \quad \tau = 2 \text{ (min/km)}, \quad [N_i] = [1000, 1500, 2000, 2500], \quad [y_i] = [300, 200, 150, 100], \quad \kappa = 10, \quad r_A = 200.
\]

The values of \( \alpha_i, \beta_i, \) and \( \eta \) are set to be consistent with the empirical result (Small, 1982) and Assumptions 1–4.

\[
[\alpha_i] = [0.3, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1], \quad [\beta_i] = [0.15, 0.09, 0.06, 0.03], \quad \eta = 4.
\]

We conduct comparative statics with respect to bottleneck capacity \( \mu \). The no-toll equilibrium number of commuters \( i \in I \) is presented in Figure 3. This figure shows that downtown commuters relocate to the suburb in order of decreasing \( i \) with increases in bottleneck capacity. They do so because increasing \( \mu \) reduces bottleneck cost \( c_b^*(N^s) \) of all commuters, creating incentives for downtown commuters to relocate to the suburb. This is consistent with the results presented in Section 5.2.1.

The effects of the optimal congestion toll appear in Figures 4–7. Figure 4 presents the long-run equilibrium number \( N^{\text{opt}}_i \) of suburban commuters \( i \) under the optimal congestion toll. Although this result is qualitatively the same as that at the no-toll equilibrium (Figure 3), congestion tolling changes the total number \( N^s = \sum_{i \in I} N^s_i \) of suburban commuters, as illustrated in Figure 5. Note that when \( \mu \) is small, imposition of the congestion toll does not alter \( N^s \). This occurs because for small \( \mu \), only commuters 4 reside in the suburb (i.e., commuters traversing the bottleneck

![Figure 3: Number \( N^{\text{opt}}_i \) of suburban commuters \( i \) at no-toll equilibrium](image1)

![Figure 4: Number \( N^{\text{opt}}_i \) of suburban commuters \( i \) under the optimal congestion toll](image2)
are homogeneous). Thus, congestion tolling does not affect the commuting costs of suburban commuters, as shown in Arnott (1998). Furthermore, a suburban population increase attributable to congestion tolling leads to expansion of the city boundary $X^B$, as illustrated in Figure 6. That is, imposing the optimal congestion toll causes the physical expansion of the city. Figure 7 indicates that congestion tolling reduces the utility of commuters 4 (i.e., commuters with the lowest value of time). That is, the poorest commuters lose from congestion tolling. We also see from Figures 5–7 that the difference between equilibria without and with tolling increases in two ranges of $\mu$ where $N^\ast$ is constant. This occurs because, in these ranges, increases in bottleneck capacity do not alter the suburban population at the no-toll equilibrium but increase its population at the equilibrium with tolling. These results are also consistent with those presented in Section 5.2.1.

6 Conclusion

This study has developed a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure time from home and residential locations in a monocentric city with a single bottleneck. By using the properties of the complementarity problem, we systematically examined the spatial distribution of commuters and the effects of time-varying congestion tolling. The results indicate that commuters sort themselves temporally and spatially on the basis of their value of time and their flexibility. Furthermore, imposing an optimal congestion toll alters the urban spatial
structure. This finding differs fundamentally from the results obtained by Arnott (1998), who considered homogeneous commuters. Our finding thus also suggests that interactions among heterogeneous commuters change the effects of congestion tolling.

In addition, we used a simple example to demonstrate that imposing a congestion toll without redistributing toll revenues causes the physical expansion of the city, which is opposite to the standard results of traditional location models considering static traffic flow congestion. This difference arises from the following reasons: in the traditional residential location model, imposing a congestion toll makes commuting more expensive; in our model, however, tolling eliminates the queuing congestion; hence, it can make commuting less expensive. We further show that, although congestion tolling generates a Pareto improvement in this example when commuters do not relocate, it leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters: rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from tolling. These results suggest that considering commuter heterogeneity and commuters’ residential location choice is important when we examine the efficacy of transportation policies intended to alleviate peak-period congestion.

This study made simplifying assumptions that each commuter traverses only one bottleneck and that rich commuters are more inflexible than poor commuters. Furthermore, although we considered the quasi-linear utility function, it is well known that the income elasticity of demand for land is positive. Therefore, it is important to examine the robustness of our results by analyzing a model with multiple bottlenecks, general heterogeneity, and other utility functions such as Cobb-Douglas utility. In addition, it would be valuable for future research to investigate effects of policies other than optimal congestion tolling, such as step tolls (Arnott et al., 1990a; Laih, 1994, 2004; Lindsey et al., 2012) and transportation demand management measures for alleviating traffic congestion (Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Takayama, 2015).

### A Equivalence between the bid-rent and complementarity approaches

We show that long-run equilibrium conditions (11) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach. The condition (11a) can be rewritten as

\[
\begin{align*}
N_i(x) \left\{ r(x) + r_A - \Psi_i(x, v^*_i) \right\} &= 0 \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \quad \forall_i \in I, \\
N_i(x) &\geq 0, \quad r(x) + r_A - \Psi_i(x, v^*_i) \geq 0 \quad \forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \quad \forall_i \in I. 
\end{align*}
\]  

(65a)

or equivalently,

\[
\begin{align*}
\left\{ r(x) + r_A = \Psi_i(x, v^*_i) \right\} \text{ if } N_i(x) > 0 \\
\left\{ r(x) + r_A \geq \Psi_i(x, v^*_i) \right\} \text{ if } N_i(x) = 0 
\end{align*}
\]

\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_+, \quad \forall_i \in I. 

(65b)

\(\Psi_i(x, v^*_i)\) is given by

\[
\Psi_i(x, v^*_i) = H^{-1}(v^*_i - y_i(x)), 
\]  

(66)

\[17\] Kuwahara (1990) and Akamatsu et al. (2015) have shown the properties of a bottleneck model with multiple bottlenecks.

\[18\] Liu et al. (2015) proposes a semi-analytical approach for solving an equilibrium of a bottleneck model with general heterogeneous users, which is applicable to our model.
where $H^{-1}(\cdot)$ is the inverse function of $H(\cdot)$. Furthermore, since $\max_{x_i} [y_i(x) + f_i(a(x)) - v_i^*] / a(x) = \Psi_i(x, v_i^*)$, $\Psi_i(x, v_i^*)$ can be interpreted as the bid-rent function of commuters $i$. This shows that conditions in (11b), (11c), and (65a) are the equilibrium conditions of the bid-rent approach (see, e.g., Fujita, 1989, Definition 4.2).

**B Proof of Lemma 2**

We can show that, for any $x^d, x^s \in \text{supp}(N^*)$, there is no $x^* \in (x^d, x^s)$ such that $N^*(x^*) = 0$, because the indirect utilities of suburban and downtown commuters $i$ are given by (13). Thus, we obtain Lemma 2 (i).

Differentiating the indirect utilities $v_i^d(x)$ and $v_i^s(x)$ with respect to location $x$, we have

\[
\frac{dv_i^d(x)}{dx} = \begin{cases} 
-\alpha_i \tau + h'(N_i^*)(\frac{dN_i^*(x)}{dx}) & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) \geq r_A, \\
-\alpha_i \tau & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) \leq r_A,
\end{cases}
\]

(67a)

\[
\frac{dv_i^s(x)}{dx} = \begin{cases} 
-\alpha_i \tau + h'(N_i^*)(\frac{dN_i^*(x)}{dx}) & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) \geq r_A, \\
-\alpha_i \tau & \text{if } f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) \leq r_A.
\end{cases}
\]

(67b)

Therefore, the long-run equilibrium number $N_i^*(x)$ of commuters residing at $x$ satisfies

\[
f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) \geq r_A \quad \forall x \in \text{supp}(N^*). \tag{68}
\]

Furthermore, it follows from long-run equilibrium conditions (14a) and (14c) that $N_i^*(x)$ also satisfies

\[
\begin{cases} 
f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) > r_A & \forall x \in \text{supp}(N^*) \setminus \{X^B\}, \\
f'(\frac{1}{N_i^*(x)}) = r_A.
\end{cases}
\]

(69)

This completes the proof.

**C Proof of Lemma 3**

It follows from (26) that $N(x)$ and $\frac{dN(x)}{dx}$ are given by

\[
N(x) = \begin{cases} 
h^{-1}(h(N(X^d_i)) + \alpha_i \tau (x - X_{i+1}^d)) & \text{if } x \in [X_i^d, X_{i+1}^d], \\
h^{-1}(h(N(X^s_i)) + \alpha_i \tau (x - X_{i+1}^s)) & \text{if } x \in [X_i^s, X_{i+1}^s],
\end{cases} 
\]

(70a)

\[
\frac{dN(x)}{dx} = \frac{\alpha_i \tau}{h'(N(x))} \quad \forall x \in \text{supp}(N), 
\]

(70b)

\footnote{As shown in, e.g., Fujita (1989), this maximization problem defines the bid-rent function.}
where $h^{-1}()$ is the inverse function of $h()$. Hence, the population constraints (14b) and (14d) can be rewritten as

$$N_i^p = \int_{X_i^p}^N(x) \,dx = \int_{N(X_i^p)} N(x) \frac{dx}{dN(x)} \,dN(x)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\alpha \tau} \int_{N(X_i^p)} N(x) \frac{h'(N(x))}{dN(x)} \,dN(x) = \frac{1}{\alpha \tau} \int_{N(X_i^p)} \left( \frac{1}{N(x)^2} f''(\frac{1}{N(x)}) \right) \,dN(x)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\alpha \tau} \left\{ -r(X_i^p) + r(X_i^p) \right\},$$

$$N_i^d = \int_{X_i^d}^N(x) \,dx = \frac{1}{\alpha \tau} \left\{ -r(X_i^{d+1}) + r(X_i^{d+1}) \right\}.$$  

(71a)

(71b)

Since $r(X_i^{p+1}) = r_A$ and $r(X_i^{d+1}) = r(d) + r_A$, we have Lemma 3.

## D Proof of Proposition 6

The KKT conditions of problem (50) are given by

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 n_i(x, t) \left[ u(z_i(x, t), a_i(x, t)) + \lambda \left[ w_i - z_i(x, t) - r_A a_i(x, t) - c_i(x, t) \right] - \eta(x) a_i(x, t) - \rho(t) - v_i \right] = 0 \\
 n_i(x, t) \geq 0, \quad u(z_i(x, t), a_i(x, t)) + \lambda \left[ w_i - z_i(x, t) - r_A a_i(x, t) - c_i(x, t) \right] - \eta(x) a_i(x, t) - \rho(t) - v_i \leq 0,
\end{array} \right. \quad (72a)$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 z_i(x, t) n_i(x, t)(1 - \lambda) = 0 \\
 z_i(x, t) \geq 0, \quad n_i(x, t)(1 - \lambda) \leq 0,
\end{array} \right. \quad (72b)$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 a_i(x, t) n_i(x, t) \left[ f'(a_i(x, t)) - \eta(x) - r_A \right] = 0, \\
 a_i(x, t) \geq 0, \quad n_i(x, t) \left[ f'(a_i(x, t)) - \eta(x) - r_A \right] \leq 0,
\end{array} \right. \quad (72c)$$

$$\lambda \sum_{i \in I} \int \left[ w_i - z_i(x, t) - r_A a_i(x, t) - c_i(x, t) \right] n_i(x, t) \,dt \,dx = 0$$

$$\lambda \geq 0, \quad \sum_{i \in I} \int \left[ w_i - z_i(x, t) - r_A a_i(x, t) - c_i(x, t) \right] n_i(x, t) \,dt \,dx \geq 0,$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 \eta(x) \left[ 1 - \sum_{i \in I} \int a_i(x, t) n_i(x, t) \,dt \right] = 0 \\
 \eta(x) \geq 0, \quad 1 - \sum_{i \in I} \int a_i(x, t) n_i(x, t) \,dt \geq 0,
\end{array} \right. \quad (72d)$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 \rho(t) \left[ \mu - \sum_{i \in I} \int n_i(x, t) \,dx \right] = 0 \\
 \rho(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu - \sum_{i \in I} \int n_i(x, t) \,dx \geq 0,
\end{array} \right. \quad (72e)$$

$$N_i - \int n_i(x, t) \,dx \,dt = 0, \quad v_i \geq 0,$$

(72f)

(72g)

where $\lambda$, $\eta(x)$, $\rho(t)$, and $v_i$ are Lagrange multipliers.

These conditions lead to $\lambda = 1$. It follows from this and $\lim_{a \to 0} f'(a) = \infty$ that condition (72c) can be rewritten as

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l}
 n_i(x, t) \left[ f'(a_i(x, t)) - \eta(x) - r_A \right] = 0, \\
 n_i(x, t) \geq 0, \quad f'(a_i(x, t)) - \eta(x) - r_A \leq 0.
\end{array} \right. \quad (73)$$
This condition is equivalent to
\[
\begin{cases}
  a_i(x, t) = g(\eta(x) + r_A) & \text{if } n_i(x, t) \geq 0, \\
  a_i(x, t) \geq g(\eta(x) + r_A) & \text{if } n_i(x, t) = 0.
\end{cases}
\]  

(74)

Because \( f(a) - a f'(a) \) is monotonically increasing with increases in \( a \), we can rewrite condition (72a) as
\[
\begin{cases}
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) - v_i = 0 & \text{if } n_i(x, t) \geq 0, \\
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) - v_i \leq 0 & \text{if } n_i(x, t) = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

(75)

Since this condition is separable with respect to \( t \) and \( x \), we have
\[
\begin{cases}
  c_i^r - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) = 0 & \text{if } \int n_i(x, t)dx \geq 0, \\
  c_i^r - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) \leq 0 & \text{if } \int n_i(x, t)dx = 0,
\end{cases}
\]

(76)

\[
\begin{cases}
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - c_i^r - v_i = 0 & \text{if } \int n_i(x, t)dt \geq 0, \\
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - c_i^r - v_i \leq 0 & \text{if } \int n_i(x, t)dt = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

(77)

Furthermore, conditions (72c) and (72g) can be represented as
\[
\begin{cases}
  \eta \left[ 1 - g(\eta(x) + r_A) \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} n_i(x, t) \right] = 0, \\
  \eta(x) \geq 0, \quad 1 - g(\eta(x) + r_A) \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} n_i(x, t) \geq 0,
\end{cases}
\]

(78)

\[
N_i - \int \left\{ \int n_i(x, t)dt \right\}dx = 0, \quad v_i \geq 0.
\]

(79)

Therefore, KKT conditions in (72) can be rewritten as
\[
\begin{cases}
  c_i^r - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) = 0 & \text{if } n_i(t) \geq 0, \\
  c_i^r - s_i(t - t') - \rho(t) \leq 0 & \text{if } n_i(t) = 0, \\
  \rho(t) \left[ \mu - \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} n_i(t) \right] = 0, \\
  \rho(t) \geq 0, \quad \mu - \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} n_i(t) \geq 0,
\end{cases}
\]

(80a)

\[
\int n_i(t)dt = \int_d^{\infty} N_i(x)dx,
\]

(80b)

\[
\begin{cases}
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - c_i^r - v_i = 0 & \text{if } N_i(x) \geq 0, \\
  w_i + f(g(\eta(x) + r_A) - [\eta(x) + r_A]g(\eta(x) + r_A) - \alpha_i \varepsilon x - c_i^r - v_i \leq 0 & \text{if } N_i(x) = 0.
\end{cases}
\]

(80d)

\[
\begin{cases}
  \eta \left[ 1 - g(\eta(x) + r_A) \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} N_i(x) \right] = 0, \\
  \eta(x) \geq 0, \quad 1 - g(\eta(x) + r_A) \Sigma_{i \epsilon I} N_i(x) \geq 0,
\end{cases}
\]

(80e)

\[
N_i = \int N_i(x)dx.
\]

(80f)

This proves Proposition 6.
References


